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The Paradox of Adversity: New Left Party Survival and Collapse in Latin America
Abstract
Political parties are the basic building blocks of representative democracy. They reduce
information costs for voters, enhance executive accountability, and contribute to democratic
governability by facilitating legislative organization and aggregating the interests of powerful
societal groups. Yet we continue to know relatively little about the conditions under which
strong parties form. The dominant theories of party-building are mostly based on historical
studies of the United States and Western European countries, almost all of which developed
stable party systems. Drawing on this literature, a segment of the early scholarship on
party-building in third-wave democracies optimistically took `party development' for granted,
assuming that parties would follow from democracy, cleavages, or certain electoral rules. Yet
party-building outcomes in third-wave democracies fell short of scholars' initial, optimistic
expectations. In many third-wave polities, social cleavages, attempts at electoral engineering,
and decades of democratic competition did not produce durable parties. On the other hand,
in numerous third-wave democracies, new political parties did take root. What accounts
for the variation in party-building outcomes observed across the developing world? More
generally, under what conditions does party-building succeed?
Drawing on evidence from fourteen months of interviews and archival research in Brazil,
Mexico, Peru, and Argentina, this project provides the rst systematic comparison of party-
building success and failure on the Latin American new left. It argues that most new
parties do not survive because they do not build strong organizations composed of committed
iiiactivists. As a result, they do not withstand early crises. Paradoxically, parties with strong
organizations and committed activists are more likely to form under conditions of adversity.
Oce-seekers with low access to state resources and mass media have an incentive to do
the dicult work of organization-building. Intense polarization and conict (e.g., civil war,
populist mobilization) generate committed activists by producing the higher causes that spur
individuals and groups to collective action. New party-builders are more likely to experience
this cluster of adverse conditions under authoritarian rule.
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viiChapter 1 The Paradox of Adversity: New Left Party
Party Survival and Collapse in Latin America
Political scientists rarely agree, but on the importance of political parties, they speak in
near unison. Parties play an indispensable role in representative democracy.1 They reduce
information costs for voters,2 extend politicians' time horizons,3 and contribute to democratic
governability and stability by socializing elites, aggregating the interests of powerful societal
groups, facilitating legislative organization, and enhancing executive accountability.4
Yet parties remain weak in much of the developing world. Over the last two decades, es-
tablished parties have declined or collapsed across Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the
post-Soviet world. Moreover, despite decades of competitive elections and repeated eorts
at electoral reform, relatively few new parties and party systems have taken root. Strong
1`[M]odern democracy', writes Schattschneider (1942), `is unthinkable save in terms of political parties' (1).
2By reducing information costs for voters, parties increase political participation, a central value within
normative democratic theory. On Downs' (1957) classic account, voting exacts costs to the individual, not
only in money and transportation time, but also in the time and eort required to form a preference between
candidates. Because people are busy and/or relatively uninterested in politics, they are unlikely to acquire
sucient candidate information in the absence of information shortcuts. Downs argues that parties, by
representing simple principles and policy stances, make it easier for ordinary citizens to form preferences
between numerous candidates. Hence, parties increase the likelihood that ordinary citizens will vote and
become politically active.
3By extending politicians' time horizons, parties improve long-term policy outcomes. Parties have instru-
mental value for oce-seekers, providing the money and organizational resources necessary to run successful
campaigns, and in some cases delivering a signicant portion of automatic votes from partisans in the elec-
torate (Aldrich 1995: 24-5). Yet parties, viewed as unitary actors, are more likely than individual politicians
to have long time horizons and national { as opposed to local or regional { goals, and hence to stake out
positions in favor of policies and ideas with long-term, universal benets for national populations (Levitsky
and Cameron 2003: 3).
4Parties help protect the interests of powerful societal groups, whether elites (Gibson 1996) or mass-based
civil society organizations (Collier and Collier 1991), reducing the likelihood of mass praetorianism (Hunt-
ington 1968). Parties make legislative debate more simple and ecient, unite the positions of large groups
of legislators, and sometimes unite the positions of presidents and groups of legislators, all of which increase
democratic governability (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999, Levitsky and Cameron 2003).
They act as a check on presidential power, socialize elites, and { when rmly rooted in the electorate {
reduce the likelihood that political independents will gain power. In all these ways, they help check or
prevent the emergence of major politicians who lack governing experience and a strong commitment to
democratic institutions.
1new party systems have emerged in some countries,5 but in many others they have not,6 and
in a few countries party systems have decomposed entirely.7
Party weakness has destabilized democracy. Where party systems have collapsed and not
been rebuilt, democracies have often fallen into crisis (e.g., Russia).8 In contrast, where
successful party-building has occurred, democracies have typically become consolidated (e.g.,
Brazil).9
Despite the clear importance of parties, we continue to know relatively little about the
conditions under which strong parties form. The dominant theories of party-building are
mostly based on historical studies of the United States and Western European countries,
almost all of which developed stable party systems.10 These works explore how electoral
institutions (Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994), social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), and
access to patronage (Shefter 1994) shape emerging party systems, leaving aside the more
5E.g., Brazil, El Salvador, Ghana, Taiwan.
6E.g., Ecuador, Kenya, Russia, Venezuela.
7E.g., Peru, Guatemala. S anchez (2009) calls the Guatemalan party system a party `non-system'.
8Also Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador. In 1990s Venezuela and 2000s Ecuador, party system collapse facilitated
the rise of charismatic, media-savvy `neopopulists' who won presidential elections, campaigning on their
dissociation from the party establishment and capitalizing on the popular perception of political parties
as ineectual and exclusionary (Hugo Ch avez in Venezuela, 1998; Rafael Correa in Ecuador, 2006). Upon
entering the presidency, both leaders concentrated power in the face of weak partisan opposition and
ultimately dismantled core democratic institutions (Levitsky and Loxton n.d.). Chapters Two to Three
and Chapter Seven of this book will suggest that in Brazil and Peru, the contrasting fates of new left
parties/coalitions determined subsequent democratic outcomes. Brazil's Workers' Party and Peru's United
Left coalition (IU) both formed in 1980. The PT developed within a highly inchoate party system, the
IU in a semi-institutionalized system with two major national parties (APRA, AP). Both the PT and
IU had popular mass bases, promoted distinctive programs, and quickly came to anchor the left poles of
their national party systems. The PT survived its rst decade, after which the Brazilian party system
progressed from inchoate to semi-institutionalized, and Brazil became a consolidated democracy. Hagopian
(forthcoming) identies the survival of the PT as crucial for the stabilization of Brazil's party system.
The IU collapsed in 1990, and Peru subsequently experienced party system disintegration and democratic
breakdown. Lynch (2000) identies the IU's failure by schism as a precondition for the election of anti-
system outsider, Alberto Fujimori, and the resulting collapse of Peru's party system and democracy.
9Also Ghana, Taiwan.
10Duverger 1954; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988; Kitschelt 1989; Lijphart 1994;
Shefter 1994; Aldrich 1995; Kalyvas 1996.
2fundamental question why parties take root in the rst place.
Some of the classic scholarship posits, or rests on the premise, that basic conditions such
as electoral competition, social cleavages, and certain formal institutions should give rise
to strong parties (e.g., Aldrich 1995). Drawing on this literature, a segment of the early
scholarship on party-building in third-wave democracies optimistically took `party develop-
ment' for granted, assuming that parties would follow from democracy, cleavages, or certain
electoral rules (e.g., Brader and Tucker 2001).
Yet party-building outcomes in third-wave democracies fell short of scholars' initial, op-
timistic expectations. In many third-wave polities, social cleavages, attempts at electoral
engineering, and decades of democratic competition did not produce durable parties. The
perceived failure of third-wave party-building gave rise to a reverse, pessimistic trend in the
literature on party development. Scholars began to identify contemporary impediments to
party-building, emphasizing heightened social fragmentation (Roberts 1998), programmatic
convergence around free markets and democracy (Roberts 1998), elite access to mass media
(Mainwaring and Zoco 2007), and elite access to party `substitutes' such as state resources
and business conglomerates (Hale 2006).11
Yet neither the optimistic view that parties should emerge under democracy, nor the pes-
simistic view that the era of party-building has passed, corresponds to the facts. The third-
wave party-building record presents considerable variation. On the one hand, in many new
democracies, politicians have not invested in parties, despite their supposed utility, and par-
ties have not followed from social cleavages or electoral engineering.12 On the other hand,
11See also Barndt (n.d.).
12Politicians have passed electoral reforms to create incentives for party-building in a range of third-wave
democracies, but these reforms have done little to produce strong parties. In many cases, parties have
weakened following the implementation of such reforms (e.g., Dargent and Mu noz n.d.) and some of
the most successful new parties in recent decades seem to have taken root despite prevailing electoral
institutions (Brazil's PT, PSDB, and PFL.
3in numerous third-wave democracies, new political parties have taken root.
What accounts for the variation in party-building outcomes observed across the developing
world? More generally, under what conditions does party-building succeed?
Dening new party survival
The book denes political party as a group of individuals contesting elected oce under a
common label.13 Yet the central theoretical question of the book { Under what conditions
does party-building succeed?14 { does not concern all attempts at party-building. It only
concerns major new parties and coalitions: those that, for at least one shining moment, be-
come serious electoral contenders at the national level.15 To be considered a serious national
contender, new parties do not need to win national elections, presidential or legislative. They
should, however, be in the running. More importantly, they must win enough elections { at
the congressional level, and possibly at the subnational executive and legislative levels { to
play major roles in their country's politics.
New party survival denotes medium-term electoral signicance at the national level.16 The
book examines why, among parties that seriously contend for national power, some endure
on the national stage, while others collapse. The book equates new party survival with
survival of the formative phase (Panebianco 1988), roughly the rst decade of a party's
existence. Parties that never achieve national electoral signicance do not receive attention,
independently of whether they endure the formative phase as marginal actors.
13Epstein (1967); Chhibber and Kollman (2004); Hicken (2009).
14Alternatively: `Under what conditions do new parties survive?'
15Although some coalitions do not come close to cohering, as coalition elites make no attempts to unify
the relevant constituent parties, other coalitions persist across multiple elections, and major elites actively
pursue unication under a single party label (e.g., Peru's Izquierda Unida). The book treats the latter
type of coalition as a party, recognizing that `party' may be a slight misnomer.
16For a similar denition, see Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (n.d.).
4As a nal qualication, surviving party means surviving party, not surviving politician.
Parties that depend on a charismatic national leader for down-ticket electoral success tend
to collapse or become marginal as soon as the candidate in question exits the political
stage. Thus, personalistic vehicles { even long-lasting ones (e.g., Bolivia's ADN under Hugo
Banzer) and previously institutionalized ones (e.g., Peru's APRA under Al an Garc a)17 {
are not successful parties in their own right.
The book's central theoretical question can now be restated as follows: Why do some new
parties/coalitions that become serious national contenders survive the formative phase, while
others collapse after their initial success?
New left party survival and
collapse in Latin America
Latin America's new left parties and coalitions oer an ideal setting for examining the roots
of party-building success, both in general and in third-wave polities specically. These new
left parties (tabulated below) emerged during the third wave, a period in which the vast
majority of Latin American countries shifted from military rule to democracy. At the end
of the 1970s, military regimes ruled all but a handful of Latin American countries,18 but
in a period of several years, nearly all of these regimes fell, some quickly collapsing (e.g.,
17In her analysis of party rebuilding after system collapse, Cyr (n.d.) denes party revival in terms of
presidential performance, thus scoring Peru's APRA as a successful comeback due to Al an Garc a's 2006
presidential election victory. APRA's electoral signicance, however, depends entirely on Garc a. In 2006,
APRA won 36 of 120 seats (thirty percent) in Peru's unicameral legislature. In 2011, APRA failed to
produce a successor candidate to Garc a, and the party elected four of 130 seats (three percent). These
facts indicate that APRA is no longer a successful party in its own right.
18In the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American militaries, backed by economic elites and other informal civilian
allies, toppled democratically elected governments and assumed power across the region. Latin America's
military regimes took diverse forms. Some military governments pursued statist and redistributive policies
(e.g., Peru under Velasco; Brazil's BA regime), others adopted radical neoliberal reforms (e.g., Chile's
Pinochet/BA regime), and many sought to neutralize the perceived Marxist security threat through hard
repression (e.g., all Southern Cone BA regimes).
5Argentina's Dirty War regime), others gradually liberalizing (e.g., Brazil's military regime).19
Several established opposition parties capitalized on the breakdown of authoritarian rule by
contesting national power under new democracy.20 Simultaneously, a large number of new
opposition parties { from the left, center, and right { emerged on the scene and became
serious contenders for national power. Some of these new parties, from inception, shared
the electoral arena with established parties (e.g., Mexico's PRD).21 Others were born into
systems with no established parties (e.g., Brazil's PT).22 A similar process unfolded in the
few Latin American countries that had not experienced democratic breakdown during the
1960s and 1970s (e.g. Colombia, Venezuela). In these countries, established parties that had
dominated electoral politics for decades23 began to face serious electoral competition from
newer parties.24
Scholars conventionally designate 1978 as the date of the third wave's onset in Latin Amer-
ica.25 Between 1978 and the mid-1990s, hundreds of political parties emerged and competed
in national elections in the region. A few dozen became serious national contenders, and
among these, a dozen have survived to the present.26 Of the twelve survivors, six belong
19The decline of the Soviet Union undermined military regimes on the left and right. The failure of the Soviet
model discredited the statism favored by left military governments, while the erosion of Soviet power and
inuence removed a central justication for right-wing military rule (i.e., the perceived domestic communist
threat). These challenges to authoritarian legitimacy, in combination with a region-wide debt crisis and
increased pressure for democracy from Western governments and transnational advocacy networks (Keck
and Sikkink 1998), gave rise to Latin America's third wave.
20E.g., Argentina's PJ, Chile's Socialists, Mexico's PAN, Peru's APRA, Uruguay's Blancos and Colorados.
21E.g., Argentina's UC eD e and FREPASO, Chile's UDI, RN, and PPD, Mexico's PRD, Paraguay's PEN,
Peru's IU and ML, Uruguay's FA.
22E.g., Bolivia's MAS, Brazil's PT, PFL, PSDB, El Salvador's ARENA and FMLN, Guatemala's FRG,
FDNG, and MAS, Nicaragua's FSLN.
23E.g., Venezuela's AD and COPEI, Colombia's Liberals and Conservatives.
24E.g., Venezuela's LCR and MVR/PSUV, Colombia's AD-M19 and Partido de la U.
25The third wave is conventionally dated from the mid-1970s onward globally (Huntington 1993), but from
1978 onward in Latin America (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005).
26Bolivia's Movement toward Socialism (MAS); three Brazilian parties, the Workers' Party (PT), Brazilian
Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and Liberal Front Party (PFL); three Chilean parties, the Independent
6to the left,27 placing central programmatic emphasis on the reduction of poverty and in-
equality in the economic, social, and political spheres: Bolivia's MAS, Brazil's PT, Chile's
PPD, El Salvador's FMLN, Mexico's PRD, and Nicaragua's FSLN.28 An equal number of
new left parties and coalitions collapsed after becoming serious national contenders dur-
ing the formative phase: Argentina's FREPASO, Colombia's M-19, Guatemala's MAS and
FDNG, Paraguay's PEN, and Peru's IU. Table One provides the full sample of new left
parties/coalitions born between 1978 and 1995 that received ten percent of the vote in at
least one congressional election.29 Those that have maintained the ten-percent threshold for
ve consecutive elections are treated as cases of survival, the rest as cases of collapse.
The use of legislative electoral performance, not presidential performance,30 as an indicator
of success serves to distinguish parties from personalistic vehicles, at least to the extent
possible.31 The study's operational cuto points (ten percent of vote share, ve consecutive
elections) constitute a reasonable middle ground between higher and lower alternatives that
Democratic Union (UDI), National Renewal (RN), and Party for Democracy (PPD); two El Salvadoran
parties, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and Farabundo Mart  National Liberation Front
(FMLN); Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD); Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN); and Panama's Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck
n.d.).
27(Denition from Levitsky and Roberts (2010).
28Some studies highlight distinctions between Latin America's major new left parties and coalitions. Roberts
(1998) distinguishes between the populist and organic left; Casta~ neda (2006) between two `subspecies' of
contemporary Latin American left parties and leaders, one `modern, open-minded, reformist, and in-
ternationalist' (e.g., Brazil's PT), the other `nationalist, strident, and close-minded' (e.g., Venezuela's
MVR/PSUV); Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010) between the moderate and radical (or statist) left;
and Levitsky and Roberts (2010) between left parties characterized by `concentrated' and `dispersed' au-
thority.
29No party born after 1995, including Venezuela's MVR/PSUV, has competed in enough successive congres-
sional elections to qualify as a success.
30Legislative election results may reect coattail eects, and even if they do not, independently successful
party legislators may have a fragile association with the party as such, participating out of loyalty to the
leader, or because of the electoral incentives that the leader provides.
31Some new left survivors (e.g., Bolivia's MAS) still have not experienced a leadership transition, in contrast
to others such as Brazil's PT and Mexico's PRD. If a party in the sample had maintained the ten-percent
threshold for ve consecutive elections but not survived the exit of its main leader (e.g., Bolivia's out-of-
sample ADN, led by Hugo Banzer), it would have been scored as a failure.
7do not cohere with our intuitive case-level assessments. For example, Middlebrook (2000: 4)
operationalizes party success as twenty percent of the vote in two consecutive congressional or
presidential elections, but on this measure, Argentina's meteoric new left party, FREPASO,
would qualify as a success even though it collapsed within a decade of its creation { and just
several years after becoming a serious national contender. On the other hand, if one lowered
the threshold signicantly below ten percent, one would have to treat niche or regional
parties as major contenders or even full-edged successes, as some such parties last for very
long periods.
Table 1.1: New Left Party Survival and Collapse in Latin America
Party Country Founded Outcome
FSLN Nicaragua 1979 Survival
IU Peru 1980 Collapse
PT Brazil 1982 Survival
PPD Chile 1987 Survival
AD-M19 Colombia 1989 Collapse
PRD Mexico 1989 Survival
PEN Paraguay 1991 Collapse
FMLN El Salvador 1992 Survival
MAS Guatemala 1993 Collapse
FREPASO Argentina 1994 Collapse
FDNG Guatemala 1995 Collapse
MAS Bolivia 1995 Survival
8The conundrum of new left success
The record of new left party-building in Latin America presents a conundrum. After the
third wave's onset, six new left-wing parties emerged and became institutionalized as ma-
jor national contenders. Only two solidly right-wing new parties achieved the same: El
Salvador's ARENA (est. 1981) and Chile's UDI (est. 1983).32 Judging from the regional
literature on the new left, which strikes a decidedly pessimistic tone, Latin America's new
left parties should have fared much worse.
The 1980s produced a set of challenges for left-wing party-building in Latin America. The
region's debt crisis, the implosion of its statist/protectionist economic model, and the simul-
taneous decline and collapse of the Soviet Union, gave rise to a policy consensus around free
markets, or neoliberalism, within Latin America.33 After the early 1980s, the region's left
parties paid an electoral price for promoting left economic policies, or for implementing them
once in power.34 The neoliberal consensus thus impeded left-wing programmatic dierenti-
32See Loxton n.d.
33Neoliberalism denotes a set of economic policies, primarily orthodox stabilization and structural adjust-
ment, which are usually associated with the political right and roughly conform to the Washington Con-
sensus (Williamson 1989). Orthodox stabilization encompasses scal austerity, achieved mainly through
government spending cuts, and anti-inationary monetary policy, which typically features high interest
rates on inter-bank lending. Structural adjustment entails, rst, increasing private-sector exposure to in-
ternational market competition by eliminating protective taris and lifting restrictions on foreign direct
investment (FDI) and, second, reducing the state's role in production by privatizing and deregulating
industries.
34Prior to the third wave and neoliberal turn, authoritarian regimes ruled most of Latin America, and large
segments of the political class and electorate viewed socialism as a potential alternative to the Western
capitalist model. These conditions allowed for the emergence of political parties based on fundamental
economic and regime positions, such as opposition to capitalism and support for democracy. In the 1980s
and 1990s, however, with government debt to Western lenders skyrocketing, and economic statism and
protectionism losing favor as a growth strategy, most Latin American governments turned to neoliber-
alism. In several short years, governments across the region reversed decades of statist, protectionist,
and often highly inationary economic policies and adopted the major economic reforms { privatization,
deregulation, trade liberalization, scal austerity, tight monetarism { favored by Western policymakers and
intellectuals, promoted by Western governments, necessitated by global market shifts, and in some cases
explicitly demanded by Western lenders like the IMF (Stallings 1992). As external pressures mounted and
growing numbers of left-leaning voters, technocrats, and political elites came to view hallmarks of the left's
traditional platform as infeasible or undesirable (e.g., land reform, the socialization of core industries), US-
9ation, programmatic consistency, and hence brand development (Lupu forthcoming).35
The discrediting of Marxism generated an identity crisis, and also produced new ideological
fault lines, within the Latin American left. Forced to grapple with the defeat of revolu-
tionary leftist ideas, many left-wing networks and organizations in Latin America reformed,
or renovated, their core beliefs and policy stances, accepting the basic features of the free
market and advocating a range of social and economic policies designed to smooth capital-
ism's rough edges.36 Yet revolutionary leftism did not disappear. To dierent degrees in
dierent countries, the radical left remained a potent force, and internal divisions between
radicals and moderates posed a threat to the basic ideological integrity of new left parties
and coalitions (Roberts 1998).
The decline of organized labor and rise of the informal sector37 made popular incorporation
and coalition-building more dicult for left parties. As Latin American governments aban-
doned protectionism, domestic industries folded and shrank, and industrial trade unions,
on which left parties had traditionally depended for votes and resources, folded and shrank
with them.38 The shedding of manufacturing jobs, coupled with the general unemployment
style capitalism became the `only game in town' (Linz and Stepan 1996). In the new world order of the
1980s and 1990s, however, left parties did not have authoritarian regimes to oppose and could no longer
take economic and social policy cues from the Soviet Union, as many had done for decades. Anti-capitalist
platforms tended to have limited electoral appeal, and even where left parties managed to gain electoral
traction by opposing capitalism, once in government they confronted insurmountable obstacles to sweeping
economic reform.
35In addition, the recessions, budget crises, and inationary spirals of the 1980s increased the likelihood of
weak performance for left and right governments alike (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck n.d.).
36E.g., selective nationalization, regulation, a stronger public safety net.
37The informal sector encompasses all economic activity { excluding illegal tracking { `that takes place
outside the regulatory norms of the state' (e.g., taxes, licensing, labor regulations, zoning ordinances)
(Cross 1998: ).
38By the late 1980s and 1990s, organized labor had become too small a constituency to ground a successful,
national party-building project. Brazil's Workers' Party (PT) is no exception. Unions gave the PT strength
in certain regions of Brazil (particularly S~ ao Paulo), but the PT depended on other organized constituencies
elsewhere. See Chapter Two. Moreover, the new left often could not count on the support of organized
labor, given unions' longstanding ties to established parties, especially those with classic populist origins
(Murillo 2001; Levitsky 2003).
10spikes of the debt crisis, caused an explosion of the informal sector.39 In order to reach
this ballooning, atomized social class,40 new left parties had to make dicult programmatic
adjustments. Traditional hallmarks of the left platform such as wage indexation did not
resonate with informal workers. Increasingly, left electoral success would require segmented
appeals, with politicians and parties attempting to build heterogeneous coalitions of formal
and informal workers, as well as rural laborers and middle-class groups.41 This segmentation
would necessitate a careful balancing of interests between distinct, potentially conicting
voting blocs.42
Given the formidable obstacles to left-wing party-building in contemporary Latin America,
the success of the new left, relative to the new right, merits close examination. Six major
new left parties took root, and not because the diculties highlighted by scholars did not
obtain in their cases. On the contrary, most of Latin America's new left survivors faced the
full range of diculties associated with the debt crisis, decline of communism, and neoliberal
turn.43
Mirroring the classic literature on party system development, current literature on new left
39Informal workers became the largest social class in many Latin American countries, including Brazil and
Mexico, the two most populous countries in the region (Haber 2008).
40Informal workers tended to exhibit weaker collective identities than their counterparts in organized labor,
and the geographical dispersion of informal workers often prevented the creation of sectoral and cross-sector
associations (Roberts 1998). Thus, although specic sectors of the informal working class occasionally
became unionized (e.g., street vendors in Mexico City (Cross 1998)), most did not do so, and there was
virtually no cross-sectoral unionization. For a discussion of informalization and collective action, see
Roberts (1998: 63-73).
41Although left parties in Latin America had long possessed `uid, diverse' constituencies, especially relative
to their Western European labor-based counterparts, neoliberal-era deindustrialization amplied these
characteristics. The `downsizing' of organized labor and the rapid growth of the heterogeneous informal
sector fragmented the left's potential activist and voter bases. Whereas classic populist parties in Latin
America had relied on a central support base (organized labor), the new left could not `be dened by its
appeal to a core social constituency' (Levitsky and Roberts 2010).
42See Luna (n.d.); Bruhn (1998).
43I.e., Brazil's PT, El Salvador's FMLN, Mexico's PRD, Nicaragua's FSLN (see Chapters Two through Five
and Chapter 8). Moreover, numerous new left parties that collapsed arguably faced less extreme versions
of these diculties (e.g., Argentina's FREPASO, Colombia's AD-M19).
11parties in Latin America focuses disproportionately on successful cases, or cases of survival.
While book-length analyses of new left survivors number in the hundreds,44 book-length
analyses of new left failures number in the single digits.45 In addition, most books and
articles on failed cases were published before the parties in question had fully collapsed46
or even begun to collapse.47 These non-retrospective analyses typically assumed, explicitly
or implicitly, that the relevant parties would survive.48 Many studies of new left survivors
highlight variables (e.g., institutional variables) that also obtain for failed new left parties
and hence cannot account for variation.49 Other analyses of new left survivors leave out or
bury variables that do help explain variation, such as mass media access50 and the party
leader's internal network ties.51 Without giving attention to cases of party-building failure,
we cannot understand the causes of party-building success.52
44E.g., Keck (1992); Coppedge (1994); Bruhn (1998); Roberts (1998); Loaeza (1999); Borjas (2003); Wood
(2003); Chavez and Goldfrank (2004); Van Cott (2005); Casta~ neda and Morales (2007); Greene (2007);
Ortega (2008); Wuhs (2008); Hunter (2010); Kitschelt et al. (2010); Levitsky and Roberts (2010); Mart nez
Gonz alez (2010); Ribeiro (2010); Goldfrank (2011); Secco (2011); Mossige (2013); Rodr guez (n.d.).
45Retrospective book-length studies of failed cases include Herrera (2002) and Adrianz en ed. (2011) on
Peru's IU and Valenzuela (2003) on Argentina's FREPASO.
46E.g., L opez-Maya (1997) on Venezuela's LCR; Boudon 1997 on the LCR and Colombia's AD M19.
47E.g., Novaro and Palermo 1998 on Argentina's FREPASO.
48L opez-Maya 1997, Novaro and Palermo 1998.
49Ribeiro (2010), for example, attributes the early PT's cohesion, in part, to the implementation of full pro-
portional representation in the National Executive Committee roughly a decade after the party's founding.
Yet Peru's United Left coalition (IU) split apart despite having full proportional representation in the
National Leadership Council (CDN) from its founding onward. For details, see Chapters Three and Seven.
50See Chapters Two through Six.
51See Chapters Three, Five, and Seven.
52In the last two decades, political scientists have devoted increased attention to methodological problems
associated with small-n, qualitative research (Munck 1998). One strand of this literature focuses on theory
development (Mahoney 2005), and within this strand, authors have focused in particular on the problem
of poor case selection. Critics argue that small-n qualitative researchers are prone to selection bias and, in
particular, to `selecting on the dependent variable', or examining cases with the same value or similar values
on the outcome of interest (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Achen and Snidal 1989; Geddes 2003). From
the perspective of large-n, statistical research, selection on the dependent variable prevents researchers from
identifying the independent variables and interactions that vary systematically with change in the value
of the dependent variable. This limits the extent to which qualitative researchers, in cross-case studies,
can make valid causal inferences. According to Barbara Geddes, for example, selection on the dependent
12Moreover, the reliance on single- and two-case studies, as opposed to medium-n studies,
has led scholars to provide descriptive, laundry-list accounts, or to emphasize explanatory
factors that do not travel across successful cases (e.g., electoral laws,53 internal democracy54).
Small-n studies are also biased toward voluntarism, often assigning inordinate weight to the
contingent choices of party leaders.55
In short, selection on the dependent variable has caused new left scholars to present unper-
suasive arguments or underemphasize key explanatory variables. In turn, small-n research
designs have biased analyses toward voluntarism and, more generally, prevented scholars
from identifying explanatory variables common across cases of success.
Theories of party-building
In recent years, a growing group of scholars has seized on empirical variation in third-wave
party systems, or reexamined variation in the traditional party systems of the West, in order
variable has tainted the ndings of many classic cross-case, small-n, qualitative studies on topics such as
economic development and revolution (Geddes 2003). In response to this critique, some have argued that
the value of qualitative research (e.g., the in-depth tracing of complex causal processes) does not require
variation on the dependent variable (Hall 2007). Others have promoted qualitative methods intended to
solve the problem of poor case selection. For a review of these methods, see Mahoney (2005).
53Scholars of Brazil's PT and Mexico's PRD, for example, have emphasized the role of electoral institutions,
particularly legal registration requirements, in the successful organizational development of both parties
(Keck 1992; Ribeiro 2010; Rodr guez n.d.). Keck (1992) writes, for example, that the `legal requirements
of the new party law passed in 1979 had a crucial impact on the structure of the Workers' Party and on its
eorts to become an internally democratic mass membership party' (86). Yet other new left successes (e.g.,
Nicaragua's FSLN, El Salvador's FMLN, Bolivia's MAS), and even some failures (Peru's IU, Venezuela's
LCR), built strong organizations in the absence of comparable registration requirements.
54PT scholars and members frequently identify the party's vibrant, base-level participatory democracy as
crucial to the party's early success. Most new left successes in Latin America, did not have comparable
institutions of participation and debate at the base level during early development. For details, see Chapters
Two through Five and Chapter Eight.
55Scholars have partially attributed the success of Mexico's PRD to the charismatic leadership of Cuauht emoc
C ardenas (Borjas 2003) and the success of Brazil's PT to leader Lula da Silva's charismatic leadership,
promotion of internal democracy, and emphasis on organization-building (Hilgers 2008; Hunter 2010).
Others have retrospectively linked FREPASO's collapse to Carlos `Chacho'  Alvarez's insistence on rapid
electoral growth (Abal Medina 2009), the AD-M19's failure to party leader Antonio Navarro's inattention
to organization-building (Boudon 2001; see also Garc a et al. 2008), the fracturing of Venezuela's LCR to
founder Alfredo Maneiro's unexpected death in 1982 (L opez-Maya 1997), and the disintegration of the IU,
in part, to coalition leader Alfonso Barrantes's aloofness (Roberts 1998).
13to generate and test new theories of party-building.56 To what extent do these theories,
almost all based on non-Latin American cases, shed light on new left party survival and
collapse in Latin America?
Institutions and party-building
Literature examining the impact of formal institutions on party development has multiplied
in recent decades. Several key perspectives have emerged from this literature. One strand
argues that low legal barriers to entry facilitate the creation, or emergence, of new parties
(Moser 1999, 2001; Van Cott 2005). On this account, low thresholds for party registry,
ballot access, and electoral representation facilitate party formation by enabling new parties
to establish a toehold in the political system.57
Another strand links low party system fragmentation to centralizing political institutions.
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) argue that in vertically centralized polities,58 voters do
not reward subnational governments for policy outcomes, and subnational elites thus ag-
gregate nationally on pain of electoral marginality (e.g., the US).59 Building on Chhibber
and Kollman, Allen Hicken argues that party system fragmentation decreases in horizon-
tally centralized political systems, where elites have incentives to coordinate with each other
across subnational units. Hicken (2006, 2009) attributes the recent, precipitous decrease in
56Kitschelt (1989); Kalyvas (1996); Chhibber and Kollman (2004); Hale (2006); Hicken (2009); Hanson
(2010); Samuels and Shugart (2010); LeBas (2011); Arriola (2013); Riedl (forthcoming).
57Moser (1999, 2001) nds, for example, that proportional representation systems ease party-building by
blocking outsider candidates and hence making it easier for new parties to elect a critical mass of national
legislators. Van Cott (2005) argues that low electoral, nancial, and infrastructural barriers have facilitated
ethnic party formation in Latin American countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador, and that high thresholds
have prevented ethnic party formation in Peru.
58I.e., Weakly federalized polities.
59Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) argue that regional parties tend to proliferate in more federal (vertically
decentralized) polities such as contemporary India and Canada. Other accounts suggest, however, that by
giving subnational governments policy autonomy and control of state resources, federal systems facilitate
party-building by helping nascent parties consolidate at the local and regional levels and scale up from
there (Holland n.d.).
14Thailand's eective number of national parties to the country's 1997 constitutional reforms,
which imposed strict penalties for party-switching and created incentives for parliamentary
coordination through the implementation of mixed-member proportional representation.60
He contrasts Thailand with the Philippines, where the party system fragmented after Presi-
dent Marcos' 1986 ouster and the passage of reforms weakening the national executive (e.g.,
the presidential reelection ban).61
A nal strand of the institutionalist literature, represented by Samuels and Shugart (2010),
suggests that presidential systems impede party-building. According to Samuels and Shugart,
presidential systems weaken parties by giving substantial patronage access and policy inu-
ence to presidents, who are not subject to removal by the legislature or, it follows, from their
own party (assuming they belong to one). Parties in presidential systems thus tend to be
less disciplined, as the executive and legislative wings may clash, and also less autonomous,
given their inability to hold the executive branch accountable. For these reasons, presidential
systems reduce elite incentives for party-building.
Their merits notwithstanding, the above institutionalist arguments possess two main limi-
tations for the purposes of the present analysis. First, most of them do not strictly concern
new party survival, instead examining the causes of new party emergence (Moser 1999, 2001;
Van Cott 2005), or of variation in the number of national parties (Chhibber and Kollman
2004; Hicken 2009). Second, and more importantly, in contemporary Latin America, the key
variables highlighted in existing institutionalist theories either do not vary across diverse
60Thailand's party system fragmentation decreased precipitously in the late 1990s and 2000s. The PTP
(formerly PPP) was born in 1998 and is now the country's leading national party. In the 1997 constitution,
party-switching penalties included laws prohibiting cabinet members from returning to the legislature and
laws lengthening the period required to join a new party. The mixed-member PR system, modeled on
Germany's, stipulated that 4/5 of lower-house candidates run in single-member districts.
61Hicken's analysis centers on the presidential reelection ban, which discouraged presidents from investing
in parties and, by eliminating incumbency, weakened the incentive for internal and external challengers to
coalesce around the president or a single opposition candidate.
15party systems, or appear to distribute randomly across them. Every new left party in Latin
America, successful or failed, developed in a presidential system with full or mixed-member
proportional representation.62 New left parties have succeeded in both federal (e.g., Brazil,
Mexico) and unitary systems (e.g., Chile, El Salvador, Uruguay), in systems with both high
(e.g., Brazil, Mexico) and relatively low barriers to entry (e.g., Bolivia), and in systems with
electoral rules considered inimical to horizontal centralization (e.g., Brazil).63 Equally, new
left parties have failed in a wide range of institutional contexts (e.g., Argentina, Colombia,
Peru, Guatemala).64
Access to resources and party-building
A second approach attributes party-building outcomes to variation in access to resources
(i.e., patronage and nance). Most scholars within this approach hold, straightforwardly,
that access to patronage, public nance, or private nance facilitates party-building. Shefter
(1994) shows, for example, that the founders of the United States' Democratic and Repub-
lican Parties used state patronage to mobilize their supporters and construct national party
organizations. Chandra (2004) nds that India's ethnic parties succeeded where they had
enough state patronage at their disposal to attract elites within their ethnic group. Bruhn
(n.d.) identies an association between public nance and party system institutionalization
in Latin America.65 Along complementary lines, several scholars have argued that low ac-
62Mexico's PRD and Venezuela's LCR, a shadow case covered in the conclusion, developed under mixed-
member PR. The rest developed under full PR.
63On the latter point, see Mainwaring (1999).
64It should also be noted that, according to a sizable body of scholarship, electoral institutions in third-
wave democracies are often endogenous to deeper, structural factors such as authoritarian incumbent
strength during the transition. See, for example, Stepan (1988); Garret on (1995); Linz and Stepan (1996);
Ahmed (2010); Riedl (forthcoming). Riedl (forthcoming) nds that during democratic transitions in sub-
Saharan Africa, strong authoritarian incumbents (e.g., in Ghana, Senegal) imposed electoral rules that
`[forced]...aggregation into fewer eective parties, and polarization into discrete incumbent and opposition
camps' (viii). Where outgoing regimes were too weak to impose such rules (e.g., Zambia, Benin), party
systems remained fragmented.
65Bruhn also argues, more specically, that access to Mexico's generous public party fund enabled the new
16cess to state resources impedes party-building (e.g., Fish 2005).66 Arriola (2013) focuses
on private nance, arguing that nancial liberalization has facilitated multiethnic coalition-
building in sub-Saharan Africa by giving opposition politicians access to business capital
and, consequently, the capacity to `purchase cross-ethnic endorsements' (183).67
Others hold, however, that access to resources, especially state resources, actually impedes
party-building. In his analysis of party non-formation in post-Soviet Russia, Hale (2006) nds
that federal and provincial politicians have systematically used the state { and, to a lesser
extent, business { as a `substitute' for parties. Hale observes that investing in parties would
require Russian political elites to sacrice resources and autonomy without the guarantee of
a worthwhile personal return, electorally or materially. Rather than investing in traditional
party organization, these elites have sought to maintain their electoral clout by mobilizing
their bureaucratic efdoms for electoral campaigns and tapping both government agencies
and corporations for money and candidate allies.68 Hale's analysis appears to travel to other
inchoate third-wave party systems (e.g., Belarus, Ukraine, Peru), where politicians in power
have eschewed party-building once in oce, instead selecting candidates from within the
government apparatus and deploying government workers to perform the functions often
reserved for party activists.69
left PRD to nance national campaigns and sustain a national party organization.
66Fish (2005) argues that robust political parties did not emerge in post-Soviet Russia, in part, because
the state monopolized property, employment, and industry, and would-be opposition parties thus faced
an overwhelming material disadvantage. Dargent and Mu~ noz (n.d.) identify reforms depriving regional
barons of access to patronage as a key impediment to party-building in contemporary Colombia.
67Also see Luna (2010), who nds that access to private nance enabled Chile's new right UDI to engage in
private clientelism and thus to shore up support among the informal urban poor during early development.
68Along similar lines, Reuter and Remington (2009) observe that in 1990s Russia, governors who controlled
powerful provincial machines refused to give up their resources and autonomy to a national party with an
uncertain future.
69E.g., Presidents Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine, Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, Alberto Fujimori of Peru,
and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines (Smith 2005: 447), and the leaders of the West African party-
states (Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali) (Zolberg 1985: 94). In Peru during the 1990s, Alberto
Fujimori made heavy use of his allies within the national security establishment, deploying the armed
17Although the above scholars appear to dier on whether access to resources facilitates or
hinders party-building, their arguments can be reconciled. Patronage and nance have a
double-edged eect on party-building: access to these resources weakens incentives but in-
creases the capacity for party-building. Thus, it is relatively uncommon for politicians in
power to invest in new parties, but when they do invest in new parties,70 the state resources
at their disposal can provide the means. Moreover, although an initial period in the oppo-
sition is usually necessary in order for oce-seekers to invest in parties (about which more
later), once a party become institutionalized and wins major positions of power, state pa-
tronage and public nance usually facilitate organizational expansion (Levitsky, Loxton, and
Van Dyck n.d.).71
Most institutionalized parties initially develop with little access to patronage and nance.
Indeed, every new left survivor in Latin America save Chile's PPD spent its formative years
in the opposition, with scarce access to state and nancial resources. If patronage and nance
do not fuel and sustain new parties, what does?
Ideology and party-building
In an important new study, Stephen Hanson posits that strong ideologies are necessary to
sustain collective action and produce durable parties: `no ideologies, no parties' (Hanson
2010: xv). Hanson argues that French Republicanism, Soviet Communism, and German
National Socialism all facilitated party-building by providing politicians and activists with
forces for his electoral ground campaigns and tapping the National Intelligence Service for funds and
candidates.
70Politicians in power often, or even typically, invest in new parties for non-electoral purposes like mass
mobilization or defense from a perceived threat. See Huntington (1968); Shefter (1994); Smith (2005);
Roberts (2006).
71There are multiple examples of parties that initially developed in the opposition, built grassroots organi-
zations, and, after winning major positions of power decades into their existence, used the state funds and
administrative resources at their disposal to continue investing in territorial organization (e.g., Brazil's PT
in the 2000s). See Van Dyck (2014); Van Dyck and Montero (n.d.).
18a single, higher cause to coordinate around. These ideologies, on Hansons' account, gave
members `long-term visions of the political future' (xxvi) that trumped their short-term
electoral or material ambitions and hence `articially [elongated]' their time horizons (30).
In all three cases, party elites and activists committed to electorally uncertain, poorly re-
sourced party-building projects and stuck it out through thick and thin. Hanson uses the
same framework to explain party-building failure in post-Soviet Russia. Largely due to the
decline of communism, he argues, contemporary Russian parties lack strong ideologies and,
consequently, have not managed to sustain elite and activist commitment.
While Hanson (2010) makes an important contribution by showing that ideological convic-
tions can extend members' time horizons and fuel activist commitment,72 his argument { `no
ideologies, no parties' { cannot explain most (or perhaps any) cases of survival among Latin
America's new left parties. Although these surviving parties were clearly located on the left
of the ideological spectrum, they did not have party ideologies  a la the Communists in Russia
or Nazis in Germany. On the contrary, given their need to build bridges across dierent left
movements and organizations, and given the global backdrop of communism's decline and
collapse, most of these parties, initially, were left fronts. The FSLN, FMLN, FA, PT, and
72Hanson (2010) states that ideology `allow(s) partisans to sustain collective action in the initial phases
of party-building' (xxii). Ideological convictions, on Hanson's account, lengthen party members' time
horizons by providing them with `clear and consistent visions of the political future'. These visions `can
articially elongate the time horizons of those who join their cause, making it rational for them to forgo
their short-term individual interests in favor of pursuing the long-term benets available to early converts
in the event of an ideological movement's ultimate victory' (ibid., xi). Especially under `chaotic social
conditions', `ideologues will usually be the only political entrepreneurs capable of mobilizing large-scale
networks of committed activists'. This is because political `pragmatists', `whose political positions...shift
quickly along with the rapidly changing political circumstances', will be especially unlikely to sustain
long-term commitment to any particular political strategy (ix and p. 79). Thus, `ideological parties in
turbulent new democracies tend to emerge as the winners in a process of `social selection' that eliminates
their nonideological competitors, which are relatively more vulnerable to the free-rider problem' (ibid.:
62). To support his theory, Hanson attempts to show that in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany,
and post-Soviet Russia { all contexts of relative social chaos { parties with stronger ideologies (e.g.,
France's republican party, Germany's National Socialist Party, Russia's Communists) were more likely
than pragmatic parties (e.g., France's Orleanists and Bonapartists, German liberal parties, and a multitude
of new Russian parties) to build networks of committed activists.
19PRD all brought together a range of conicting left ideologies spanning orthodox Marxism
and pro-capitalist social democracy. Each contained major divisions between moderates and
radicals throughout the formative phase. It was not a shared ideology that fueled collective
action in these parties.73
In sum, existing theories of party-building oer valuable insights but cannot explain new left
party survival and collapse in Latin America. The remainder of the chapter will present the
book's theory of new party survival and failure and set the stage for the coming empirical
chapters.
The fragile formative phase
The formative phase is a critical period, or a hump that new parties must get over in order
to achieve institutionalization.74 In Latin America, the vast majority of parties that emerged
after the third wave's onset failed within a decade of their creation. Among the parties that
survived the formative years, however, nearly all have become institutionalized, surviving to
the present day. On the new left, all six major parties that survived the rst fteen years
have survived until the present and remain serious national contenders,75 some lasting for
73Hanson identies `the discrediting of Marxism-Leninism' as an impediment to the creation of successful
parties in post-Soviet Russia (xv), but a similar discrediting of Marxism { and the resulting elimination
of the perceived communist threat { did not prevent left (Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD) and anti-left (e.g.,
Chile's UDI, El Salvador's ARENA) parties from taking root in Latin America and other third-wave
regions.
74One might call the formative phase a critical juncture, or a relatively short period during which varying
conditions across one's units of observations have important long-term consequences. Critical junctures
vary in duration, and the key antecedent conditions during critical junctures range from contingent choices
by powerful individuals to structural conditions over which individuals have little control (Collier and
Collier 1991: 27). The formative phase of party development is relatively long in duration (ve to fteen
years), and the formative-phase conditions for new party survival and failure, elaborated above, are primar-
ily structural (i.e., polarization, low access to state resources and mass media, high access to preexisting
organizations).
75Bolivia's MAS, Brazil's PT, Chile's PPD, El Salvador's FMLN, Mexico's PRD, Nicaragua's FSLN.
20over thirty years.76 In short, the question why only some parties become institutionalized
largely reduces to the question why only some parties survive the formative years.
Almost without exception, party institutionalization requires the establishment of a success-
ful party brand, or label. Many institutionalized political parties owe their electoral success,
cohesion, and durability, almost completely, to their brand. Very few parties, however, are
born with a successful brand. While a small subset of new parties do start with strong
national brands and electoral bases due to their prior organizational histories,77 most new
parties must rst develop their brands by dierentiating themselves78 from other national
parties and politicians and, crucially, demonstrating consistency over some period of time.79
It follows that during the formative phase, most political parties are still in the process of
growing and consolidating their brands.80
As new parties seek to build up and nail down a partisan constituency in the electorate, they
almost invariably face electoral disappointments and even crises. New party survival usually
depends, thus, on the capacity to overcome these challenges. Grzymala-Busse (2011) has
distinguished between regime duration, or longevity, and regime durability, or the capacity to
withstand crisis. The book similarly distinguishes between new party survival (i.e., duration,
or longevity) and new party durability. New parties tend to fail not because they face crisis,
but because they have a low capacity to withstand the setbacks that new parties, survivors
76FMLN, PT.
77These include authoritarian successor parties such as El Salvador's ARENA and Chile's UDI (Loxton n.d.)
and insurgent successor parties such as El Salvador's FMLN and Nicaragua's FSLN (Holland n.d.). See
also Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (n.d.).
78They can dierentiate themselves through distinctive policy proposals (Lupu forthcoming), sociocultural
associations (Ostiguy 2009), mass party structures (Samuels and Zucco n.d.), and more.
79The dierentiation/consistency framework comes from Lupu (forthcoming).
80Given the importance of dierentiation, it is not a coincidence that almost every successful new party in
Latin America began with a solidly left (Brazil's PT, Uruguay's FA, El Salvador's FMLN, Mexico's PRD)
or right (Chile's UDI, El Salvador's ARENA) program. For a lucid theoretical account of dierentiation,
consistency, and brand development, see Lupu (forthcoming).
21and failures alike, often face. The theory presented below seeks to explain, fundamentally,
why some new parties but not others are equipped to survive crisis.
The paradox of adversity: a theory
of new party survival and collapse
Under what conditions do new parties survive? One might suppose that new parties with na-
tional ambitions would benet from access to state resources and broadcast media. Equally,
one might think that new parties would fare best in political atmospheres free of violent
conict and destabilizing mass mobilizations. This book presents the opposite argument.
Favorable conditions do not give rise to durable parties. On the contrary, adverse conditions
are critical for party-building. Most new parties collapse because they do not have strong
organizations with committed activists and, consequently, are ill-equipped to rebound from
early electoral crisis. Paradoxically, new parties with strong organizations and committed
activists are most likely to emerge under conditions of adversity.
Conditions for organizational strength
Organizational strength denotes a mass membership and extensive local infrastructure of
party branches and nuclei.81 In a few historical cases, party organizations have encapsulated
their bases, structuring members' daily lives and personal identities through the sponsorship
and organization of everyday activities and the development of distinctive party subcultures
(e.g., Europe's early labor and confessional parties).82 In the contemporary era, strong par-
ties tend to build fewer base-level oces, recruit fewer activists, and play a smaller role in
81Some have dened organizational strength as the `routinization of rules and procedures' within the party
organization (Levitsky 2003, Krasner 1988, North 1990, Knight 1992), or the extent to which the party
organization's members accept the formal and informal rules governing internal decision-making. Others
have dened the concept in terms of value infusion, or the degree to which party members value the
perpetuation of the party for its own sake, not as a vehicle for the achievement of some separate goal (e.g.,
economic equality, a particular candidate's election) (Levitsky 2003, Huntington 1968).
82The mass labor and confessional parties of turn-of-the-century Europe structured millions of members' daily
22structuring members' day-to-day lives. Still, they continue to have substantial local infras-
tructures, large activist networks and memberships, and even medium-sized core electorates
(Levitsky 2003: 13).
Strong organizations deliver votes through several potential mechanisms. First, they facili-
tate large-scale, on-the-ground electoral mobilization. Party foot soldiers can do campaign
work, organizing rallies, going door to door, distributing written information, and transport-
ing individuals to polling booths, while local party oces can provide nancial, material
and logistical support for these campaign activities. Second, grassroots organizations and
activists on the ground can help parties disseminate their brand and develop long-term parti-
sans.83 Third, territorial organization facilitates the capture of subnational oce, which, by
allowing parties to gain experience in (and demonstrate a capacity for) government, can con-
tribute to their longer-term success.84 Fourth, party elites can channel patronage resources
more eciently through party activists (Levitsky 2003; Zarazaga n.d.).85
Building a strong party organization is laborious, time-consuming, and for party leaders,
autonomy-reducing. To begin, top party leaders and local organizers must recruit and for-
mally incorporate large numbers of members and activists. Then, top elites, local leaders,
and local activists must house, equip, and sta local oces, establish vertical and horizontal
lines of communication across party organs, institutionalize formal or informal mechanisms
lives and personal identities, creating entire party subcultures and sponsoring and organizing members'
everyday activities (e.g., youth leagues, women's groups, sporting clubs, picnics, etc.). See Wellhofer 1979;
Sartori 1968; Farneti 1973; Katz 1990; Kalyvas 1996.
83See Samuels and Zucco (n.d.)
84See Holland (n.d.).
85Party organizations, in some cases, may provide electorally valuable `legitimacy benets' as well (Scarrow
1996: 42). A party's membership statistics may be widely disseminated via mass media; a large membership
may act as an eective symbolic representation of a party's existing or target constituencies; a vibrant
internal life may enhance perceptions in the wider electorate that the party in question is broad-based,
participatory, and internally democratic; in all these ways, a strong organization can make a party more
appealing to undecided voters, thus strengthening its electoral performance (Scarrow 1996: 42). (The
content in this footnote is repeated, with minor adjustments, in Van Dyck (2014).
23for collective decision-making and conict resolution, and secure nancing for physical in-
frastructure, communication systems, transportation, and sta salaries, often through mem-
bership dues and small donations. These processes take time and, at all levels, require large
amounts of volunteer work and the donation and pooling of individual and group resources.
As Kalyvas (1996) observes, organization-building `does not come naturally or automati-
cally to political actors. It is a dicult, time-consuming, costly, and often risky enterprise'
(41). Crucially, electoral progress based on organization-building occurs slowly. Large ac-
tivist bases diminish elite nimbleness and autonomy, imposing procedural constraints and
demanding ideological stances that inhibit rapid electoral growth (Kitschelt 1994: 225).
Oce-seekers only have an electoral incentive to invest in organization if they cannot win
oce via lower-cost routes, or routes that require less sacrice in time, labor, and autonomy.
Two such routes are (1) the distribution and mobilization of state resources and institutions
(Hale 2006) and (2) mass media appeals. Consequently, the adverse and relatively rare
combination of low access to the state and low access to mass media creates an electoral
incentive for oce-seekers to invest in party organization.
State, media, and incentives
for party organization
As noted earlier, in reference to Hale (2006), politicians in power have incentives to use the
state for electoral purposes rather than undertaking the costly, autonomy-reducing work of
party-building. To date, however, few scholars have focused on the positive implications
of this insight for party-building. Simply put, because access to state resources weakens
incentives for party-building, low access to state resources strengthens incentives for party-
building, other things equal. For oce-seekers, an extended period in the opposition actually
serves as a blessing in disguise. In the political wilderness, individuals cannot tap state coers
and institutions for candidates and campaigners. Eectively, they lack access to a major
24party substitute { one which has prevented politicians from building parties in numerous
third-wave countries.
In the contemporary era, oce-seekers without access to the state often do not need base-
level organization in order to obtain a mass following.86 Given the broad penetration of
television and radio in most countries today, media-savvy political entrepreneurs can win
major elections, including presidential elections, through mass media appeals, with little or
no party organization behind them.87 Moreover, they can do so almost instantaneously, with
great autonomy, and with minimal eort or resources.88
The rise of broadcast media has reduced elite incentives89 for party-building and, conse-
quently, weakened or prevented the emergence of strong parties in many present-day poli-
ties.90 Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) nd that contemporary party systems are more volatile
86In addition, in the contemporary period, high access to the state typically brings regular and extensive
broadcast media coverage. Thus, state-originated parties and candidates often use broadcast media to
maintain and build electoral support.
87Hale (2006) makes this observation succinctly: `In the era of mass communications and widespread media,
it is entirely possible for a party to win oce almost solely on the basis of ideational capital' (i.e., without
patronage or organization) (14).
88Levitsky and Cameron (2003) state that `contemporary politicians may reach millions of voters through
television and may do so more quickly and at lower cost (in terms of human and organizational resources)
than through party organizations' (24).
89Mass media also change ordinary citizens' incentives. In the age of widespread media use, party membership
has become less essential for individuals seeking political information or channels of communication with
elites. Further, there is evidence that broadcast media consumption causes individuals to disengage from
civil society (e.g., local party organizations) (Putnam 1995: 678-80). Katz (1990) nds evidence of these
eects, identifying a strong inverse relationship between individuals' TV/radio consumption and party
membership (157).
90This argument should not be overstated. The growth of mass media has not entirely eliminated electoral
incentives for organization-building (Van Dyck n.d.). Party organization continues to give parties an
important advantage in local elections, where mass media campaigns tend to be less cost-eective and
more logistically dicult: `(t)elevision debates and advertisements are more easily planned (and, in the
case of paid advertising, cheaper to produce) the fewer the locally based interests to which special appeals
have to be made' (Ware 1992: 74). Moreover, in larger elections, vote-seeking elites with access to mass
media have at least some incentive to pursue the additional votes (i.e., the marginal electoral benets) that
result from separate strategies, like organization-building (Scarrow 1996: 36; Hale 2006: 206; Epstein 1980:
375). Still, for individuals with access to media, the marginal electoral benets of organization-building
are typically insucient to justify the considerable associated costs in time and labor.
25than historical party systems due, in part, to `the emergence of television as a major actor
in enabling candidates to win election... It is easier and { in the short term { more eective
to use the modern mass media than to build a party' (156-7).91 Katz (1990) observes that
in contemporary Western Europe, `the party meeting, the party canvasser, the party press
[are] all supplanted in importance by the party leader speaking directly to his or her sup-
porters on the small screen' (146).92 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, media-based,
personalistic political vehicles have proliferated in Russia,93 but not a single strong party
has taken root.94 In South America during the 1990s, three new left parties { Colombia's
M-19, Argentina's FREPASO, Chile's PPD { rose to national prominence through mass me-
dia appeals, with weak or nonexistent organizations.95 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, leader
of Brazil's PSDB, memorably observed in the late 1980s that `a TV channel is worth more
than a party' (Mainwaring 1999: 150).96
In short, for individual oce-seekers, state- and media-based electoral strategies, relative
to organization-based strategies, exact minimal costs in time, labor, and autonomy. These
strategies allow for elite nimbleness and autonomy and bear electoral fruit quickly. Conse-
quently, politicians and political entrepreneurs with access to the state or media tend not
to invest in mass party structures, instead using state resources and institutions as party
91Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) also identify the earlier parties' incorporation of large blocs of new citizens
as a key factor. In this connection, see also Coppedge 1997.
92Landi (1995) similarly states that `...television, radio, and the media in general outstrip the intermediating
function of the local party organization. [The party activist] has become dispensable' (211-2).
93E.g., the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Fatherland-All Russia.
94Hale (2006): 66-8, 81-3. Hale (2006) writes of post-Soviet Russia that `with television sets in every home...a
political entrepreneur no longer needs a mass organization of the kind traditionally wielded by parties to
reach large numbers of voters. Instead, one simply needs enough money to purchase advertising time or a
air for obtaining coverage on television news' (242).
95Boudon (2001); Abal Medina (1998, 2009); Plumb (1998).
96Fernando Collor de Mello, the telepopulist, won Brazil's 1989 presidential election largely due to televised
advertisements, appeals, and debate performances. His ash party, the PRN, had no grassroots structures,
although he did benet from the support of allied right-wing mayors with control over local patronage
(Ames 1994).
26substitutes or attempting to build electoral constituencies through mass media appeals.
Crucially, politicians and oce-seekers who use state resources or mass media to build sup-
port tend to rise relatively quickly. As they gain visibility and support, they close their
share of the electoral market, eclipsing or crowding out programmatically similar, would-be
organization-builders. Ideologically proximate elites and activists who might otherwise have
preferred a strategy of grassroots territorial expansion must either jump on the bandwagon
of the ascendant state-/media-based party or remain electorally marginal.97 In these con-
texts, new grassroots parties do not have the time and electoral space necessary to develop
and grow.
Yet where large segments of the opposition lack access to media, the only new opposition
parties capable of achieving electoral lifto are those that build strong organizations. Before
the mass media age, externally created parties could not challenge established regimes or
governing parties except by building strong party organizations (Shefter 1994).98 Historical
examples of mass-based opposition parties thus abound and span the ideological spectrum.
Classic examples include the mass confessional parties of Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria,
Germany, and Italy, which formed in opposition to Liberal regimes espousing anticlerical-
ism,99 and their labor-based counterparts, which formed in opposition to regimes and gov-
erning parties perceived as hostile or indierent to organized labor (e.g., the British Labour
Party, the German Social Democratic Party).
97Argentina's FREPASO provides a case in point. In the 1990s, Argentina's FREPASO, a new left party with
a weak organization, experienced a meteoric rise, driven almost entirely by several leaders' { especially
Carlos `Chacho'  Alvarez's { mass media appeal (Palermo and Novaro 1998; Abal Medina 1998, 2009).
Many Argentine left-wing activists supported the fast-growing, media-based FREPASO even though, in
interviews, they uniformly expressed a preference for organizational strategies over media-based ones. One
interviewee noted that the only alternatives to FREPASO were tiny, electorally marginal left parties (See
Chapter Six).
98Shefter argues that parties founded by regime outsiders (externally mobilized parties) build strong terri-
torial organizations based on ideological, programmatic appeals.
99Kalyvas (1996).
27In the contemporary era, many opposition parties enjoy access to broadcast media, but not
all do. In some of the world's least developed countries, broadcast media reach too few
people to form the basis of a national electoral strategy.100 More commonly, authoritarian
restrictions on freedom of the press foreclose the media option for contemporary opposition
parties. These parties must invest in territorial organization in order to contend for national
power.
Mobilizing structures and the
capacity for organization
Incentives are necessary but not sucient for organizational strength. Party-builders with
incentives for organization must have the capacity, or means,101 to recruit masses of members
and implant party infrastructure in large swathes of territory. The means for organization-
building come, primarily,102 from external mobilizing structures, especially preexisting orga-
nizations and movements with territorial reach, large memberships, ready-made organiza-
tional hierarchies, cadres of experienced organization-builders, and visibility and legitimacy
among segments of the wider electorate.103 Without access to such mobilizing structures,
oce-seekers will nd it dicult or impossible to build strong party organizations.104
Although states sometimes serve as platforms for strong party organizations (cf. Shefter
1994),105 mobilizing structures for party-building typically come from civil society. His-
100CITATION NEEDED.
101Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (n.d.).
102Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (n.d.) also identify nance as a useful means.
103Kalyvas (1996); Kitschelt et al. (1999); LeBas (2011); Vergara (2011); Ziblatt (n.d.). Party-builders
`work[] with the materials at hand' and `buil[d] the organizations that [are] possible' (LeBas 2011: 52).
104Preexisting organizational infrastructure also facilitates state-building. In his comparison of Italian and
German unication, Ziblatt (2006) argues that Germany, unlike Italy, was able to build a strong fed-
eral state because preexisting subnational governments possessed `infrastructural power'. Infrastructural
power at the subnational level made it feasible for the central German state to devolve state functions to
subnational units. Italy created a unitary state due to subnational infrastructural weakness.
105See also Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (n.d.); Loxton (n.d.).
28torically, mass parties have grown out of civil society actors such as trade unions, social
movements, grassroots church networks, and even guerrilla armies. These feeder structures
donate vital assets, including base-level activist networks, experienced elites, institutionalized
chains of command, physical locales, oce and communications equipment (e.g., computers,
telephones, fax machines), and vehicles.
Group seeks 
national office 
Electoral success 
requires 
organization 
Electoral success 
does not require 
organization 
No media, 
no state 
Media  
or state 
Mobilizing  
structures 
No  
mobilizing 
structures 
Group does not 
build organization 
Group builds 
organization 
Group does not 
build organization 
Figure 1.1: Conditions for organizational strength
A number of scholars thus argue that party-building outcomes largely depend on the strength
of available civil society feeder organizations. Kalyvas (1996) argues, for example, that ter-
ritorially extensive, mass-based, lay church organizations provided Christian Democratic
party-builders in Europe with electorally valuable activist networks and vital infrastructure.
29Where these church networks existed, strong confessional parties formed (e.g., Germany).106
Where they did not, strong confessional parties did not emerge (e.g., France). Along similar
lines, LeBas (2011) identies the presence of autonomous labor unions as the key factor deter-
mining whether parties with organizational reach emerged in democratizing West Africa.107
Others have attributed divergent party-building outcomes to crossnational variation in so-
cial density generally,108 or to the dierential strength of specic feeder organizations such
as guerrilla armies,109 ecological movements,110 and even business conglomerates.111
Polarization and the sources
of activist commitment
Organizational strength is necessary but not sucient to equip new parties for survival.
To be durable, new parties, even those with territorial infrastructure and large activist
networks, depend on high levels of activist commitment. In recent work, Steven Levitsky
has argued that settings of intense societal polarization and conict facilitate the emergence
of committed party activists, or partisan `believers' (Panebianco 1988: 26-30), on a national
scale.112
Conditions of low state and media access select for, but do not generate, committed activists.
Parties born in the state attract patronage-seekers. Since media-based new parties can
106Also, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Italy, and other countries.
107Such associations provided `organizational resources, independent ties to mass constituencies, and a great
deal of political visibility', constituting `mobilizing structures' that could `be co-opted by opposition
parties, giving these parties a greater ability to mobilize voters across the lines of ethnicity and geographic
space' (LeBas 2011: 51).
108See Vergara (2011) on party development in Bolivia (high social density, relatively strong parties) and
Peru (low social density, relatively weak parties).
109Nicaragua, El Salvador (strong) v. Honduras, Guatemala (weak) (Allison 2006).
110West Germany (strong) v. Belgium (weak) (Kitschelt 1989).
111See Barndt (n.d.) on Panama.
112Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (n.d.).
30reach millions instantaneously and achieve meteoric electoral rises, they too tend to attract
careerists. In addition, they often have an incentive to appeal to the median voter rather than
a narrow, radical base.113 For these reasons, both state-originated parties and media-based
new parties typically claim relatively few hardcore, ideologically driven supporters.
Parties born with low access to state and media do not, by and large, attract patronage-
seekers and short-term opportunists. Material resources are usually limited,114 and electoral
progress is uncertain and slow.115 Consequently, party elites cannot oer selective incentives
(e.g., jobs, salaries) to grassroots workers in the short term.116 Low state and media access
thus weeds out opportunists seeking short-term patronage. As a rule, only ideologically com-
mitted activists, or what Panebianco (1988) calls `believers' (26-30), are willing to volunteer
their time and labor for a new party with scarce nancial resources and weak, uncertain
electoral prospects (also see Shefter 1994; Greene 2007).117
Yet selection pressures do not generate activists. There must be a positive goal, or cause,
for party supporters to believe in and rally around. In Panebianco's terms, there must be a
113Argentina's FREPASO provides a case in point. See Chapter Six.
114Exceptions include new conservative parties with strong ties to the economic elite (Loxton n.d.; Luna
n.d.).
115These parties do not become serious contenders for national power quickly. Only by developing a mass
membership, large activist base, and territorial infrastructure, and by bringing base-level demands into
harmony with broad-based appeals, can they compete at the national level.
116In successful, established parties, leaders often motivate party workers by providing selective incentives,
especially government and party jobs.
117Shefter (1994) argues that where elites seek to mobilize a mass party and lack access to state resources,
they must mobilize individuals on the basis of ideological appeals. Greene (2007) posits that in dominant
party systems, early joiners of opposition parties must be ideologues, as only ideologues are willing to
engage in party work for long periods despite the low short-term probability of unseating the dominant
party. More specically, in dominant party systems, new parties face a massive resource disadvantage,
which greatly reduces the likelihood of short-term opposition success and thus prevents patronage-seeking
individuals from committing to the opposition. `[D]eep anti-status quo beliefs', he holds, are a near
necessary condition for the survival of opposition parties in dominant party systems (6). He shows that
the elites and activists who built Mexico's PAN and PRD { the country's two main opposition parties
under PRI hegemony { had comparatively extreme policy preferences and ideological commitments.
31collective incentive that leaders can furnish, in lieu of patronage, to motivate activists (9).118
As noted earlier, Hanson (2010) treats ideology as a potent collective incentive, necessary
for sustaining member commitment, and hence essential for building strong parties. It is
rarely possible, however, to build a territorially extensive, activist-based party organization
around a single ideology. In order to build such an organization, new party leaders, in the
typical case, must make room for a large number of local leaders, networks, movements, and
organizations with distinct ideological, regional, class, and even cultural proles.119
Conditions of intense societal polarization and conict, according to Steven Levitsky, are
more useful for producing large-scale partisan activism.120 Periods of populist mobiliza-
tion and counter-mobilization, movements against authoritarian regimes, and life-or-death
struggles such as revolution and civil war can unite otherwise disconnected groups around
higher causes and facilitate collective action. These social struggles spur heterogeneous ac-
tors to join forces, leading to the crystallization of broad, new political identities. In this
way, the polarization associated with contexts of struggle can generate partisan believers, or
militantes, on a national scale (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck n.d.).
Polarization and conict, when violent, also intensify selection pressures (Levitsky, Loxton,
and Van Dyck n.d.). Risking one's life or well-being in the service of a political cause re-
quires extraordinary commitment and belief. Individuals with weak ideological commitments
are loath to participate in revolutionary struggles, civil wars, or movements against highly
repressive authoritarian regimes. New parties born in these contexts tend to attract indi-
viduals whose convictions trump their risk aversion and desire for short-term political or
118See also Shefter (1994); Greene (2007); Hanson (2010).
119LeBas (2011) notes, for example, that in `most contexts, pro-democracy movements try to incorporate all
actors outside the state: inclusion...creates strong tendencies toward fragmentation. For the opposition
parties that succeed movements, the challenge is...[to prevent] the defection of elites and constituencies'
(LeBas 2011: 58).
120Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (n.d.).
32material gain. Like resource scarcity and electoral uncertainty, violent conict thus selects
for committed activists.
Surviving electoral crisis
So far, the section has argued that four conditions { low access to the state, low access to me-
dia, access to mobilizing structures, and high levels of polarization and conict { facilitate the
emergence of new parties with strong organizations and high levels of activist commitment.
To recap, given the relatively high costs of organization-building in time, labor, and leader
autonomy, oce-seekers only have an electoral incentive to invest in mass party structures
if they lack access to state resources and mass media. Conditions of low access to resources
and media weed out political opportunists, selecting for committed activists disposed to
carry out grassroots party work absent a short-term material payo. Incentives alone do not
produce strong party organizations, and selection pressures alone do not produce committed
activists. Access to mobilizing structures such as guerrilla armies, trade unions, and social
movements provide the capacity, or means, for organization-building. Situations of intense
polarization and conict, such as civil war or populist mobilization, help generate commit-
ted activists by producing the higher causes, or collective incentives, that spur individuals
to collective action.
Without organizational strength and activist commitment, new parties tend to be fragile.
Parties without base-level organization (e.g., many media-based parties) depend for their
early survival on the establishment of a successful party brand and, where applicable, strong
performance in government.121 If their brand becomes diluted due to programmatic shifts or
the emergence of a strong competitor, or their credibility to govern becomes tarnished due
to weak performance, they have no organization to fall back on and are likely to fold.122
121(E.g., Argentina's FREPASO, Colombia's M-19
122For a similar point, see Cyr (n.d.).
33In parties based on patronage, or on the expectation of short-term access to patronage, party
members do not coordinate around a higher cause, but in order to advance their individual
careers. Even if these parties possess base-level organization, elites and base-level party
workers lack robust commitment. Consequently, individuals within the leadership and rank-
and-le are more likely to defect if the party performs poorly in elections (Levitsky and Way
2012).123
New parties with extensive, organized networks of committed activists are more durable
than their counterparts, capable of rebounding from the electoral disappointments and crises
that commonly beset incipient political projects. Driven by a cause rather than a material
payo, party activists in territorial strongholds have long time horizons, which are critical
amid electoral crisis. If these parties have a terrible election or spend a long period in
the wilderness, activists are more likely to stick it out. Defections are less frequent and
severe, and if major defections do occur, outright collapse is less likely to occur, as a core of
members will typically remain active, and hardcore voters will typically remain loyal.124 In
short, although extensive networks of committed activists may impede vote maximization,125
they make new parties durable, giving them something to fall back on amid early crisis.
Moreover, since new parties with strong organizations claim local activists and often cannot
contest national power in the early years, they tend to prioritize subnational government,
seeking to elect mayors, municipal councilors, state and federal legislators, and even state or
provincial executives (e.g., governors) in their local and regional bastions. Subnational gover-
123`Parties that are organized exclusively around patronage and career ambition may eectively discourage
defection during normal times, while the party's hold on power is perceived as secure. However, such
parties are vulnerable to crisis, or any exogenous shock that threatens their capacity to deliver the goods'
(Levitsky and Way 2012: 8).
124In the extreme forms mentioned earlier (e.g., early twentieth-century labor and confessional parties in
Europe), mass organization also greatly reduces the frequency and intensity of electoral setbacks; the
more individuals a party encapsulates, the higher and more stable a party's electoral oor will be.
125See Greene (2007), (n.d.).
34nance allows for greater policy exibility and experimentation126 and also, given its relatively
small scale, poses less of a management challenge than national governance. Consequently,
winning subnational elections gives new parties a valuable opportunity to establish distinctive
brands, develop strong performance records, and thus consolidate electoral constituencies at
the subnational level (Holland n.d.). New parties with solid local constituencies often retain
important subnational executive posts despite national-level electoral disappointments and
setbacks. Thus, in the event of national crisis, new parties that have invested in subnational
elections and governance are more likely to endure, other things equal.127
Conditions for avoiding
fragmentation and schism
Although large networks of committed activists fortify parties during electoral crisis, they
also increase the risk of schism.128 Ideological political movements are prone to fragmenta-
tion. When factions prioritize doctrinal purity over political pragmatism and compromise,
the risk of debilitating schism is high. Consequently, many ideological parties are plagued
by sectarianism and internal divisions (e.g., Latin American communist parties). Moreover,
it is rarely feasible to build a strong organization without incorporating dierent ideologies,
regions, and classes. For these reasons, avoiding fragmentation and schism is a central chal-
126Brazil's PT, for example, used innovative programs like participatory budgeting to consolidate subnational
constituencies in dierent parts of the country (e.g., Porto Alegre).
127It should also be noted that new party elites, in this situation, can continue providing selective incentives
to activists by distributing municipal- or state-level government jobs. The dispensation of lower-level
public-sector positions in subnational strongholds may, in some cases, play a minor role in new parties'
survival of early electoral crisis.
128There are many ways for new parties to collapse. Most cases of collapse, however, fall into one of two
broad categories: electoral collapse and schism. In cases of electoral collapse, new parties experience
prolonged electoral disappointment or major electoral setbacks and do not recover. In cases of schism,
internal conicts arise, major players defect, and new parties disintegrate as a result. Though analytically
separate, electoral failure and schism are often causally related. If a new party suers electorally, party
elites and factions become more likely to split o. Conversely, if a new party loses major elites or factions,
it becomes more likely to suer electorally.
35lenge for mass-based parties (LeBas 2011).129 What factors prevent debilitating schisms in
new parties, especially those with large, committed activist networks?
Violent conict as a
source of cohesion
In addition to selecting for and generating committed activists, violent conict, according
to Levitsky and Way (2012) and Lebas (2011), can decrease the likelihood of fragmentation
and schism within participating movements and parties. On this account, violence between
groups creates dynamics within groups that raise the cost of defection. Such violence sharp-
ens we/them distinctions and creates perceptions of linked fate among competing cadres
(Levitsky and Way 2012: 871). Defection may come to be viewed as an act of treason at the
base level. Group leaders may reinforce social incentives against defection by labeling group
moderates as traitors. Where the groups in question are political parties, voters may even
punish elite splinter groups at the ballot box, eectively `trapping potential defectors within
the party' (LeBas 2011: 46).130 To support this argument, both Levitsky and Way (2012)
and LeBas (2011) provide evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. Party systems, they show,
solidied where regime and opposition engaged in violent conict (Zimbabwe, Mozambique)
but fragmented where such violence did not occur (Kenya, Zambia).131
129In her recent analysis of party strength and weakness in democratizing East Africa, LeBas (2011) empha-
sizes that `[i]t is not enough for parties to win mass support.... (T)hey must develop means of resolving
conict within their organizations (and) preventing party fragmentation.' (35). Later, she writes that
`pro-democracy movements try to incorporate all actors outside the state: inclusion...creates strong ten-
dencies toward fragmentation. For the opposition parties that succeed movements, the challenge is...[to
prevent] the defection of elites and constituencies' (LeBas 2011: 58).
130LeBas (2011) generalizes that in highly polarized societies, large blocs of the electorate typically identify
with one of the conicting groups. As a result, politicians who run independently of parties representing
the poles, or who defect from such parties, are unlikely to achieve electoral success. Polarization thus
creates electoral pressure for elites not to defect, even amid internal conict. She writes: `Where party
competition is polarized, independent and third-party candidates are signicantly less likely to win election
battles, and political aspirants are therefore unlikely to form new parties, even if they lose nomination
battles. Polarization creates intraparty cohesion by `trapping' potential defectors within the party' (46).
131LeBas (2011) argues that despite numerous structural and institutional similarities between Zimbabwe and
36Although Levitsky and Way (2012) and LeBas (2011) demonstrate that life-or-death strug-
gles can generate cohesion in new parties, many new parties do not develop under conditions
of intense, violent conict but still manage to cohere. For example, of Latin America's six
new left survivors, only two, during or prior to formation, acted as belligerents in system-
atically violent national conicts (FSLN, FMLN), and arguably, these two parties depended
primarily on their strong electoral brands { which they were born with132 { to avert fa-
tal schisms. The other new left survivors did not begin with strong brands and either did
not suer violence or experienced irregular, localized violence that left the core leadership
unharmed. What factors might have prevented fragmentation and schism in these parties?
Indispensable leadership: coattails
and unquestioned internal authority
Theorists of party-building rarely take the role of individual leaders seriously, perhaps to
avoid perceptions of excessive voluntarism. Yet leaders often have a decisive impact on new
parties' fortunes, particularly in presidential systems (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck n.d.).
Leaders play an especially important role in reducing the likelihood of debilitating internal
conicts and fatal schisms.133
New parties typically lack two features that generate cohesion in established parties: (1)
a strong party brand, and (2) institutionalized mechanisms for resolving internal conicts.
Almost all established parties possess a strong brand, which creates a powerful electoral
Kenya, only in Zimbabwe did the regime engage in violent conict with the opposition. The conict gave
rise to intense polarization, `empt[ying] out the middle ground between the incumbent party' (ZANU-
PF) and the `primary challenger' (MDC). In their study of ruling party elite cohesion, Levitsky and
Way (2012) reach a similar conclusion, nding that in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, but not in Kenya
or Zambia, collective experiences of violent struggle proved `a critical source of cohesion' for Zimbabwe's
ruling ZANU-PF and Mozambique's FRELIMO.
132Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (n.d.).
133Popular leaders also help new parties achieve electoral viability. See Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck
(n.d.).
37incentive against defection. Elites in established parties know that if they defect and run for
oce independently, they will lose the partisan vote and probably suer electorally. In ad-
dition, established parties often possess institutionalized mechanisms for conict resolution.
With time, and in response to internal pressures, many parties, especially those with large
memberships, develop formal channels for competing interests and factions to promote policy
positions and candidates, as well as accepted rules for selecting candidates and hammering
out the ocial party program.
As noted earlier, a small subset of parties are born with strong brands in virtue of their prior
organizational histories (e.g., FMLN). Most new parties, however, do not possess a brand
capable of providing strong electoral incentives against defection. Equally, most new parties
{ especially heterogeneous, mass-based new parties { lack institutionalized mechanisms for
resolving disputes. Horizontal linkages tend to be weak. Constituent factions or parties
typically have not worked together and thus lack norms of cooperation and established
procedures, formal or informal, for adjudicating internal conict.
A party leader who combines powerful electoral coattails with unquestioned internal authority
can generate cohesion in new parties by substituting for the missing brand and conict
resolution mechanism. When a party leader has more external electoral appeal than any
other party elite, lower elites know that if they defect and run for oce separately, they will
be less likely to win, unable to ride on the coattails of the leader. Such a leader { typically a
candidate for top executive oce134 { substitutes for a strong party brand by providing an
electoral incentive against defection. History furnishes numerous examples of heterogeneous
parties and coalitions whose leaders, in virtue of their external electoral prospects and clout,
played crucial roles in preventing the defection of competing elites and factions.135
134I.e., the presidency or a major governorship or mayoralty.
135These include Charles de Gaulle's RPF (est. 1947), a big tent party encompassing socialists, communists,
38Electoral coattails also give the party leader a signicant degree of leverage in internal dis-
putes. When the party leader creates a powerful coattails eect, lower elites and opposition
factions typically want him to remain in the party, for electoral reasons at least. Thus,
during internal struggles and negotiations with the leader, they will be inclined to make
more concessions and fewer demands than they might otherwise. Leaders tend to use this
leverage, to the extent possible, to shape party policy and behavior as they see t.
Yet coattails alone are a weak source of internal authority. If a new party leader does
not possess any additional source of authority, and must lord his external clout over major
wings of the party, he will have a limited capacity to impose on the party during critical
periods of internal tension and conict. In order to remain united during these critical
periods of internal struggle, new parties that lack established conict resolution mechanisms
require a leader with unquestioned, virtually unassailable authority. Otherwise, internal
conicts will escalate and may devolve into anarchy, with major opposing players reserving
veto power given the absence of a universally accepted arbitration mechanism. A leader
with unquestioned authority can step into this power vacuum and serve as the party's nal
arbiter, or informal high court, mediating diverse demands and, when necessary, imposing
a contentious decision that all accept. In this way, such leaders enable otherwise divided
parties, during critical, delicate moments, to move forward with a minimum of coherence
and unity, speaking in a single voice.
Where does this kind of internal authority come from? Aside from the internal leverage
that comes with coattails, there are two broad sources of internal authority, which are not
mutually exclusive or, in some cases, even independent. The rst source is strong cross-
factional ties, meaning productive, constructive relationships with the party's main elites
Christian Democrats, and conservatives; Juan Per on's PJ, which included strong left-wing pro-labor
elements, centrists, and conservatives; and new left parties and coalitions such as Brazil's PT under Lula,
Peru's IU under Alfonso Barrantes, and Mexico's PRD under Cuauht emoc C ardenas.
39and factional leaders. Particularly in mass-based, internally riven new parties, leaders who
possess strong crossfactional ties often become `indispensable' (Ansell and Fish 1999). By
establishing positions at the hubs of large, complex party organizations, these leaders de-
velop a singular capacity within their parties to balance conicting interests and broker
dicult deals.136 Since their parties rely on them for unity, these leaders amass considerable
power internally. In numerous parties characterized by major internal divisions and weak
horizontal linkages, particular elites have risen to the position of party leader due to their
strong crossfactional ties: Helmut Kohl of West Germany's Christian Democratic Union
(CDU),137 Zennady Zyuganov of the Russian Communists, Fran cois Mitterand of the French
Socialists,138 Carlos Menem of Argentina's Justicialist Party (PJ),139 and others.140
In new parties, the factional ties that the party leader brings to the table at time zero
are critical. In some cases, leaders have already played active, leading roles in the party's
formative struggles and main feeder organizations. These leaders begin with strong factional
136If one visualizes a party as a network in which major factions and elites are represented by nodes, leaders
with crossfactional ties act as the hub, with spokes connecting them to the major nodes. See Padgett and
Ansell (1993); Ansell and Fish (1999); Levitsky (2003).
137During the 1960s and 1970s, the CDU was riven with internal divisions along several dimensions, including
region, religion, and the party's stance regarding East Germany and reunication (Ansell and Fish 1998:
295). According to Ansell and Fish (1998), these divisions generated conicts that might have led to
major schisms if not for the networking of party chairman and eventual chancellor, Helmut Kohl: `The
basis for Kohl's success lay in his remarkable talent as an `integrator' and `mediator'.... Even before
winning the party chairmanship in 1973, Kohl had staked out a role as equilibrator and as linchpin of
party unity.... When the party was torn by internal strife, Kohl consistently managed to embody the
party itself rather than a tendency or a faction' (ibid.: 294).
138Ansell and Fish (1999).
139During the 1990s, the PJ was extremely diverse, with elites and factions spanning the far left and far
right of the political spectrum. Levitsky argues that party leader Carlos Menem, due to his strong ties
across `Peronism's complex system of internal networks', became indispensable to Peronist unity (169).
Menem, during his political career, `undertook a series of alliance shifts that took him from the far left
of the party to the far right', and in his pursuit of the 1988 presidential nomination, Menem managed to
build `a coalition...including old-guard unionists, Orthodox leaders, and rump cadre organizations of the
left...and right' that few leaders, if any, could match (Levitsky 2003: 170).
140E.g., Cosimo de' Medici of the Medicean Party (Padgett and Ansell (1993).
40ties (e.g., Lula da Silva in Brazil's PT).141 Other individuals rise to positions of party or
coalition leadership precisely because they lack ties to any faction and, consequently, do not
threaten to tilt the internal balance of power in a particular faction's direction (e.g., Alfonso
Barrantes of Peru's IU).142 It is generally harder for the latter type of leader to establish
strong crossfactional ties during the party's formative years.
Internal authority is not solely a function of the leader's crossfactional ties. It is also a
function of the leader's moral stature among party members. Leaders vary in the degree
of respect, credibility, and moral legitimacy that party members accord them. Some party
leaders acquire leadership positions in new parties without moral legitimacy among large
segments of the base. This may occur most often when heterogeneous new parties purpose-
fully designate a leader who lacks factional ties of any kind. Other new party leaders enjoy
broad respect and credibility within their parties. Among these, some may even possess a
mystical quality and be seen by party members as central to the party's identity, or as the
embodiment of its higher cause. This kind of stature within a party may be rooted in factors
such as symbolic pedigree,143 acts of heroism,144 experiences of hardship,145 leadership in the
party's founding struggles,146 and more. Insofar as a leader enjoys credibility, commands
respect, or even inspires devotion within his party, he will nd it easier to assume the role
of internal arbiter when necessary.147
141See Chapter Three.
142See Chapter Seven.
143E.g., C ardenas of Mexico's PRD.
144E.g., Charles de Gaulle of France's RFP.
145E.g., Nelson Mandela of South Africa's ANC.
146E.g., Lula of Brazil's PT; Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe's ZANU.
147High moral stature internally may even facilitate the forging of crossfactional linkages. Leaders who seek
to build and nurture ties to previously unknown leaders and activists from across the spectrum may
be more likely to succeed if they enjoy broad credibility or possess moral legitimacy. Otherwise, the
forging of crossfactional linkages may prove more challenging and depend on the individual's capacity
and disposition for assiduous networking and coalition-building. Relevant examples include Helmut Kohl
41In order for leaders to attain maximum authority within their parties, they must possess
strong crossfactional ties and high moral stature. If a leader combines these qualities with
the leverage that accompanies coattails, his capacity to arbitrate or impose during critical
internal struggles may prove decisive in overcoming internal divisions.
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Figure 1.2: Coattails and internal authority148
Crucially, there is no necessary relationship between a party leader's external electoral appeal
and internal authority (Figure 2). Historically, most party leaders have fallen into one of
three categories: those with strong internal authority but relatively low levels of external
of West Germany's CDU, Gennady Zyuganov of Russia's Communist Party (Ansell and Fish 1999), and
Carlos Menem of Argentina's PJ (Levitsky 2003: 169-77).
148Alfonso Barrantes of Peru's IU (Chapter Seven); Lula da Silva of Brazil's PT (Chapter Three);
Chauht emoc C ardenas of Mexico's PRD (Chapter Five); Schak Handal of El Salvador's FMLN; Gennady
Zyuganov of Russia's CPRF.
42appeal,149 those with high levels of external electoral appeal but weak internal authority,150
and those who combine high levels of external electoral appeal with unquestioned internal
authority.151 In some new parties, internal authority and the power to provide coattails
reside in competing elites: one with the most external electoral clout, the other with the
strongest crossfactional ties or highest moral stature. Intraparty tension tends to escalate in
these cases due to the existence of two competing power centers.152
In summary, new parties with strong organizations and committed activists are prone to
fragmentation and schism. While violent conict can create dynamics within these parties
that raise the cost of defection, most new parties with strong organizations remain intact in
the absence of violent conict. This section has argued that individual leaders can function
as vital sources of cohesion. Party leaders who combine unique external appeal with unques-
tioned internal authority may help to bind embryonic parties together during the critical
formative period. Because their word is eectively law, they can step in during moments of
conict and paralysis and impose a path forward. By furnishing coattails, they discourage
defection and reduce the likelihood of debilitating schism. In this way, strong party leaders
may substitute for established brands and institutional mechanisms of dispute resolution
during parties' formative periods.
The role of authoritarianism
The chapter has identied a set of conditions for new party survival: low access to state
resources, low access to media, access to mobilizing structures, polarization and conict
149E.g.,  Alvaro Alsogaray of Argentina's UCeD e, Gennady Zyuganov of Russia's Communist Party, Manuel
Fraga of Spain's People's Party, Schak Handal of El Salvador's FMLN.
150Alfonso Barrantes, the leader of Peru's United Left (IU), belonged to this category during the IU's
formative phase.
151The empirical chapters will argue that Lula da Silva of Brazil's PT and Cuauht emoc C ardenas of Mexico's
PRD both belonged to this category during the PT's and PRD's formative phases.
152This scenario obtained in Peru's IU during the 1980s. See Chapter Seven.
43(violent or nonviolent), and a party leader who combines coattails with unquestioned internal
authority. None of these conditions is necessary for the formation of durable parties, and
jointly, they are not necessarily sucient. Each, however, increases the likelihood of party-
building success, other things equal.153
Three of the above conditions { low access to state resources, low access to mass media, and
polarization/conict { are loosely associated, empirically, with opposition party-building un-
der authoritarian rule. First, new parties under authoritarian rule are more likely to develop
with minimal access to state resources. In most authoritarian systems,154 opposition parties
can operate. In these systems, regimes use dierent tactics to exclude the opposition from
state structures. Some simply ban elections. During the era of bureaucratic authoritarianism
(BA) in Latin America, for example, right-wing military regimes in the Southern Cone elim-
inated elections at all levels of government.155 Uruguay's Broad Front (FA), for example,
spent eleven of its rst thirteen years without contesting a single election or occupying a
single public oce. In other cases, regimes allow elections but tilt the electoral playing eld
against opponents. These `competitive authoritarian' regimes use fraud, repression, exile,
surveillance, nancial advantage, and judicial tampering to weaken the electoral opposition
and retain a monopoly on state resources (Levitsky and Way 2010).
Second, authoritarian regimes handicap opponents by limiting their access to media. Through
various mechanisms, including selective licensing, bribes, sanctions, and outright ownership,
153Specically: New parties that lack access to state resources and mass media are more likely than their
counterparts to invest in organization. If these same parties originate in struggle, they are more likely
to have activist commitment, due to high polarization levels, and the means for organization-building,
through access to mobilizing structures (e.g., trade unions, guerrilla armies). New parties with strong
organizations and high levels of committed activists are more likely to weather electoral crisis. Finally, new
parties are less likely to fragment and break apart if the party leader combines coattails with unquestioned
internal authority. They are also less likely to split apart if they emerge from violent conict.
154Extremely closed regimes (e.g., North Korea, Cuba) make it impossible for opponents to organize.
155(Elections were banned in Argentina during the late 1960s and early 1990s, in Chile during the 1970s
and 1980s, and in Uruguay during the 1970s and early 1980s. The Brazilian BA regime did not ban
congressional elections, but it did ban presidential elections from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s.
44authoritarian elites induce major media outlets to support the regime status quo and ignore
or defame the opposition. In Taiwan during the early 1990s, the Kuomintang's (KMT) con-
trol of mass media prevented opposition victories in key elections.156 Malaysia's United
Malays National Organization (UMNO) has dominated national parliamentary elections
since independence in 1957, due in part to the UMNO's ownership of major media cor-
porations (Levitsky and Way 2010: 321). Under democracy, opposition parties do not face
systematic media hostility. As a result, media-based parties tend to form in democratic
contexts.
Third, in some cases, authoritarian contexts give rise to high levels of polarization, conict,
and (less often) violence. Authoritarian regimes exclude and handicap political opponents
and may employ violence against them. Political exclusion, hostility, and violence can galva-
nize the opposition and, especially when coupled with weak government performance, give
rise to broad anti-regime movements. Since few regimes practice extreme, nationwide re-
pression, authoritarian rule, at least in the long term, rarely prevents committed political
opponents from organizing such movements. Thus, instead of diminishing prospects for suc-
cessful opposition party-building, authoritarian contexts, by giving rise to mass mobilization,
polarization, and conict, often produce the higher causes and committed activists that are
critical for party-building. When authoritarian regimes engage in violence, they may in-
tensify selection pressures for activist commitment and generate opposition cohesion. Under
democracy, the political opposition does not face systematic exclusion, defamation, coercion,
or violence. Consequently, polarization, conict, and violence do not often escalate to the
levels associated with movements for democracy or struggles against authoritarian violence.
156`Media access...was badly skewed: All three television networks, most radio stations, and and Taiwan's
two leading newspapers were in the hands of the state, the KMT, or allies' (Levitksy and Way 2010: 315).
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Figure 1.3: The role of authoritarianism
In linking new party survival to conditions of adversity and (less strictly) authoritarianism,
the book breaks with conventional wisdom on contemporary democratization, suggesting
that the third wave has inhibited contemporary party-building rather than facilitating it. It
should be emphasized, however, that authoritarian rule is not an independent variable. The
section has simply identied a loose empirical association between a cluster of independent
variables and the regime type, authoritarianism.
After the formative phase
This theory section has argued, among other things, that new parties are more likely to
survive the formative years if they initially build strong organizations. One might expect
such parties to become organizationally weaker over time, as leading party members oc-
46cupy government positions, and the party gains traction in the broader electorate, rendering
organization less electorally necessary.
Due to three countervailing factors, however, most parties remain organizationally strong or
increase their organizational strength after the formative phase.157 First, even after a party
gains broad traction in the electorate, organization-building continues to provide marginal
electoral benets that party elites may value, particularly if the elites in question prioritize
lower-level elections.158 Second, organizational maintenance and expansion become easier
over time. Leaders and activists accumulate party-building experience, and electoral suc-
cess strengthens party nances through increased state funding and outside contributions.
Third, the initial period of organization-building may produce internal constituencies that
benet psychologically, socially, and materially from the party organization and demand its
maintenance or expansion.159 Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD, Uruguay's FA, and El Salvador's
FMLN each have expanded their organizations since the formative phase and continue to
enjoy an organizational advantage in large regions of their countries.160
Although organization contributes to party institutionalization, very few parties become
stable, long-term contenders for national power due to organization alone. Most institution-
alized parties combine strong organizations with strong brands.161 As already emphasized,
most parties, in order to develop a successful brand, must initially establish a distinct prole
157In some cases, the primary purpose of the party organization may shift from mobilization to patronage.
This shift has occurred, for example, within Argentina's PJ (Levitsky 2003).
158See Van Dyck and Montero (n.d.); Van Dyck (n.d.).
159Party leaders also might choose to continue investing because they have paid the sunk costs of infrastruc-
tural penetration.
160On the PT, see Ribeiro (2010); Van Dyck (2014).
161Neither a strong organization nor a strong label is necessary for party institutionalization. Some parties
with weak organizations survive the formative phase and become institutionalized on the strength of
their label alone (e.g., Chile's PPD), while some parties with large infrastructures survive in the long
term without partisan supporters (e.g., Brazil's PMDB, a brandless patronage machine with a larger
membership and more territorially extensive infrastructure than any other Brazilian party).
47within their political system and maintain this prole over some period of time. Since it
takes time to demonstrate consistency, party brands remain relatively weak during the for-
mative years. Parties that survive the formative years, however, tend to consolidate brands,
many of which last for decades.
To the extent that a party possesses a strong brand, and hence a loyal partisan base in
the broader electorate, elites and members will have an electoral incentive not to defect.
Consequently, even though parties tend to lose their initial source/s of cohesion (e.g., violent
struggle, a particular party leader) over time, the party brand typically becomes a key source
of longer-term cohesion. With respect to durability, weak brands are the main factor that
distinguish new parties from institutionalized parties and, other things equal, make the
former more vulnerable to collapse.
Case overviews, operationaliz-
ation, and research design
Chapters Two through Seven will present analytic narratives of two new left survivors,
Brazil's Workers' Party (PT) and Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), and
two cases of new left collapse, Argentina's Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO) and
Peru's United Left coalition (IU). This nal section presents an overview of the arguments in
Chapters Two through Seven and closes with a discussion of operationalization and research
design.
Case overviews
Why did the PT and PRD survive, while FREPASO and the IU collapsed? The four cases
subdivide into two potentially useful paired comparisons: the PT with the IU, and the PRD
with FREPASO.162 The PT and IU formed in 1980 as mass-based, left-wing, opposition
162Abal Medina (1998) also notes the striking similarities between FREPASO and the PRD, detailed below.
48forces bringing together a heterogeneous mix of radical and moderate left elements. Both
were born into relatively weak party systems without a stable left party. Brazil and Peru
had similar electoral systems, with presidentialism, full proportional representation, and
(especially in Brazil's case) additional features considered inimical to the formation of stable
parties. Both quickly established large activist bases and territorial infrastructures. The PT
survived the formative years and today anchors Brazil's partisan left. The IU split apart
and collapsed, defying scholarly predictions. To this day, Peru remains without a major left
party.
Mexico's PRD and Argentina's FREPASO also have parallel formations. Both originated as
left-wing, anti-neoliberal, elite splinter groups from dominant, traditionally populist parties
that had adopted market reforms and scal austerity: the PRI in Mexico and the Peronists
(PJ) in Argentina. The schisms that gave rise to the parties both occurred around the
time that the Soviet Union was collapsing: 1988 in Mexico, 1990 in Argentina. Both parties
brought together a heterogeneous mix of radical and moderate left elements. Both were born
into similar party systems, where two traditional parties had dominated electoral competition
for many decades.163 Both Mexico and Argentina had presidentialism with proportional
representation, full (Argentina) or mixed-member (Mexico). During the 1990s, the PRD and
FREPASO became the rst new parties in decades to challenge the two-party establishments
that had long prevailed in their countries. Both parties spent the bulk of their formative
years with virtually no access to state resources. The PRD survived early development and,
like Brazil's PT, today anchors Mexico's partisan left. FREPASO deed scholarly predictions
by collapsing amid electoral crisis in the early 2000s. Argentina remains without a major
left party to this day.164
163In Mexico, these two parties were the PRI and the PAN, the latter a conservative party that was fty-years
old. In Argentina, the two parties were the Peronist PJ and the Radical Civil Union (UCR), a centrist
party more than a century old.
164Leftist elements (e.g., kirchneristas), however, do periodically control the ideologically shifty PJ.
49Figure 1.4: Electoral history in Chamber { PT, PRD, IU, FREPASO
The PT and PRD have each participated in eight congressional elections. The PT has met
the ten-percent threshold in six consecutive elections, from 1990 to the present. The PRD
has met the ten-percent threshold in seven consecutive elections, from 1994 to the present.
In Peru, congressional elections are held only twice a decade. The IU, created just months
after the 1980 congressional elections, only participated in two congressional elections, easily
passing the ten-percent threshold in 1985, falling slightly below it in 1990, and breaking
apart soon after. In Argentina, congressional elections are held every two years. FREPASO
and its precursors (FREDEJUSO, FG) participated in ve congressional elections, passing
the ten-percent threshold in the middle three, suering a crisis in the fth election in 2001,
and collapsing soon after.
Paradoxically, the survival of the PT and PRD can be traced, in large measure, to early
adversity. For both parties, adverse conditions during the formative period led to the creation
50of strong party organizations composed of committed activists. Organizational strength and
activist commitment enabled them to survive early electoral disappointments and crises.
Specically, both the PT and PRD spent the bulk of their rst decades in the opposition,
with few executive positions and hence meager access to state resources. In 1980s Brazil
and 1990s Mexico, conservative opponents of the PT and PRD monopolized television and
radio, leaving the PT and PRD with scarce access to media. Low access to state resources
and media created an incentive for the leadership of both parties to invest in organization,
and also selected for committed activists willing to build the PT and PRD from the ground
up, without remuneration or prospects for a plum government position.
The PT grew out of the unprecedented mass labor mobilizations of the late 1970s, the PRD
out of the mass cardenista anti-fraud movement launched in response to the `stolen' 1988
presidential election. These formative struggles produced the higher causes that spurred
base-level petistas and perredistas to collective action. Heterogeneous petistas united around
the cause of empowering workers and the popular sectors in a historically elitist political sys-
tem. Similarly heterogeneous perredistas united around the cause of democratizing Mexico
and rolling back 1980s neoliberalism, both to be achieved by putting C ardenas in the presi-
dency. Both parties built their organizations on civil society structures: new unions, Catholic
grassroots communities, and Marxist networks in the PT's case; the traditional Marxist left,
the extraparliamentary social left, and defecting PRI structures in the PRD's case. Both
parties, but especially the PRD, suered early repression in select regions and localities,
which hardened activist commitments. Organizational strength and activist commitment
fortied both parties during early development. The PT and PRD suered abysmal rst
elections (in 1982 and 1991, respectively) but rebounded due to the persistence of activist
networks in territorial strongholds.
The survival of the PT and PRD, however, cannot be traced exclusively to organizational
51strength and activist commitment rooted in adversity. Given their origins in broad mass
movements, both parties were left fronts with high levels of internal heterogeneity. Party
leaders Lula da Silva (PT) and Cuauht emoc C ardenas (PRD) played decisive roles in pre-
venting fatal schisms. Both leaders combined electoral coattails and unquestioned internal
authority. Consequently, they furnished electoral incentives against defection and had the
capacity to arbitrate and impose during critical moments of internal conict. In this way,
while the early PT and PRD were still attempting to build strong brands and institutionalize
conict resolution procedures, their leaders substituted for both.
This chapter has argued that (1) a strong organization composed of committed ac-
tivists and (2) conditions for avoiding schism (e.g., a strong party leader) are critical
for new parties. In the broadest terms, FREPASO collapsed because it lacked the rst, while
the IU collapsed because it lacked the second.
FREPASO's collapse, paradoxically, can be traced to its advantageous origins. Unlike the
PT and PRD, FREPASO emerged and developed under democracy, in a relatively auspicious
context. FREPASO spent the bulk of its rst decade in the national opposition, with little
access to state resources, but the party developed under conditions of press freedom, with
regular and unfettered access to the country's major television, radio, and newspaper outlets.
Although FREPASO did not emerge in a context of intense polarization or conict, party
elites did have ties to independent working-class and teachers' unions that, like FREPASO,
belonged to the political left and opposed the PJ. These unions might have provided the
organization platform for a grassroots party-building eort, but FREPASO's leaders, the
media-savvy Chacho  Alvarez foremost among them, intentionally kept the unions at arm's
length.
Facing a relentless electoral calendar, the top FREPASO leadership calculated that an ex-
tensive partisan activist base would take time and labor to develop and, crucially, would
52demand a radical, electorally suboptimal economic program.  Alvarez and his closest asso-
ciates preferred to target oating middle-class progressives with media appeals, and to tone
down the party's previously strident economic rhetoric in favor of a clean government plat-
form. For these reasons, the FREPASO c upula completely eschewed organization-building.
As FREPASO shot up in the polls, the majority of Argentina's left elites and groups { in-
cluding many who might have wished to build an Argentina version of Brazil's PT { jumped
on the FREPASO bandwagon.
When FREPASO, as junior partner to the Radicals, won the vice presidency and a shared
congressional majority in 1999, the party amounted to a media-based brand, property of
a few dozen elites. Calamity struck in 2000-1, and FREPASO was not organizationally
equipped to survive. Amid a violent economic crisis and corruption scandal,  Alvarez, in an
eort to save the FREPASO brand, resigned the vice presidency in 2000. The gambit failed,
and in the 2001 midterms, FREPASO lost sixty percent of its Chamber seats. The brand
had stopped delivering, and FREPASO elites jumped ship. With no activist networks to fall
back on, FREPASO collapsed in the months following the 2001 election.
The IU, like the PT and PRD, was born in adversity and established a strong territorial
organization with a large, committed activist base. After leading extended mass mobiliza-
tions against Peru's right-tacking Morales Berm udez military government in the late 1970s,
the country's left parties and associated organizations and movements united to form the
IU in advance of the 1980 general election, which marked Peru's democratic transition. The
IU remained in the national opposition throughout the 1980s, although coalition leader Al-
fonso Barrantes did hold the important Lima mayoralty from 1983 to 1986. Throughout the
decade, the IU enjoyed little access to Peru's independent but concentrated and conserva-
tive television and newspaper establishments. Electorally, the IU depended on an extensive,
primarily volunteer activist base, driven to halt the right's advances and return the left to
53power. Although the IU inherited many of these activists from its constituent parties, a large
number of independent IU supporters (the no partidarizados) also became active at the base
level during the 1980s. The IU, in contrast to FREPASO, was organizationally equipped to
endure.
Despite this, the coalition suered a fatal schism in 1989-90. This schism resulted from
coalition leader Alfonso Barrantes's weak internal authority. IU leaders gave the top position
to Barrantes, an independent ex-aprista, in part because he possessed electoral appeal, but
also because he lacked ties to any of the coalition's founding parties and organizations, and
hence did not threaten the internal balance of power between constituent parties. Although
IU elites recognized, almost universally, that Barrantes stood the best chance of winning
the Peruvian presidency, Barrantes, in contrast to the PT's Lula, the PRD's C ardenas, did
not possess unquestioned internal authority. He lacked ties to the IU's major elites and
constituent parties and could not claim any special source of broad moral legitimacy within
the coalition. Leaders of the IU's radical bloc (e.g., Javier Diez Canseco), who dominated
the IU's internal organization, openly described Barrantes as a populist caudillo, not an
authentic left leader. In the deft, unprompted formulation of one moderate coalition member,
Barrantes was `accepted as a candidate but disputed (discutido) as a leader'.165
From the IU's inception, Barrantes lacked internal decision-making authority in critical zones
of uncertainty. In contrast to the PRD's C ardenas, who unilaterally vetoed early calls for
a unanimity requirement in the PRD's National Executive Committee, and who imposed
himself as presidential candidate in 1994 and 2000 despite signicant internal competition,
Barrantes tried and failed (1) to veto the unanimity requirement in the IU's National Ex-
ecutive Committee early in the 1980s, (2) to `tame' IU radicals on the internally polarizing
issues of the late 1980s (e.g., the IU's stance on the Shining Path and Alan Garc a), and (3)
165Author's interview with Panchi.
54to impose himself as the IU's presidential candidate in 1989. In the lead-up to the 1990 pres-
idential election, IU radicals refused to grant Barrantes the presidential nomination without
a primary, and Barrantes defected to run independently. With the previously united left
split down the middle, both Barrantes and the IU performed abysmally in the 1990 election,
and the IU dissolved shortly thereafter.
The divergent origins and outcomes of the PT, the PRD, FREPASO, and the IU t a broader
trend within the new left. By and large, Latin America's surviving new left parties and
coalitions developed in adversity. Specically, most new left survivors spent key formative
years in opposition to authoritarian rule, either as new opposition parties (e.g., PT, PRD) or
insurgent precursors engaged in civil war (FMLN, FSLN). The PT spent its rst ve years
(1980-5) under military-authoritarian rule. The PRD spent its rst eleven years under PRI
hegemony (1989-2000). As guerrilla armies, the FSLN and FMLN spent at least a decade
under authoritarian rule. The out-of-sample left survivor, Uruguay's FA (est. 1971), spent
eleven of its rst thirteen years under military rule (1973-84). In contrast, every major new
left failure was born under democracy.
Table 1.2: Authoritarian origins and new left survival
Survival Collapse
Authoritarianism FSLN, FMLN,
PT, PPD, PRD
Democracy MAS IU, M19, PEN,
FREPASO,
MAS, FDNG
55Earlier, the chapter raised the question: Why, given the various obstacles facing the new
left in Latin America, did new left parties fare well relative to their right-wing counterparts?
This book points to a possible answer. New left parties fared relatively well after the onset
of the third wave because, more often than new right parties, they emerged from adversity.
Operationalization
In preview of the analytic narratives presented in the empirical chapters, this section pro-
vides scores for each of the book's four main cases on the theory's independent and interme-
diate variables. As detailed earlier, the determinants of organizational strength and activist
commitment include access to state resources, access to mass media, access to mobilizing
structures, and origins in polarization and conict. For these four independent variables,
the parties receive a score based on the following questions, respectively: Did the party win
a major executive position within ve years? Were mass media independent and free of
systematic conservative bias during the party's rst ve years? Did party elites have ties to
large mobilizing structures during the rst ve years? Did the party emerge from intense
societal polarization and conict?
The questions have a relatively short, ve-year time frame because oce-seekers' incentives
and capabilities in the initial few years almost invariably determine whether leaders will
invest in, and succeed in building, a solid, durable organization. Winning a major may-
oralty or governorship during this time does not provide a level of state access sucient to
substitute for a national party-building eort (although it may be useful in other ways).
Parties that wish to become national electoral forces, as all major new left parties did, need
electoral capacity across the country, not just in a few large cities or a few states. Only the
national government apparatus can substitute for a national party. Thus, parties that won
the presidency within ve years receive a `full' score for state access, while those that won a
major subnational position receive a `limited' score, and the rest receive a `none' score.
56Along similar lines, for the mobilizing structures variable, parties receive a `full' score if,
during the rst ve years, party elites had ties to preexisting organizations and movements
with national mass memberships (1 member per 1000 citizens), as well as infrastructure
in one fth of the country's municipalities and, where applicable, in half of its states or
provinces. If party elites had ties to mobilizing structures without national reach, but with a
major presence in one or a few big cities, or in most of the municipalities of one or two states,
they receive a `limited' score. If a party's elites did not have ties to mobilizing structures
with national or subnational reach, they receive a `none' score.
New left parties that initially developed in a context of press independence did not neces-
sarily enjoy a level of media access sucient for building a national electoral constituency.
In countries where mass media were independent but concentrated in the hands of conserva-
tive forces, new left parties could not make eective national appeals. Consequently, cases
only receive a `full' score on media access if, during the rst ve years, mass media were
independent and free of systematic conservative bias. If mass media were independent but
systematically conservative, new left parties receive a `limited' score, and if mass media were
not independent, parties receive a `none' score.
Finally, for the origins in polarization and conict variable, the book distinguishes between
`violent conict' (e.g., civil war) and `nonviolent conict' (e.g., peaceful, anti-regime mobi-
lizations). Although both types of conict generate large-scale activist causes, violent conict
produces additional eects on party-building, namely selection pressures and intragroup dy-
namics that help prevent fragmentation and schism. If a new party does not emerge from
either type of struggle, it receives a `no conict' score.
This section also scores the cases on a composite of the intermediate variables, organizational
strength and activist commitment. A party receives a `yes' score for this composite variable
if, in the rst ve years, two conditions held: (1) the ratio of party members to population
57reached 1 per 1000, and the party established formal branches in twenty percent of the
nation's municipalities and, where applicable, half of the states (organizational strength);
(2) the party depended primarily on unpaid volunteers for grassroots party work (activist
commitment).
Table 1.3: Organization and activist commitment
Party State
access
Media
access
Mobilizing
structures
Polarization/
conict
Organization with
committed activists
PT
(Brazil)
None None Full Nonviolent
conict
Yes
PRD
(Mexico)
None None Full Nonviolent
conict
Yes
IU
(Peru)
Limited Limited Full Nonviolent
conict
Yes
FREPASO
(Argentina)
None Full Full No conict No
Table 1.4: Survival and collapse
Party
Organization with
committed activists
Leader with coattails
and internal authority Outcome
PT
(Brazil)
Yes Yes Survival
PRD
(Mexico)
Yes Yes Survival
IU
(Peru)
Yes No Collapse
by schism
FREPASO
(Argentina)
No Yes Electoral
collapse
58Finally, the section scores each of the four cases on a composite of the party leader's coattails
and internal authority. Party leaders receive a `yes' score if, during the rst ve years, two
conditions held: (1) most major party elites believed that the leader, compared to all other
elites, had the best chance of victory in a top executive election (coattails); (2) the leader
held a unique position at the hub of the party's network of relationships or possessed a special
source of credibility, respect, or moral legitimacy within the party (internal authority).
Research design
Party-building remains an undertheorized area of research despite the high volume of ex-
isting literature on parties. Thus, the book's empirical research design is mainly geared
toward theory generation. Chapters Two through Eight nest four in-depth case studies in a
broader, medium-n comparison. The case studies do not test the book's theory. Rather, they
function as `plausibility probes' (Eckstein 1975), evidencing the theory's initial plausibility
by illustrating its key causal mechanisms at work in a few select cases. In-depth, small-n
research enables the tracing of micro-level causal mechanisms and thus facilitates the gen-
eration of robust theories (Hall 2007). The conclusion, Chapter Eight, provides evidence of
the theory's generalizability, supplementing the four case studies with an analysis, based on
desk research, of the remaining new left left survivors and failures and several out-of-sample
cases (e.g., Uruguay's FA, Venezuela's LCR).
The book's case universe is restricted to major new left parties/coalitions on methodological
grounds. In order to understand the conditions for successful party-building, one should, to
the extent possible, compare cases of survival and collapse that dier as little as possible
on analytically relevant dimensions, observed and unobserved. Latin American countries
are characterized by broad structural and institutional similarities, which include religion
(Catholicism), socioeconomic measures (middle-income levels, high inequality), and electoral
rules (presidentialism, PR). The region's major new left parties and coalitions bear additional
59similarities. As detailed earlier, these parties arose in the same time period (1978-1995) and
had to adapt to the collapse of communism, the neoliberal turn, the decline of unions, and
the expansion of the atomized informal working class. Despite these and other similarities,
Latin America's new left parties vary on the outcome of interest, survival. Thus, they may
be treated as `most similar' cases.
Chapters Two through Seven draw on data from 13-14 months of interviews and archival
research in S~ ao Paulo, Campinas, and Bras lia, Brazil; Mexico City, Mexico; Lima, Peru;
and Buenos Aires, Argentina. I conducted eighty-ve interviews with party elites, party
activists, party observers, and country-based scholars and examined over 1000 documents
from ocial party archives, newspaper archives, and interviewees' personal archives. The
empirical chapters draw on numerous additional sources, including dozens of published inter-
views with party members,166 retrospective rst-hand testimonies,167 and detailed scholarly
analyses conducted by party members.168
To score the cases on independent and intervening variables, the chapters draw heavily on
expert country analyses, especially rst-hand accounts and analyses, as well as interviews
(especially for the leadership variables). The most useful sources included Meneguello (1989),
Keck (1992), Ribeiro (2010), Secco (2011), and Rodr guez (n.d.) for the PT; Bruhn (1998),
Borjas (2003), Mart nez (2005), and Rodr guez (n.d.) for the PRD; Novaro and Palermo
(1998) and Abal Medina (2009) for FREPASO; and Cameron (1994), Roberts (1998), Herrera
(2002), and Adrianz en (ed.) (2011) for the IU.
While rst-hand accounts/analyses and secondary materials furnished most of the evidence
necessary for scoring variables, interviews and archives provided most of the evidence neces-
166E.g., de Moraes and Fortes, eds. (2008); Gonz alez et al, eds. (2010).
167E.g., Herrera (2002).
168Borjas (2003); Novaro and Palermo (1998); Secco (2011).
60sary for demonstrating causal mechanisms, or the relationships between variables. Interviews
present methodological challenges, as ideas and events that may not have seemed important
to participating actors in the moment (e.g., a party's reliance on mass media or quick access
to state resources) might come to seem important in retrospect. For this reason, it is crucial,
in interviews, to pose general, open-ended questions and listen for unprompted statements,
in order to avoid implanting ideas in the interviewee's mind.169
Yet the validity of interview evidence also depends on repetition across a diverse range of
interviews. Insofar as multiple interviewees with dierent beliefs and loyalties (e.g., radicals
v. moderates in a particular party) independently conrm that a particular meeting oc-
curred, or that a particular line of thought prevailed among the party elite or activist base,
one can be condent that the interviewees have not confabulated or provided idiosyncratic,
unrepresentative interpretations of events.170
Still, no interviewing technique can wholly circumvent the problem of hindsight. Thus,
archives are an invaluable source of eld evidence. Unlike interviews, archives reveal what
participants and observers thought and expressed in real time, before they knew how events
would ultimately unfold.171 The PT chapters draw extensively on materials from the Perseu
169As an illustration, in Mexico, PRI operatives murdered hundreds of PRD activists during the late 1980s
and early to mid-1990s, and scholars such as Greene (2007) and Rodr guez (n.d.) have posited, with
evidence, that these repressive conditions selected for ideological activists and elites. Yet no existing
studies explore the collective psychological eects of PRI violence on local networks of perredistas. When
asked to describe the PRD's reaction to the electoral crises of 1991 and 1994, one party activist from San
Luis Potos , without any previous mention of PRI violence, stated, `we were at war'. This provided a
small bit of evidence that, at the base level, PRI hostility and violence sharpened PRI/PRD boundaries
and hardened perredistas' collective identity.
170If, for example, only a lone, radical interviewee had highlighted the toxic relationship between Alfonso
Barrantes and IU radicals, Chapter Seven could not, with justication, have characterized Barrantes'
crossfactional ties as weak. Yet since several interviewees oered the same assessment, and most of them
generally supported Barrantes, the characterization has a relatively solid basis.
171Ocial PT archives from the 1980s, for example, provide in-the-moment evidence that low access to media
contributed to organization-building, as party organizers, in their campaign manuals and pamphlets,
exhorted activists to donate time and resources given the PT's resource disadvantage and the opposition
of the conservative media establishment (Chapter Two).
61Abramo Foundation's S ergio Buarque de Holanda Center: Documentation and Political
Memory, and from the Edgar Leuenroth Archive at the University of Campinas. The PRD
chapters rely heavily on articles published in the Mexican weekly magazine, Proceso. All Pro-
ceso excerpts were originally cited in Borjas (2003) unless otherwise noted. The FREPASO
chapter makes extensive use of Marcos Novaro's valuable personal archive. Finally, the Peru
chapter draws heavily on articles published in the Peruvian monthly magazine, Quehacer.
* * *
The rest of the book is organized as follows. Chapters Two and Three analyze the survival
of Brazil's PT, while Chapters Four and Five analyze the survival of Mexico's PRD. The
two pairs of chapters have the same analytical structure. Chapters Two and Four show
that for the PT (Chapter Two) and PRD (Chapter Four), early adversity led to the cre-
ation of a strong party organization composed of committed activists, and that organization
and activist commitment enabled the survival of early electoral crisis. Chapters Three and
Five argue that by combining coattails and unquestioned internal authority, Lula da Silva
(Chapter Three) and Cuauht emoc C ardenas (Chapter Five) substituted for strong brands
and institutionalized conict resolution procedures and thus prevented fragmentation within
the early PT and PRD.
Chapters Six and Seven analyze the collapses of Argentina's FREPASO and Peru's IU,
respectively. Chapter Six shows that FREPASO's elite founders rose to national prominence
through mass media appeals, did not have an incentive to invest in grassroots organization,
and were not organizationally equipped to survive the electoral crisis of the early 2000s.
Chapter Seven argues that within the IU, Alfonso Barrantes furnished coattails but did not
possess unquestioned authority and thus could not veto constraining decision rules, arbitrate
internal conict, or ultimately even impose himself as candidate. These facts, the chapter
shows, prompted his exit and the IU's fatal schism.
62The conclusion, Chapter Eight, summarizes the book's argument, explicitly compares the
PT, PRD, FREPASO, and IU to each other, applies the book's argument to the broader set
of new left cases and a few shadow cases, and discusses research implications.
63Chapters 2-3 The Survival of Brazil's Workers' Party (PT)
Chapters Two and Three analyze the survival of Brazil's Workers' Party (PT). Founded
in 1980, the PT has contended for national power in Brazil since the late 1980s. Petistas
have held ten governorships and nearly two-thousand mayoralties, including S~ ao Paulo's.
The party has elected at least ten percent of Brazil's federal deputies in every congressional
election since 1990. In recent years, the PT has consolidated its position as Brazil's leading
party, retaining the presidency in 2006 and 2010 after party leader Lula da Silva's rst
successful presidential bid in 2002. Given Brazil's size, economic strength, and growing
presence on the global stage, the PT is not just the most important new party in Latin
America, but among the most important in the world.
Figure 2.1: The PT in the Chamber of Deputies (1982-present)
Dozens of scholars have studied the PT in depth. The bulk of existing literature either
examines why the PT successfully `adapted', moderated, and reached the presidency during
64the 1990s and 2000s, or investigates the causes and eects of well-known PT institutions,
governing practices, and policies such as early internal democracy, participatory budgeting in
municipal government, and the Bolsa Fam lia conditional cash transfer program. Chapters
Two and Three do not directly concern any of these issues. Instead of asking why the PT
adapted and reached the presidency, or why the PT has adopted certain distinctive practices
and policies, the chapters ask a more basic question: Why did the PT survive and become
institutionalized as a major national party in Brazil?
65Chapter 2 Building the PT: adversity and survival
`The weapons of power are armies, money, and information.'
{ Slogan on PT ier, undated1
The PT survived because of early adversity, not in spite of it.
The PT originated in mass struggle against Brazil's military regime (1964-85). The PT's
founders belonged to and drew from three social forces that played central, collaborative
roles in this struggle: the organized Marxist left, the grassroots Catholic left, and above all
the autonomous new union movement. The new unions and their civil society allies on the
Catholic and Marxist left conceived the PT as a partisan vehicle for democratic and socialist
transformation.
In order to eect change in the institutional sphere, the PT, at a minimum, would have to
achieve electoral success at the national level. Yet the early PT lacked access to nance
and patronage. With no ties to the economic elite, and with federal laws banning union
donations, the PT, from inception, would fundamentally depend on public resources. Public
resources, however, proved scarce. Not until 1989, when Luiza Erundina assumed the S~ ao
Paulo mayoralty, did the PT occupy its rst major executive position.
The early PT also lacked access to media. Under military rule and the early Nova Rep ublica,
the PT confronted a powerful mass media establishment dominated by the Globo network
and both closed and opposed to the left opposition. Major news outlets denied the PT
access, circulated open propaganda, and systematically omitted and edited news coverage to
the PT's detriment.
1From Edgar Leuenroth archive.
66Low access to state resources and media created an incentive for PT elites to invest in
organization. Unable to reach voters through media or attract activists and supporters with
salaries, petty clientelism, and promises of patronage, the PT could only contend for national
power if it developed a large, volunteer organization and, through it, distributed collective
incentives to the broader population. PT leaders understood this. In campaign materials
and internal strategic discussions, party leaders repeatedly emphasized, to each other and
to the rank-and-le, that they depended on activists to deliver the unltered party message
to would-be supporters.
Elite incentives were insucient for the creation of a strong PT organization. Party founders
also had to be capable of large-scale organization-building. The PT's capacity for organization-
building came from founders' origins, linkages, and support in civil and political society,
primarily the new unionism, Catholic left, and Marxist left. Lacking the resources and in-
stitutional capacity to nance or administer large-scale territorial implantation from the top
down, the national PT organization depended on the bottom-up initiative and dispersed
human, material, and infrastructural resources of these civil society feeder organizations.
Thus, low access to material resources and media made organization-building electorally
imperative, while the PT leadership's origins and linkages in civil society made organization-
building possible. Yet the PT depended on one more vital ingredient: activist commitment
based on belief in a higher cause.
Individuals do not engage in time-consuming, labor-intensive, unremunerated, and some-
times risky partisan activism unless driven by a higher cause. The PT's higher cause went
beyond opposition to military rule. Leaders branded the PT, and the rank-and-le viewed
the PT, as a novelty in Brazilian history: the rst authentically popular expression in a
society perpetually dominated by elites. It was this narrative of popular struggle, which
Lula and other new unionist party leaders embodied, that inspired thousands of local civil
67society leaders and activists to build the PT organization from the ground up.
During its formative period, the PT far surpassed the organizational requirements imposed
by law. Petistas built the most internally vibrant of Brazil's major parties, with the largest
volunteer activist base and one of the largest territorial infrastructures. Despite slow early
growth and major initial setbacks (e.g., the 1982 elections), local activist networks in the
PT's core bastions persisted, rebounded, and, together with party leaders, continued to
invest in PT-building, new union-building, and the broadening of PT/civil society linkages.
Organizational strength and activist commitment thus fortied the PT, enabling the party
to survive a slow, often disappointing formative phase. By the late 1980s, the PT had
consolidated Brazil's dominant partisan brand on the left and become institutionalized as a
major national party.
Setting the stage: military rule and
the genesis of the Workers' Party
The Brazilian military seized power in 1964 with economic growth slowing, ination and
debt rising, worker and peasant mobilization intensifying, and { within the military { fear of
Marxist insurgency mounting due to the radicalization of organized labor, the formation of
urban and rural guerrilla groups within Brazil, and the recent consolidation of Marxist rule
in Cuba.2
National security `hard-liners' and economic statists controlled Brazil's military regime for
most of the rst decade of military rule (1964-74). Early regime technocrats viewed economic
progress and social order as mutually reinforcing (Stepan 1971, 1973 (ed.); Moreira Alves
2In their forcible takeover, Brazil's military golpistas enjoyed support from key societal and political ac-
tors/blocs, including most of the business class and rural landowning elite, numerous governors, much of
the national media establishment, and segments of the middle class that prioritized the restoration of social
order and resolution of Brazil's scal and economic troubles over democratic stability.
681988; Skidmore 1988). While social order would provide a secure platform for economic
growth, broad-based material progress would mitigate and preempt social unrest, violent
opposition, and other forms of instability.
In order to restore and sustain social order, early military governments adopted a multi-
pronged approach, restricting political contestation and protest, repressing left `subversives',
and actively attempting to unify the general public around regime ideology. The rst military
government of Castelo Branco (1964-7), by executive decree, imposed the basic authoritarian
system that would last until the early 1980s. Shortly after inauguration, the government
expelled inuential opposition gures from political life3 and canceled the 1965 presidential
elections.4 Following a strong opposition showing in the direct gubernatorial elections of
1965,5 the Castelo Branco government banned all existing parties and created an ocial
two-party system composed of the situacionista (ruling) ARENA and oposicionista Brazilian
Democracy Movement (MDB).6 ARENA and the MDB would remain Brazil's only legal
parties until the liberalization of the party system in 1979.
The country's two most hard-line military governments { under Presidents Costa e Silva
(1967-9) and M edici (1969-74) { employed heavy repression in order to defeat `subversives'.
From the late-1968 passage of the Fifth Institutional Act7 until the mid-1970s { a period
3These included former president Juscelino Kubitschek.
4The Castelo Branco government also intervened in hundreds of unions, banning strikes.
5Opposition parties won in Minas Gerais and Guanabara, a former state encompassing modern-day Rio de
Janeiro.
6The Castelo Branco government also circumscribed the functions of the national legislature, expanded the
decree-making powers of the presidency, and made the 1970 gubernatorial elections indirect. (Because
the constitution stipulated direct gubernatorial elections, military governments could only impose indirect
elections via executive decree.) The Castelo Branco government also outlawed direct elections of mayors,
authorizing governors to appoint mayors instead. Government lawyers would incorporate many of these
reforms into the military's 1967 Constitution.
7Costa e Silva's term (1967-9) gave rise to the rst serious outbreak of hostilities between the military regime
and its opponents, but national security `took center stage' during the M edici years (1969-74). During
Costa e Silva's term, the Revolutionary Popular Vanguard (VPR) perpetrated a fatal, military-directed
69known as the Anos de Chumbo, or `Lead Years' { Brazilian military and police murdered
or `disappeared' between 100 and 500 individuals and committed other forms of repression
on a much larger scale, arresting approximately 50,000 individuals, torturing 20,000, exiling
10,000, and suspending the political rights of (cassando) 5000 (Chiavenato 1997: 131; Keck
1992: 52).8 Both governments primarily targeted the Marxist left,9 which encompassed
urban guerilla cells (responsible for dozens of bank robberies and kidnappings),10 rural guer-
rilla forces,11 clandestine parties and political organizations, and radical intellectuals and
opinion-makers. From the hard-line military perspective, the Marxist left posed a range
of threats to national security, from `terrorism' and armed revolution to the radicalization,
inltration, and mobilization of civil society, especially organized labor.
In order to win the `battle of ideas', Brazil's military rulers attempted, from the beginning, to
unify the general public around regime ideals and goals { in Amaral and Guimar~ aes' (1994)
words, `to guarantee national unity and the massication of the ideology of national security'
car bomb attack, and the police killed a student protester in Rio de Janeiro, triggering a mass protest in
Rio, the (Passeata Cem Mil). Amid growing opposition to state repression among MDB legislators (e.g.,
M arcio Moreira Alves), Costa e Silva's National Security Council penned the Fifth Institutional Act (AI-5),
empowering the federal executive to close the national legislature, remove elected ocials, and use repression
to limit political forms of expression and association. Following AI-5's passage in December of 1968, the
Costa e Silva government tightened authoritarian controls and began to create a `culture of fear' through
coercion and violence. The administration closed Brazil's congress for nearly a year, passed and enforced
strict censorship laws, and began to target `subversives' with a range of violent and repressive measures,
from exile and suspensions of political rights (cassa c~ oes) to detentions, torture, and disappearances (Moreira
Alves 1988).
8The Brazilian Human Rights Commission and Amnesty Commission have estimated 333 and 457, respec-
tively. Other sources estimate between 100 and 200 (CITATION NEEDED).
9In their use of cassa c~ oes and forced exile, hard-line governments also targeted less radical individuals
considered dangerous due to their social or political inuence. These included political and cultural elites
such as Juscelino Kubitschek, Gilberto Gil, Caetano Veloso, and many more.
10Several of Brazil's most well-known urban guerrillas, including Carlos Marighella and Carlos Lamarca,
died in armed exchanges with police in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
11In 1972-3, the Brazilian military engaged and defeated the rural guerrilla force, the Guerrilha do Araguaia
(Par a), resulting in scores of casualties (CITATION). The Guerrilha's leaders modeled the force on the
Chinese Revolution and had close ties to the PCdoB (Rodr guez n.d.: 142). With approximately eighty
members, the Guerrilha was the strongest domestic insurgency in Brazil during the Cold War period.
70(32). In pursuit of national integration and cultural homogenization, early military govern-
ments created Brazil's rst public telecommunications companies, Embratel (est. 1965) and
Telebr as (est. 1972),12 and actively promoted the monopolization of Brazil's private me-
dia market, singling out the pro-regime TV Globo for `special favor' in the all-important,
fast-growing television sector (Amaral and Guimar~ aes 1994: 32).
In 1970, the M edici government canceled the broadcasting license of the Excelsior television
network, which had opposed the 1964 coup. The most overt attempts at top-down ideological
indoctrination came in the early 1970s, when the M edici government sought to popularize
nationalist, anti-opposition slogans such as `Brazil: Love it or Leave it' and `If you don't live
to serve Brazil, you don't serve to live in Brazil'.13 The federal government produced and
circulated hundreds of thousands of bumper stickers with such slogans, while business allies
placed the slogans on their products, and governista media networks (most importantly TV
Globo) broadcast them.14
In the economic domain, Brazil's hard-line military governments, in contrast to their Chilean
and Argentine counterparts, systematically deepened the state's role in private and public
industrial production (Skidmore 1988) and made massive, long-term investments in infras-
tructure, higher education, and the public safety net (Weyland 1994). After the Castelo
Branco government (1964-7) stabilized the Brazilian economy, improved the scal outlook,
and neutralized organized labor,15 the successor governments of Costa e Silva and M edici,
12The Cardoso administration would partially privatize Embratel and Telebr as in 1998.
13Brasil: Ame-o ou Deixe-o and Quem n~ ao vive para servir o Brasil, n~ ao serve para viver no Brasil.
14CITATION NEEDED.
15In order to curb ination and ballooning public debt, which had partially motivated the 1964 military
coup, the Castelo Branco government passed a set of orthodox stabilization measures, issuing a new
currency (the cruzeiro novo), imposing strict monetary controls, implementing tax reforms designed to
increase revenue, selectively cutting the budget and downsizing the public sector, and placing a set of
constraints on organized labor intended to increase the eciency of public and private corporations (e.g.,
bureaucratic reorganization, wage compressions, removal of employment guarantees). With respect to
71under the stewardship of powerful nance minister Delm Netto (1967-74), aggressively pro-
moted infrastructural and human capital development and `doubled down' on public and
private domestic production in sectors ranging from natural resource extraction to complex,
high-end manufacturing.
These governments ramped up funding for university research, provided critical nancial
support to edgling private industries, poured resources into core primary-sector public com-
panies (Petrobr as, Vale do Rio Doce), and { seeking to `move up the value chain' { founded
ambitious new public companies such as Embraer (aerospace/defense, est. 1969).16 In the
early 1970s, the M edici government undertook a series of `pharaonic' infrastructural projects,
including the construction of the Itaip u hydroelectric dam, Transamaz^ onica highway, and
the country's rst nuclear plant in Angra dos Reis, Rio de Janeiro.
From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, the Brazilian economy grew at a dizzying pace. The
Costa e Silva years (1967-9) saw a near two-fold increase in the rate of economic growth.
The M edici years (1969-74) brought an economic `miracle' in which national income grew
at an average of roughly ten percent, and tens of millions of Brazilians entered the mid-
dle class. Aided by increased tax revenues, the combined product of robust growth and
Castelo Branco-era tax reforms, the M edici government implemented the most signicant
social policy expansions since the Vargas era, investing heavily in Brazil's higher education
system and, in 1971, extending pension coverage to rural workers and domestic servants, two
important and previously excluded occupational categories (Weyland 1994).
In 1972-3, however, Brazil's economy slowed and ground to a halt. In 1972, the M edici
bureaucratic reorganization, in 1966 the Castelo Branco government, as part of an eort to neutralize
organized labor, replaced the previous patchwork of sector-specic administrative agencies (IAPs) with
a single administrative body, the INPS. The government also implemented modest industrial reforms,
increasing support for public and private domestic industries and providing nancial incentives for foreign
industries to invest in Brazil.
16Embraer was privatized in 1994.
72government postponed direct gubernatorial elections until 1978, `[foreseeing] probable defeat
in important states' in the 1974 election (Skidmore 1988: 150). No longer bolstered by
a boom, the hard-line military elite began to lose support, especially among the middle
sectors opposed to the repression, censorship, and electoral exclusion of the Lead Years.
Consequently, the military's internal balance of power shifted toward soft-liners. The March
1974 inauguration of Brazil's fourth military government, headed by Petrobr as president
General Ernesto Geisel, ushered in a less repressive, authoritarian phase of military rule. The
Geisel government initiated a `slow, gradual, and safe' political `opening' (abertura), dened
by an `easing' of repression and electoral exclusion (distens~ ao). The Geisel government
allowed free electoral advertisements on television and radio and began an attempt to co-opt
civil society opponents into the institutional sphere (von Mettenheim 1995: 100).
In the November 1974 congressional election, however, the MDB surged and nearly defeated
the ruling ARENA, provoking a short-term hard-line retrenchment.17 In 1975-6, the Geisel
government escalated its use of repression. Detentions spiked, new disappearances came to
light, and police committed two notorious, high-prole murders in S~ ao Paulo, killing oppo-
sition journalist Vladimir Herzog (October 1975) and autonomous metalworker Manoel Fiel
Filho (January 1976).18 The Geisel government also formally restricted political parties' me-
dia access. The Lei Falc~ ao, passed in July 1976, prohibited political debates/advertisements
on television/radio and only allowed parties, during ocial campaign season, to display
photos of their candidates (Secco 2011: 81).
Authoritarian retrenchment did not serve the military's goals. Political and societal oppo-
sition continued to intensify, such that by early 1977, the Geisel government foresaw major
potential losses in the direct gubernatorial elections of 1978. While `dialing down' its use
17The MDB's seat share increased from eighteen percent to thirty percent in the Senate, and from twenty-two
to forty-four percent in the Chamber (compared to 1970).
18von Mettenheim 1995: 101-2.
73of hard repression, the Geisel government closed the national congress in early 1977 and
passed the `April Package' (Pacote de Abril), a set of executive decrees making the 1978
gubernatorial elections indirect, strengthening ARENA's presence in the national congress,
and extending presidential terms to six years.
Due to a combination of long- and short-term factors, opposition to military rule, by the late
1970s, had broadened and coalesced into a national movement (Moreira Alves 1988). Despite
renewed economic growth and social policy expansion under Geisel,19 tens of millions of
Brazilians had not participated meaningfully in, or beneted signicantly from, the country's
material advances under military rule. In fact, poverty and inequality had deepened. Lower-
class wages had not kept apace with ination, leading to reductions in the real income levels
of the urban poor. Vertiginous economic growth at the `top' had widened the notorious
chasm between Brazil's upper and lower classes. Rapid urbanization and the deepening of
poverty had exacerbated problems of unemployment, crime, malnutrition, overcrowding, and
inadequate infrastructure in the favelas of major cities (e.g., S~ ao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro).
The problems of poverty, inequality, and urban dysfunction, coupled with the memory of
the M edici years, recent galvanizing incidents such as the Herzog and Fiel Filho murders,
and the continued denial of basic democratic freedoms, provided ideological fuel for the
regime opposition as the second half of the 1970s progressed. Equally, the diminution and
eventual elimination of hard repression under Geisel lowered the cost of open dissent, causing
many exiles to return to Brazil and leading relatively moderate or risk-averse individuals to
participate in the growing opposition movement.
The balance of power between regime and opposition only shifted decisively, however, with
19Robust economic growth persisted under Geisel, such that by 1980, the Brazilian economy had more than
tripled in size since 1967 (in ination-adjusted 1980 reais (www.ipeadata.gov.br). The Geisel government
also implemented a new set of broad-based social policies, including progressive tax reform, the universal
extension of emergency health care, and the extension of basic health care to the rural poor.
74the rise of Brazil's autonomous union movement. Industrial and economic development
during the 1960s and 1970s brought a major increase in the size of Brazil's public and
private workforces, across the primary, industrial, and service sectors. From 1960 to 1978,
the number of unionized workers shot from 1.5 million to over 10 million (Keck 1992: 13).
Because the late M edici and Geisel governments rolled back some of the most draconian wage
and employment tenure policies of the hard-line era, Brazilian organized labor, even the more
autonomous sectors, initially remained on the `sidelines' of the opposition movement. Yet in
late 1977, a World Bank study revealed that the M edici government had `doctored' ination
gures in 1973, dramatically underreporting the rising cost of food, housing, and other core
goods and services in order to keep workers' indexed wages low in real terms.20
The revelation, publicly conrmed by the Geisel government, led to mass labor mobilization
among a set of autonomous unions (os aut^ enticos) in the industrial belt of Greater S~ ao Paulo,
known as the ABC (or ABCD) paulista.21 The S~ ao Bernardo Metalworkers' Union, headed
by Lula da Silva (union secretary since 1972), led the nascent movement (Sluyter-Beltr~ ao
2010). Since the early 1970s, os aut^ enticos had explicitly rejected Brazil's longstanding
corporatist system of state/labor relations. Under this system, the Brazilian political elite,
since the Estado Novo period (1937-45), had prohibited cross-sectoral unionization, instead
engaging unions vertically by individual sector and, according to autonomous unionists,
cowing and coopting union leaders (derisively called p^ elegos) at the expense of rank-and-le
workers. This pattern of relations had persisted, with minor variations, across authoritarian
and democratic periods.
20In 1973, due to the global oil supply shock and resulting spike in ination, the M edici government `repo-
sitioned' worker salaries by indexing wages to ination, across the board.
21The ABC region comprises the outlying cities of Santo Amaro, S~ ao Bernardo do Campo, S~ ao Caetano,
and (later) Diad^ ema and housed the core and supporting industries associated with Brazil's booming
automobile sector. With the addition of Diad^ ema (formerly part of S~ ao Bernardo do Campo, some began
to call the ABC paulista the ABCD paulista.
75The wage recovery campaign thrust the autonomous union movement into the national spot-
light. The `new unionism' (novo sindicalismo), as it came to be called, rapidly spread to ur-
ban centers and rural areas across regions and occupational sectors. By 1978, the movement
counted nearly three million workers, roughly a quarter of Brazil's formal-sector working
class (Rodr guez n.d.: 145).22 In 1978, the metalworkers of the ABC paulista spearheaded
the rst in a wave of general strikes, pressing for higher real wages as well as more favorable
tenure policies, increased shop-oor representation, and relaxed criteria for union formation
and expansion.
As the new unionism's `star' rose in the late 1970s, the Catholic left became heavily involved
in the autonomous labor struggle. The progressive wing of the Catholic Church had emerged
as a key opposition force during the hard-line era of military rule.23 Beginning in the early
1960s, Brazil had witnessed a proliferation of Catholic grassroots communities (CEBs): small
groups of lay Catholics, usually between ten and seventy individuals, who organized on a
regular basis, in or outside of church, to analyze the Bible, examine the relationship between
biblical teachings and everyday experience, and discuss political and social issues generally
(Cavendish 1994). The CEBs emerged in a broader context of Church liberalization and
reorientation toward issues of poverty and social justice, reected globally in the Second
Vatican Council (1962-1965) and regionally in the rise of Liberation Theology (Guti errez
1971) and the Catholic Conferences of Medell n (1968) and Puebla (1979).
From the early 1960s to mid-1970s, tens of thousands of CEBs sprouted up in rural areas,
middle-class urban neighborhoods, and slums (e.g., the favelas encircling metropolitan S~ ao
Paulo). By the end of the Anos de Chumbo, Brazil counted approximately 40,000 CEBs
(Skidmore 1988). As authoritarian constraints tightened and repression increased under
22This made the New Unionism the largest independent labor movement in Brazilian history.
23Levine 1986; Mainwaring 1986; Skidmore 1988; Cavendish 1994.
76Costa e Silva and M edici, the Catholic Church provided an `umbrella of safety' for regime
opponents (Cavendish 1994: 187). CEBs became one of a few secure fora for political
dissent in the country.24 During the harshest years of repression, CEBs and interlinked
neighborhood associations became hubs of opposition activity, giving refuge to potential
targets of repression and oering resources and safe meeting places to dissident groups of
various stripes (Cavendish 1994).
CEB members' anity with the new unionism stemmed from a range of factors, includ-
ing common class backgrounds (CEB members belonged overwhelmingly to the `popular
classes'), similar organizational cultures (e.g., grassroots participation), and a range of shared
values (e.g., equality, anticentralism, bottom-up change). CEBs supported and encouraged
the formation of rural and industrial new unions through the Pastorais da Terra and Pas-
torais Oper arias. CEBs also built bridges between the new unions and other social move-
ments, particularly poor neighborhood associations (Keck 1992: 79).
Minority sectors of Brazil's Marxist left also became involved in the autonomous labor strug-
gle. Despite competition and conict between the new unionism and the communist party
`establishment' (i.e., PCB, PCdoB, MR-8),25 numerous smaller Marxist networks and orga-
nizations, drawn to the new unionism's militant class consciousness, created new union cells
to foment and participate in the autonomous mobilization of organized labor.
As the labor movement's external ties proliferated, new unionist demands and goals broad-
ened from labor reform to democratization and the reduction of poverty and inequality
through socialist policies. `[T]he new unionism soon established itself at the forefront of the
democratic opposition forces' (Sluyter-Beltr~ ao 2010: 4).
24Levine 1986; Mainwaring 1986; Skidmore 1988; Cavendish 1994.
25About which more below.
77In response to the general strike of 1978, the Geisel government conceded real wage increases
but did not give ground in other areas. Consequently, a view took hold within the new unions
that autonomous workers needed political representation in order to secure fundamental labor
reform. In July of 1978, Lula, aware that the increasingly soft-line military regime would
soon open the party system to independent new entrants, wrote that a labor-based party in
Brazil `was just a matter of time' (paraphrased in Secco 2011: 40). At the 1978 Oil Workers'
Congress in Salvador, Bahia, new unionists ocially proposed the creation of the Workers'
Party for the rst time (Secco 2011: 267). In January of 1979, new unions approved the
creation of the party, overriding a small minority of dissenting voices (Keck 1992: 67).
The push to create the Workers' Party began, in earnest, in 1979. Following the new unions'
second general strike in March 1979, the newly inaugurated Figueiredo government (1979-
85), instead of making policy concessions,26 `harshly repressed' participating unions across
the country, from Rio Grande do Sul to S~ ao Paulo to Minas Gerais.27 Police arrested a large
number of aut^ enticos and imprisoned the new unionism's three `principal leaders',28 Lula da
Silva, Ol vio Dutra, and Jac o Bittar, for weeks.29 Anti-labor repression galvanized the PT
leadership and base.30 The new union leadership formulated a statement of principles (Carta
de Princ pios) and distributed approximately 200,000 copies to attendees of the 1979 May
Day rallies, held in most of the country's major population centers (Bahia, Cear a, Minas
Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, S~ ao Paulo) (Keck 1992: 67).
By late 1979, a national, `big-tent' opposition movement had taken shape, which spanned
26On his inauguration in March 1979, Figueiredo had `rearmed the government's commitment to liberal-
ization' (von Mettenheim 1995: 106). In later months, he would `make good' on this promise.
27Interview with Ol vio Dutra in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 122).
28Sluyter-Beltr~ ao (2010: 2).
29Lula led the metalworkers' union of S~ ao Bernardo do Campo, Bittar the oil workers' union of Paul nia and
Campinas, S~ ao Paulo, and Dutra the bank workers' union of Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul.
30According to one leading new unionist and PT founder, the repression under Figueiredo made the new
unions realize that they needed a political party; that strikes were not enough (interview with Bom).
78elites in the political, cultural, and economic spheres and a host of interlinked civil society
actors, including student movements, neighborhood associations, the Catholic left, Marxist
parties and organizations, and { at the forefront { new unions (Skidmore 1988; Moreira Alves
1988). Despite their many internal dierences, these groups united around the demand for
democracy in order to force concessions from an increasingly soft-line military regime.31
As the opposition movement reached peak strength, Brazil's controlled transition to democ-
racy accelerated. In late 1979, amid social unrest and an economic slowdown, the Figueiredo
government granted amnesty to all Brazilians still in exile and scheduled direct gubernatorial
and mayoral elections for 1982, to be held concurrently with the congressional elections that
had continued, with periodic disruptions and institutional manipulations, since the 1964
coup. In a new Organic Law of Political Parties, the government liberalized Brazil's party
system, dissolving ARENA and the MDB, and allowing the formation of new parties for the
rst time since 1965.
The Organic Law, which took eect several months after the May Day rallies, imposed
steep electoral and organizational barriers to entry for new parties. In crafting the law,
the Figueiredo government had two objectives: rst, `to divide the opposition' and thus
`[stem] the rising tide' of the MDB (Keck 1992: 87); second, to favor new parties built on
the outgoing party establishment, while preventing the entry of outside political forces. The
law stipulated that new parties with one-tenth of the national congress's current members
(Chamber plus Senate) could obtain registry immediately. The rest, within twelve months
of the law's passage, had to hold local party conventions (and thus to establish local oces)
in twenty percent of the municipalities of at least nine states.
To establish a local oce, new parties had to incorporate, as members, two percent of the
electorate in the smallest municipalities (i.e., those with fewer than 1000 voters) and 1170+
31`Dierences among these groups were minimized in the name of opposition unity' (Keck 1992: 42).
79members in the largest municipalities (i.e., those with more than 500,000 voters).32 Parties
would lose their registry if, in any future congressional election, they did not receive three
percent of the national vote as well as ve percent of the vote in nine states. Moreover, the
law prohibited parties from mounting municipal campaigns in municipalities without a party
Diret orio. All of these provisions favored new parties built on old and outgoing established
parties, as established parties could transfer politicians and infrastructure to their successors.
The voto vinculado provision of the Organic Law stipulated that voters, on pain of ballot
annulment, had to vote for the same party's candidates in every state or national race on
the ticket. Thus, parties, in order to compete in a given state election, for example, had
to eld a gubernatorial candidate. This would force smaller opposition parties, in 1982, to
place otherwise electable elites in gubernatorial races that they stood no chance of winning.
Excluding the short-lived Partido Popular (PP),33 ve Brazilian parties obtained registry
in advance of the 1982 congressional elections. All save the PT met the electoral or organi-
zational requirements by inheriting legislators, members, and infrastructure from currently
or previously established parties (Power 2000). Two of the four, the Social Democratic
Party (PSD, est. 1979) and Brazilian Democracy Movement Party (PMDB, est. 1981),
succeeded the ARENA and MDB organizations, respectively. The Brazilian Labor Party
(PTB), to which deposed ex-president Jo~ ao Goulart had belonged, also resurfaced and split
in two. Former PTB leader, Leonel Brizola, and a group of PTB elite allies and associ-
ated activist/patronage networks secured registry as the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) in
1979. Under the symbolic leadership of Ivete Vargas (niece of Get ulio), separate PTB net-
works with strong rural clientelistic linkages retained the PTB label and became registered
32In addition, the law stipulated that in order to eld state and local candidates, parties had to have oces
in the relevant state or municipality.
33The PP merged into the PMDB quickly after securing registry.
80in 1981.34
Unlike the above parties, the PT lacked a partisan predecessor and thus could not count
on a `ready-made' territorial network of local elites, activists, and branches. Most Marxist
and Social Democratic leaders in Brazil { including Fernando Henrique Cardoso and other
leaders of the MDB's Tend^ encia Popular { argued against the creation of the PT, charging
the party with dividing Brazil's progressive opposition and, in doing so, `making the perfect
the enemy of the good'.
Building the early
PT organization
From inception, the PT developed in adversity. Party founders lacked access to public and
private resources and faced a closed, hostile, and highly inuential mass media establishment.
Paradoxically, these conditions created a powerful electoral incentive for early PT leaders
to invest in mass party structures. The early PT stood as an exception in the Brazilian
party system, putting a premium on grassroots organization-building and treating physical
territory as the key arena of electoral politics (Meneguello 1989). Within a decade, the PT
had built a powerful grassroots organization, with a dense infrastructural presence in several
regions of the national territory and a large, committed base of card-carrying members.
Low access to resources
With a new and untested party label, a radical and adversarial prole, and the nationally es-
tablished, center-left MDB on its right `ank' (Kitschelt 1994), the PT, on creation, attracted
very few established left-wing political elites. Brazil's three largest Marxist parties, the PCB
34Of these four, the PDS and PMDB remained serious national contenders in the long term and also pro-
duced oshoots { the PFL/DEM (est. 1985/2007) and PSDB (est. 1988), respectively { that became
institutionalized as major national parties.
81(est. 1922), PC do B (est. 1962), and MR-8 (est. 1964), immediately `jumped on the PMDB
bandwagon'. In total, ten elected oceholders, all progressive MDB defectors, joined the PT
in 1979-80. All ten held legislative posts at the federal or state level: one in the Senate,35
four in the Chamber of Deputies,36 and six in the S~ ao Paulo state assembly (Keck 1992: 82,
95).37 Although the PT's MDB defectors provided valuable oce space, telecommunications
equipment, and administrative sta,38 these organizational resources constituted a tiny frac-
tion of what PT leaders would need in order to secure registry, much less to build a national
party. In a country with over twenty states and over 4000 municipalities, the PT did not
hold a single executive post in 1979-80.
Strikingly, the PT continued with minimal state resources for nearly a decade. Prior to 1988,
the PT elected only three mayors, two in small cities (Diad^ ema in 1982, Santa Quit eria do
Maranh~ ao in 1982) and one in the larger Fortaleza, Cear a (1985). Only in 1988 did the PT
win a major subnational executive position, the mayoralty of S~ ao Paulo. In the same year,
the PT won thirty additional mayoralties { two in state capitals (Porto Alegre, RS; Vit oria,
ES)39 { and, for the rst time, crossed the ten-percent threshold in Chamber seat share
(10.2). In 1992, the PT won two small governorships, in the Federal District of Bras lia and
the state of Esp rito Santo. The PT did not win the presidency or a major governorship
(i.e., in S~ ao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Bahia, or Rio de Janeiro) before 2000.
35Adhemar Santillo of Goi as.
36Edson Khair of Rio de Janiero, Ant^ onio Carlos de Oliveira of Mato Grosso, Henrique Santillo of Goi as,
Airton Soares of S~ ao Paulo
37Jo~ ao Batista Breda, S ergio dos Santos, Irma Passoni, Marco Aur elio Ribeiro, Geraldo Siqueira, Eduardo
Suplicy.
38According to Keck (1992), the early PT's MDB defectors provided `critical infrastructural and logistical
support during the period of party legalization' (Keck 1992: 73). The `benets they brought with them were
enormous' and included `meeting rooms, clerical help, free telephone service to other parts of Brazil', `sta
aides for research, mailings, and preparing other printed material'. `Most of the PT deputies dedicated as
much as possible of this resource to party work' (Keck 1992: 83).
39RS: Rio Grande do Sul. ES: Esp rito Santo.
82The early PT also suered from weak nancing. From inception, the party depended for
ocial revenue on four sources: (1) membership dues, (2) mandatory salary contributions
(cotiza c~ oes) from PT public oceholders, elected and unelected, (3) the federal party fund,
with each party's nancial allotment determined by its percentage of Chamber seats, and
(4) volunteer contributions from individuals or corporations, whether outright donations or
purchases of PT products such as shirts, pins, etc.
From the early 1980s to mid-1990s, the majority of party funding came from salary con-
tributions (Ribeiro 2010: 106). In March 1982, the PT mandated that petista public o-
cials donate an extraordinary thirty percent of their salaries to the party (Secco 2011: 75),
roughly ten times the percentage contributed, on average, by members of other Brazilian
parties (Keck 1992: 133). During this time, the remainder of PT nancing came primarily
from the federal party fund (Keck 1992: 111; Secco 2011: 105-7), despite the PT's modest
presence in the national legislature. The national Diret orio formally required PT members
to provide a small due (a cafezinho) to their municipal Diret orio, but in practice, few ever
did (Secco 2011: 105). The early PT explicitly eschewed ties to business and the economic
elite, trumpeting itself as a partido sem patr~ oes (`party without sponsors'). Corporate con-
tributions would remain `taboo' (Ribeiro 2010: 109; Secco 2011: 107) until the mid-1990s
and only become an explicit national objective in the 2000s.40
Federal law prohibited formal linkages to, or donations from, unions. The ban on union
donations deprived the PT of a revenue source available to many classic labor-based parties
40According to one party founder and campaign strategist, the timing of the increase in corporate contribu-
tions resulted from several factors. First, in the mid-1990s, a large number of PT candidates had concluded
that national electoral success would require adopting modo tradicional de fazer campanha. Second, many
PT candidates had toned down their socialist rhetoric and lowered their `negatives' among the economic
elite. Third, the PT, by the early 1990s, had won a number of important subnational positions, and in
1994, most observers believed that Lula would win the presidency. The business sector, according to the
interviewee, `wanted in' on the PT in order to protect its interests. Governing experience also enabled PT
politicians to `meet businesspersons linkes to the public sector', whom party elites simply did not know
during the 1980s (interview with Alli).
83(e.g., Britain Labour Party, Sweden's Social Democratic Party).41 Outside of formal party
channels, new unions, which had `deeper pockets' than any other PT feeder groups or orga-
nizations, gave money to PT Diret orios, militantes, candidates, and cash-strapped local PT
politicians, especially vereadores.42 The new unionists directed such contributions primarily,
but not exclusively,43 to petistas with new union origins. Informal union contributions in-
creased signicantly after the creation of the CUT in 1982 (about which more below). One
early party member recalled, for example, that the PT only began to use carros de som after
the formation of the CUT.44
Still, the PT suered great penury until the late 1980s and remained nancially weak un-
til the second half of the 1990s. Annual party revenue ranged from 200,000 to 450,000
ination-adjusted Brazilian reais between 1983 and 1986.45 From 1986 until the mid-1990s,
annual revenue never exceeded 2.6 million reais (the gure in 1992) (Ribeiro 2010: 111).
Consequently, countless PT iers from the 1980s exhort militantes and supporters to donate
money (in addition to campaign labor):
`Our party is poor, just like Brazilian workers. It lives o small donations from its members
(liados) and activists (militantes), who organize small parties and sell b^ onus. We don't use
paid campaigners (Cabos Eleitorais) and run a decent, honest campaign.' { Campaign booklet
for a slate of PT candidates in Rio de Janeiro state, 198246
`We rely on the resources that we can create collectively. That's why each person's contribution
is fundamental.' { Bulletin for Francisco `Chico' de Souza's state deputy campaign, 198647
`In contrast to the other parties, which have the wealth from exploiting millions of workers
to invest in their candidates' campaigns...the PT and the Frente Brasil Popular [the PT's
41Keck 1992: 91.
42Interview with Secco.
43Interview with Secco.
44Interview with Kotscho. Ricardo Kotscho is an award-winning journalist and former Lula press secretary
(2003-4).
45Figures adjusted for 2010 ination levels.
46From CSBH archive.
47From CSBH archive.
84presidential electoral coalition in 1989] have as the only source of resources the voluntary
contributions of its militantes and of the millions who will vote for Lula on November 15.' {
Special nancial bulletin released by the PT's state Diret orio in Minas Gerais during the 1989
presidential campaign48
In short, the formative-phase PT operated under severe resource constraints. Early party
leaders could not provide nancial or career inducements to activists save from oceholders'
salary contributions, jobs and resources controlled by a small number of governors, mayors,
and legislators, and meager allotments from the federal party fund. In light of Brazil's
vastness and population size, the patronage and nance held by early party elites could not
begin to fuel a national electoral eort. The distribution of selective incentives thus played
almost no role in the PT's development until the late 1980s, and a marginal role until the
second half of the 1990s.
Low access to media
`Whoever has television, radio, and newspapers will always
be in power.' { Ant^ onio Carlos Magalh~ aes,49 1975
Under military rule, television became the dominant medium in Brazil, particularly in the
political news domain. Television ownership skyrocketed during the 1960s and 1970s,50
growing by tens of millions.51 During this period, Brazilians, by and large, did not use
the radio to obtain news (Porto 2003: 292),52 and only a tiny fraction of the population
48From CSBH archive.
49Bahian media mogul, three-time governor, and Minister of Communications under Sarney (1985-90)
50The newspaper industry also expanded, although on a much smaller scale. Approximately one-hundred
newspapers were founded during the last half-decade of military rule (Lawson 2002: 197).
51Beyond Citizen Kane.
52Broadly, Brazilians preferred television and print media as news sources, using radio for musical entertain-
ment (Porto 2003: 292). Although some radio show hosts used their radio audiences to launch political
careers (Porto 2003: 292), relatively few Brazilians consumed radio in order to obtain political news.
Evidence suggests that radio has become a more important campaign vehicle in recent years (Boas n.d.).
85regularly consumed newspapers or news magazines.53 By the late 1970s, the vast majority
of Brazilians learned about politics from television,54 and ownership or indirect control of
popular local/regional TV stations had become essential for political success.
By law, television and radio networks could only own a handful of state and local stations.
Vargas-era federal statutes gave the Brazilian president exclusividade not only in granting
general broadcasting licenses to major networks but also in distributing the ownership rights
of all state and local television and radio stations not owned by media corporations (i.e., the
vast majority of the total).
Moreover, the law allowed politicians and candidates to receive broadcasting concessions.
Although politicians could not legally serve as station directors, they could, in their capacity
as owners, appoint all station personnel (including directors) and thus dictate station content
from `behind the scenes'. In 1993, Milton Tavares, a Brazilian lawyer, observed that in
practice, politicians who owned local stations had long appointed supporters, friends, or
family members to directorships, taking eective control of station content.55
As mass media expanded in Brazil, control of broadcasting concessions became a major `pa-
53Brazilians might also have been more likely to view newspapers as politically biased. The director of Gallup
Brazil stated in 1993 that `television [in Brazil] has more credibility than print media' for the simple reason
that, for most viewers, images lend trustworthiness to news stories. `The vast majority of the television-
watching population', he stated, `do not see a political position...in the dierent TV channels' and, in
general, `think that what they see on TV is true' (Carlos Matheus, Director of Gallup Brazil, quoted
in documentary, Beyond Citizen Kane). Explaining public skepticism toward newspapers, one veteran
reporter and PT member emphasized in an interview that Brazilian newspapers, in contrast to television
programs, have never contained separate editorial sections and thus have always incorporated political
biases { quite perceptibly, in his view { into their supposedly objective presentations of `the news' (interview
with Kotscho). A petista functionary oered a dierent perspective, stating that Brazilian media, print
and television alike, are more `camouaged' than in the US. Citing Folha and Veja as examples, she
claimed that Brazilians, even educated ones, wrongly believe that media sources, in general, are objective
(interview no. 5
54Newspapers and news weeklies aected politics mainly through elite channels, helping set elite agendas
(Porto 2003: 291) but only contributing marginally to the mass dissemination of news. Television exerted
vastly more inuence on public opinion.
55Interview in Beyond Citizen Kane.
86tronage cow' and source of power for the president. Presidents generally awarded television
and radio concessions either to established allies (often politicians) or to local politicians or
media outts in exchange for political support. R omulo Furtado, Secretary General of the
Ministry of Communications from 1974 to 1990, summarized the presidential perspective:
`If I were president, I would never give a license or concession to an enemy'.56
Porto (2003: 293-4) summarizes that, beginning in the 1970s, the `consolidation of urbani-
sation and of the cultural industry...originated a new kind of relationship between the state
and local oligarchies'. In exchange for allying with the president, local and regional politi-
cal bosses received broadcasting concessions and `began controlling the electorate...by using
the local media, creating the new phenomenon of electronic coronelismo', as opposed to
traditional coronelismo.57
In order to maximize ratings, local and regional station owners had to rebroadcast popular
national programs. By the time of the PT's formation, the Sistema Globo de Televis~ ao,
or TV Globo (est. 1962), held a national television monopoly. TV Globo owed its suc-
cess to the military regime. Roberto Marinho, the CEO of the Globo conglomerate, had
openly supported the 1964 military coup.58 As a reward, Brazil's military governments had
56Quoted in Beyond Citizen Kane.
57Nunes Leal (1949) famously coined the term coronelismo to describe the clientelistic system that dominated
rural politics in mid-twentieth century Brazil: one in which landowners secured the political allegiance of
their rural workers { largely through the distribution of individualized material benets (e.g., credit, cash)
{ and directed them to vote for particular politicians, who protected the landowners' interests (e.g., by
blocking land reform). A large number of scholars now use the term coronelismo eletr^ onico to capture
powerful elites' control of local and regional broadcast media { and hence of their own political futures,
given the increasing centrality of broadcast media to contemporary electoral politics. These include Stadnik
(1991); Motter (1994); Costa and Brener (1997); Bayma (2001); Capparelli and dos Santos (2002); Porto
(2003); dos Santos and Capparelli (2005); dos Santos (2006); Lima and Lopes (2007); Pieranti (2008);
Stevanim and dos Santos (2011); G oes (2012); Boas (n.d.).
58In the lead-up to the April 1964 coup { often termed the revolu c~ ao (`revolution'), especially by supporters
{ the CEO of the Globo conglomerate, Roberto Marinho, openly sided with the military, despite having
previously supported President Goulart. In an early 1990s interview, Armando Falc~ ao, Brazilian Minister
of Justice from 1974 to 1979, described Marinho as a revolucion ario da primeira hora (`revolutionary in
the rst instance') (from Beyond Citizen Kane.
87nurtured TV Globo in its infancy59 and, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, given TV Globo
preferential treatment in the allocation of broadcasting spectra, federal subsidies and the
non-enforcement of regulations (Lawson 2002: 184).
The military had also made it `impossible' for other networks `to compete commercially
with Globo' and been `careful to avert the formation of any [competitors]' (Amaral and
Guimar~ aes 1994: 33). As noted earlier, the M edici government canceled the broadcasting
license of the Exc elsior network in 1970, and months after taking oce in March 1980, the
Figueiredo government (1980-5) did the same to Rede Tupi (est. 1950), previously Brazil's
largest television network and a Globo competitor in the `make-or-break' areas of telenovelas
and news.60
The only television networks besides TV Globo that thrived under military rule did so
by assuming niches outside the TV Globo-dominated domains of telenovelas, sitcoms, and
news. The seminational Bandeirantes (est. 1967) functioned as `a specialized channel of
sports, movies, direct sales, and packaged programming'. The younger Sistema Brasileiro
de Televis~ ao (est. 1981) `cautiously [avoided] any kind of competition with Globo' and
`consolidated as a distant second place' during the 1980s (Amaral and Guimar~ aes 1994: 33).
By the mid-1970s, TV Globo's agship, prime-time news program, Jornal Nacional (est.
1969), commanded the highest nightly news ratings in Brazil by a wide margin. The net-
work's news monopoly increased considerably during the second half of the 1970s due to the
59TV Globo arose in 1962 { two years before the military coup { from a controversial agreement between
the Globo media conglomerate (est. 1925) and the US-based Time-Life. In exchange for a share of future
prots, Time-Life provided TV Globo with a massive infusion of start-up capital and thus an overwhelming
advantage over competitors. Globo received six-million USD in start-up capital from Time-Life, compared
to 300,000 USD for the Tupi network, then Brazil's largest television network. When the military seized
power, TV Globo, trammeled by lawsuits resulting from the Time-Life deal, still did not possess legal status.
In an explicit gesture of favoritism, the Castelo Branco government canceled pending legal investigations
of TV Globo and awarded the network a television license in 1965.
60Rede Tupi produced Brazil's rst major telenovela, O Direito de Nascer, in the mid-1960s.
88placement of popular, Globo-produced telenovelas alongside Jornal Nacional in the prime-
time slot. Given the popularity of TV Globo programming, especially during prime time,
most state and local stations, in order to succeed, had to obtain rebroadcasting rights from
Globo.61
Not only did TV Globo enjoy hegemony in the all-important television sector, the Globo
conglomerate stood alone in holding top positions across hard news, television, radio, and
print media. Almost all hard news came from the Globo News Agency, Brazil's largest,62 and
two S~ ao-Paulo-based newspapers,63 the Estado de S~ ao Paulo and Folha de S~ ao Paulo.64 The
Sistema Globo de R adio commanded the second largest radio audience (after Bandeirantes)
and O Globo the third largest newspaper readership (after Folha and Estado).65
Moreover, the non-Globo news outlets, like Globo, had conservative owners and, conse-
61By the 1970s, the path to political dominance at the state level involved two steps: rst, `oering political
support in exchange' for TV and radio licenses from the federal government, and second, securing the
legal right to rebroadcast TV Globo content, `since it [was] the dominant network' (Porto 2003: 295).
According to Amaral and Guimar~ aes (1994), `[i]f local stations [did] not partner with Globo, they [would]
command a much smaller audience and have far less inuence. [Joining] the weaker second- or third-ranked
national systems...[was] a cut above standing alone', while `autonomy...[was] synonymous with high costs,
marginalization, and exclusion from the market' (32).
62Amaral and Guimar~ aes 1994: 30.
63Unlike in the United States, news weeklies (especially Veja) have also played a signicant role in news-
gathering (Porto 2003: 291).
64Interview with Kotscho.
65By the early 1990s, Bandeirantes and Globo (Sistema Globo de R adio) owned roughly three quarters of
Brazil's national AM/FM radio channels (Amaral and Guimar~ aes 1994: 30). Bandeirantes owned 92
channels, the Globo network fty. The other major radio networks { Jornal do Brasil, Brazilian South,
and Manchete { owned 25, 17, and ve, respectively. By 2000 (NEED OLDER DATA), Folha, Estado,
and Globo's national newspaper (O Globo), boasted daily circulations of 472,000, 367,000, and 335,000,
respectively. Globo did not enter the news weekly market, traditionally dominated by the conservative-
leaning magazine Veja (est. 1968), until 1998. With  Epoca, Globo quickly attained a top position. As of
2003, three news weeklies dominated the market: Veja (owned by the Grupo Abril, est. 1968), Globo's
 Epoca, and Isto  E (owned by Editora Tr^ es, est. 1976), with readerships of 1,152,000, 498,000, and 381,000,
respectively (Porto 2003: 291).
89quently,66 tended to leaned conservative in their news coverage.67 These included SBT,
Estado, Veja, and even Folha on some accounts. Ricardo Kotscho generalized, for example,
generalized that a handful of `conservative, traditional' families have controlled news produc-
tion in Brazil since before the military era, citing the Marinho family (Globo), the Mesquita
family (Estado), the Civita family (Veja), and the Frias family (Folha).68 The founder of
SBT (est. 1981), TV host S lvio Santos, openly espoused conservative views.69
In summary, when the PT materialized on the political scene and initially developed at the
end of the military era, TV Globo held a monopoly in television news, while a handful of
predominantly conservative private media corporations, led by Globo, dominated the broader
news market. In most Brazilian states, the leading television channel featured Globo news
programming, including the prime-time Jornal Nacional and telenovelas, while the leading
newspaper obtained hard news from the Globo News Agency. Very often, the same individual
or group owned the leading television station, radio station, and newspaper (Amaral and
Guimar~ aes 1994: 30). Under these conditions, neutral or anti-establishment independent
media might ourish in select, lightly monitored locales, but never at the national or state
level.
66Media observers, including within the PT, have often noted that that the conservatism of media `higher-ups'
(the c upula) generally `carried the day' and often created tension with rank-and-le journalists (the base)
(interview with Kotscho). `In S~ ao Paulo, [the media] are family dynasties, and in the rest of the states,
the politics of the news business owners goes (faz-se)'. From interview entitled `Meios de comunica c~ ao,
balan co e compromisso' in PT newspaper (CSBH archive). A 1986 campaign newspaper for PT candidates
Jos e Dirceu and Jorge Baptista, for example, states that `[d]espite journalists' resistance, the owners of the
media manipulate information in accordance with their interests and only divulge the facts and version
that serve the interests of the dominant classes' (from CSBH archive). See also `Meios de comunica c~ ao,
balan co e compromisso', late 1980s PT newspaper (pp. 2-3), from CSBH archive.
67One PT founder from S~ ao Paulo reserved special criticism for Globo and other broadcasters, on the ground
that they, in contrast to newspapers and magazines, depend on public concessions and thus owe neutrality
to the public (interview with Donato).
68Interview with Kotscho.
69In the late 1980s, Santos would seek the presidential nomination of Brazil's most right-wing party, the
PFL, before aborting his candidacy.
90Amid the opposition ferment of the late 1970s, TV Globo functioned as the military's uno-
cial mouthpiece. TV Globo systematically emphasized { and occasionally exaggerated { the
military's accomplishments, especially on the economic front. Lawson (2002) summarizes
this aspect of the implicit understanding between Globo and the military: `...[The] Globo
network played an important role in supporting the military's ideological objectives by ad-
vancing an image of Brazil as an economic powerhouse.... In return, the network beneted
from repeated allocations of broadcasting spectra and from the general growth of a heavily
subsidized television market' (Lawson 2002, p. 184)
Equally, TV Globo omitted, distorted, and manipulated developments in order to weaken
and defame the political opposition. In some cases, TV Globo's censorship extended beyond
military dictates. For example, while the military forbade any airing of music by popular
artist and regime opponent, Chico Buarque, TV Globo forbade mention of Chico Buarque's
name altogether.70 During the new unionists' 1980 general strike, TV Globo drastically
underreported the number of striking workers, misrepresented union demands, and aired
statements from the industrialist, M ario Garnero, while cutting statements by Lula from the
broadcast.71 In a late 1980s interview on media, Jorge Baptista, journalist and PT leader,
remarked that `in a country of our dimensions, a political fact only becomes a POLITICAL
FACT (emphasis in original) when it manages to pass through the meios de comunica c~ ao de
massas...'72
In the PT's rst high-prole attempt at municipal governance (in Diad^ ema), the party `did
not enjoy a sympathetic national press; there was extensive reporting of intraparty conict
and of the PT's mistakes in Diad^ ema, and very little coverage of successful eorts' (199;
for details, see 210). Remarkably, from early 1983 to early 1984, TV Globo did not cover
70See Beyond Citizen Kane.
71Beyond Citizen Kane.
72Interview entitled `Meios de comunica c~ ao, balan co e compromisso' in PT newspaper (date unknown).
91the Diretas J a! movement, which the PT led at the grassroots level.73 Only in the nal
month of mobilization (April 1984) did Globo provide coverage, `caving in' due to ratings
competition from other media outlets and mounting pressure from the public and from
sectors of inuential journalist unions,74 including Globo's own.
Moreover, before 1985, Brazilian parties possessed virtually no media platform of their own.
Federal law prohibited parties from purchasing television time, and the Lei Falc~ ao (1976-
1985) placed major restrictions on public radio and television advertisements, only permitting
parties to display static party logos and candidate pictures/blurbs. In a context of media
neutrality, the Lei Fal c~ ao and prohibitions on the purchase of media time might have helped
level the `playing eld', and thus beneted the early PT, by preventing the richest parties
from pouring millions of dollars into slick, eective campaign ads. Given the conservatism
of network coverage, however, these laws denied the PT the only opportunity it might have
enjoyed to control a mass-consumed set of party messages and images.75 In this way, the
law magnied the political inuence of Brazil's Globo-dominated mass media establishment.
Given the legal constraints on public political advertisements and the legal prohibition of
private television and radio ads, Brazil's dominant media networks, despite their dependence
on public concessions, eectively `lled the void', pushing a broadly conservative agenda and
sometimes broadcasting `open propaganda', both positive and negative, in order to inuence
electoral outcomes.
The PT and media post-transition
Relative to other media, television grew in political inuence after the transition to civilian
731.5 million individuals participated in the movement's nal demonstration, on April 16, 1984.
74In a campaign bulletin from 1983-4, a group of journalists running for union positions (and presumably
aliated with the PT) decried Brazilian media for their imbalanced coverage of the Diretas J a movement.
The critique focused on the Globo network (bulletin entitled `Jornalistas de oposi c~ ao: Boletim de Campanha
Chapa 2' (date unknown).
75Interview with de Filippi.
92rule. By 1989-90, almost ninety percent of Brazilians obtained political information from
television, either primarily or exclusively (Porto 2003: 291). Meanwhile, print media pen-
etration remained weak. As late as 2000, only four daily newspapers were sold per one
hundred citizens. In the early 2000s, only two thirds of Brazilians could read beyond a basic
level, while only a third boasted more than a secondary education. Brazil continues to lag
behind most of the world, including most middle-income Latin American countries (e.g.,
Argentina, Chile), in newspaper readership.76
Given the outgoing military's relatively high level of support during the transition, especially
from the economic elite and middle class, Brazil experienced a slow, incomplete transition to
democracy, which the military largely `imposed' (Karl 1990). Relative to more discredited
outgoing militaries in the region (e.g., in Argentina), the Brazilian military retained consid-
erable powers post-transition (Stepan 1988; Valenzuela 1992).77 Some scholars of the post-
transition period have focused on the persistence of `traditional politics' (Hagopian 1996)
and the military's eorts, through legal measures, to impose ocialist successor parties and
prevent the formation of external, anti-establishment parties like the PT (Mainwaring 1999;
Power 2000). Others have focused on more specic issues such as budget allowances, weak
civilian oversight of the military, and military control of the police, the intelligence services,
and state enterprises (Stepan 1988). Relatively few scholars of the Brazilian transition have
highlighted `authoritarian enclaves' in the media domain.78
Some of President Figueiredo's nal actions in oce presaged what would follow under the
Sarney and Collor administrations. In the `waning days' of military rule, Figueiredo `awarded
a number of licenses to political allies, even altering the planned allocation of broadcast
76Porto (2003): 291.
77Scholars have referred to these powers as `prerogatives' (Stepan 1988), `tutelary privileges' and `reserved
domains' (Valenzuela 1992), and `authoritarian enclaves'.
78Although see Porto (2003, 2012), who identies the Brazilian president's eective retention of broadcast
media prerogatives as a major and ongoing impediment to full democracy.
93frequencies to dierent cities so that space on the radio spectrum would be available where
it was politically expedient' (Boas n.d.: 2-3). According to petistas Jos e Dirceu and Jorge
Baptista, these concessions included multiple radio channels for federal deputies Jos e and
Marcinino Camargo, the latter `linked to Maluf and the PDS'.79
Under the Sarney administration (1985-90), the distribution of local television and radio
licenses on political grounds `reached a new level' (Porto 2012: 63). The president and his
communications minister, Ant^ onio Carlos Magalh~ aes, `extensively used broadcasting licenses
as political currency' (Porto 2012: 63; see also Motter 1994). Of the 1028 TV and radio
concess~ oes that Sarney dispensed during his term, he distributed 539 (over half of the total)
in the nal nine months of the 1987-88 Constituent Assembly. Of these, he awarded nearly
one-hundred to assembly representatives who, in exchange, supported the continuation of
Brazil's presidential system and a one-year extension of Sarney's term (Motter 1994; Porto
2003: 294; Boas n.d.).80 Broadly, Sarney and Magalh~ aes awarded coveted concessions to
state-level allies and supporters (sometimes family members),81 conditional on legislative
support, ground campaign help, advantageous local and regional media coverage, and/or
other political favors.
Although Brazil's 1988 constitution transferred control of concess~ oes to the Communications
Ministry and mandated congressional approval for awarding/canceling concessions, separate
provisos such as the extension of licenses to fteen years, exemptions for rebroadcasting
stations, and quorum and voting rules for congressional approval allowed the media estab-
79`Meios de comunica c~ ao, balan co e compromisso', late 1980s PT newspaper, from CSBH archive.
80`During the rst three years of the new democracy, President Jose Sarney and Communications Minister
Antonio Carlos Magalhaes { both powerful political bosses with media holdings themselves { authorized
broadcasting concessions for 91 representatives to Brazils Constituent Assembly. Evidence suggests sub-
stantial back-room dealmaking: many concessions were granted during the most intense months of delib-
eration on the new constitution, and legislators who received licenses went on to vote overwhelmingly in
favor of several key amendments supported by Sarney' (Boas n.d.: 3).
81President Sarney awarded sixteen new licenses to members of his own family (Porto 2012: 63-4).
94lishment and the Communications Ministry { and hence the president { to retain eective
control (Amaral and Guimar~ aes 1994; Porto 2003).82 Amaral and Guimar~ aes (1994) summa-
rize that `[t]he Constitutional Assembly of 1988 frustrated the dreams of those who backed
the democratization of the Brazilian system of radio and television broadcasting via constitu-
tional reform... [T]he wording of the 1988 law cemented the old system... [T]he possibility of
change by administrative means is clearly dicult, if not impossible' (Amaral and Guimar~ aes
1994: 34).
Five years after the Constitution's passage, Armando Rollemberg, president of the national
Journalists' Union, could generalize that `political favoritism' remains `the only criterion'
for awarding concess~ oes.83 Analysts estimate that, as of the early 1990s, two thirds of local
television licenses fell under the direct or indirect control of politicians who had received
concessions from the federal government.84 Moreover, in an analysis of twenty-one Brazilian
states, Amaral and Guimar~ aes (1994) found that in nineteen, a single individual or group
owned both the leading newspaper and television station.
The identities and political allegiances of Brazil's local and regional mass media barons did
not shift appreciably after the transition to civilian rule. Under the Nova Rep ublica, just
as the traditional coroneis of the military era retained their rural clientelistic voting blocs
(Hagopian 1996), the electronic coroneis of the military era, through connections to the
Sarney and Collor administrations, retained media assets and alliances and `moved to estab-
82Porto (2003) writes: `Although the new constitution included measures that restricted the politically
motivated use of TV and radio licences, electronic colonelism continues to be a key feature of the Brazilian
political system.... Nevertheless, the constitution also established quorum and voting rules in order for
Congress to reject licences authorised by the Executive, making it very dicult for the Parliament to reject
them. The changes also left out of Congress control the repetidoras, the relay stations that retransmit the
broadcasting signals of the networks. This `lapse' allowed presidents to continue using licences as political
currency, as did Cardoso in his successful struggle to get Congress approval of his right to run for re-
election'.
83Quoted in Beyond Citizen Kane.
84Beyond Citizen Kane.
95lish dominant positions within local and regional media markets' (Boas n.d.: 2). In 1993,
Armando Rollemberg, president of Brazil's Journalists' Union, summarized that `[t]oday, all
the political groups that beneted from the dictatorship and the Sarney government are the
owners of the television and radio in our country. This is bad because these groups no longer
represent majority public opinion. The country changed.... [It] rejected the military dicta-
torship. But the military's supporters have control of the media in our country'.85 Porto
(2003) summarizes that `the New Republic was...a period in which the legacy of the author-
itarian past was not only maintained in some areas, but even strengthened. One example
was the expansion of electronic colonelism through Sarney's presidency' (293).
Equally, TV Globo's inuence did not wane under civilian rule. Both Sarney and Collor
had personal ties to Globo that predated and fueled their initial political ascents.86 During
the military period, the Sarney and Collor families controlled media empires in Maranh~ ao
and Alagoas, respectively, and both Sarney and Collor, before rising to regional political
prominence, had secured the exclusive right to rebroadcast TV Globo content in their home
states.87 Sarney and Collor thus owed their early political success, in large measure, to Globo.
Moreover, upon assuming the presidency, both Sarney and Collor suered from weaknesses {
low public support in Sarney's case, weak partisan support in Collor's case { that increased
their dependence on Globo and hence their susceptibility to Globo's inuence.88
The Sarney and Collor administrations manipulated regulatory enforcement to Globo's ad-
85Beyond Citizen Kane.
86Globo's subsidiary in Alagoas state, for example, played an important, perhaps decisive role in Collor's
1986 gubernatorial victory in Alagoas.
87Sarney secured the rights before the 1985 transition, Collor in 1986 (in time for his 1986 gubernatorial
campaign in Alagoas).
88Argemiro Ferreiro, editor of the Rio-based newspaper, Tribuna da Imprensa (1986-91), has observed that
the Globo network amassed immense power under Sarney because of the Sarney government's `weakness'
and resulting susceptibility to Globo's inuence (from Beyond Citizen Kane). Amaral and Guimar~ aes
(1994) summarize, along similar lines, that `[t]he Globo network...imposed its structure as a national
model on the civilian regimes that followed [military rule]' (32; emphasis added).
96vantage, actively contributed to the bankruptcy of NEC do Brasil and Globo's re-sale
purchase of the company,89 and also gave Globo executives, particularly Marinho, direct and
informal inuence over relevant appointments and policy matters (Porto 2003, 2012). In
the early 1990s, federal police arrested several individuals in Rio de Janeiro for watching a
humorous, pirated television segment in which a narrator, dubbing over a video of Marinho
speaking, showed viewers how to set up a pirated television transmitter.90
In short, Roberto Marinho and Globo reached the `apogee' of their `political power' under
Sarney and Collor (Porto 2012: 64).91 Between 1988 and 1993, TV Globo commanded 78
percent of Brazil's television audience, with penetration in over 99 percent of the Brazilian
territory, and with 99.9 percent of Brazilian televisions carrying the network. On the typical
night, fty-eight percent of Brazil's television audience, on average, tuned into TV Globo
for the Jornal Nacional and telenovelas (CITATION NEEDED).92 As of the early 2000s,
television remained `the most important medium in Brazil' and TV Globo `the dominant
network', with `an absolute majority of the national audience ratings' (Porto 2003: 291). TV
Globo's `dominance increase[d] during prime time', and Jornal Nacional remained `the main
TV news bulletin in the country' (Porto 2003: 291, 299). Consequently, politicians in the
Nova Rep ublica depended on access to TV Globo. Federal deputy, Paulo Ramos, observed
in 1993 that for legislative candidates, appearances on Globo { which Roberto Marinho
89NEC do Brasil was a Globo competitor and subsidiary of Japan's powerful, multinational NEC.
90Beyond Citizen Kane.
91By the early 1990s, Marinho had become one of three Brazilian billionaires and, according to many (in-
cluding Chico Buarque), the most inuential civilian in the country (Beyond Citizen Kane).
92TV Globo's popularity also stemmed from the beloved daytime show, Xou da Xuxa (`Xuxa Show'), which
aired from 1986 to 92). During prime-time hours, twenty-four percent of the national television audience
watched SBT (Porto 2003: 291). Along with SBT and Bandeirantes, TV Globo controlled 93 percent of
the television stations in Brazil and commanded 98 percent of Brazil's television audience (Amaral and
Guimar~ aes 1994: 28). During the mid- to late 1990s, Globo received far more television advertising revenue
than any other network, with approximately two-and-a-half times that of SBT, its nearest competitor
(Porto 2003: 291).
97occasionally vetoed { often made the dierence between victory and defeat.93
In implicit exchange for government favoritism, Globo awarded rebroadcasting contracts to
allies of Sarney and Collor. In 1986, after Sarney's communications minister, Ant^ onio Carlos
Magalh~ aes (ACM), helped engineer the bankruptcy of Globo competitor, NEC do Brasil, TV
Globo `broke an 18-year contract with TV Aratu' and awarded the exclusive rebroadcasting
rights to ACM's own TV Bahia (Porto 2003: 295).
More importantly, Globo and other networks continued to broadcast conservative news cov-
erage and even `open propaganda', despite the passage of important post-transition reforms,
which gave parties legal tools to respond to such abuses. TV Globo adopted a frequently
laudatory, infrequently critical posture toward the Sarney government, despite allegations
of rampant corruption and cronyism and the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions of the
late 1980s. In a 1986 interview, Paulo Frateschi, joint organizer of Apeosep, the S~ ao Paulo
state teachers' union, observed that Sarney's stabilization package in the late 1980s passed
`with TV Globo, Manchete, Folha, Estado, everyone there, displaying the plan as if it were the
great salvation'.94 Only when commercial interests dictated a critical approach (e.g., during
the movement to impeach Collor) did TV Globo provide more access to the opposition.
TV Globo's most agrant and egregious breach of journalistic neutrality took place during the
1989 presidential election campaign, which pitted Collor against the PT's Lula da Silva. In
the campaign, `Lula [had been] vilied day and night by the press', and not just Globo (Secco
2011: 141). The management of Estado de S~ ao Paulo, for example, imposed a pro-Collor line
{ not just a pro-Collor editorial position { on the paper's rank-and-le journalists.95 It was
TV Globo's unbalanced coverage of the Lula/Collor debate, however, that likely tipped the
93Beyond Citizen Kane.
94Published interview entitled, `A D vida  E Fabricada' (1986), from CSBH archive.
95Well-known reporter Augusto Nunes stated this publicly in 1988 (interview with Kotscho).
98polls in Collor's favor.96 In its prime time recap of the debate, the Globo's Jornal Nacional
gave seventy seconds more air time to Collor and, more importantly, heavily edited debate
segments so as to increase Collor's favorables and portray Lula as radical and dangerous.
Vianey Pinheiro, producer of TV Globo S~ ao Paulo at the time, called the Globo's prime time
coverage of the debate { which he participated in editing { a `publicity special for Collor'.
President of the national Journalists' Union, Armando Rollemberg, called the coverage a
`shameless manipulation' and `agrant breach of journalistic ethics'.97 During the 1989 cam-
paign, the PT produced a television parody of Rede Globo called Rede Povo, `displaying, with
great irony and creativity, facts...omitted by the mass media and alternative perspectives on
the big national issues' (de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 282).
It should also be noted that, after the 1985 revocation of the Lei Fal c~ ao, access to public
television remained highly unequal, a point frequently stressed by PT candidates after the
transition to civilian rule. A representative 1986 campaign ier for Clara Ant, PT candidate
for state deputy in S~ ao Paulo, decried the `anti-democratic division of free time on TV'
as `one of many maneuvers against the PT'.98 In many cases, publicly funded television
programs remained under the control of conservative individuals and groups. In a late 1980s
interview, PT leader Jos e Dirceu observed that with regard to curating personnel, public
educational TV in Brazil { and S~ ao Paulo's inuential RTC (R adio e Televis~ ao Cultura) in
particular { remained in `the times of the military dictatorship'.99
In short, following the 1985 transition from military to civilian rule, the media environment
96In a conversation with the author, a S~ ao Paulo-based journalist stated that, in his view, Roberto Marinho's
involvement in the 1989 election decisively aected the outcome (interview no. 6).
97The content and quotes in this paragraph come from Beyond Citizen Kane, a 1993 BBC documentary
censored in Brazil (rst fully and then outside universities) throughout the 1990s.
98From the CSBH archive.
99`Meios de comunica c~ ao, balan co e compromisso', late 1980s PT newspaper (date unknown: p. 3), from
CSBH archive.
99did not improve for the PT. As late as 2002, Brazilian mass media remained `profoundly
biased toward candidates of the [r]ight' (Lawson 2002: 200). PT leaders during the early
stages of the Nova Rep ublica constantly decried the politics of Brazilian media and pressed
for media reform:
 Many petistas who ran for legislative and Constituent Assembly seats in 1986-88 listed the democra-
tization of media as a central platform point (e.g., Pl nio Arruda Sampaio, Geraldo Siqueira).
 Summarizing a widespread view within the PT, Jorge Baptista, journalist and petista, commented on
possible media reforms in an undated, Sarney-era PT newspaper interview: `One [way forward], mainly
in relation to broadcast media, which are the most powerful, is through the control of concessions {
today a privilege of the president...used to benet the most well-connected (chegados), the closest to
home (os mais intimos da casa)'.100
 A 1992 PT election campaign manual stated: `In Brazil, elections have long been characterized by
radio and television abuses. In numerous elections, we have witnessed numerous instances of elec-
toral propaganda in radio and television programs, which end up directly interfering in the electoral
process... We know that...the stations (emissoras) will highlight some candidates. What we cannot
allow is for the stations, on the pretext of providing news, to do open propaganda for their favored
candidates and against their opponents'.101
 In a 1993 interview, Lula identied the hegemony of Globo as a central impediment to full democ-
ratization in Brazil: `Democracy presupposes freedom of communication, speech... There won't be
democracy without the democratization of mass media... If you have one outlet that every day talks
to sixty-, seventy-million people, and the control of the messages falls to a team taking ideological
orders from one man [Roberto Marinho]... one is deprived of any possibility of democracy'.102
* * *
In summary, under military rule and the early Nova Rep ublica, the PT confronted an inu-
ential, reactionary, Globo-dominated mass media establishment, at turns closed and hostile
to the left opposition. Media hostility impeded the PT's electoral progress, and low media
access constrained party elites.
Some analysts of Brazilian media have stressed the personal convictions of individual me-
dia owners, particularly Roberto Marinho, in explaining the conservatism of mass media
100`Meios de comunica c~ ao, balan co e compromisso', late 1980s PT newspaper (pp. 2-3), from CSBH archive.
101`Instru c~ oes sobre propaganda eleitoral for Elei c~ oes 92' (date unknown).
102Beyond Citizen Kane.
100in Brazil.103 This argument smacks of excessive voluntarism. The longstanding structure
of state/media relations in twentieth-century Brazil { not the chance preferences of media
moguls { virtually ensured conservative dominance of Brazil's airwaves and newspapers dur-
ing the PT's formation. Media corporations primarily sought prot, and in order to run
protable media enterprises, they depended on, or at least beneted greatly from, the good
favor of the political establishment.
The Globo conglomerate, for example, has long prioritized commercial interests over any par-
ticular ideological agenda. Throughout its history, Globo has cultivated relationships with
the governing elite, whatever the corresponding ideology. R adio Globo received its initial
concessions from Presidents Kubitschek and Goulart, to whom Roberto Marinho enjoyed
regular personal access. The military regime nurtured and favored TV Globo. After mili-
tary rule, Globo enjoyed a cozy, mutually advantageous relationship with Sarney and Collor
(1990-2). When public opposition to Collor became overwhelming, the Globo network `piled
on' for commercial reasons. Argemiro Ferreiro, editor of the Rio-based newspaper, Tribuna
da Imprensa, summarized in the early 1990s that the hegemonic Globo `[was] above all a com-
mercial enterprise'. Globo, he summarized, `aligns itself with whomever is in power', possesses
a `governista vocation', and functions as `a kind of ocial, or quasi-ocial, spokesperson for
the powerful (os donos do poder)'.104
In closing, it should be added that for the rst decade and a half, the PT, by and large, did
not pursue or make eective use of the scarce media opportunities that it did have. In the
1982 subnational elections, the PT's rst major electoral test, `[p]robably the least eective
element in the PT's [S~ ao Paulo] campaign...was the use of the mass media.... The party was
103Amaral and Guimar~ aes (1994); vanden Heuvel (1995); interview with Kotscho. Several scholars (e.g.,
Porto 2012) have observed that Roberto Marinho and other top Globo ocials personally held conservative
political views and used their inuence to shape political developments.
104Beyond Citizen Kane.
101not particularly successful in linking electoral positions with topical issues of the kind likely
to arouse journalistic interest. Few candidates succeeded in making use of those spaces that
might have been available TV talk shows, for example' (Keck 1992: 143).105 Although the
PT did become more media-friendly and -savvy over the course of the 1980s,106 the party's
relationship with media remained fraught. In 1988-9, the PT boycotted the grande m dia.107
Only in the mid-1990s did the PT end its `war' with mass media and begin to court all major
networks actively, recognizing the importance of media not only for campaigns but also for
governance.108
The incentive for organization
`ORGANIZATION'
{ Full caption, large and in bold, under Lula headshot
(PT campaign sticker, 1982)
During the PT's formative years, the Brazilian political context dictated that any externally
created party of the left must invest in organization in order to have a chance at success.
Given the inuential and reactionary mass media establishment, no party conceived outside
state structures, media-savvy or not, could have acquired a national following through media
appeals. Only a grassroots party like the PT could have succeeded. Selection eects thus
help explain the PT's organizational strength.
Yet the PT's investment in grassroots organization also stemmed from the explicit recog-
nition among party founders { a recognition powerfully evidenced in campaign materials,
105`The party had a great deal of trouble getting its message across in newspaper coverage of the campaign;
news coverage tended to either report party statements atly or to concentrate on the conict between
the PT and the PMDB' (Keck 1992: 143).
106Some petistas cite Eduardo Suplicy's 1985 campaign for the S~ ao Paulo prefeitura to illustrate the party's
media learning. According to one party founder, Suplicy's segment during the hor ario eleitoral gratuito
remains a PT model to this day (interview with Azevedo).
107Interview with Kotscho.
108Interview with Kotscho.
102internal party communications, and member interviews { that low access to resources and
a hostile, closed media environment made organization fundamental. The previous sections
have attempted to show that the early PT lacked access to state and private resources; that
Brazil's top media networks ignored and defamed the PT; that the PT, like all Brazilian
parties, could not purchase television or radio time; and that for free public advertisements,
the PT, initially, had to use a limited, ineective platform and, after the revocation of the
Lei Falc~ ao, still had to cram party and candidate advertisements into very short time slots.
The current section demonstrates that these conditions aected PT founders' organizational
calculus. Materially strapped, o the airwaves, and in competition with politicians and par-
ties that enjoyed considerable resources and media access, early PT leaders understood that
the party's rise or fall would depend on the size, ecacy, and durability of its grassroots
structures.
Archival research revealed thousands { and suggested the existence of hundreds of thousands
{ of campaign materials and internal communications stressing (1) the PT's penury, (2) the
mass media's manipulation of political news, boycott of the PT, and hostility to the PT,
and (3) the opposition's great wealth and extreme media favoritism. Crucially, PT elites and
activists also explicitly stressed that these diculties rendered organization vital. Copious
campaign pamphlets, activist manuals, internal analyses { as well as interview excerpts and
external analyses { draw the connection between the PT's low access to media and resources
and its reliance on volunteer activism and contributions:
1982 elections
 `The PT was a partido sem patr~ oes... Because of its very nature, it had nancial diculties. This...was
overcome (superada) by the eorts of the miltantes, who donated money, who raised money...and who
had a genuine identication with and commitment to the party... The militancia was the only thing
I had in 1982, the volunteer milit^ ancia [i.e., during his bid for federal deputy in S~ ao Paulo]. [Later
in the interview] There was no space at all (espa co nenhum) in the small, medium, or large media.
What is the media in Brazil? It has always been in the hands of the richest, most traditional families.
Even local media. They didn't interview us, cover us, or inform people about us. But they did cover
103other parties. There was simply no coverage of us.' { interview with Djalma Bom, new unionist and
PT federal deputy (1982-6)
 `[Barroso] depended exclusively (contava somente) on the sacrice and eort of comrade groups in
Vila Prudente, the ABC region, and other districts... [H]e didn't have resources...' { 1982 bulletin
from the Electoral Oce of PT S~ ao Paulo municipal councilor, Cl audio Barroso109
 `The PT doesn't have the support of the powerful. Our campaign depends on the strength and
union of our supporters.' { 1982 campaign paper entitled `Why to vote for the PT', section entitled
`Participate in the PT campaign'110
 `For workers, a strong and organized political party is fundamental in order to win power... In these
elections, our tool is the PT.' { PT campaign ier111
 `Only the organization of us workers will guarantee that our plan is realized.' { Campaign booklet
for Virginia de Angelis112
1986 elections
 `We're reaching the nish line of this electoral campaign. More than ever, economic power counts (se
faz valer). The PT's campaign evidently depends on other powers: the energy and will of those who
believe in this platform... THE DECISIVE MOMENT HAS ARRIVED. We're going to need all the
enthusiasm, availability, creativity and organization to take the platform of the Eder candidacy to as
many people as possible.' { Campaign bulletin for Eder Sader, federal deputy candidate from Rio de
Janeiro
 `The PT doesn't have the support of the rich and powerful for its electoral campaign. We need
your participation in order to spread the propostas of the PT. We depend on you.' { Campaign ier
for Eduardo Suplicy, SP gubernatorial candidate, and H elio Bicudo and Jac o Bittar, SP senatorial
candidates113
 Materials from Francisco `Chico' de Souza's 1986 state deputy campaign:
{ `All the economic power of the bourgeoisie is used to nance the millionaire campaigns of its
candidates.' { Campaign bulletin
{ A campaign ier emphasizes that the real world diers from what appears on television
{ `In contrast to other parties, we rely exclusively on the strength of our militantes' (Diferente-
mente dos outros partidos, n os s o contamos com a for ca dos nossos militantes) { Letter to
militantes, Nov. 5, 1986114
109From CSBH archive.
110From CSBH archive.
111From CSBH archive.
112From CSBH archive.
113From Edgar Leuenroth archive.
114From CSBH archive.
104 `In the electoral campaign we'll have to confront the economic power and electoral machines of the
patr~ oes, even the anti-democratic division of free propaganda time on TV (one of the many maneuvers
against the PT). It will be with the collaboration and eort of the workers themselves that the PT
carries its message to the population.' { Campaign ier for Clara Ant, S~ ao Paulo state deputy
candidate
 `Now the campaign begins in earnest. We're going to put our team on the eld. With enthusiasm,
with desire. We're going to confront economic power with creativity and intense work.' { Campaign
bulletin for Olinto Alves Leite and Wallace Dellamagna Sant'Ana, candidates for federal and state
deputy in S~ ao Paulo, June 1986115
Early campaigns broadly
 `The PT had much less money than the other parties... The milit^ ancia was everything.' { interview
with Ricardo Azevedo, founding PT activist and intellectual
 `My mandate was always very characterized by the grassroots (organicidade), exactly what I had
built for ten years.... I was always a public gure, but not very much of the mass media. My
process for building a mandate was always very linked to the grassroots party and the grassroots
union movement.' { Paulo Rocha, new unionist and ve-time PT legislator from Par a, describing
early campaigning experiences116
1989 presidential election (Lula v. Collor)
 `This is a campaign with scarce economic resources because the PT is a poor party that depends on
the contributions of its members, us, the workers. That's why your support is fundamental { your
desire to work and publicize the PT and Lula.' { From PT newspaper for Lula's presidential bid117
 The PT's ocial campaign manual for the 1989 presidential election states that, in the rst phase of
the campaign, `the entire party, each diret orio municipal, n ucleo, milit^ ante or liado of the PT...has
the responsibility to carry to the streets the true and only hope of change, which is Lula's candidacy
(1). The manual instructs militantes to contact `local radios and newspapers' and `feed them campaign
information on a daily basis, if possible. This scheme is fundamental for the PT and for the Frente,
given that the mass media's boycott of [our] campaign is big' (4). Apart from the local media strategy,
the manual focuses entirely on mobilization, describing the third and nal phase of the campaign as
`the moment of mass acts, rallies, agita c~ oes, and marches'.118
 In a manual for PT activist leaders, the Comit^ e Popular Pr o-Lula treats volunteer activism and
mobilization as the core of the PT's 1989 campaign strategy. The manual emphasizes that the
party's nancial constraints { `for popular parties and campaigns...always the biggest problem' {
necessitate the following measures: creative money-saving (e.g., using one's own typewriter to produce
party leaets); nding free or reduced-rate meeting places belonging to a companheiro; soliciting
contributions from other militantes and supporters; hosting fundraising barbecues and parties; selling
115Segment entitled, `Vamos Fazer Uma Campanha Criativa'. From CSBH archive.
116Interview with Paulo Rocha in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): 150-1.
117From the CSBH archive.
118Page number of nal quotation not recorded by author. From CSBH archive.
105party paraphernalia; forming `electronic brigades', making homemade videos, and showing them in
`homes, clubs, unions, communities, and even in public plazas'; `skillful' wall-painting `in order not to
create enemies'; and forming distribution groups to take printed materials door-to-door and to areas
with high concentrations of people, including factories, fairs, public transportation stops, schools,
busy streets, and avenues.119
 M ario Milani of Paran a's Coordena c~ ao de Propaganda distributed a manual to the state's municipal
campaign committees. The manual stated: `It is known that the printed media (newspaper, magazine,
and outdoor) and electronic media (radio, television, and cinema) are in the hands of the bourgeois
parties... The big propaganda agencies, the bankers, the multinationals, the agriculturalists, and big
business are armed with dollars to make their ideas count... If we use creativity, we will be able to
spread our proposals more eciently than they, who command the mass media.' The manual proposes
specic strategies, encouraging militantes, for example, to put up pictures of sts with a large `L' (for
Lula) and lling in the `ula' later.120
 `The issue of campaign nancing, in a party like ours, places on us the responsibility of linking the
issue tightly to the party organization and the organization of popular support committees for Lula.
We have to turn the nancial question into an instrument of organization for our support base. This
base cannot be composed solely of militantes for the parties in the Frente Brasil Popular, but must
expand to the point of organizing a network of contributors, willing to build a left alternative in the
country... It falls to the PT to motiviate the Frente and all the parties that compose it to embark,
with boldness (ousadia), on a fund-raising drive in order to avoid being suocated by the economic
power of our adversaries. Collor, Brizola (PDT), Ulysses [Guimar~ aes, PDT] and others have the
machines of the bourgeoisie to sustain them: planes, million-dollar fundraisers, free time on TV, press
coverage happen one after the other under our eyes. To contain this situation an unprecedented activist
eort is necessary [emphasis not in the original]. Every Lula supporter must be a fund-raising post.
Imagination must be placed in the service of seeking power. Dinners, parties, individual fund-raising,
lists, bazaars, barbecues, feijoadas must multiply across the country, in order to create a true pro-Lula
current.' { PT presidential campaign bulletin, no. 9 of 14121
 `Organizac c~ oes Globo, and especially the Rede Globo de Televis~ ao, give prominence to Collor's initia-
tive against some of Alagoas's maraj as [i.e., idle, well-paid bureaucrats]. The link between his family
and Globo is old: his father funded a media empire in Alagoas... His brother Leopoldo was Globo's
commercial director in S~ ao Paulo. The political bond between Collor and Roberto Marinho was
consummated in July 1988, with lawyer Jorge Serpa acting as intermediary... [Marinho and Serpa]
manufacture a name capable of deluding a segment of Brazilians...who can give the impression of
rejecting traditional politics. For this contract job (empreitada), they have relied on the directors of
powerful state companies like Osires Silva, ex-president of Embraer and Petrobr as, on owners of the
big construction companies (Murilo Mendes, S ergio Quintela), on leaders of the most reactionary busi-
ness sectors (like Rui Barreto, ex-president of the Associa c~ ao Comercial do Rio and Albano Franco,
president of the Confedera c~ ao Nacional da Ind ustria), on the ministers of the Army, Le^ onidas, and
Communications, Ant^ onio Carlos Magalh~ aes. The manufactured candidate... [At the bottom of the
paper] `The Movimento Pr o-Lula's nances do not receive help from the wealthy and the specula-
tors: they depend on the solidarity of militantes, supporters (simpatizantes), and voters (eleitores).
Raise money in all the activities you carry out, get contributions from friends, and send this suado e
carinhoso dinheirinho [`kind, hard-earned small sum'] to the account Lula 89 PT, no. 13.000-1, Ag.
0300x, S~ ao Paulo, Banco do Brasil { PT newspaper entitled `Brasil Urgente, Lula Presidente'
119From CSBH archive.
120From CSBH archive.
121From CSBH archive.
106 `[B]y 1988, political commentators counted the [PT's] ability to call upon its activists for social and
political campaigns as a political resource that almost made up for its lack of nancial resources.' {
Keck (1992: 238-9)
 `Perpetually short on funds, the PT [in 1989] depended heavily on the commitment and energy of its
militants' { Hunter (2010: 113)
1994 presidential election (Lula v. FHC)
 From `Os 13 pontos do Rui Falc~ ao: Manual de Campanha' (the campaign manual prepared by PT
president, Rui Falc~ ao, for the 1994 presidential race):
{ `FHC is the candidate of Itamar, of the sharks in power under Collor who tried to stop his
impeachment. For these candidates of the rich, money and colorful propaganda and the support
of the TVs, radios, and newspapers won't be lacking. Against them, we will put on the eld
the enthusiasm (garra) of the working class, the strength of the union movement, the energy
of popular organizations, the thirst for change from a nation that can no longer stand so much
injustice and corruption...'
{ The large media networks and the press, repeating what they already did in 1989 to elect Collor,
openly defended the government-supported candidate, Fernando the Second [i.e., FHC]... But
starting now we have a small slot on radio and television, to show the reality of things and
strike down accusations. Even more important: starting now, the famous and feared milit^ ancia
do PT, whom our enemies so criticize but observe with such envy, wakes up and enters the
contest...'
{ `In a campaign with few resources, like ours, each of our supporters' homes needs to function as
a kind of Residential Committee, with materials to distribute, propaganda out front, meetings
to talk about the campaign and prepare propaganda activities'
{ `The candidates of the rich and corrupt run their campaigns giving money to paid electoral
workers (cabos eleitorais). We run campaigns with the voluntary sweat and dedication of our
militantes.'122
1996 municipal elections
 `[Our] moral victory [in the 1996 municipal elections] came with the creativity and political will of the
milit^ ancia and our radical posture of confronting political and economic power with the petista mode
of campaigning: politicization of the debate, social mobilization, a campaign of activism (campanha
militante)... The election brought back rallies, marches, the PT star and ags, from Porto Alegre to
Bel em, from Campo Grande to Natal'. { `Um Balan co Petista' by Jos e Dirceu (reections on the
1996 elections)123
Access to civil society and
the capacity for organization
122From CSBH archive.
123From the Edgar Leuenroth archive.
107Low access to resources and media gave the PT an incentive to build a strong party orga-
nization. Access to civil society { in particular, to the new union movement, the grassroots
Catholic left, and elements of the Marxist left { gave party founders the capacity to succeed.
With rare exceptions and slight variations, PT members and scholars of the PT's formation
converge in identifying the new unionism, the Catholic Church, and Marxist left (often called
the `traditional' left or `organized' left) as the three core feeder groups, or vertentes, of the
PT.124
Due to time and resource constraints, the early PT leadership could not make a signicant
material or logistical contribution to the formation of local organs and nuclei. Major national
leaders visited local organs and civil society organizations to give speeches and provide
encouragement and advice,125 while the major Diret orios disseminated manuals for setting
up and sustaining nuclei, Diret orios, and electoral committees.126 But this was all. The
party c upula did little more than encourage local civil society leaders to build local nuclei
and Diret orios from the `ground up' { to assume party leadership roles, to draw volunteers
and administrative resources from their own organizations and movements, and to pool
participating individuals' resources, labor, and creative energies.
Keck (1992: 94) thus summarizes that, in order to maximize territorial expansion, early PT
leaders `[appealed] to leaders of already organized constituencies', mainly `leaders of unions
and grassroots movements, members of the CEBs, and members of the organized left'. A
124`Sobre a constru c~ ao partid aria', Raul Pont, June 1987 (from Edgar Leuenroth archive). Also, interview
with Sergio Alli.
125Although the national leadership faced time and resource constraints, major PT leaders (including Lula)
did play an important `ground-level' role by visiting established local party organs or local civil society
organizations to encourage leaders to create organs. In Paran a in 1982, for example, Lula once visited
twelve municipal Diret orios in a single week (Secco 2011: 59). Rural union leader Manoel de Concei c~ ao
played a critical, ground-level role in the formation of the PT in Maranh~ ao and Rio Grande do Norte
(Secco 2011: 59).
126A PT text from Belo Horizonte on electoral tactics, dated Christmas 1980, stresses `the urgent need for the
party to adopt a policy of quadro formation, of political consciousness-raising, so that in each municipality
our companheiros can walk on their own two feet without feeling disoriented' (from the CSBH archive).
108PT founder and unsuccessful candidate for governor of Pernambuco in 1982 captured the
early PT's reliance, for organization-building, on local civil society leaders:
`[The party] grew little by little.... [W]e built those PT nuclei, beginning from our relationship
with leaders in each place... The shift from boss (cacique) to collective must be a long, organic
trek, in the union, in the cooperative, in the association, in the neighborhood, in the community,
in the settlement, in the school, wherever there are people to organize' (emphasis not in the
original).127
In short, the PT's rst decade of organizational expansion occurred via `diusion' (Panebianco
1988: 50128): in a decentralized and spontaneous manner, led by `distinct party elites in dif-
ferent regions, without the presence of a strong center in charge of expansion' (Ribeiro 2010:
251-2).
In building its organization, the PT, in eect, created a new class of political elites. The
PT c upula called local civil society leaders and activists into the institutional sphere, and
through internal promotion within the party organization, these leaders and activists as-
cended to major leadership positions and became party candidates.129 A ier for petista
Luiz Gushiken's 1986 federal deputy campaign stressed that `[i]t's not enough just to elect
our candidate. We seek to strengthen the PT, with the training of hundreds of petista lead-
ers' (Edgar Leuenroth archive). Keck (1992) observes that as of the early 1990s, a growing
number of petistas were rising to leadership positions from within the party organization.
The PT and unions
The new union movement acted as the fulcrum of the PT's decentralized, grassroots, party-
building endeavor. Throughout the PT's formative phase, but especially in the early 1980s,
127Interview with Manoel de Concei c~ ao in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): 73-4.
128According to Panebianco's original denition, territorial penetration, as distinct from territorial diusion,
`occurs when the center...leads...the formation of local...party associations. Territorial diusion occurs
when...local elites construct party associations which are only later integrated into a national organization'
(Panebianco 1988, p. 50).
129Author's conversation with Ribeiro, .
109new union leaders became PT leaders, new union rank-and-le became PT rank-and-le,
and new union oces and members' homes became PT oces and meeting places. New
unions provided the PT with more leaders, quadros, activists, and rank-and-le members
than any other civil society movement or organization. In addition, new union subculture
and institutions, including the base-level internal democracy that had distinguished new
unions for years, carried over into the PT (Ribeiro 2010; Secco 2011).
The PT's new union base expanded and evolved considerably during the PT's early devel-
opment. In 1983, new unionists founded the Central  Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT) in
order to strengthen the new unionism. The autonomous labor movement had already begun
to extend beyond its original bases (e.g., ABC paulista, Porto Alegre) to new regions and
economic sectors. New unionists intended the CUT to accelerate this process. The CUT
founding thus provoked the military's last `gasp' of hard-line retrenchment. The Figueiredo
government struck at the heart of the just-formed confederation in 1983, intervening in an
ABC metalworkers' strike and arresting the top leadership, including Lula. Later in the same
year, the CUT carried out its rst general strike. Approximately two-million workers par-
ticipated, suggesting that the social force of the new unionism had already increased (Secco
2011: 268). Over the next several years, the CUT expanded, and autonomous labor grew
in stature. The CUT surpassed CONCLAT to become Brazil's largest union confederation.
The growth of the new unionism largely accounted for the expansion of the PT base and
infrastructure, and for the PT's increasingly national character, over the course of the 1980s.
In part, autonomous labor grew through the incorporation of rural unions, thanks to the
organizing eorts of the Catholic left's Pastorais da Terra.130 Prior to the 1983 founding
130A PT founder from Par a, for example, recalled the integral role that CEBs played in bringing rural unions
into the CUT: `...[W]ith the founding of the CUT-Par a, I came to lead its process of construction. In
1986, we won twenty-four rural unions, naturally, with much help from the CEBs, which were strong in
Par a' (Interview with Paulo Rocha in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): 149).
110of the CUT,131 urban new union leaders decided, somewhat contentiously, to include rural
unions in the confederation.132 Strikingly, more than a quarter (27.3 percent) of the founding
CUT signatories were rural unions (Secco 2011).
More centrally, the new unionism grew through the incorporation of public- and middle-sector
unions. During the late 1970s, private-sector industrial unions, typied by Lula and the
metalworkers, dominated the new unionism both numerically and in the popular imagination.
For most of the 1980s, however, the `paradigmatic labor struggles' involved bank workers
and teachers (Keck 1992: 193). Correspondingly, after Lula's long stint as the PT's rst
president (1980-7), two bank workers { Ol vio Dutra (1987-8) and Luiz Gushiken (1988-90)
{ occupied the party's top internal position. As the autonomous labor movement became
more middle-class, it became less confrontational, which spawned the creation, in 1986, of a
leftist CUT faction, the CUT pela Base, in S~ ao Paulo (Secco 2011: 268).
Although the moderation of autonomous labor led to similar changes in the PT's base,
program, and rhetoric and the development of a softer, more inclusive external image (Keck
1992: 193), it also periodically created tension with the PT. Despite considerable overlap
between the PT leadership and new unionist/CUT leadership, on occasion the PT criticized
the CUT for not taking more radical positions in favor of workers' interests (Keck 1992:
193). During the general strike of 1987, for example, a number of top PT leaders publicly
rebuked the CUT leadership for not exhorting rank-and-le unionists to participate.
The above notwithstanding, the labor movement remained the PT's backbone. In contrast
to CONCLAT, whose leaders' political allegiances varied, the CUT remained `basicamente
petista (with minority participation from other groups)' through the 1980s (Secco 2011: 68).
131New unionism's umbrella confederation (about which more later).
132Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 266).
111Given the internal diversity of the new unionism, the prole of the PT's main feeder unions
varied considerably across regions, within regions, and even within states. In the ABC
paulista and other urban areas (e.g., Betim, MG), industrial new unions played the dominant
role in building the early PT. In other, less industrial urban centers, middle-sector new
unions often played the dominant role (e.g., bank workers in Porto Alegre, teachers in Rio
de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte).133 In the Northern region, rural unions, in conjunction
with the Catholic Church, tended to lead the process. In a few places, the PT created new
unions, not the other way around { for example, in Maranh~ ao, where the state's dominant
PT tend^ encia, the PT de A co, under the leadership of Manoel de Concei c~ ao, recruited rural
workers into the new union movement.134
It should be emphasized that most Brazilian unions did not join the PT or the new union
movement. Many Brazilian unions had conservative leaders who rejected new unionism
in order to protect their own privileged relationships with the political establishment. A
signicant minority had left-wing leaders who, instead of supporting the new union movement
and PT, supported or belonged to Marxist parties, above all the PCB.
The PT and the Catholic left
The Catholic left played a vital role in the organizational development of the PT { especially
in urban peripheries and rural areas. In the formulation of Frei Betto,135 CEBs possessed
`autonomy and complementarity' in relation to the PT (as to the new unionism previously).
CEB members' anity with the PT largely stemmed from the characteristics and experiences
that they had shared with the new unions (e.g., class backgrounds, organizational cultures,
133On the role of teachers in the PT's early organization-building, see interview with Hamilton Pereira in de
Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 265).
134See Borges (1998): 96, cited in Secco (2011: 43).
135Priest, author, ALN militante, early PT supporter, and CEB enthusiast.
112commitments to equality, bottom-up change).136 Yet the PT's socialism added appeal for
many on the Catholic left, who, inuenced by Liberation Theology, believed that Marxism
and Christianity complemented one another. Betto famously claimed in 1986 that a `real
Christian' is a communist, and a `real communist' a Christian (Secco 2011: 45).
Members of CEBs and the Catholic left who participated in transition-era politics over-
whelmingly joined or at least supported the PT. Frei Betto described the early PT as a
`vehicle' for social and political transformation and the CEBs as the `gasoline station'. CEB
members drew political inspiration from their CEB experiences and set out to nd appropri-
ate vehicles, from the PT and new unions to the MST and many other civil society actors.
From the beginning, most CEBs operated in Brazil's urban periphery and countryside. At
the time of the PT's formation, for example, thousands of CEBs operated in peripheral S~ ao
Paulo alone. Because the Catholic left possessed a large grassroots base, CEBs, like the new
unions, fed into the PT en masse. Many CEB members created PT n ucleos de base. Some
CEBs simply became PT n ucleos. Tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of CEB members
became PT members, activists, and leaders. Lincoln Secco recalled that most PT militantes
in Greater S~ ao Paulo belonged to CEBs. Notable early leaders with CEB backgrounds
included Ol vio Dutra, Luiza Erundina, Marina Silva, and `many other less well-known or
unknown' petistas.137
Like the new unions, the Catholic Church provided important organizational resources, espe-
cially meeting places for PT nuclei and local committees. Both Lincoln Secco and a Catholic
Church scholar, in interviews, stressed that, given the resource constraints of the PT and
its base, local Catholic Church organs { though they did not contribute nancially to the
136On CEB/PT anity, see also Keck (1992: 97).
137Interview with Frei Betto.
113PT, even informally138 { provided meeting places for PT nuclei139 and even oered courses
in political consciousness-raising (conscientiza c~ ao pol tica).140
Because the Catholic Church, unlike the new unions, boasted a local infrastructure extending
to the far reaches and forgotten corners of the national territory, CEBs signicantly broad-
ened the PT's early territorial reach, especially in rural regions. The Catholic Church's
pastoral work in the Brazilian countryside `was fundamental for the PT's achieving a truly
national character' (de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 262). According to Marxist PT
founder Hamilton Pereira, the PT, through its linkages to the Catholic Church, `[became]
a party that [brought] along the various expressions of Brazil. Because the Church was] a
national institution'.141 Lula himself has observed on multiple occasions that the Catholic
Church played a more important role than unions in the PT's national implantation.142
The PT and the Marxist left
Brazil's Marxist left, from the beginning, had a complicated relationship with the PT. On
the PT's formation, the Marxist left included a pragmatic, gradualist, and institutionalist
Marxist `establishment', comprising the country's two oldest and largest communist parties,
the pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist Party (PCB, est. 1922) and Maoist Communist Party
of Brazil (PCdoB, est. 1962), as well as the MR-8, a PCB splinter and Brazil's third largest
Marxist organization (Keck 1992: 96).143 With the initiation of the abertura and distens~ ao in
138Interview with Secco.
139Interviews with Secco and Almeida.
140Interview with Rosemari Almeida.
141Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 262).
142Interview with Frei Betto.
143The MR-8, a PCB splinter party, originated in 1964 under the name, the Dissid^ encia Comunista de
Guanabara, before taking the name, MR-8, in 1967 to commemmorate Che Guevara's death. The `MR'
stands for Movimento Revolucion ario, the `8' for the day Guevara died (October 8, 1967). The MR-
8 gained worldwide visibility after kidnapping the United States' ambassador to Brazil, Charles Burke
Elbrick.
114the mid-1970s, the PCB had moderated, choosing to support the MDB, advocate a peaceful
democratic transition, and seek positions of power within Brazil's slowly changing political
regime (Secco 2011: 71). The PCdoB and MR-8 had adopted similar tactical positions as
the military regime became more soft-line from the mid- to late 1970s.
Given that the PMDB belonged to the center-left and, on creation, possessed national clout,
all Marxist parties that chose to participate in institutional politics had an electoral incentive
to join/support the PMDB rather than the PT.144 Following on their previous support for
the MDB, the PCB, PCdoB, and MR-8 joined the PMDB.145
Not only did the Marxist establishment resist the PT, throughout the 1980s this establish-
ment { and above all the PCB { vied with the new union movement and the PT for union
loyalties. During the initial autonomous labor ferment of the late 1970s and early 1980s, new
unionists had come to view the established Marxist labor leadership as insuciently radical,
willing to denounce peleguismo but not to `frontally attack' it (Secco 2011: 69). Secco (20110
summarizes that while in 1978, `it was dicult to radically separate PCB unionists and fu-
ture PT unionists', by 1980, dierences between the new unions and the formal, Marxist
union establishment had sharpened (Secco 2011: 67).
The division between Marxists and the PT/new unionism culminated in 1983, when PT
and new unionist leaders, in an eort to consolidate and strengthen autonomous labor after
the PT's electoral setback of 1982, formally separated from the Unidade Sindical faction of
Brazil's umbrella labor confederation CONCLAT { considered peleguista by the aut^ enticos
{ and founded the CUT. Unidade Sindical had included new unionists and most Marxist
labor leaders. The Marxists did not follow the new unions into CUT, opting to remain in
144This fact distinguishes the PT from Mexico's PRD. In Mexico, the PMS had a strong electoral incentive
to merge { and did merge { into the PRD because of Cuauht emoc C ardenas's national electoral clout.
145The PCB's decision to ally with the PMDB has led some commentators to charge the PCB with failing
to `connect with the new spirit of the epoch' (Rodr guez 2010: 146; see also Vianna 2001).
115CONCLAT.
Lincoln Secco summarizes that the PCB, `until the mid-1980s', boasted a `signicant pres-
ence' (capilaridade importante) in unions and `remained a strong opponent of the PT within
the union movement.146 As a consequence of this competition, animosity and distrust be-
tween the PT and the non-petista Marxist left often ran high during the PT's early devel-
opment. Among Marxists, for example, a rumor circulated `widely' that General Golbery
do Couto e Silva, author of Brazil's National Security Doctrine, had supported the PT's
development in order to divide the left and weaken the PCB within the labor movement
(Secco 2011: 72).
In a 1987 debate, Lula attested to the strength of Marxist parties' union presence during
the 1980s, asserting that `the big delay in forming the PT were the Marxists precisely'.147
An internal PT booklet from 1987-8 entitled `Os direitos dos trabalhadores e a Constituinte'
reects ongoing tension between the PT and Marxist establishment, criticizing `the com-
munists' for letting the PMDB co-opt them, and growing `comfortable' (acomodados) with
`third-rate government positions'.148
The above notwithstanding, elements of the Marxist left played a critical role in the PT's
organizational development. Taken as a whole, the Marxist left varied considerably on
whether to participate in institutional politics and, more centrally,149 on which party, if any,
to support. Although the Marxist establishment, as noted above, `jumped on the PMDB
bandwagon', many PCB, PCdoB, and MR-8 leaders and quadros defected and joined the PT
146Talk by Lincoln Secco at PT Diret orio Zonal in Pinheiros, S~ ao Paulo city.
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3wlv-Y5tOw).
147From Socialismo em debate, 1917-1987: 259, a 1988 multi-author volume published my S~ ao Paulo's
Instituto Cajamar.
148From CSBH archive.
149Only a small minority of Marxist groups opted not to participate in elections.
116during the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Jos e Genoino, Paulo Fonteles, Manoel de Con-
cei c~ ao, Jamie Santos). The PT also attracted numerous, more radical Marxist organizations
and networks. The Trotskyist Fra c~ ao Oper aria (Workers' Faction), for example, dissolved
into the PT wholesale.
The PT, in order to maximize its appeal to `on-the-fence' radical Marxists, tacitly permitted
dupla milit^ ancia, whereby petistas would enjoy license to remain active in { and primarily
committed to { other parties (about which more later). Consequently, a group of small,
radical Marxist parties (e.g., Democracia Socialista, PCBR, APML, and the MEP) joined
the PT while remaining independent and explicitly treating the PT as a front for their
revolutionary long-term goals (Keck 1992: 96).150 Other Marxist groups did not join the PT
but actively supported it, given the PT's external origins and ties to autonomous labor.
Unlike the new unionists and Catholic progressives, the Marxist founders of the PT did not
provide a large social base. In 1991, only ten percent of petistas belonged, or had belonged,
to Marxist organizations of the `extreme left' (Secco 2011: 48). These organizations were
small, vanguardist networks, many having engaged in `clandestine activity since the 1960s'
(Ribeiro 2010: 186).
Yet they `punched above their weight' by contributing abilities and characteristics other-
wise in short supply. Due to Marxists' internal discipline, education and debating skills,
mobilizing experience, and capacity for activist training, PT `radicals' (relative to `mod-
erates') exercised disproportionate inuence within the early PT organization, whether in
shaping the PT's early ideology and program,151 organizing and leading the rst base-level
150The PT's Marxist elements `considered the PT little more than an electoral front, or a space to be
occupied tactically, with a long-term view toward building a revolutionary party' (de Moraes and Fortes
(eds., 2008): 32).
151Many petistas focus on the education and rhetorical skill of the early PT's Marxist leaders and quadros.
These characteristics enabled the Marxist left to inuence the PT's ideological development, and also en-
117PT n ucleos and oces,152 training PT activists,153 advising PT elites,154 or assuming major
national leadership positions.155
Still, `[t]he importance of Marxists in the PT was always greater internally (na disputa
interna) than externally' (Secco 2010: 49). Although Marxists played a critical role in early
organization-building, they possessed a limited ability to sway individuals outside the party
abled many individual PT Marxists to win positions of inuence on the equipes of non-Marxist PT elites.
Keck (1992) writes that early Marxist petistas `maintained an impressive level of militancy and...seemed
exceptionally articulate' (95). One early petista and campaign consultant summarized that the Marxists,
unlike the new unionists and left Catholics, possessed a detailed program (interview with Sergio Alli). A
Marxist ex-petista made the general observation that Marxists, given their education and skill in argu-
mentation, often dictated internal negotiations with the new unionists, both nationally and subnationally
(interview no. 3). Given the general weakness, `chaos', and `deciency' of the PT's internal press (Secco
2011: 108), the party's Marxist networks, with newspapers like Em Tempo and O Trabalho, dominated
internal public communications (Secco 2011: 110).
152Several members and analysts have emphasized the Marxists' role in mobilizing local PT networks and
creating local and state party organs. Ribeiro (2010) stresses the Marxist left's `high capacity for mo-
bilization and activist regimentation' (251). Two individuals, one a PT founder and leader, the other a
younger Marxist ex-petista, summarized that Marxists at the time of the PT's formation possessed invalu-
able experience in political mobilization, which enabled them to play a disproportionate role in member
recruitment and training at the local level and in the creation of local and state Diret orios (interview
with Azevedo and interview no. 3). Marxist parties, networks, and cliques played an especially important
party-building role in urban areas, where most lived, had received an education (often a college educa-
tion), and could lead, mobilize, recruit, educate, and train individuals in a variety of local movements and
organizations, from student and neighborhood associations to the new unions.
153Marxists brought with them an emphasis on activist and leader conscientiza c~ ao (consciousness-raising)
and training. Djalma Bom recalled that the Marxist tend^ encias conscientizou many petistas, including
himself (interview with Bom). One Marxist ex-petista observed that the Marxists inuenced the popular
leaders (e.g., new unionists) as much as the popular leaders inuenced the Marxists: `O marxismo se
concretizou e o concreto se marxizou' (interview no. 3). In 1986, the PT, at the insistence of Marxist
petistas, created a centro de forma c~ ao pol tica, the Instituto Cajamar (de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008:
282), and mandated, with limited success, that ten percent of party funds go to political training. Secco
(2011) writes that in practice, the PT never fully adhered to this internal statute.
154Secco (2011) observes that many Marxists became formuladores for new unionist PT elites, although they
often had to tone down their ideological views in order to hold these positions (48).
155Due to their political experience and high education levels, Marxists also assumed a disproportionate
number of major national leadership positions. Half of the PT's rst National Executive Committee (ten
of twenty) were new unionists (Secco 2011: 64), and most of the remainder were Marxists. (Most of the
new unionists in the CEN belonged to middle-sector unions, not industrial unions, further evidencing the
importance of education for attaining the highest positions within the PT (Secco 2011: 64).) While a
new unionist, Jac o Bittar, served as the PT's rst national secretary of organization, most members of
Bittar's oce belonged to the Marxist left (e.g., Jos e Dirceu, Jos e Ibrahim, Jorge Baptista) (interview
with Azevedo).
118fold. For this reason, Secco (2011) writes that `the CEBs and new unionism were the two
most important social vectors of the PT's formation' (49; emphasis not in the original).
In places where new unions played the dominant role in early PT organization-building,
both the Marxist and Catholic left typically played important secondary roles (e.g., the Pas-
torais Oper arias in the ABC paulista; the Trotskyist Democracia Socialista (DS) in Porto
Alegre). Moreover, and crucially, where new unions did not have a strong presence, the
Catholic left and Marxist left played the leading roles, in some cases sharing the respon-
sibilities of organization-building. Melo (1994) observes that in developed urban localities
dominated by traditional unions (as distinct from new unions), the Marxist left and al-
iated movements/organizations typically spearheaded the party-building process, while in
rural localities, the Catholic grassroots left often `led the way'. In Rio de Janeiro, Belo Hor-
izonte, Fortaleza, and Londrina, where most unions did not aliate with the new unionism,
Marxist intellectuals and activists, in conjunction with other groups, took responsibility for
recruiting members and setting up local oces (Keck 1992; Melo 1994). In more rural states
such as Acre (Keck 1992),156 Par a,157 Para ba,158 Piau ,159 and Goi as (Ribeiro 2010: 251),
CEBs associated with the Pastorais da Terra played the leading role. In Vit oria, the capital
of Esp rito Santo, CEBs played the leading role. In Par a, Goi as, Para ba, and Rio Grande
do Norte, the Marxist left made important contributions, especially in supplying top PT
ocials (e.g., the PCdoB and MR-8 in Par a).160
156As of the early 1990s, Acre was the only Brazilian state in which the PT had achieved full organizational
penetration at the municipal level (Keck 1992: 101).
157Interviews with Avelino Ganzer and Manoel de Concei c~ ao in de Moraes and Fortes (eds. 2010).
158Secco (2011: 43-61).
159Secco (2011: 43-61).
160`You know that the PCdoB tried to build the PT in some states. That's what happened here [in Par a].
So much that the president of the provisional committee was Paulo Fonteles of the PCdoB, the secretary
general was a guy from MR-8, Jamie Santos' (interview with Paulo Rocha in de Moraes and Fortes, eds.,
2008: 148). On Marxists in Rio Grande do Norte, see Secco (2011: 43-61).
119* * *
The PT beneted from ties to other civil society organizations and movements as well.
From the mid- to late 1980s in particular, the PT's societal linkages broadened from its
original bases, as the party `managed to absorb a large part of [the] energy'161 associated
with the Diretas J a! movement (1983-4)162 and the MST (est. 1984) (about which more
later).163 Landless workers, for example, played a key role in building the PT in Mato
Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. In addition, the PT drew from neighborhood associations
in Rio de Janeiro,164 the health movement in Sorocaba, S~ ao Paulo, public transportation and
environmental activists in Cubat~ ao, S~ ao Paulo, textile workers in Para ba, favela associations
and public transportation users in Santo Andr e, S~ ao Paulo, and neighborhood associations
and post-materialist movements in several cities (Secco 2011: 43-61).
These additional civil society ties notwithstanding, the PT, for early organization-building,
primarily depended on the new unions, the progressive Catholic Church, and the Marxist
left. Individuals and networks from these three groups performed the large bulk of early
organizational work. Early territorial expansion tended to occur in the areas, predominantly
but not exclusively urban, where the new unions, Catholics, and/or Marxists had a strong
presence. Elsewhere, the early PT, in the typical case, did not become heavily implanted.
Building a mass organization
A large membership and infrastructure do not, in themselves, make party organizations
strong. What made the PT strong was the size but also, crucially, the commitment of
161Phrase from talk by Lincoln Secco at PT Diret orio Zonal in Pinheiros, S~ ao Paulo city.
162Secco 2011: 119.
163Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): 266.
164Benedita da Silva, future PT governor of Rio, became involved in the PT through her leadership in Rio
favela associations.
120its base. The PT's adverse context of formation not only created an incentive for party
leaders to invest in territorial organization, it also selected for early party-builders, or `early
joiners' (Greene 2007), with high levels of commitment. Consequently, the early PT built
an organization with impressive territorial reach, composed of `believers' (Panebianco 1988:
26-30).
The size of the early PT's
infrastructure and base
The early PT established a mass activist base and extensive local infrastructure in multiple
regions of the country. Nuclei, Diret orios, and dense activist networks sprouted up in the
industrial and urban municipalities of the Southeast (e.g., S~ ao Paulo, Minas Gerais) and
South (e.g., Rio Grande do Sul, Esp rito Santo) and in select rural states (e.g., Acre, Par a)
due to the concentrated presence of civil society feeder organizations.
PT membership `shot up' during the 1979-81 period. In May 1980, the PT counted roughly
30,000 members (Rodr guez n.d.: 231). By June of the following year, the number had
multiplied seven fold, to approximately 200,000, or 0.36 percent of the national voting-
age population. By July, the PT had organized state Diret orios in twenty-one states and
claimed more than 20,000 members in four states: S~ ao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro,
and Rio Grande do Sul (Secco 2011: 50). On Secco's (2011) summary, at the time of the
1982 elections, `the PT was in the main states and already boasted a milit^ ancia even in the
Northern region, more distant from Brazil's major political and economic centers' (50).
As the PT set out to fulll the legal requirements in 1979-80, the national leadership, along-
side the formal party organization, actively encouraged the development of informal partic-
ipatory nuclei { something not mandated by law. From 1980 to 1982, the period of greatest
base-level PT ferment, thousands of petista activists created n ucleos de base: informal base-
level networks, composed of at least 21 petistas, which met in houses, garages, churches, etc.
121to discuss, debate, and plan party-related matters. The nuclei did not receive nancial aid
from the PT and often sold party paraphernalia to nance their activities.
In many cases, PT nuclei succeeded base-level structures linked to PT feeder organiza-
tions, especially CEBs.165 `The PT's conception of the nucleus...had an anity with the
organizational form of the base communities of the Catholic Church', especially due to the
`profoundly anticentralist bias' underlying both organizational forms (Keck 1992: 104). Nu-
clei `mimicked' the CEBs, according to Secco (2011: 78). Keck (1992) nds an association
between rates of nucleus formation and CEB density (104).
N ucleo membership peaked around ve percent in 1982 but fell precipitously over the course
of the 1980s (Secco 2011: 84, 263). Many n ucleos dissolved into campaign committees and
local Diret orios.166 While in 1982 the PT boasted roughly 1000 n ucleos with nearly 30,000
individuals participating (Secco 2011: 80), the number of n ucleos had fallen below 700 by
the mid-1980s (Ribeiro 2010: 263) and to 200 by the mid-1990s (Ribeiro 2010: 87).
After 1981-2, the PT's membership and formal infrastructure expanded in a relatively steady
manner. At 0.36 percent in 1981, the PT's membership as a proportion of the voting-age
population rose to 0.44 percent in 1984, to 0.60 percent in 1988, and to 0.74 percent in 1995
(Ribeiro 2010: 244). With regard to party infrastructure, by 1985 the PT had organized
municipal Diret orios in 1100 of 4022 Brazilian municipalities (Secco 2011: 117). During
the second half of the 1980s, the PT, largely due to the CUT's expansion into rural and
new urban areas, made considerable organizational advances outside S~ ao Paulo state. By
1989, the PT had established a municipal branch in nearly half (44 percent) of Brazil's
municipalities. In absolute terms, in 1989, the PT boasted 625,000 members (Keck 1992:
165Interview with Frei Betto.
166`Confusion over specic functions of nuclei within party, coupled with precarious intraparty communica-
tions, tended to erode nucleus formation over time'. Many nuclei were `absorbed into electoral committees
in 1982 and never reconstituted' (Keck 1992: 104).
122110). By the mid-1990s, the number approached one million.
Adversity, selection eects, and the
commitment of the PT's early joiners
Many petistas characterize the party's organizational push during the 1980s as an undertak-
ing of Himalayan diculty, achieved through force. Primarily, the diculty stemmed from
the need to recruit hundreds of thousands of new members. Given the PT's low media access,
early organizers had to engage in `person-to-person' (corpo a corpo) recruiting, and given the
party's lack of resources, they could not oer selective benets. Instead, they had to inspire
individuals to devote their time and labor to the nascent PT. Further, in recruiting petistas,
party-builders had to compete both with the MDB/PMDB, which urged Brazilians not to
`waste their vote' on the PT,167 and with the PCB, which boasted strong ties to sectors of
organized labor and considered itself the authentic party of the Brazilian working class.168
When recalling the initial years of development, petistas often stress the diculty of sat-
isfying the legal organizational requirements,169 and the negative electoral consequences of
the voto vinculado.170 Keck (1992) writes that the PT gained legal status in 1980 against
`seemingly impossible obstacles' (Keck 1992: 93), referring to the legal organizational re-
quirements for registry. Paulo Rocha, PT founder from Bel em, Par a, recalled that in Par a,
`we legalized the PT almost by force (meio na marra), with the creation [of oces] in eigh-
teen municipalities'.171 The voto vinculado law, in eect for the 1982 elections, slowed the
PT's electoral progress by forcing the party to run viable legislative candidates in executive
167The PMDB launched a `voto  util' campaign against the PT in S~ ao Paulo in 1982.
168Interview with Djalma Bom, published in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 90).
169E.g., Interview with Djalma Bom in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 89-90).
170Interview with Raul Pont in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 226).
171de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 148
123elections that they stood no chance of winning. 172
Rodr guez (n.d.) summarizes that the PT's early organizational development involved `an
extraordinary eort' to incorporate `distinct groups and sectors across an extensive territory'
(Rodr guez n.d.: 225). Two founding petistas oered especially vivid accounts of early
diculties. First, in an unprompted statement from a published interview, Djalma Bom
observed that although the conjuntura of the late 1970s facilitated and `contributed to the
creation of the PT',
`the hardships were immense [emphasis Bom's]. You cannot imagine how hard it was to create
the PT'.173 Later in the same interview, Bom reiterated the point: `You cannot imagine the
diculties of forming the PT. [People] thought we wouldn't meet the legal requirements. But
the thing went forward, with all the diculties we had.... The legislation itself militated against
(cerceava) the creation of political parties. We had to redouble forces (n os tivemos que nos
desdobrar) in order to satisfy [them]'.174 In the state of S~ ao Paulo alone, the PT, by late 1980,
had to establish more than one-hundred municipal oces in order to achieve registry: `We
would travel into the countryside, without anything, with an old Volkswagen Beetle, and we
did not have money. During that period, at midnight, the tolls opened at midnight allowing
us to pass for free, so we would wait... Everything was very dicult'.175
One of the initial MDB defectors, Irma Passoni, described her 1982 campaign for federal
deputy in similar terms:
`I didn't even spend much money. The little debt I accrued I paid o in the following term.
The political campaign was assumed by all the militantes. There were people who made notes
on papel de p~ ao and gave them to people... It was really complicated, involving a lot of sacrice
and suering as well. The diculties increased when I was the PT's secretary of Organization
and I went to create the party's provisory committees. If it was hard here in the capital, it
was much worse in the interior. We were called communists, revolutionaries, I don't know
what. How were we going to organize the PT in the 120-something municipalities necessary
[for legalizing the party]? It was an insane task. The initial construction of the PT in the
interior was done by workers who had left the ABC and by members of the community. I was
172Anticipating this, an internal tactical paper from Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais in Christmas 1980 stresses:
`[W]e seek to elect lots of municipal councilors, some mayors, and to avoid the defeat of deputy candidates
without a chance of winning, who would stand a reasonable chance of winning for the PT if they ran for
municipal councilor or mayor' (`Elei c~ oes em debate: Uma t atica eleitoral para o PT', from CSBH archive).
173de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 95.
174de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): 89-90.
175de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 90).
124secretary of Organization without any estrutura, without a cent. We slept in the homes of
community participants, we ate in their homes, and they often had little to eat. That's how
we built the PT.176
For the PT, the diculty of early party-building also stemmed from the repressive atmo-
sphere of the late 1970s and 1980s. Unlike the PMDB, the PT and its feeder groups (both
before and after the PT's formation) originated in a `hostile context' (Rodr guez n.d.: 225).
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Marxist left, autonomous urban unionists, and rural workers
{ at dierent periods, in dierent regions, and to varying degrees { suered repression at
the hands of government forces or local oligarchies. Although the general public often did
not know about or give special salience to the repression of workers, the PT did. Campaign
materials from the 1980s demonstrate that PT leaders frequently invoked the repression of
workers in order to galvanize and grow the base.
Marxists suered much of the torture and murder under hard-line military rule. Autonomous
urban labor, in contrast, suered very little extreme repression. Military and police killed a
relatively small number of urban new unionists from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s (e.g.,
Manoel Fiel Filho in January 1976; two strikers in Leme, S~ ao Paulo, soon after the transition
to civilian rule). More often, government forces intervened in unions to remove the leadership
or broke up strikes, hurling political epithets at workers and their collaborators and arresting
union leaders. In 1979, the Figueiredo government arrested dozens of top new union leaders,
including Lula, and detained them for weeks in April/May 1980. In response, Lula and
fellow new union leaders carried out a hunger strike, leading to their eventual release.
During the PT's formative phase, no feeder group suered greater repression than au-
tonomous rural workers and the actors who helped organize them (above all, the Catholic
176Passoni continues: `That's also what happened in the national organization of the PT. The available
estrutura was that of the mandatos of the deputies.... We depended on militantes at the regional level:
in Piau , Cear a, Rond^ onia, Acre... And that's how we built the PT in all of Brazil, with the eorts of
each individual, in each place, with each person's resources. It was born from the forces that each person
possessed...' (interview with Irma Passoni in de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 318-9, 321).
125left). Like their urban counterparts, autonomous rural workers frequently faced interven-
tions and verbal abuse from military, police, and local elites. Yet for rural workers, forceful
interventions only `scratched the surface'. In rural Brazil, local oligarchies enjoyed near total
impunity due to the weakness of civil society, media, and the state. Between 1975 and 1989,
these oligarchies, sometimes aided by military and police, murdered 1377 rural workers in
agrarian conicts (Petit 1996: 142).177 Murders of rural workers spiked during the 1987-
88 Constituent Assembly, when the push for land reform intensied. PT leader Hamilton
Pereira recalls: `It was the period in which we were mobilizing to interfere in the Constituent
Assembly, 1987-8, that the degree of violence in the land struggle climaxed (chega ao parox-
ismo). Every third day a union leader, a nun, a priest, someone involved in the land struggle
was killed'.178 In the rural states where the early PT established a strong presence (e.g.,
Par a, Acre), `the PT necessarily reected these struggles' between rural workers and local
oligarchies (Secco 2011: 46; also see Petit 1996 on the PT's development in Par a).
The adverse conditions of the PT's formation (scarce resources, low media access, repres-
sion, disadvantageous electoral laws) created powerful selection pressures. The party's lack of
access to resources and media and steep organizational barriers to entry made early party-
building non-remunerative and highly labor-intensive. Repression raised the cost of par-
ticipation for certain feeder groups, especially rural workers in the Northern region and
certain Marxist networks. These diculties, along with the party's dim short-term electoral
prospects at the national level, `weeded out' political opportunists and selected for `true
177In addition to the murders, local oligarchies and allied military and police frequently intervened in rural
worker strikes and demonstrations, displaying force and verbally assaulting both union organizers and the
poor, often illiterate rank-and-le. A rural CUT leader, PT founder, and senatorial candidate recalled a
representative episode in which military ocers halted a mass demonstration of autonomous rural workers
in Rur opolis, Par a in May 1980: `We were surrounded and monitored by military personnel on all sides...
It seemed like the end of the world because there was enormous persecution. They invented things that
I didn't understand... When they said that we were communist, I didn't know what communism was. I
didn't understand anything' (de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 170).
178Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 266).
126believers', or the ideologically committed. Given the low short-term benets and often high
short-term costs of participation, individuals without strong ideological convictions, by and
large, did not join the PT, even if they leaned left politically.
PT members and observers have noted as much. Bruhn (2008) treats the PT's early de-
velopment as comparable to that of Mexico's PRD. Citing Greene (2007), she writes that
both were `antisystem parties, founded in the course of a struggle against an authoritarian
regime and with the explicit purpose of confronting that regime.... Such parties are of in-
terest only to people with extreme views who are driven by ideology more than the desire for
power.... They are natural-born protesters' (165; emphasis not in the original). Djalma Bom
recalled in an interview that `the PT milit^ ancia used to be warlike (aguerrida)... Things
were much harder, but we did things with much more happiness and solidarity (integra c~ ao)
(de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 95). In a 2008 interview, Ol vio Dutra, one of the PT's
central founders, stressed, `[a] party that enters the government runs the risk of...rapidly
attracting opportunists of all stripes who want benets'.179 The PT, he observed, `did not
arise from public oce, either legislative or executive, but from the struggle of the Brazilian
people' (de Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 124). A PT founder and campaign consultant
similarly observed that while most Brazilian parties depended on clientelism, the PT, with
no executive power, relied on a social base driven by conviction, not material incentives.180
But what conviction drove early petistas? In order to fuel local party-building eorts, party
leaders must provide some type of incentive to activists, and if leaders cannot distribute
selective material incentives (jobs, money), they must oer collective incentives: an identity
and/or set of goals shared widely by party members, which transcend individuals' desire for
wealth, power, and status (Panebianco 1988: 24).
179de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): .
180Interview with Alli.
127Petistas did not rally around a single positive ideology (about which more below). Members
and feeder networks ran the gamut of left ideologies, from orthodox Marxism to pro-capitalist
social democracy. Equally, petistas did not coordinate around the goal of ending the military
dictatorship. If the desire to end military rule had fundamentally animated petistas, they
would have joined the PMDB, which also opposed the military regime, advocated a swift
end to military rule, and, crucially, possessed far greater electoral clout than the PT.
If not united by a specic, positive ideological vision, or by simple opposition to the military
dictatorship, what positive goal and/or identity did early petistas coordinate around? Why
were such a diverse range of individuals willing to devote time and labor to an electorally
marginal party-building project?
From the PT's inception, PT leaders branded the party, and members viewed the party, as a
novelty in Brazilian history: the rst authentically popular expression in a society perpetually
dominated by elites.181 The PT's popular origins distinguished it from all other Brazilian
parties, including the opposition PMDB. During the PT's early years, campaign literature
explicitly `lumped the PMDB in' with the rest of the bourgeois political establishment.
Petistas characterized the PMDB as a domesticated and articial opposition, cut from the
same elite cloth as all the other parties. A 1982 ier for a group of PT candidates from
Rio de Janeiro, for example, described both the PDS and the PMDB as the parties of `the
landowners and factory owners'.182 In contrast, the PT, to quote one campaign booklet, was
oposi c~ ao pra valer (`an opposition that counts').
In an illustrative quotation from a 2008 interview, PT leader from Minas Gerais, Luiz Dulci,
explained why the PT, in its earliest days, did not dissolve into, or at least ally with, the
progressive Tend^ encia Popular of the MDB:
181Interview with Alli and interview no. 3.
182From the CSBH archive.
128`Look, it wasn't due to dierences in political platform. There were dierences in that respect,
but they were surmountable (contornaveis). In my opinion, the root problem, even if no
one recognized it openly, was the forma de fazer politica'. When asked, `In what sense?', he
replied that `the parlamentares of the MDB did in fact have deep democratic convictions and
sincere social commitments, but theirs was a traditional vision of the party...with an exclusively
institutional conception of politics. They had causes in common with Lula and with us [the
PT], but they did not give the same weight as we did to social movements, nor to the whole
of civil society; they didn't think it was possible to create a party from the bottom up, truly
participatory, in which the popular classes acted directly and above all became politically
educated in order to lead the state one day. We wanted more than to restore representative
democracy...We wanted to give [representative democracy] a new quality, making each citizen,
in their daily life, an active political subject'.183
Early campaign materials focus on the popular character of the PT, not the characteristics of
individual PT candidates, who often shared platforms verbatim and ran unitarily. Countless
homemade and party-produced pamphlets and iers emphasize that the PT's distinctiveness
lay in its popular origins. These texts claimed that political change could only come de baixo
para cima (from the bottom up), and that the PT alone involved the masses in the political
process. A 1982 campaign ier for Roberto Martins, PT candidate from Bahia, stated that
`[a]t this electoral juncture, the PT distinguishes itself from the other opposition parties,
calling all the people to organization and struggle'.184 Early PT slogans included, `A worker
votes for a worker', and the Portuguese rhyme, `Vote number three [the PT's ballot number],
the rest is bourgeois'.185
The PT's authentically popular origins gave it a m stica that resonated across the left spec-
trum, including with Marxists. During the initial years especially, the PT's unique socio-
logical prole attracted a wide range of left groups, including many on the Marxist left.186
In the words of one Marxist ex-petista, the PT's `founding myth' of popular authenticity
`permitted incredible diversity'.187 Marxist PT leader Raul Pont recalled in a 2008 interview
183Interview with Luiz Dulci in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 204).
184From the CSBH archive.
185From CSBH archive.
186Personal communication with Ribeiro.
187Interview no. 3.
129that although Marxists did not agree with many of the PT's positions, the PT was the party
that Marxists had been waiting for, `dreaming about':
`[In the 1960s], we wanted [a party with a real social base] but there were no workers, no
laborers, not even masses. [There was a] ferrada repression, a smaller working class, unions
with pel^ egos... So we said: `Look, the PT is the party we dreamed of, the party we always
fought for, a party of the workers, so we don't need to remain outside. We don't need to
ght for the complete line today, tomorrow. It's a process. What's important is for the party
to be of the workers, class-based. Our role here is to ght to make it internally democratic,
anti-capitalist, protective (defensor) of democratic socialism..."
Although the PT would spend the 1980s almost entirely out of government, the PT's gov-
erning ethos, established later in the party's history, would reect a continued fundamental
emphasis on popular participation and empowerment. When the PT began to win important
positions in the late 1980s and 1990s, party elites trumpeted the modo petista de governar,
which centered on popular participation, over any particular ideological or programmatic
goal (Samuels 2004). The party's most innovative and inuential experiment in municipal
governance (Porto Alegre, 1989-2005) achieved world renown due to participatory budgeting,
not to specic social policies such as education or health reform.
In sum, from the beginning, the PT's popular identity, and the goal of putting the reins of
government in workers' hands, animated petistas and, crucially, extended their time horizons.
Petistas sought to transform Brazil's historically elite-dominated political system and knew
that success, given the PT's utter marginality in the 1980s, would require dogged persistence.
Accordingly, party leaders explicitly downplayed the signicance of particular, short-term
electoral victories, keeping their gaze xed on radical political transformation. Describing
his 1982 campaign for governor of Rio Grande do Sul, for example, Ol vio Dutra stated:
`We had a disposi c~ ao incr vel. A very spontaneous thing.... We clearly understood that [the
public] machine and the state were responsible for all the inequalities, the injustices, and the
situation that we had to change. There was a lot of heart, excitement, a very rooted conviction,
due to the social struggles, that the people had to play the leading role in history and that
130the PT had to carry this proposal forward, independently of whether we won the elections'
(emphasis not in the original).188
Keck (1992) observes that after the disastrous elections of 1982 (about which more below),
petistas rededicated themselves to union and social movement activity, `as if the election
campaign had represented a deviation from the normal goals of party activity' (153; empha-
sis Keck's). A leading early petista from Minas Gerais recalled that `[w]e wanted a mass
party but organic, activist, not just a party of public opinion. A party that didn't just op-
erate during election season'.189 In a 1986 internal PT interview, party leader Gumercindo
Milhorem Neto echoed an oft-voiced sentiment: `Winning an election doesn't mean winning
power. Power in S~ ao Paulo, in the cities and in the states in general, belongs to the large
property owners: the owners of car factories, of bus businesses, of transportation businesses,
the big ranchers, the big bankers; these are the powerful'.190 The PT's 1989 presidential
campaign reected the party's continued non-electoralist character, as party leaders know-
ingly took electorally suboptimal stands on potentially decisive issues (Hunter 2010: 112).
In particular, Lula and the national elite remained explicitly socialist, chose not to pursue
an alliance with the PMDB, and refused to condemn the increasingly aggressive MST, rec-
ognizing that such decisions would provide fodder for the conservative opposition (Hunter
2010: 112).
The above notwithstanding, the non-Downsian character of the early PT should not be
overstated. The internal life of the PT, almost from the beginning, did revolve around
elections. As noted above, the party's main grassroots structures for dialogue and debate
outside of elections, the n ucleos de base, only ever involved a small minority of party members
and weakened considerably very early in the party's history. Secco (2011) argues that `[t]he
188Interview with Ol vio Dutra in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 124).
189Interview with Luiz Dulci in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 204).
190Published interview entitled, `A D vida  E Fabricada' (1986). From CSBH archive.
131ephemeral nature of the nuclei had an obvious cause. Most activists got excited about (se
empolgava com) electoral campaigns' (Secco 2011: 85). After a couple of years, he states,
`elected ocials and [t]he leaders of tend^ encias and union organizations made careers, and
the bases went home' (Secco 2011: 77). Keck (1992) summarizes that, by the late 1980s,
the PT's `desire to maintain active grassroots party organizations outside of election periods
ha[d] gone largely unfullled' (121).
Organizational expansion
and electoral progress
Most of the PT's electoral progress during the 1980s followed from organizational expansion,
at the state and federal as well as municipal levels. The PT could only run municipal
candidates `where it had a diret orio', and for federal, state, and local candidates alike, `the
presence of a local party organization was important for mounting a campaign' (Keck 1992:
152). Activist networks `kicked into gear' for elections at all levels. Municipal and zonal
Diret orios served as local campaign headquarters (bases de campanha).191
Given the PT's lack of access to media and resources, the PT's votes, throughout the forma-
tive phase, tended to come either from PT militantes or from the persuadable voters they
managed to reach in person. Consequently, in electoral terms, the early PT performed best
in its organizational bastions (e.g., the ABC paulista). Keck (1992) nds that in the S~ ao
Paulo state election in 1982, the PT received less than two percent of the vote in 97 percent
of municipalities without a PT Diret orio, and over ve percent of the vote in 57 percent
of municipalities with one (152). Meneguello (1989) nds, more generally, that throughout
the 1980s, the PT's electoral results closely tracked pre-election organizational strength. In
places with local PT oces and large PT memberships, the PT performed well, indepen-
dently of other factors, even rally attendance.
191Interviews with Venturi and de Filippi.
132The PT's slow progress in large executive elections, far from reecting organizational weak-
ness, demonstrated that even an exceptionally strong grassroots organization could not com-
pete with the media empires and patronage machines at the disposal of PT opponents. One
party founder and intellectual recalled that for major executive elections, the Hor ario Gra-
tuito alone mattered more than the milit^ ancia.192 Yet in the smaller elections, especially
municipal elections and legislative elections at the state and federal levels, corpo a corpo
campaigning played a key role { often a fundamental, decisive role.193 Consequently, the
PT's performance in these lower-level elections tracked the party's steady organizational
progress, both in traditional strongholds and in parts of the national territory where the
PT developed new linkages with autonomous workers and other civil society actors. In its
rst decade in the Chamber, for example, the PT experienced an `incremental growth in
support' (Keck 1992: 160), progressing from eight (1982) to sixteen (1986) to thirty-ve
(1990) elected deputies.
Just as the PT's organizational strength contributed to electoral success, election campaigns
and electoral success contributed to the PT's organizational strength (Keck 1992: 123-66;
see also Bartolini 1983). Save the PT's rst major organizational push, when party-builders
set out to satisfy the legal organizational requirements for registry, the periods of greatest
organizational expansion occurred both in the lead-up to and wake of elections. In large mea-
sure, organizational expansion (particularly membership increases) during and after elections
resulted from the PT's heightened visibility and { following the 1985, 1986, and 1988 cycles
{ increased electoral credibility.
Equally, however, the PT intentionally `campaigned to organize' (Keck 1992: 123-66). Party
leaders consciously used elections, especially large executive elections (e.g., presidential, S~ ao
192Interview with Azevedo.
193Interviews with de Filippi and Azevedo.
133Paulo gubernatorial), to enlarge the permanent party organization, capitalizing not only on
heightened visibility and increased credibility, but also on campaign infrastructure. In the
lead-up to the 1982 elections, for example, Jos e Dirceu wrote that `the electoral campaign
[of 1982] will serve for us to expand the organized bases of the PT, doing recruitment drives
and nucleus formation simultaneously'.194 Also in the lead-up to the election, the S~ ao Paulo
state Diret orio's Secretary of Press and Publicity (Divulga c~ ao) emphasized in a campaign
strategy proposal that the grupos de apoio for the 1982 elections should become tomorrow's
PT nuclei.195
The trend continued for the remainder of the decade (and beyond). After the 1985 may-
oral elections, the PT carried out recruitment drives (Keck 1992: 109, 156). A Manual de
Grupo de Apoio for the 1986 congressional elections, written as a dialogue, asks whether
support groups can become permanent after the campaign and answers `yes', providing rel-
evant instructions.196 In a letter to PT militantes before the 1986 elections, Jorge Baptista
emphasized that `[t]he electoral campaign must serve the organization and consolidation of
our party: the PT'.197 A ier supporting Jo~ ao Ant^ onio for state deputy in 1986 read: `...[W]e
choose to run a candidate, envisioning the strengthening of the PT and the forma c~ ao of new
militantes, so that the party contributes to the advancement and politicization of popular
movements and unions'.198 A ier for Luiza Erundina's 1988 S~ ao Paulo mayoral campaign
reads: `The candidacy of Luiza Erundina synthesizes the PT's objectives in the electoral
progress: win the elections and, beyond that, impel party-building (impulsionar a constru c~ ao
194`O PT e as elei c~ oes de 1982'. From the Edgar Leuenroth archive.
195`A campanha eleitoral do PT: Divulga c~ ao e propaganda { uma proposta de discuss~ ao'. From the Edgar
Leuenroth archive.
196From CSBH archive.
197From the Edgar Leuenroth archive.
198From Edgar Leuenroth archive.
134partid aria), organize and conscientizar workers and the general population'.199
Organizational strength
and the survival of crisis
Not only did organizational strength enable the PT to make steady (albeit slow) electoral
progress in an adverse context, the PT's grassroots capacity and ethos fortied the party
amid early electoral crisis. The PT suered its most crushing setback very early, in the 1982
municipal, state, and congressional elections. The party had entered the electoral season, its
rst, with great optimism due to bottom-up fervor, the `great energy of struggle' (energia
grande de luta),200 and the unexpectedly large rally audiences associated with the PT's 1982
campaigns (Keck 1992: 141-4).
In particular, given Lula's national prole and strong performance in the 1982 gubernatorial
debates, petistas approached the S~ ao Paulo gubernatorial election with high hopes. Most
activists believed that Lula would win the governorship, arguably the second most important
oce in the country, and certainly the most important of the oces contested in 1982. `Ev-
eryone who participated...in the electoral campaign', recalled 1982 federal deputy candidate
Djalma Bom (S~ ao Paulo), `expected [Lula to be elected governor]. And it wasn't for nothing
because the largest rallies were done by the PT and Lula.... That created the expectation,
you know?'.201
Yet Lula placed a distant fourth in the S~ ao Paulo gubernatorial race. Ol vio Dutra, probably
the second most important leader in the party, placed last in the Rio Grande do Sul guber-
natorial race. The PT did elect municipal councilors (vereadores) in local strongholds across
the country, in S~ ao Paulo state, major urban centers in and out of the South and Southeast
199From the CSBH archive.
200Interview with Donato.
201de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): 96.
135(e.g., Bahia), and even remote, rural states such as Acre, Amazonas, Par a, and Rond^ onia
(Secco 2011: 50). Yet in a country with more than 4000 municipalities, the PT won only
two mayoralties, in the small cities of Diad^ ema, bordering S~ ao Bernardo do Campo, and in
Santa Quit eria do Maranh~ ao.202 In the Chamber of Deputies, the PT elected a paltry eight
legislators, three-and-a-half percent of the total.
Keck (1992) calls the 1982 results a `profound shock and disappointment to the PT' (Keck
1992: 149), which `the PT experienced as a severe defeat' (152-3), and after which `deep
disappointment and a kind of collective depression' set in (156). In the post-election analysis,
party leaders concluded, among other things, that the 1982 campaigns had distanced the
party from its civil society roots. The party initiated a `return to the base' and a renewed
emphasis on `social action' (Keck 1992: 197), both in the organized labor sector and more
broadly (Diretas J a!, the landless workers' movement). Unbeknownst to PT leaders, this
reinvestment in civil society would reap electoral dividends just a few years later.
With no elected oces to occupy, top party leaders (e.g., Lula, Ol vio Dutra, Jac o Bittar),
rededicated themselves to the autonomous labor movement. As discussed earlier, in 1983,
they founded the CUT, beginning a highly successful eort to broaden and strengthen the
new unionism over the next few years. The PT's renewed focus on social action quickly
came to involve other civil society actors and movements as well. In 1984, a set of regional,
previously uncoordinated landless worker movements joined to create the national Landless
Workers' Movement (MST). Land reform had already become an important element of the
PT platform { and would only become more important as the 1980s progressed, as the move-
ment strengthened and the push for land reform intensied. Although the MST eschewed
partisan involvement, landless workers and rural activists predominantly supported the PT
202One PT founder and intellectual attributed the PT's success in Diad^ ema, interestingly, to two factors:
the strength of the PT milit^ ancia, and the fact that Diad^ ema did not have a single TV or radio station
(interview with Azevedo).
136as of the mid-1980s. By the late 1980s, the PT `[had been] armed as the land struggle's
main partisan reference', especially given Luis Carlos Prestes' exit from the PCB.203
The PT's involvement in Diretas J a!, however, played a more central role in the party's post-
1982 rebound. The 1983-4 period gave rise to Diretas J a!, the largest social movement in
Brazilian history. The movement arose in early 1983 amid economic crisis.204 A combination
of economic slowdown and extreme ination eroded the military's legitimacy, and anti-regime
sentiment intensied. A wide range of actors, from political parties to movements and civil
society organization, joined to press for direct presidential elections. At its peak in early
1984, the Diretas J a! claimed 1.5 million participants.
While the PMDB led Diretas J a! at the institutional level, the PT led `on the street' (Secco
2011: 113). In November 1983, the PT lled S~ ao Paulo's gigantic Pacaembu Stadium for the
rst Diretas J a mass protest. An early petista observed that no other party could have begun
to mobilize such a massive crowd (interview with Alli). The PT's street-level leadership
during Diretas J a! enhanced the party's status in civil society, as did the PT's decision to
boycott the indirect election of 1985 (about which more below). Secco (2011) writes that
due to the PT's boycott, `its number of supporters and presence in social movements grew'
(e.g., in student movements) (Secco 2011: 119).
After the amendment for direct elections (the Dante de Oliveira Amendment) narrowly lost
in a congressional vote, the PMDB accepted the result and nominated a leader, Tancredo
Neves, to run in the indirect presidential election of 1985. The PT deliberated whether
to send its federal deputies to the Electoral College to vote for Neves. In order to reach
a decision, the PT held an internal vote. Twenty-thousand petistas participated, and an
overwhelming majority, eighty-six percent, voted to boycott the Electoral College.
203Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 266).
204In 1983, the Brazilian economy ground to a halt, and annual ination reached nearly 250 percent.
137Months before the mayoral elections of 1985, the PT's second electoral cycle, `many [PT
leaders] expressed doubt that the party would last out the year' (Keck 1992: 235). The
failure of the Diretas J a movement, as well as internal conicts over the decision to reject
a compromise solution, had `produced yet another internal crisis' (Keck 1992: 154). The
PT's perceived inability to translate civil society strength into institutional ecacy `was
causing a full-scale crisis of identity in the party' (ibid). The mayoral elections `were widely
seen as the great test of the party's organizational viability. Unless the results were a vast
improvement over the party's performance in 1982, party activists would more than likely
opt to concentrate their energies entirely on movement organizations', not the PT (ibid).
Yet the PT performed unexpectedly well. The party had mounted campaigns in nearly every
state capital, and petista candidates registered breakout performances across the board. The
PT's Maria Luiza Fontanelle won the mayoralty of Fortaleza (Brazil's fth largest city), and
unlike in 1982, PT candidates nished second or third in a number of other major municipal
contests. In Vit oria, Esp rito Santo and Aracaj u, Sergipe, for example, the PT placed second,
and in the all-important S~ ao Paulo mayoral race, the PT's Eduardo Suplicy nished a close
third with twenty percent of the vote.
In part, the PT's performance simply reected the party's new civil society ties, developed
since 1982. Crucially, however, the PT had also begun to solidify a distinctive party brand.
Although the PT's rm stand against indirect election led to the party's short-term marginal-
ization in the spheres of institutional politics and the national media, it helped cement the
party's image as a principled political actor, less willing to compromise for short-term polit-
ical gain than the center-left, establishment (situacionista) PMDB. Secco (2011) writes that
`this choice [to boycott the Electoral College]...reinforced [the PT's] external identity as a
group of social opposition' (119). The PT beneted, electorally, from its enhanced stature
among pro-democracy advocates, receiving a large portion of the `protest vote'.
138After 1985, the PT suered major electoral disappointments (e.g., Lula's losses in 1989 and
1994) but never ran a serious risk of electoral collapse, as in 1982 or 1985. The party made
steady electoral progress for the next decade. In the 1986 congressional elections, the PT
doubled its congressional contingent, jumping from eight to sixteen federal deputies. The
newly elected deputies included Lula, Ol vio Dutra, and several other major party leaders.
Former Marxist and PT leader, Jos e Dirceu, won a seat on the S~ ao Paulo state assembly.205
The 1988 elections `were a great leap forward'. The party elected thirty-one mayors, up from
one in 1985 and 1982. Luiza Erundina won the PT's major executive post, the S~ ao Paulo
mayoralty. The PT won three state capitals (SP, Porto, Vit oria), six mid-sized industrial
cities in SP state (including three in the ABCD region),206 and three small cities in Minas
Gerais (Hunter 2010: 81). The PT also performed well in rural districts where the party had
`worked closely with the landless movement and/or rural unions, labor organizations' (Keck
1992: 157).
After 1988, the PT, and especially Lula, became perennial contenders in major national and
subnational elections. Lula came within a `hair' of winning the 1989 presidential contest,207
and placed second again in 1994 (about which more below). In 1990, the PT doubled its
legislative contingent a second time, electing thirty-ve federal deputies and winning over
ten percent (10.2) of Chamber vote share, and in 1992, the PT, despite losing control of the
S~ ao Paulo mayoralty, elected fty-four mayors (up from thirty-six in 1988) and won its rst
governorships: the Federal District (Bras lia) and Esp rito Santo.
205Thus, after four years dedicated to a base, the PT's top national leaders { in Keck's (1992) words, the
party's `best-known and most legitimate spokespersons' (224) { was returning to institutional politics.
206Diad^ ema, Santo Andr e, S~ ao Bernardo do Campo
207The race, in a commonly used phrase, pitted `unorganized Brazil' (Collor) against organized Brazil' (Lula).
Lula won in the cities, with the votes of organized workers and sympathetic middle-class progressives, but
he fared extremely poorly among the unorganized poor and working class, especially in the undeveloped
Northeast, where Collor and allied conservative patronage and media machines dominated. Coronelismo,
both material and electronic, narrowly won the election for Collor.
139Chapter 3 Avoiding schism in the early PT:
the indispensability of Lula da Silva
So far, the chapter has examined the causes and consequences of the early PT's organizational
strength. Low access to resources and media created an electoral incentive for the PT to build
a strong organization, while access to civil society { union, church, and Marxist structures
{ gave the PT the capacity to succeed. Due primarily to these conditions, the early PT
developed a large base of activists and members, organized locally, with a high level of
commitment to the party's aims. Organizational strength accounted for the early PT's
steady electoral development, and the party's grassroots capacity and ethos fortied it amid
early electoral crisis.
The previous section identied the PT's perceived popular essence as the main collective
incentive fueling early petistas. Members' identication with and commitment to the PT's
popular character and narrative, however, did not eliminate centrifugal forces within the
party. Indeed, the sincere ideological commitments of petistas, while useful for elongating
activist time horizons and preventing electoral collapse, arguably made the party base less
pragmatic and thus threatened cohesion. As a rule, sectarianism plagues the most ideolog-
ical parties and movements (e.g., Marxism), given that internal currents, despite diering
from each other in seemingly minor ways, often prioritize ideological purity over political
pragmatism and compromise.
Moreover, PT blocs and factions diered in major, not minor, ways. From inception, the
PT was furiously expanding, rst, to achieve ocial status and, second, to prepare for the
1982 elections. In this process, the party prioritized territorial reach over internal coherence.
Leaders wanted to incorporate as many societal actors as possible, from across the left
spectrum. In order to attract the maximum range and number of feeder groups, the party
c upula openly welcomed and embraced internal dierence and, in order not to alienate
140any important actors on the radical or moderate left, refrained from espousing a specic
ideology. In the words of one Marxist ex-petista, if party leaders had ocially endorsed
any `systematic analysis' of the nation's current ills and proper direction, they would have
alienated important groups.208
The vast majority of early PT leaders, new unionists included, endorsed socialism in a broad
sense. Yet party leaders faced a dicult balancing act. On the one hand, they rejected rigid
Marxist doctrine, which just a fraction of the leadership and base espoused. On the other,
they sought to attract Marxists by making the PT's ocial ideology unspecic, open-ended,
and hence contestable. A vague petista socialism, or `democratic socialism', resulted. PT
leaders, including Lula, openly identied themselves and the party as socialist, but they
dened their socialism primarily in negative terms, `as a rejection of bureaucratic socialism
and social democracy' (Ribeiro 2010: 214).209 The more positive formulations of petista
socialism possessed little specic content: the emancipation of workers by workers, to be
realized in practice through internal and external democracy, not `worked out' a priori.210
Lula articulated o socialismo petista in his address at the PT's rst Encontro Nacional in
1981.
The PT succeeded in attracting a very heterogeneous set of actors, who not only diered in
ideology, but also hailed from disparate regions, belonged to dierent socioeconomic strata,
and identied with dierent subcultures. PT members and factions spanned unreformed
Marxism and the moderate left, the popular and middle sectors, the private and public
sectors, the full range of education levels, and developed and undeveloped areas of the coun-
208Interview no. 3.
209`Dened strictly in negative terms { as a rejection of bureaucratic socialism and social democracy { the
PT's democratic socialism never advanced, in almost thirty years, beyond' Lula's 1981 speech (Ribeiro
2010: 214).
210Keck 1992: 120-1.
141try.211 Secco (2011) emphasizes the `enormous regional diversity' of the early PT, observing
that local PT networks varied widely from state to state, and even municipality to munici-
pality, in their civil societal and ideological proles.212 Echoing the analysis of Keck (1992),
he stresses that the early PT `was not just one thing', but instead a patchwork of local or-
ganizations and subcultures, the character of each local branch and activist network largely
determined by the identity of the leading feeder group/s in the area.213
Although the PT's internal heterogeneity produced a range of conicts and tensions, dif-
ferences between PT moderates (primarily new unionists) and radicals (overwhelmingly
Marxists) posed the greatest challenge to cohesion. The early PT housed a large num-
ber of loosely organized new unionists and left Catholics and a large number of small but
very well-organized Marxist parties and organizations. From inception, the PT, in order
to attract Marxists, recognized the direito de tend^ encia, which permitted the existence,
within the PT, of formally organized factions (tend^ encias) that possessed specic ideological
proles and sought to inuence the PT's programmatic direction and occupy both public-
sector and party positions. The party thus originated as a party of, not with, tend^ encias.214
`Tend^ encias', Ribeiro (2010) writes, `are part of the petista DNA' (186).
Crucially, the PT leadership also tacitly permitted dupla milit^ ancia, enforcing virtually no
restrictions on tend^ encias' activities outside the party. Tend^ encias were allowed, although
not encouraged, to remain separate parties and explicitly to treat the PT as a tactical party
in the service of separate, revolutionary ends. Most did. On a standard view within most
211In the words of one founding petista, previously a founder of the Revolutionary Brazilian Communist
Party (PCBR), `you had a large number of MDB legislators, you had the university movement, the art
world, the world of journalism, the public sector you had many areas that came together to create the
party' (interview with Apol^ onio de Carvalho in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 22).
212Talk by Lincoln Secco at PT Diret orio Zonal in Pinheiros, S~ ao Paulo city.
213Talk by Lincoln Secco at PT Diret orio Zonal in Pinheiros, S~ ao Paulo city.
214Phrase taken from D'Amato (1964).
142Marxist tend^ encias, new unionists lacked full class consciousness and, barring `conversion',
would never pursue revolutionary ends. These tend^ encias thus treated the PT, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, as an electoral front and regarded their own participation in the PT as
a `tactic', not a `strategy'.
Indeed, new unionists did not subscribe to Marxism, at least its more revolutionary tenets.
According to one Marxist PT founder, new unionists feared Marxists' revolutionary dis-
course.215 In one characteristic reaction to radical members of the PT in Par a, a rural union
leader described the discussions surrounding the formation of the CUT in 1983: `There was
a part [of the text synthesizing the discussions] that talked about getting into power. The
language was very... [trails o ] I think they were people linked to the MR-8'.216
Workers' discomfort with Marxists resulted not only from ideological dierences, but also
from interpersonal barriers rooted in class dierence. New unionists' political views had
arisen, primarily, from working-class and union experience, not from reading and education.
PT workers often seemed not to respect PT Marxists, viewing them as disconnected intellec-
tuals, materially comfortable in their private lives, and limited in their experience of genuine
struggle. In early 1981, an internal PT document, circulated to clandestine Marxist parties
associated with the party, tellingly read: `If you want to enter the party that the working
class, the actual working class, is organizing, ne. You will be welcomed. But don't come
as owners of the truth, dictators of the rules for the masses' (Teixeira 1981, cited in Secco
2011: 95; emphasis not in the original).
Yet PT workers also, at times, seemed insecure about, and even resentful of, Marxists' higher
education levels. According to one Marxist PT founder, new unionists `knew nothing about
political theories, philosophies', and Lula, initially, `[was] so conscious of his origins that he
215Interview with Apol^ onio de Carvalho, de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008).
216Interview with Avelino Ganzer in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 171).
143didn't want to talk to intellectuals and students'.217 A Marxist ex-petista noted that, early
in the party's history, Lula openly admitted to having no idea what Marx or Lenin argued.218
For all these reasons, `...there was, in the PT, a kind of base-level, anti-intellectual worker
culture, even though [the party] had attracted many intellectuals since its founding' (Secco
2011: 94). A former urban guerrilla and initial PT enthusiast recalled that at an early PT
meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the new unionists in control of the meeting did not allow Marxist
intellectuals to take the microphone, only allowing oper arios to speak.219
Critiques of the radical tend^ encias by moderate petistas, Ribeiro (2010) writes, `are as old
as the tend^ encias' themselves (186). From the party's early days, such critiques crop up
regularly in internal party communications and usually center on allegations of duplicity,
insularity, and rigid dogmatism.220 Interestingly, new unionists encouraged the formation of
n ucleos de base, in part, to create union- and church-based counterweights to the Marxist
tend^ encias (Secco 2011: 78).
* * *
In sum, given the internal weight of ideologues in the PT as a whole, and the serious ideo-
logical and sociological dierences between PT groups, schism posed a threat. In the words
of Hamilton Pereira, Marxist PT leader,
`Initially, [the PT was] very strong and very fragile. It [was] strong because it [was] the meeting
place between the [Marxist] left...and a nascent workers' movement. Now, [it was] very fragile
because it was...born from a break with both the III International and social democracy... Only
the PT [was] more complex than that. It incorporate[d] people with a Church background and
the unionists... What was the result of this? The threat of low cohesion, of fragmentation (da
falta de coes~ ao, da fragmenta c~ ao).221
217Interview with Apol^ onio de Carvalho, de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): .
218Interview no. 3.
219Interview with Estev~ ao.
220Ribeiro (2010): 332, footnote 8; Dutra 1987.
221Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 264).
144Indeed, on numerous occasions during the formative phase, the PT seemed on the verge
of schism. Keck (1992) summarizes that in the rst half of the 1980s...it often appeared
that the diculties in resolving internal and environmental challenges would destroy the
party' (18). In particular, throughout the 1980s and rst half of the 1990s, conicts between
moderate PT leaders and radical elements of the PT base threatened the party's integrity.
The remainder of the section describes the PT's central internal conicts and analyzes why
the PT avoided fatal schism during the formative phase.
The PT's luta interna
From the beginning, petistas resolved their dierences, primarily, in a formal internal arena,
the sistema pol tico petista. In 1980, the PT established a formal internal democracy in
which the rank-and-le could assert control, directly and indirectly, over internal dialogue
and governance (Keck 1992: 91). Drawing on aspects of both new unions and CEBs, the PT,
from the beginning, put a premium on participatory democracy: `The PT's organizational
proposta was based, essentially, on the principle of participatory democracy' (Secco 2011:
81). While the PT's exible ideology would foster a sense among the PT's internal groups,
including the more radical minority groups, that they could inuence the party's direction,
the party's formal and informal participatory democratic institutions would provide channels
for the bottom-up shaping of party policy and principle.222
The formal rules of the sistema pol tico petista would go virtually unchanged until 2001.
These rules combined proportional representation (with a ten-percent minimum) for forming
the national and subnational oces, or Diret orios, and winner-takes-all majoritarianism for
forming executive committees, or Executivas. All PT members were eligible to participate in
ocial party meetings, Encontros, at the municipal or (in large cities) zonal level. Municipal
222Interview no. 3 and communication with Ribeiro.
145and zonal Encontros sent delegates to state Encontros, which in turn sent representatives
to the national Encontro. At every level, Encontro attendees elected representatives to the
national, state, municipal, and zonal oces, or Diret orios, by proportional representation.
Tend encias had to receive ten percent of the Encontro vote in order to receive a minimum
of representation in the corresponding Diret orio.
Encontro members typically voted as part of tend^ encias, the `parties of the petista political
system' (Ribeiro 2010: 186). The tend^ encia or coalition of tend^ encias that held the absolute
majority in a Diret orio appointed all members of the corresponding executive committee, or
Executiva. Only in Rio Grande do Sul did the state Diret orio allot internal executive posts
via proportional representation.223
A large number of Marxist feeder organizations became tend^ encias immediately upon join-
ing, including the particularly eective and inuential Trotskyist groups, (Causa Oper aria,
Converg^ encia Socialista, O Trabalho). Given the number and ecacy of Marxist tend^ encias,
`the tend^ encias', in informal PT parlance, became shorthand for the `revolutionary leftist
currents and parties acting within the PT' (Keck 1992: 118-9).
During the 1980-2 period, Marxist tend^ encias exerted enormous inuence internally, both in
organizing the party at the local level and in shaping the party program. As already noted,
in the initial rush to achieve registry and expand the ground organization in preparation for
the 1982 elections, the national leadership devoted scarce energy to issues of programmatic
coherence and internal discipline, partly due to lack of time (Keck 1992: 121), partly in
order to avoid imposing on segments of the base. This state of aairs created fertile terrain
for well-organized Marxist petistas who wished to control the party message and program in
their local bastions.
223Interview with Raul Pont in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 225).
146On the PT's ocial analysis, the incoherence { and, at times, the militant stridency { of the
party's November 1982 campaign harmed the party electorally. After the electoral debacle,
the internal inuence of Marxists became a top concern for the PT's moderate, largely
new unionist leadership. Despite their numbers, moderate PT leaders lacked the discipline,
and internal focus/ecacy of the PT's left tend^ encias. Party leaders concluded that the
interaction of Marxist ecacy and organizational decentralization, and the resulting absence
of a single and minimally pragmatic party line, had thwarted and would continue to thwart
the party's external electoral ambitions. By underinvesting in the luta interna, moderates
had allowed radicals' undue inuence over the party message, ultimately handicapping the
party at the ballot box. Moving forward, electoral progress would require a minimum of
coherence and pragmatism in the party program.
The 1982 election marked a watershed in PT history for two reasons.224 First, PT moderates
created a large, formal, centrist bloc, the Articula c~ ao dos 113 (henceforth Articula c~ ao). In
creating the Articula c~ ao, the PT's moderate center set out to formalize and consolidate its
dominance, with a view toward imposing at least a modicum of programmatic moderation
on the entire party. On Keck's (1992) summary analysis, the founders of Articula c~ ao sought
to create a `unifying political center' (Secco 2011: 93) and `impose a relatively unied vision
of the party's nature and goals' (Keck 1992: 114). `The formation of Articula c~ ao was
an attempt to consolidate leadership of the party.... It represented an eort to impose a
relatively unied vision of the party's nature and goals, not to the point of eliminating
factional dierences, but at least as the expression of a clear majority' (Keck 1992: 114).
Rodr guez (n.d.) similarly characterizes the Articula c~ ao as an attempt by Lula and allies
to formalize their status as the PT's dominant coalition. Ricardo Kotscho simply called the
224The electoral setback of 1982 proved `crucial in [the PT's] early development' (Keck 1992: 124), leading
to a new `period' of PT history according to some. From talk by Lincoln Secco at PT Diret orio Zonal in
Pinheiros, S~ ao Paulo city.
147Articula c~ ao the `center of the PT'.225
Second, as discussed earlier, during the same period (late 1982 to early 1983), PT labor
leaders, many simultaneously involved in the creation of Articula c~ ao, `returned to the base'
on the view that the party had grown too distant from its civil society roots. As a central
element of the `return to the base', PT labor leaders created and nurtured the CUT. PT
moderates hoped and intended, with the CUT initiative, to increase the internal leverage of
moderates by strengthening the new unionism. Thus, both the creation of the Articula c~ ao
and the `return to the base' `were attempts to consolidate [leadership] of the party in the
hands of labor movement leaders and those they considered their allies' (Keck 1992: 153).
The rise of Articula c~ ao
Articula c~ ao's founding leaders spanned new unionists, left Catholics, and Marxist leaders and
intellectuals. Lula did not formally join Articula c~ ao but, according to Secco (2011), led the
bloc `symbolically' (93). Articula c~ ao's leaders included all the `strongest personalities'226 and
`main names of the period' (Ribeiro 2010: 187), including Lula (informally), Ol vio Dutra,
and Benedita da Silva. According to Marxist petista Hamilton Pereira, radicals who joined
the Articula c~ ao did so as `a service to the consolidation of the PT' (F and F 2008: 265).
In June of 1983, 113 party leaders published the Articula c~ ao's manifesto, the Manifesto
dos 113. In positive terms, the manifesto continued in the tradition of petista socialism.
Articula c~ ao armed socialism but kept its positive vision vague and open-ended, to be
contested and realized in practice through mass participation and democracy, both in and
out of the PT.
In the manifesto, the Articula c~ ao also situated itself between the `vanguardist' and `elitist'
225Interview with Kotscho.
226Interview with Donato.
148poles of the party { on the one hand, the Marxist tend^ encias and, on the other, more prag-
matic, conservative sectors that placed too much emphasis on short-term electoral politics
and insucient emphasis on the party's civil society linkages (Keck 1992: 114; Secco 2011:
94).
In truth, however, the goal of reining in the Marxists constituted the primary motivation for
creating Articula c~ ao. While arming socialism, the Manifesto dos 113 dened Articula c~ ao
in clear opposition to traditional Marxism. Various tenets and characteristics of Marxism
received censure, including bureaucratization, vanguardism, the treatment of the PT as a
tactical front, and the treatment of the present conjuntura as an early, bourgeois-democratic
`stage' in Brazil's development toward communism (Secco 2011: 94; Ribeiro 2010: 214). The
manifesto reserved its most pointed criticisms for petistas de duas camisas who `subordinate
themselves to parallel commands' and `enclose themselves in the proposal of a traditional
vanguardist party that deems itself representative of the working class'.227
Ribeiro (2010) thus summarizes that PT leaders created the Articula c~ ao in order to `maintain
hegemony' over the leftist factions in particular: `The construction of a large faction [the
Articula c~ ao] was the measure found to attempt to restrain the activity of the leftist groups'
(186, 187). Along similar lines, Secco (2011) observes that the Articula c~ ao arose more as
an antitend^ encia', `an eort to contain (enquadrar) the tend^ encias and centralize the party'
(Secco 2011: 123).
The Articula c~ ao quickly established a dominant internal position. In the Articula c~ ao's rst
internal election in 1984, bloc members won two thirds of the delegate seats to the third
National Encontro in 1984. From 1984 to 1986, `the Articula c~ ao began to impose on the
entire party its critiques of the other tend^ encias' behavior' (Ribeiro 2010: 188).228 Among
227Documento dos 113. Articula c~ a dos 113, S~ ao Paulo, June 1983.
228Interestingly, the Articula c~ ao's rst major imposition targeted the more elitist, institutionalist sectors of
149other things, Articula c~ ao leaders insisted on a more inclusive and less strident campaign for
the 1985 mayoral elections. Keck (1992: 155) thus observes that in 1985, the PT adopted a
more inclusive and humorous campaign tone and even made better use of media in certain
elections (e.g., the S~ ao Paulo mayoral race). The party ran more middle-sector candidates
and paid more attention to the middle sectors and other demographics (e.g., housewives)
(155).
After the PT's unexpectedly strong performance in the 1985 elections, the Articula c~ ao con-
solidated its dominance. Basking in the glow of the PT's strong electoral results, Articula c~ ao
wrested or retained control of the vast majority of zonal, municipal, and state Diret orios and
increased its dominance within the Diret orio Nacional, having elected nearly three quarters
of the delegates at the IV Encontro Nacional.
Executive proportionality
and dupla milit^ ancia
As the Articula c~ ao consolidated its dominance, tensions between PT moderates and rad-
icals escalated. The creation and consolidation of the Articula c~ ao both exacerbated and
brought into relief the internal marginalization of the Marxists. Radicals began to chafe at
the rules of the petista political system, which patently beneted moderates at the expense
of radicals. As described earlier, PT formally practiced winner-takes-all majoritarianism in
the allotment of executive posts at all levels. With majorities in Diret orios at the federal,
state, municipal, and zonal levels, the Articula c~ ao, after 1984 and 1986 Encontros, monopo-
lized the PT's executive functions, except where subnational Executivas informally practiced
the party. In 1985, the PT membership internally voted in favor of boycotting the indirect elections. The
`no' vote prevailed, in part, because the left tend^ encias most opposed to the indirect elections mobilized
their members eectively. Following the vote, the PT's national Diret orio, controlled by the Articula c~ ao,
mandated that all federal deputies abstain. When three (of sixteen) PT federal deputies { Airton Soares
(SP), Bete Mendes (SP), Jos e Eudes Freitas (RJ) { participated and cast votes for the PMDB's Tancredo
Neves, the DN promptly expelled them from the party.
150proportionality.229
Absent the formal implementation of proportionality in the CEN, the Articula c~ ao would
monopolize the PT most important executive body indenitely. The majoritarian system
for the Executivas `was one of the main bones of contention between the Articula c~ ao and the
leftist factions throughout the 1980s' (Ribeiro 2010: 188). By the May 1986 Encontro, the
PT's left tend^ encias feared irrelevance and, increasingly, began to openly question whether
they should remain in the PT.
For the Articula c~ ao, unity of action remained at the top of the internal agenda. Despite
internal dierences, the PT needed to project an image of unity and a coherent message.
PT radicals, in the view of Articula c~ ao leaders, continued to undermine this imperative.
Moderate exasperation with left tend^ encias' entrismo (`betweenism') and abuse of the Direito
de Tend^ encia (factional rights) intensied around the time of the IV Encontro Nacional (May
1986). Only a month earlier, in April, authorities had arrested a group of radical petistas
for robbing a Banco do Brasil branch in Salvador (Ribeiro 2010: 188). At the Encontro,
the PT expelled the implicated petistas and formally resolved to regulate (regulamentar)
and contain (enquadrar) the tend^ encias in the next Encontro Nacional. `The question of
proportionality [in the Executivas] could only be discussed after that enquadramento. In
the meantime, the majoritarian criterion would remain in eect' (Ribeiro 2010: 188). In
May of 1987, O Trabalho, one of the PT's most important Trotskyist factions, split in two,
with most joining the Articula c~ ao and the rest remaining a separate tend^ encia (called the
Agrupamento).
Throughout 1987, left petistas forcefully demanded proportional representation in the CEN,
calling the majoritarian alternative nakedly anti-democratic. In an April 1987 pamphlet,
229In practice, some state, municipal, and zonal Diret orios used proportionality in the allotment of executive
posts in order to prevent the defection of minority groups. In the all-important National Executive
Committee (CEN), however, the Articula c~ ao maintained absolute control.
151`O PT as Tend^ encias e a Luta Interna' (`The PT, the Tend^ encias and Internal Struggle'),
petista Augusto de Franco wrote: `Mere obedience of statutes by individuals...and identi-
cation with the platform are not sucient to normalize democratic relations between the
diverse tend^ encias within the PT and between the tend^ encias and party organs'. Granted,
`everyone must endorse the majority position after internal deliberations...so that for the
masses, there [is] only the PT, and not its currents'. Yet the PT's internal political system
must enable the various tend^ encias `to defend their stances within the party'. The pam-
phlet centered on the need for proportional representation `in all party organs: Diret orios
and Executivas'. Later, the pamphlet reiterated `the necessity of correcting deformities in
our internal democracy (guaranteeing, for example, proportional participation of the minori-
ties in the Executivas').230 In a June 1987 pamphlet, `Sobre a constru c~ ao partid aria' (`On
party-building'), Marxist PT leader Raul Pont extolled proportional representation in the
Diret orios but stressed: `We need to consecrate that at the level of the Executivas as well,
incorporating...this rule explicitly and clearly so that it does not depend on the good will of
the...majorities'.231
In December 1987, the PT held its fth Encontro Nacional, standardly considered `the most
important in the history of the PT' (Secco 2011: 121). The Articula c~ ao won sixty percent
of the delegate vote { a wide majority, but not as wide as in 1986. At the Encontro, left
tend^ encias, for the rst time, formally proposed the implementation of proportionality in
the CEN. The Articula c~ ao, despite some defections, succeeded in blocking the motion. In a
formal resolution on the issue, the Articula c~ ao acknowledged that, at the subnational level,
PT Diret orios already practiced proportionality on an informal basis but cited the need for
greater cohesion at the top. The Articula c~ ao resolved that the National Diret orio would only
approve proportionality in the CEN if radical tend^ encias rst consented to the abolition of
230From Edgar Leuenroth archive.
231From Edgar Leuenroth archive.
152dupla milit^ ancia. The resolution armed that all PT tend^ encias must treat the PT as a
strategic vehicle, not as a tactical front in the service of separate, fundamental objectives.
Handing over executive functions to tend^ encias with separate party projects, the resolution
argued, would prevent unied action and lead to decision-making paralysis.232
The general resolution passed, but due to internal negotiations with the the most `prob-
lematic' tend^ encias as well as the demands of the 1989 presidential campaign, the PT did
not regulate the tend^ encias or institute proportionality across the board until 1990 (Ribeiro
2010: 189). In April 1990, the DN abolished the right of tend^ encias to claim independent
status as `parties', subordinate members to internal decisions, subordinate themselves to
international bodies, engage in clandestine activities, disseminate independent programs,
man independent locales, and more (Ribeiro 2010: 189). In May of 1990, the DN insti-
tuted proportionality for executive committees at all levels, including the CEN. At its rst
National Congress in 1991, the PT lowered barriers to entry for representation in the Di-
ret orios { and hence the Executivas { by abolishing the ten-percent minimum. In addition,
the PT took several measures to empower base-level petistas without strong ties to a partic-
ular tend^ encia, and hence to limit the decision-making inuence of small, well-organized left
tend^ encias (e.g., the institution of a direct method { i.e., closed primaries { for executive
candidate selection).233
The implementation of proportionality in the CEN observably strengthened left tend^ encias'
commitment to the PT. The vast majority of left tend^ encias accepted the internal regulatory
reforms of 1990-1 period. Some of these, including the PRC and PCBR, dissolved and
either joined preexisting tend^ encias or created new ones. Others continued as before, but
in deference to the new regulations (Ribeiro 2010: 192-3). As of mid-1990, PT tend^ encias
232Discussed in Ribeiro 2010: 189.
233`PT: O desao de ser partido', from the oces of PT Deputies Eduardo Jorge and Jos e Genoino (1992).
From Edgar Leuenroth archive.
153numbered ten in total: the Articula c~ ao and nine smaller Marxist tend^ encias.234 In 1992,
the PT expelled two Trotskyist tend^ encias, Converg^ encia Socialist and Causa Oper aria, for
violating the newly imposed restrictions on tend^ encias.
The Marxist surge
and risk of schism
The collapse of socialist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc produced a realignment
of forces within the PT. First, the crisis of international socialism led some Marxist factions
to `renovate'. The PRC, a Marxist tend^ encia with `reasonable internal weight' led by Jos e
Genoino, renounced Marxism at the VII Encontro in 1990 and moved denitively to the
PT's right wing, alongside the more moderate sectors of Articula c~ ao. More importantly, the
collapse of socialism created a ssure within Articula c~ ao that ultimately led to the group's
schism. Whereas Articula c~ ao's moderate majority saw the collapse of the USSR and Eastern
European regimes in a positive light, `the Marxist and ex-Marxist wings' of Articula c~ ao, like
the PT's left tend^ encias, `refused to expressly condemn the socialist experiments that were
collapsing' (Ribeiro 2010: 197). The left dissidents within Articula c~ ao claimed that the bloc's
moderate wings, in pursuit of electoral success, were abandoning the PT's commitment to
socialism and, in their excessive focus on institutional politics, distancing the party from
civil society, its historical source of strength (Melo 1994: 86-9; Ribeiro 2010: 199-200, 203).
Articula c~ ao held a majority at the VII Encontro, and the formal resolution approved at the
Encontro, entitled O Socialismo petista, reected the tend^ encia's ideological divisions. In
keeping with tradition, the text armed socialism and `rmly' rejected social democracy,
both as an end in itself and a means to socialism (Ribeiro 2010: 199). The resolution shied
away from a specic, positive vision, Marxist or otherwise. As before, `petista socialism
234CS, DS, FS, Luta pelo Socialismo, TM, OT, VS, Vol Prolet aria, Nova Esquerda (Ribeiro 2010: 190-1).
154would be built from practical experience' (ibid). Yet in a demonstration of left dissidents'
inuence, the text also warned of a `capitalist regression' in the Eastern Bloc countries (ibid).
Equally, the resolution reected eorts by Articula c~ ao's moderate leaders (e.g., Lula, Dirceu)
to bridge the tend^ encia's growing divide. The text's formulators endeavored, when possible,
either to synthesize or navigate between the tend^ encia's contrasting, even contradictory, left
and right wings. They resolved, for example, that the PT should both lead (ser dirigentes
de) and dialogue with (ter interlocu c~ ao com) civil society, not one or the other.
By the time of the PT's polarized I Congresso (1991), however, conict between moderates
and radicals had become `signicantly sharper' (Ribeiro 2010: 197), and internal conict had
begun to hamper the Articula c~ ao's internal electoral fortunes. Articula c~ ao elected a plurality,
but not a majority, of delegates to the congress. Over the next two years, conjunctural
debates { regarding Collor's impeachment, the presidentialism/parliamentarism plebiscite,
and Luiza Erundina's controversial term in S~ ao Paulo { further divided Articula c~ ao (Ribeiro
2010: 200-3). Meanwhile, external critiques of Articula c~ ao from the PT's Marxist tend^ encias
were resonating with and galvanizing large segments of the party base. In 1992 and 1993,
Marxist tend^ encias won majorities in a series of major municipal Diret orios, including those
of S~ ao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Fortaleza, Porto Alegre, Vit oria, and Bel em (Hunter
2010: 120, note 18). These municipal results aected the composition of state Diret orios,
which in turn would aect the composition of the Diret orio Nacional.
Articula c~ ao formally split in 1993. Prior to that year's VIII Encontro, Articula c~ ao's left
dissidents had released a manifesto, A Hora de Verdade, outlining their critiques of Artic-
ula c~ ao's moderate wings. At the Encontro, the Articula c~ ao's left dissidents acted as an
informal bloc, temporarily called Hora de Verdade (HV), and allied with the left tend^ encia,
Democracia Socialista (DS), combining their teses into a single tese, Op c~ ao de Esquerda
155(`Left Option').235 The `core of the Articula c~ ao', under the new name Unidade de Luta
(Hunter 2010: 125, note 33), published a separate, individual tese, as did Democracia Radi-
cal (`denitively situated on the PT's right wing' (Ribeiro 2010: 204)) and a coalition of the
PT's most extreme left tend^ encias.
The HV/DS tese won majority support (fty-six percent), giving PT radicals their rst
national majority. The text approved at the VIII Encontro Nacional unambiguously endorsed
socialism, embraced revolutionary struggle, and rejected the `third way' between socialism
and social democracy. The text also exhorted a second `return to the base'.236 Months after
the Encontro, the Articula c~ ao's left dissidents would register as a formal tend^ encia under
the name Articula c~ ao de Esquerda (AE).
The PT's ocial platform and preliminary campaign strategies for the 1994 presidential
election reected the internal ascendance of the Marxist tend^ encias. The platform `evoked
radical change brought about by state action', promising transformation and even revolution.
With regard to campaign strategy, left tend^ encias insisted on highlighting Lula's status as an
oper ario (laborer) and on allying exclusively with left-wing, predominantly socialist parties
such as the PCdoB, the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the United Socialist Workers' Party
(PSTU), the Popular Socialist Party, and the Green Party (PV).237 The platform did depart
however, from the strident, unabashed socialism of 1989, demonstrating the evolution and
continued inuence of the moderate minority.238
As the 1994 election neared, moderate/radical tensions escalated. In some respects, these
235Prior to 1986, the DS had been an independent party as well as a powerful left tend^ encia in the PT. In
1986, the DS dissolved and became a PT tend^ encia only. In subsequent years, the DS tacked toward the
`center' of the PT political system, becoming part of the PT's `moderate left' (Ribeiro 2010: 204).
236Hunter (2010): 121.
237Hunter 2010: 119.
238Hunter (2010) summarizes, `[t]he overarching dierence between the 1989 and 1994 programs was that
the latter backed away from professing socialism as the ultimate goal' (118-9).
156tensions mirrored, at the national level, internal PT struggles that had previously occurred at
the subnational level. Indeed, since the mid-1980s, the most intense conicts within the PT
had occurred when PT executive candidates and elected PT executives, confronted with the
realities of campaigning and governing on a large scale, sought to impose pragmatic measures
and confronted resistance from internal PT elements. The rst major episodes occurred in
large municipalities, including Fortaleza (1986-9), Campinas (1989-92),239 and S~ ao Paulo
(1989-92). In S~ ao Paulo, prefeita Luiza Erundina (PT) had sought unsuccessfully to sell a
pragmatic, pluralistic governing approach, the `PT de resultados', on the local and national
PT.240 Erundina's struggles with the PT organization had continued without resolution for
four years, hampered her administration, and played a signicant role in the PT's defeat in
S~ ao Paulo in 1992 (Hunter 2010: 89-92).241
Ironically, in the lead-up to the 1994 presidential election, Lula and his closest associates (e.g.,
Jos e Dirceu), who had weighed in against Erundina just a couple of years earlier, `began to
fear for the PT's chances in the upcoming presidential election' and moved to impose a more
pragmatic campaigning strategy and more moderate platform on the Marxist-controlled Di-
ret orio Nacional.242 Importantly, however, what Luiza Erundina failed to achieve in S~ ao
Paulo, Lula succeeded in achieving nationally. After the formation of the `extreme left'
Diret orio Nacional in 1993 (Hunter 2010: 121), Lula ran for party president and won
overwhelmingly. Lula used his mandate to inject a dose of pragmatism into the party's
239In February 1991, new unionist Jac o Bittar, petista mayor of Campinas, was expelled from party after
`developing strong links with the [clientelistic] Quercia machine' and stating that he was `no longer bound
by decisions of the Campinas diret orio' (Keck 1992: 235).
240The Erundina administration favored social policies that would benet all disadvantaged sectors of so-
ciety, including the vast informal poor, and not just PT constituents (e.g., formal-sector workers). The
municipal and national PT and CUT forcefully resisted, demanding the union-focused agenda that Erun-
dina promised in the campaign. Erundina also awarded all major cabinet positions to allied factions,
alienating important sectors of the S~ ao Paulo Diret orio (Hunter 2010: 91).
241Secco (2011) writes that the PT was `its own greatest enemy' during Erundina's term (1989-92) (130).
242Hunter (2010): 121.
1571994 presidential bid. Shortly after winning, in late May of 1993, Lula demanded that the
PT's xiitas (Shiites, or radicals) `give him a margin of autonomy to run his campaign' and
`threatened to call o his candidacy if the trend toward radicalization continued' (Hunter
2010: 121). Subsequently, Lula met `quietly' with business elites, contacted centrist party
leaders `about possible alliances', insisted on moderating the PT's privatization and expro-
priation platforms, and successfully advocated the vice presidential nomination of business-
and military-linked Aloizio Mercadante (Hunter 2010: 121-2). Lula managed to impose these
measures without incident.243
Despite his eorts, Lula lost decisively to the PSDB's Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC).
Save the PT's 1982 electoral debacle, this loss proved the most devastating and challenging
in the party's history. With good reason, petistas had entered the campaign condent of
victory and, on the prevailing internal analysis, lost unnecessarily. FHC had played a leading
role in devising and promoting the anti-inationary Real Plan as nance minister. The Real
Plan enjoyed immense public support, having stabilizing Brazilian price levels after years of
high ination and periodic hyperination. Imprudently, moderates and radicals alike had
chosen to oppose the Plano Real. While Hora de Verdade and other left tend^ encias had
`publicly demeaned price stability as a `bourgeois' concern', moderate factions [had] charged
that stabilization had been accomplished by squeezing salaries, and members of the Lula
camp [had] openly predicted the ultimate failure of the plan' (Hunter 2010: 125).
Lula's pragmatism notwithstanding, PT moderates also believed that the party's continued
association with leftism, in voters' minds, had contributed to the 1994 presidential loss. Mov-
ing forward, they concluded, the party would not win national power on an uncompromising
left platform. This conclusion marked an important shift. Prior to the 1994 election, many
243On Hunter's (2010) summary, `[a]s radical as the program, tone, and tactics [alliances, caravans] of the
1994 campaign were, without the moderating inuence of Lula and his associates they would have been
markedly more so' (Hunter 2010: 120).
158PT moderates believed that a solidly left party could win national power in Brazil. This
view stemmed, in large measure, from Lula's strong performance in 1989. PT moderates
and radicals alike originally took Lula's 1989 performance as evidence that left-wing appeals
resonated with the median voter in Brazil.
After 1994, a revisionist view of the 1989 election took hold among PT moderates. Leftism as
such had not beneted Lula. Instead, the `special circumstances of [the 1989] campaign { a
highly polarized contest between a populist right-wing candidate associated with the military
regime and a candidate who represented a break with that style and era' { accounted for
Lula's strong showing (Hunter 2010: 126).
After Lula's 1994 loss, PT moderates concluded that future presidential victory would re-
quire `a centrist ideological shift', `the provision of concrete immediate material benets',
a deemphasis on program, and an increased emphasis on Lula's charismatic personality
(Hunter 2010: 126). Moderates thus stepped up their eorts to defeat radicals internally.
The PT's X Encontro Nacional, the most polarized in the PT's history, took place in 1995.
The Articula c~ ao, in alliance with the DR, narrowly won after `picking o', with oers of top
party positions, two AE elites who had played important roles in the AE's creation (C^ andido
Vaccarezza, Rui Falc~ ao).
The contest for party president pitted Jos e Dirceu of Articula c~ ao, whom Lula explicitly
supported, against Hamilton Pereira of AE. During pre-vote speeches, C esar Benjamin of
the AE made an `unusual frontal attack' on Dirceu, to Dirceu's surprise.244 On Hamilton
Pereira's telling, Benjamin emphasized that Dirceu `had received money from businesspeople,
and `that it was absurd for a workers' party to rely on money from big business... In sum,
he said everything that his liver dictated'.245 Dirceu edged out Pereira by two to three
244Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 273).
245Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 273).
159percentage points, and PT centrists once again assumed control of the DN and CEN.
In a vivid demonstration of the party's deep ssures, however, the PT did not manage to
form the full CEN until January of 1997, due to an impasse resulting from the Articula c~ ao's
refusal to give the Secretary General position to AE member, Arlindo Chin^ aglia. As initially
promised, C^ andido Vaccarezza received the appointment in exchange for having defected
from AE prior to the X Encontro.
The 1996 municipal elections did not alleviate internal tensions. After the elections, an
anonymous moderate petista in the CEN raised the ire of radical petistas, arguing { in
agreement with a recent Estado de S~ ao Paulo article { that moderates had fared better
than radicals, and that the PT would benet from left tend^ encia's `domestication' and
maturation.246
Reecting on the X Encontro and resulting impasse in forming the CEN, Hamilton Pereira
recalled years later: `See the point we reached in terms of fragility...'247 Lacerda (2002: 66-9)
and Ribeiro (2010: 207-8) concur that, at this moment, the PT came as close as ever to a
major schism.
Yet internal crisis gave way, relatively quickly, to moderate hegemony. After their 1995
victory, the Articula c~ ao and DR formalized their alliance under the new name, Campo Ma-
jorit ario and set out to institutionalize moderate control of the PT, which in the previous
couple of years seemed to have depended on Lula's informal, `behind-the-scenes' machina-
tions.248 Campo Majorit ario would remain the PT's dominant coalition into the 2000s and
246Internal PT text, `Saem os `sem-voto', entra o PT adolescente', by Sonia Hip olito. From Edgar Leuenroth
archive.
247Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 273).
248`Despite an organizational format of low leadership autonomy, Lula found ways to exert authority over
the party and to assume independent or parallel actions when he could not do so. Nonetheless, it was
evident to party moderates that they could not always depend on such informal measures. After the 1994
160transform the PT into a center-left, electoral-professional, and (according to Ribeiro 2010)
internally undemocratic party.
The fundamental sources of PT unity
Though beset by internal conict from inception, the PT, unlike other Brazilian parties
(e.g., PDS and PMDB) and other Latin American new left parties (e.g., IU, LCR, FMLN),
never suered a major schism.249 What factors, fundamentally, enabled the PT to avoid
debilitating schism?
Petista socialism and
internal democracy?
Many party members and observers have pointed to the party's undened socialism and
participatory democracy. While the former made the PT's ideology contestable, the latter
gave members and factions a fair chance at inuencing the evolution of this ideology. On
the importance of ideological indenition for cohesion, Ribeiro (2010) writes that
`[t]he maintenance (and even exaltation) of this ideological indenition (nebulosidade), over
the years, became an incentive for tend^ encias to remain in the PT. The petista ideology was
seen as terrain in dispute (campo em disputa) by the factions, each with its more consolidated
theory. A more precise ideological denition would be an incentive to defect for disagreeing
correntes' (Ribeiro 2010: 214).
Along similar lines, Marxist petista Hamilton Pereira, in reference to the texts approved at
the I Congress (1991), opined that
`socialismo petista...[was] a lucid, intelligent formulation because it [didn't] opt for a conceptual
or ideological denition of socialism, but suggest[ed] a path to follow in order to get a formu-
lation. That was a political accomplishment of the greatest importance... [The PT] `managed,
presidential defeat they would take steps toward developing more institutionalized means to secure their
leadership position within the organization' (Hunter 2010: 123).
249Some might regard the 2004 schism, in which Marina da Silva defected from the PT to form PSOL.
PSOL, however, quickly became a marginal force, and the PT won the next two presidential elections. In
contrast, the oshoots of the PDS and PMDB { the PFL and PSDB { became institutionalized and, on
most accounts, surpassed their predecessors.
161in the thick (miolo) of the crisis of socialism's demoralization, to nd a formula that [gave]
ideological cohesion to the party'.250
Some of the same scholars (e.g., Ribeiro 2010), as well as numerous petistas, have also
suggested that the PT's much vaunted internal democracy, by giving factions a `fair shot' at
shaping the party's explicitly open-ended future, helped the PT avoid debilitating schisms.
Internally, the PT constituted a forum in which a wide range of individuals and groups could
dialogue, debate, and vie for inuence over the party's direction. Tend^ encias competed in
elections at the zonal, municipal, state, and national levels, and the party eventually allocated
executive functions, at all levels, through proportional representation. Scholars and petistas
claim that this internal regime fostered a sense of inclusion and agency among participating
petistas. In particular, scholars and party members have identied the implementation of
full proportionality in the CEN as decisive for avoiding major radical defections during the
second half of the 1980s (e.g., Ribeiro 2010).
The ill-dened, open-ended nature of petista socialism did indeed allow for internal ideological
contestation, and there is `no question that the degree of internal democracy and level of
participation in PT far outstrip[ped] that of any other important Brazilian party' (Keck
1992: 121),251 Yet the exogenous contribution of these variables (ideological indenition,
internal democracy) to PT cohesion should not be overstated. While a more specic party
ideology might have alienated important sectors within the PT, petista socialism possessed
far too little positive content to fuel the PT's heterogeneous base, absent other factors.
Internal democracy-centered explanations of PT cohesion overlook a number of key coun-
terarguments. First, the PT only implemented proportional representation at the national
executive level in 1990, a full decade after the party formed. Until 1990, thus, PT mod-
250Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 270).
251, and that `the PT has initiated into political life thousands of cadre who feel condent about publicly
defending party positions'
162erates monopolized the party's executive functions at the national level, `dominat[ing] the
strategic posts' (Ribeiro 2010: 211). Second, although proportional representation in the
national executive kept radical factions in the PT, the defection of radical factions, in all
likelihood, would not have seriously weakened the party. The PT would have retained its
core leadership, including Lula, and the party brand would have remained intact.
Third and nally, internal democracy arguments focus on institutional design but do not
account for institutional strength. Comparative evidence suggests that, with respect to in-
ternal procedures for adjudicating conict, the particularities of institutional design matter
relatively little.252 In order for internal institutions to act as a source of cohesion, all major
players must `buy in'. From the PT's inception, the tend^ encias, by and large, accepted inter-
nal election results and complied with internal decisions made by opponents in power. This
requires explanation. In other important parties and coalitions, factions have refused to sub-
mit to the dictates of internal opponents. In Peru's Izquierda Unida (IU), for example, every
constituent party reserved veto power in the party c upula (see Chapter Five). In Mexico's
PRD, accusations of fraud continue to mar internal elections between party corrientes (see
Chapter 3). The strength of the PT's democratic institutions simply raises the question:
Under what conditions do ideologically heterogeneous politicians and activists internalize
the ethos of opposition loyalty expressed in such petista statements as:
`I've always held that the tend^ encias are important, but they cannot be more important than
the party organs. Thus, any position taken by the tend^ encias regarding governance must pass
through the party organs... [R]espect for pluralism and internal diversity is a sacred thing for
us'. { Ol vio Dutra 253
252In Mexico's PRD, most internal compromise and conict adjudication occurred through through the oce
of party leader, Cuauht emoc C ardenas. Although the PRD possessed an internally democratic formal
structure based on local, state, and federal elections and proportional representation, the party's parallel,
informal hub-and-spokes regime, based on C ardenas's active brokerage of competing demands, accounted
for virtually all major decisions. Chapter 3 presents this argument in depth.
253Interview with Ol vio Dutra in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 130-1).
163`We learned democratic practice...with the factions inside the PT. [The factions] helped a lot
in building and consolidation the PT. Did we disagree? We disagreed. Are we going to argue?
Let's argue. Are we going to resolve our dierences? We're going to resolve them. Are we
going to come up with a plan of action? We are. This was always respected, and it was very
good for the PT.' { Djalma Bom254
The great virtues of the PT organization were its internal democracy, its openness, with-
out rigidity, non-sectarian, non-dogmatic, accepting of currents within it that came from the
Church, currents of every type, that wanted to ght against the dictatorship. These are the
things that make the PT unique.... But we'll never cease to have a nucleus, a current that
thinks more about the future, that thinks what the party doesn't think...' { Raul Pont255
If not ideological indenition or internal democracy, what factors fundamentally account for
the early PT's cohesion?
Lula's indispensability: electoral
coattails and internal legitimacy
For PT radicals, the prospect of winning national power { of defeating the `bourgeois state'
{ provided a strong electoral incentive to remain in the PT, and thus helped compensate
for ideological dierences with moderate petistas. In a June 1987 internal text, `On party-
building', Marxist petista Raul Pont wrote,
`If the PT's organs of debate and deliberation are democratic, and factional rights are assured,
it is imperative that once [internal] decisions are made, the party acts cohesive and unied.
This unity is not dictated by some desire of ours or the whim of more orthodox spirits. It is
dictated by the unity and strength of our enemy. The bourgeois state, through monopolies,
the police, the armed forces, and the media, is increasingly unied in its repressive actions, in
its capacity to act'.256
Yet for petistas, the possibility of winning national power, during the formative phase, did
not come primarily from the PT brand. It came primarily from Lula's membership in the
party. Like most new parties, the PT did not possess a powerful, solid brand upon creation.
254Interview with Djalma Bom in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 98).
255Interview with Raul Pont in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008): 225.
256From Edgar Leuenroth archive.
164The party won less than three percent of the Chamber vote in 1982, roughly ve percent
in 1986, and a little over ten percent in 1990. Especially given the electoral clout of the
ideologically proximate PMDB, the PT label provided a relatively weak electoral incentive
against elite defection.
To a signicant degree, thus, the `Lula brand' substituted for a strong PT brand during the
formative phase. From the beginning, early petistas coordinated, in large measure, around
the goals of electing Lula governor of S~ ao Paulo (in 1982) and, subsequently, president of the
Republic (in 1989 and 1994). On this point, party members and observers leave little room
for doubt. Marxist petista Hamilton Pereira summarized that `the PT confronted enormous
diculties to become consolidated as a political pact in the 1980s... The PT achieved an
elevated padr~ ao of discipline and unity of action. In large part generated by the expectation
to elect Lula president, it's true'. 257 `All PT candidates', Lincoln Secco summarized in
an interview, `depended on Lula's electoral performance', which `pulled along' lower-level
PT candidates.258 Pedro Ribeiro observed in conversation that `everyone knew [Lula] was
the name with the greatest electoral appeal in the PT'.259 Keck (1992) observes, `...[I]t was
recognized that the party had to include Lula to get o the ground (Keck 1992: 81). Hunter
(2010) argues that `[t]he PT beneted from having a single virtually irreplaceable leader
who enjoyed more societal support than the party' (3). In short, because Lula enjoyed
greater external popularity than the PT, his presence provided a strong electoral incentive
for petistas to remain within the party fold.
Crucially, however, it was the risk of internal radical takeover, not the threat of radical
defection, that produced the early PT's most signicant internal crises. After both the 1982
electoral debacle and, years later, the left tend^ encias' surge in the mid-1990s, Lula and his
257Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 270).
258Interview with Secco.
259Author's conversation with Ribeiro, .
165moderate allies sought, facing possible failure, to impose on the PT's radical wing. If they
had failed, they might have abandoned the PT project as electorally non-viable, like other
new left leaders in Latin America under similar circumstances (e.g., Alfonso Barrantes (see
Chapter Five)).
In describing Lula's internal dealings with the PT, many petistas and external analysts
highlight the ways in which Lula `stood above faction'.260 Although `symbolically' associated
with Articula c~ ao (Secco 2011: 93) and, more generally, with PT moderates, Lula `put himself
above the factions in various ways' and refrained from explicitly `taking sides'.261 Lula
chose, for example, not to join the Articula c~ ao formally. He also demonstrated prudence
in abstaining, consistently, from contentious internal votes. In an academic study of the
ideological tensions and ambiguities in the PT from 1980 to 1995, de Azevedo (1995) observes
that Lula `always avoids participating in any faction or involving himself directly with any
party bloc' (154). In an extension of this argument, Marxist petista Hamilton Pereira, in
2008, extolled Lula and his moderate allies for standing above and embracing the PT's
heterogeneous factions, and for dening the PT very clearly, at the outset, as a political
rather than ideological pact.262
Yet these claims should not be overstated. During the internal crises mentioned above, Lula
sided with the moderates, and whether he did so explicitly or implicitly, the PT base knew
where Lula `stood'. PT cohesion thus depended, in large measure, on Lula's demonstrated
ability to `tame', or `domesticate', radical elements of the PT base.
260Phrase borrowed from Ansell and Fish (1999).
261Interview with Secco.
262`The great merit of our rst leaders, Lula, Z e (Jos e) Dirceu, was that they formulated the following
vision: `We cannot start from the premise that we are an ideological pact. For the PT to work, we have
to constitute ourselves as a political pact, that abrigue (shelters, protects) these dierences. But that
perception was not made explicit initially. It will only be made explicit at the V Encontro. It was a
kind of instinctive thing: `People, don't make this a religion; that will put us on a bad course (desanda).
It can't become the Church... [The leadership] was a non-group group, a tend^ encia against tend^ encias'
(interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008: 264).
166Lula's internal leverage came, in part, from his aforementioned coattails. In her analysis of
PT adaptation in the 1990s, Hunter (2010) demonstrates that Lula, in order to `demand
change within the party', `used his electability as leverage' (3). `The presence of a popular
leader with a singular ability to gain societal support', she later summarizes, `served as
crucial leverage for change within the [PT]' (6).
Lula's internal leverage, however, did not stem from electoral coattails alone. Comparative
evidence suggests that electoral coattails are not sucient for a moderate party leader to
impose pragmatic measures on a radical base, especially if a separate leader within the party
commands greater loyalty among the radical base.263 Unlike other leaders of new left parties
in Latin America, Lula combined electoral coattails with remarkably broad-based support
within the heterogeneous PT. Perhaps more than any other single event, Lula's victory by
`overwhelming consensus' in the 1993 contest for PT president { despite left tend^ encias'
control of the DN { demonstrated Lula's unique level of support across the PT base.
Where did this support come from? In contrast to other new left leaders in Latin America
(e.g., Alfonso Barrantes), Lula, in his capacity as PT leader, began with strong ties to his
party's core feeder groups, having led and actively participated in the PT's autonomous labor
struggles of origin. By the end of the 1970s, Lula, to a greater degree than any other individ-
ual, had developed collaborative relationships with the full range of leaders involved in the
autonomous labor movement, from rural, industrial and middle-sector unionists to Catholic
leftists and Marxists. As Sluyter-Beltr~ ao (2010) summarizes in his study of the movement's
rise and `decline', the metalworkers of S~ ao Bernardo, led by Lula, `constituted...the principal
hub of the New Unionism' (Sluyter-Beltr~ ao 2010: 3; emphasis added). Since the early PT
grew out of the new unionism, Lula constituted the hub of the early PT network as well.
263By way of illustration, Peru's IU split apart and collapsed before the 1990 presidential election because
party leader Alfonso Barrantes, on whom the IU depended electorally, failed to impose upon the IU's
radical elements and exited the party in order to run on a separate ticket. See Chapter Five.
167More fundamentally, however, Lula's strong ties across the PT base, both before and after
the PT's creation, were rooted in internal legitimacy and, for many, m stica.264 The early
PT's animating narrative { the founding myth that motivated early moderates and radicals
{ cast the PT as the rst authentically popular political expression in Brazil's history. The
PT's S~ ao Paulo nucleus of new union leaders, led by a manual laborer who had lost a nger
in a metalworking accident,265 incarnated this myth. Lula and the S~ ao Paulo aut^ enticos
made the PT narrative credible.
Ribeiro (2010) summarizes that `the paulista nucleus acted...as a symbolic amalgamation,
providing the collective incentives fundamental to party-building. In particular, the charis-
matic gure of Lula, the l der m aximo do PT, was the party-building project's main source of
identication and unity' (251). In a conversation with the author, Ribeiro characterized Lula
as `the most authoritative historical voice of the party; the incarnation of PT history'.266
Unprompted, one petista observed that Lula, `became a unifying force' in the PT `because
he incarnated the myth' of the party as an authentic expression of the popular sectors.267
Along similar lines, Keck (1992) writes that while `Lula was not the only leader with na-
tional credibility involved in the creation of the PT', he was the `key gure. As the labor
leader primarily responsible for sparking the campaigns and strikes that increased the power
264On several accounts, Lula's personal warmth also facilitated relationship-building across moderate and
radical networks. Manoel de Concei c~ ao, founding PT member, leader of the PT de A co, and leader of the
clandestine Maoist PT feeder party, A c~ ao Popular, recalled: `All my life I have had a good relationship
with Lula. He has always been my friend, my brother' (interview with Manoel de Concei c~ ao in de
Moraes and Fortes, eds., 2008: 71). Lincoln Secco summarized that `Lula is very sentimental. Despite
not supporting the partisan left, he often praised (elogiava) certain people. I remember that he praised
Ronald Rocha of the Tend^ encia Marxista (which is no longer in the PT today)... In a country like
Brazil, personal relationships mix easily with political relationships, even though they don't put an end
to ideological dierences. Some of Lula's old friends moved to the left [wing] of the party in certain phases
of its history' (interview with Secco).
265In an interview, Lincoln Secco emphasized this aspect of Lula's biography in analyzing Lula's `internal
charisma' (interview with Secco).
266Author's conversation with Ribeiro, .
267Interview no. 3.
168of the whole Brazilian labor movement, his was the voice needed to give legitimacy to the
formation of a party' (Keck 1992, p. 77).
Lula's background earned him the admiration of leading radicals (e.g., Florestam Fernandes)
and moderates alike.268 One Marxist ex-petista observed that although most Marxists con-
sidered Lula and the new unionists insuciently radical, they admired and respected the PT
leadership's authentic working-class origins. Keck (1992) observes: `However much the left
might criticize what it called his vacillation, it recognized that Lula was still the authentic
working-class leader par excellence, and there would be no Workers' Party without him' (81).
Lula did not impose on PT radicals by lording his external appeal, or his control of union
resources, over them. The manner of Articula c~ ao's rise illustrates this point. The S~ ao
Paulo new unionists who led the Articula c~ ao did not have signicant resources at their
disposal. Further, the 1982 electoral debacle had chastened them { above all Lula, who had
nished a distant fourth in the S~ ao Paulo gubernatorial race. Yet they quickly established
internal dominance, formally uniting, allying with a broad range of leaders from the Catholic
and Marxist lefts, and, under the Articula c~ ao label, winning repeated landslides in internal
elections.
At root, the creation of the Articula c~ ao, in Keck's (1992) formulation,
`was an attempt to promote a particular denition of the party's essence... [Articula c~ ao's]
legitimacy derived primarily from its ability to shape a credible vision of the party's identity.
Its centrality reinforced the argument that despite the sectarian divisions...the core or essence
of the PT was composed of people who brought to the party a wide range of experiences in
popular struggles' (116).
Without Lula, the `working-class leader par excellence' (Keck 1992: 81) and ultimate symbol
of the PT's original struggles, the Articula c~ ao, `symbolically led by Lula' (Secco 2011: 93),
268Interview with Secco. According to Secco, Lula lost much of his respect in 2002, when he promoted
a conservative economic platform and enlisted the campaign services of electioneer, Duda Mendon ca
(interview with Secco). See also: Interview with Hamilton Pereira in de Moraes and Fortes (eds., 2008:
268).
169could not have claimed the party's moral center. The Articula c~ ao's moral authority followed
from the central role that Articula c~ ao's leaders, above all Lula, had played in the popular
struggles that gave birth to the PT.
Not only had Lula `cut his teeth' in popular struggles prior to the PT's creation, he remained
committed to the PT's civil society linkages, both rhetorically and in practice, throughout the
formative phase. To begin, Lula continued to build internal linkages after the PT's creation,
regularly visiting local party organs in the early years (Secco 2011: 59) and, throughout the
1980s and 1990s, helping bring new civil society leaders into the PT. When the occasion
merited it, Lula also weighed in, publicly, against the PT's more electoralist and institu-
tionalist currents throughout early development. After a group of victorious PT candidates
tempered their rhetoric in the late 1980s, for example, Lula rebuked them, warning of those
who only knew `the red carpet of parliament' and had not `slugged it out' (amassar barro)
in the slums.269 In the I Congresso (1991), Lula stressed on repeated occasions that `[w]e
must not let electoral concerns take over the party's agenda'.270
In short, a leader without Lula's popular mystique, organic connections, and ongoing com-
mitment to the grassroots may not have succeeded in `taming' the PT base, whether in the
1980s, when Lula lent decisive weight to the creation and consolidation of Articula c~ ao, or in
the mid-1990s, when Lula won the party presidency and helped engineer the PT's long-term
shift to center-left electoral-professionalism.
* * *
In summary, Lula acted as a fundamental source, perhaps the fundamental source, of unity
in the early PT. Not only did he furnish electoral incentives against defection when the party
269Interview with Secco.
270Machado and Vannuchi (1991: 6), cited in Hunter (2010: 25).
170brand remained relatively weak, he also leveraged his electability and strong crossfactional
ties, the latter rooted in moral authority, to balance the PT's diverse currents and, at crucial
junctures, impose moderation on a largely radical base.
Numerous petistas and PT analysts converge in this assessment. When asked why the early
PT did not split apart despite internal divisions, Lincoln Secco, stated, unprompted, that
the early PT was lucky to possess, in Lula, a leader who combined `external and internal
charisma'.271 In an interview with the author, Frei Betto, when asked what united the PT,
stated that Lula was always the unifying factor. Betto stressed that even when certain
tend^ encias disagreed with Lula, they generally did not speak out publicly against him.272
When asked the same question, early petista and current S~ ao Paulo vereador, Ant^ onio Do-
nato, stated that the early PT was the most viable electoral vehicle on the left, but also that
Lula succeeded in creating a strong center without squashing (esmagar) the minorities.273
Pedro Ribeiro, in an email conversation with the author, remarked that `Lula was always
one of the few `glues' between the factions, above them all, unifying the party... Lula was
a great negotiator of agreements, and also a guarantor of those agreements - and not only
due to the electoral factor, but because he was the most authoritative historical voice of the
party, the incarnation of PT history'.274 Rodr guez (n.d.) concurs in her comparative study
of the PT and Mexico's PRD, summarizing that Lula, like Cuauht emoc C ardenas, was a
`strong [leader]...who centralized the functions of the party voice [and], due to [his] moral
quality, established [himself] as [a guarantor] of pacts between groups' (208).
In her comprehensive study of PT adaptation in the 1990s, Hunter (2010) attributes Lula's
271Interview with Secco.
272Interview with Frei Betto.
273Even when the DN expelled the Trotskyist Converg^ encia Socialista and Causa Oper aria in 1992, Donato
observed, they did so against their own will. By violating the regulamenta c~ ao de tend^ encia, Donato
argued, CS and CO, in eect, chose to leave the party (interview with Donato).
274Author's email exchange with Ribeiro, .
171successful imposition on radicals to his combination of external and internal support:
`[A]s a founding member and longstanding leader within the PT, Lula had the authority to
convince a wide range of party militants that he could win presidential oce if only they would
go along with the measures he advocated for change... His candidacy as party president met
with overwhelming internal consensus despite erce conicts over other issues. At the end of the
day, it was Lula's popularity among petistas [emphasis not in the original] and the widespread
belief that he was the candidate the PT could put forth that brought the party back into his
fold' (36, 122).
Hunter (2010) concludes, more generally, that `the existence of a single leader who enjoyed
both a strong presence within the party and popularity with the electorate' distinguishes the
successful PT from other failed left parties and coalitions in contemporary Latin America
(3; emphases not in the original).275
The current chapter, in conjunction with Chapter Five, elaborates a similar argument. Chap-
ter Seven will argue that Peru's new left coalition, Izquierda Unida (IU), collapsed by schism
due, fundamentally, to the internal weakness of moderate coalition leader Alfonso Barrantes.
Barrantes' situation in the IU prior to the 1990 Pervuian presidential election roughly par-
alleled Lula's situation in the PT prior to the 1994 Brazilian presidential election. Among
IU elites, Barrantes alone stood a chance of winning the presidency, but he did not possess
moral authority or organic ties within the coalition. IU radicals had always wavered in their
support for him, and in the lead-up to the presidential elections, it appeared likely that Bar-
rantes would lose in a closed primary for the coalition's presidential nomination. Barrantes
demanded the nomination outright, absent a primary, and IU radicals refused. Instead of
submitting to radical demands and running in the primary, Barrantes split from the IU to
run for president in 1990 on a separate ticket. The IU collapsed shortly thereafter.276
275In this connection, Hunter (2010) identies Felipe Gonz alez as `an interesting parallel of someone who
drew on his popularity among the electorate and within the party to gain acceptance for measures that
encountered strong internal opposition' (36).
276Hunter (2010) concurs with this assessment in a brief conclusion: `Barrantes proved unable to persuade
elements outside his own wing to follow his lead. Unlike Lula, he could not manage to leverage his
172popularity into moderating the IU's platform and image to sustain it as a serious electoral contestant.
Whereas Lula was a founding member of the PT and remained at the heart of the party, Barrantes did
not enjoy this standing. His independence may have allowed him to `stay above the fray', but it also
hindered his eorts to exert inuence over parties within the Izquierda Unida. The parties of the far left
never fully accepted Barrantes' leadership. Javier Diez Canseco of the PUM, a key component of the IU's
radical wing, even charged that Barrantes had reduced the IU to `an electoral front around a caudillo'
(194).
173Chapters 4-5 The Survival of Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution
Chapters Four and Five analyze the survival of Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD). Founded in 1989, the PRD has become Mexico's leading left party and a perennial
contender for national and subnational power. Since the late 1990s, the PRD has won eleven
gubernatorial elections in six Mexican states and continuously held the jefatura de gobierno
of the Federal District, the second most important elected oce in the country. The PRD
has elected at least ten percent of Mexico's federal deputies in every congressional election
since 1994 (Figure 1). In 2006, the PRD elected a quarter of Mexico's federal deputies, and
the party's Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador came very close to winning the presidency. Given
Mexico's size, economic strength, and geopolitical signicance, the PRD is one of the most
important new left parties in Latin America.
Figure 4.1: The PRD in the Chamber of Deputies (1991-present)
174Despite the PRD's enduring, national electoral signicance, leading scholars have often
treated the party as a failure. Greene (2007) emphasizes that left ideologues in the PRD
leadership and base have made electorally suboptimal choices and thus prevented the party
from winning the presidency.1 Bruhn (1998) argues that the early PRD did not `consolidate',
failing to coordinate its activists, build stable party/interest group relations, and construct
a strong `ideological identity' (198).2 Hilgers (2008) similarly claims that the PRD, by en-
gaging heavily in clientelism, has failed to develop a strong programmatic identity (Hilgers
2008). Rodr guez (n.d.) characterizes the PRD as internally dysfunctional, emphasizing
that the PRD, unlike Brazil's Workers' Party (PT), has weakly institutionalized factional
relations and, in her view, no stable dominant coalition (548).3
These chapters do not contest the above accounts or critical accounts provided elsewhere.4
Yet they do begin from a dierent and insuciently explored premise: that the PRD, if
viewed in broader comparative perspective, is a clear case of new party survival. Despite
electoral setbacks and a certain degree of internal dysfunction, the PRD is one of a handful
of new left parties in Latin America to become institutionalized and regularly contend for
national power.
Why did the PRD succeed in becoming institutionalized as a major national party?
1One such choice is the nomination of Cuauht emoc C ardenas as the party's presidential candidate in 2000.
2Bruhn argues that Brazil's Workers' Party (PT), in contrast, did consolidate.
3On the latter point, Borjas (2003) disagrees.
4Scholars have argued that the PRD has governed poorly at the subnational level (Borjas 2003; Rodr guez
n.d.). Ortega (2010) implicitly treats the PRD as an organizational failure, highlighting the party's infras-
tructural weakness in various Mexican states and at the base level more generally (13, 17). Mart nez (2005)
highlights various forms of dysfunction within the national PRD organization. For additional critiques, see
S anchez (2008, 1999).
175Chapter 4 Building the PRD: adversity and survival
Casta~ neda (1995) has compared Mexico's 1994 presidential election to a soccer game `where
the goalposts were of dierent heights and breadths and where one team included eleven
players plus the umpire and the other a mere six or seven players' (131). One could apply
this metaphor to the PRD's entire formative period.
The PRD grew out of cardenismo, a heterogeneous mass movement to elect Cuauht emoc
C ardenas president of Mexico in 1988. C ardenas's bid for the Mexican presidency consti-
tuted an attempt, after nearly a decade of economic and humanitarian crisis, to defeat the
authoritarian, hegemonic PRI, reverse Mexico's neoliberal turn, and restore the authentic
revolutionary legacy of social justice and economic nationalism championed by Cuauht emoc
C ardenas's father, ex-president General L azaro C ardenas. After a presidential campaign
marked by extreme resource asymmetries and systematic mass media bias against the left,
Carlos Salinas of the ruling PRI defeated C ardenas in an election widely viewed as fraudu-
lent. In the election's aftermath, the cardenista movement grew in size and intensity, and
from it, the PRD emerged.
During the late 1980s and most of the 1990s, the PRI enjoyed a vast public and private
resource advantage over its competitors, especially the PRD. Until the mid-1990s, the PRI
monopolized broadcast media and controlled the instruments of fraud and repression. The
PRI used all of these resources and tools to keep the PRD, in particular, in the political
wilderness. The PRD thus developed without patronage or nancial resources, and in a
closed, hostile media context. The party could not achieve electoral progress except through
extensive volunteer activism. During the initial years of party development, national PRD
leaders, acutely aware of their disadvantages, made it a top priority to develop party activist
networks in as much of the national territory as possible.
176Lacking the resources and institutional capacity to nance or administer large-scale terri-
torial implantation from the top down, the national PRD organization depended on the
bottom-up initiative and dispersed human and infrastructural resources of the local leaders,
movements, and organizations sympathetic to cardenismo. Just a couple of years into the
PRD's existence, thousands of local party nuclei had sprouted up, in various regions of Mex-
ico but especially the Federal District and poor southern states. Most local party organizers
had origins in extraparliamentary social left movements and organizations, defecting PRI
networks, and the traditional Marxist political left. To build local party branches, these
local organizers recruited activists and used physical locales and administrative resources
from their feeder structures of origin. The PRD's bottom-up, decentralized organizational
expansion quickly resulted in a high degree territorial implantation. By the middle of the
1990s, the PRD claimed over one-million members and formal oces in over half of Mexico's
2000-plus municipalities.
The PRD activists who made up the core of the party organization possessed high levels
of commitment. Early adversity selected for these committed activists. Due to mass media
hostility, fraud, and acute penury and resource asymmetry, party elites could not oer salaries
to activists, or make credible promises of national electoral success and patronage spoils in
the short term. Moreover, repression and murder at the hands of subnational PRI authorities
raised the cost of activism in the PRD's southern strongholds. Between 1988 and the mid-
1990s, hundreds of FDN and PRD activists lost their lives, and thousands spent time in
jail. Given these conditions, pragmatists and careerists were unlikely to join the PRD.
Only `believers', or individuals with sincere ideological commitments to the party, would
participate in such a poorly resourced, electorally uncertain, and personally risky political
undertaking.5
5Term from Panebianco (1988: 26-30).
177Electoral disadvantage and repression selected for but did not generate committed PRD
activists. The polarization of the late 1980s produced the higher causes that fueled the PRD's
early volunteer army. The goal of taking the reins of national government from the PRI,
and dealing a decisive blow to authoritarianism and neoliberalism in the process, spurred
local leaders and organizations from across the left ideological spectrum to join in building
and campaigning for C ardenas and the early PRD. Activist commitment solidied when the
PRI, in order to retain power, violently repressed and systematically defrauded the left at the
national and subnational levels. Early perredistas derived moral and psychological benets
from their active contribution to the party: benets that compensated for unremunerated
time and labor and, in some cases, the threat of violence and even murder.
In sum, within a few years of its creation, the PRD possessed a strong and durable organiza-
tion, with ocial party branches in large swathes of the national territory, and with activists
driven by a belief in the PRD's cause, not by a short-term material or electoral payo. Orga-
nizational reach and activist commitment fortied the early PRD amid successive electoral
crises. After both the disastrous 1991 midterms and C ardenas's unexpectedly lopsided loss
in the 1994 presidential election, party activist networks rebounded in territorial bastions.
Setting the stage: PRI decline
and the creation of the PRD
Public support for Mexico's dominant PRI fell precipitously in the 1980s. Latin America's
1980s debt crisis devastated Mexico, ushering in nearly a decade of economic crisis. Mexico's
per capita income decreased for four of the years between 1982 and 1987, including by nearly
six percent in 1986. Ination increased at an average rate of 88.4 percent per year between
1982 and 1988, reaching 159 percent in 1987. The real minimum wage fell by roughly half
between 1983 and 1988. The ranks of unemployed swelled over the course of the decade, as
178public-sector employees lost their jobs and small businesses folded.6
Like most Latin American governments, the administration of Miguel de la Madrid (PRI)
reacted to the 1980s debt crisis by shifting from economic statism and protectionism to
austerity and free market reforms. In the initial years of de la Madrid's sexenio (1982-
1988), the PRI government implemented a series of scal and market reforms including tari
reductions, large privatizations, broad wage freezes, and draconian budget cuts. The short-
term social costs of recession, ination, and scal tightening proved immense. As the decade
closed, middle- and lower-class Mexicans had fewer jobs, lower incomes, and fewer public
benets to compensate for unemployment or reduced income.
Separate, simultaneous developments caused further reductions in PRI support. The PRI's
core rural constituencies continued to shrink with urbanization. Highly publicized corruption
scandals fed popular discontent, particularly given the economic circumstances of the 1980s.
Crucially, in 1985, the Federal District suered a devastating earthquake, which destroyed
parts of the city and killed over 10,000 individuals, predominantly from the lower class.7 The
de la Madrid administration's earthquake response was widely perceived as incompetent and
inadequate.
The combination of unfavorable demographic shifts, prolonged economic crisis, corruption
scandals, and humanitarian catastrophe generated the PRI's most signicant crisis of legiti-
macy since the late 1960s. Between 1983 and 1987, public support for the PRI fell twenty-ve
percent, largely due to increased disaection among Mexico's popular sectors (Bruhn 1998:
119). This shift in public opinion created an electoral opportunity for the PRI's challengers,
particularly those on the left.
6The gures in this paragraph are taken from Bruhn 1998: 118 and Ortega 2008: 198.
7One PRD founder recalls that the most signicant drop in PRI public support among Federal District
voters came as a result of the earthquake, creating `a space' for a left electoral alternative (interview with
Saucedo).
179In 1986, a group of dissident PRI leaders founded an anti-neoliberal faction, the Corriente
Democr atica (CD). Led by Michoac an governor Cuauht emoc C ardenas, former PRI president
and UN ambassador Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, and former UN ambassador Igenia Mart nez, the
CD proposed to rebuild the PRI's eroding societal linkages and reverse de la Madrid's auster-
ity and privatization through debt repudiation, wage hikes, increased protection of domestic
industry, and increased state involvement in production. CD elites sought to advance their
cause from within by democratizing the PRI. They pressed for more vigorous, wide-ranging
programmatic debate and the implementation of formally democratic candidate selection
procedures (Rodr guez n.d.: 185-6).
The PRI did not carry through substantive internal democratic reforms, and C ardenas did
not receive consideration as the PRI's presidential candidate. In October of 1987, Carlos
Salinas de Gortari, de la Madrid's Secretary of Program and Budget and an enthusiastic
proponent of de la Madrid's neoliberal adjustments, was ngerpicked as the PRI's presi-
dential candidate (Rodr guez n.d.: 186). The CD defected from the PRI in protest of the
party's internal authoritarianism and, programmatically, its technocratic neoliberalism and
abandonment of revolutionary goals and ideals.
Less than two weeks later, C ardenas announced his candidacy on the ticket of the Authentic
Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), formerly a PRI satellite party, or parastatal.8
Soon after, two additional parastatals, the Socialist Popular Party and the Socialist Workers'
Party,9 broke with the PRI and joined the CD and PARM to form the National Democratic
Front (FDN). Several parties and organizations promptly joined the FDN, including the
8The `parastatals' were a group of electorally marginal, nominal opposition parties which, prior to the PRD's
formation, had `cooperated with the PRI to the point of co-nominating PRI presidential candidates' (Bruhn
1998: 3). Months before ocially backing C ardenas, the PARM announced that it would no longer support
PRI presidential candidates (Rodr guez n.d.: 186).
9PPS, PST. After deciding to back C ardenas, the Socialist Workers' Party (PST) changed its name to the
PFCRN.
180Social Democratic Party, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Green Party, Democratic
Unity, the Progressive Forces of Mexico, and the National Workers' and Peasants' Council.
In January of 1988, the FDN ocially nominated C ardenas as its presidential candidate.
C ardenas possessed a powerful electoral brand, particularly among peasants and urban pop-
ular sectors. This brand derived from his unique lineage. As the only son of General L azaro
C ardenas, C ardenas symbolically bore, for many Mexicans, the authentic legacy of the Mexi-
can Revolution. General L azaro C ardenas had served as a general in the Mexican Revolution
and as president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940. As president, he had left a lasting imprint,
implementing extensive agrarian reform, making pioneering investments in education, in-
frastructure, and social insurance, and nationalizing Mexico's oil industry. PRI presidents
before Salinas uniformly recognized `the General' as Mexico's greatest ever (Borjas 2003:
510).
Early campaign events drew an explicit connection between C ardenas the son and C ardenas
the father. In the initial months of 1988, the C ardenas campaign held a series of `landmark
mobilizations'. One took place in the Comarca Lagunera of Coahuila and Durango, where
masses of peasants had beneted from L azaro C ardenas's land reform policies. Another took
place in Mexico City's z ocalo, where C ardenas led a rally to celebrate the ftieth anniversary
of his father's nationalization of Mexico's oil industry.10
While C ardenas's last name evoked his father and the Mexican Revolution, his rst name,
Cuauht emoc, evoked Mexico's pre-conquest Aztec history. C ardenas's `physical traits and
grave, austere attitude' further reinforced `the indigenous prototype' rather than `the mestizo
or creole one' (Borjas 2003: 293). C ardenas thus `concentrated many of the symbols of
national identity displaced during [Mexico's] recent history' (Borjas 2003: 293). Bruhn
10Another took place at Mexico's UNAM, a large university and bastion of Mexico's Marxist left (Bruhn
1998: 131-2).
181(1998) observes that `no other actual or potential opposition candidate could have drawn
upon the legitimacy of these symbols in quite the same way' (127).
As of the late 1980s, the left opposition could point to the deepening immiseration of Mexico's
urban and rural poor and charge the PRI with a kind of betrayal { the acceptance of
an externally imposed economic model at the expense of social justice for Mexicans. As
governor of Michoac an (1980-6), C ardenas had opposed, and to some extent deed, the
PRI's neoliberal shift during the 1980s. Thus, the left opposition could propose, through
Cuauht emoc C ardenas, a return to the revolutionary nationalism practiced in the candidate's
political life and embodied in his very name.11
C ardenas's candidacy generated mass support in various regions of the country. This support
came primarily from three broad groups: the cardenista left, the traditional Marxist left, and
the social left.12 The cardenista or independent left, the largest of the three groups, included
citizens who supported C ardenas but did not participate actively in separate left parties or
organizations. Like C ardenas, many were PRI defectors and did belong to local networks of
fellow ex-pri stas. The traditional Marxist left, alternatively the historical or parliamentary
left, encompassed a heterogeneous array of Marxist parties that, in the 1970s and 1980s, had
moderated, committed to institutional politics, and sought a gradual transition to democracy
through electoral participation and political reform. From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s,
parties of the traditional Marxist left had created a succession of electoral alliances that
culminated in the 1988 founding of the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS).
Initially, for the rst half of 1988, the PMS elded its own presidential candidate, Heberto
Castillo of the constituent Mexican Workers' Party (PMT). The PMS refused to join the
11Summarizing the appeal of cardenismo, one scholar observes that the FDN, unlike the opposition PAN,
`represented the ocial ideology of social justice from a group of renegade elites capable of revitalizing
revolutionary ideals at a moment when...lower sectors felt abandoned by the state' Brachet-M arquez (1996:
121, emphasis added).
12Hern andez (2010: 38) identies these three groups as the three main vertientes of the PRD.
182FDN on ideological grounds; unlike much of the FDN, the PMS `retained the basic ideals
of socialism and only begrudgingly accepted the tenets of democracy' (Greene 2007: 93).
Ultimately, however, practical electoral considerations trumped ideological dierences. In
late May of 1988, the powerful student organization, the University Student Council (CEU),
expressed overwhelming support for C ardenas at a rally in UNAM's Ciudad Universitaria.
Fearing political marginalization,13 recognizing C ardenas's unique potential to put the left
in the presidency, and somewhat amenable to C ardenas's revolutionary nationalism,14 the
PMS, most of whose members lacked pre-PMS ties to Heberto Castillo, opted to back the
FDN in early June of 1988.15 Castillo thus retired his candidacy in favor of C ardenas, and
the PMS joined the C ardenas campaign.
C ardenas's third base of support, the social or extraparliamentary left, included social move-
ments and organizations that had not previously participated in institutional politics. The
bulk of these movements and organizations possessed militant Marxist origins. Following
the PRI's violent crackdown on the left in the late 1960s, many Marxist leaders and activists
had not moderated, instead rejecting electoral participation and committing to (sometimes
violent) social struggle. A large number of social left groups originated as splinter groups
from the moderating Marxist establishment. Other social left organizations, usually less
militant, emerged subsequently and focused on more post-materialist issues. The social left
thus encompassed a wide array of actors, including ex-guerrilla nuclei, rural unions, popular
urban movements, teachers' unions, radical blue-collar unions, student associations, NGOs,
environmental groups, homosexual rights groups, and more.
Despite facing a slew of disadvantages, the FDN mounted the most signicant challenge to
13Traditionally, Mexican socialists and communists had drawn much of their support from university stu-
dents, particularly UNAM students.
14See Mart nez (2005): 93.
15Borajs (2003): 291.
183PRI hegemony since the mass mobilizations of the late 1960s. In the lead-up to the 1988
election, the PRI-controlled Televisa and other mass media outlets defamed and ignored
C ardenas, while subnational PRI authorities employed coercion and occasionally committed
murder in order to minimize FDN activism, especially in the FDN strongholds of Michoac an
and Guerrero. In order to maintain power, the PRI ultimately had to resort to fraud.
C ardenas lost by a wide margin in the ocial tally, with a reported thirty-one percent of valid
votes to Salinas's fty percent. The FDN elected nearly twenty eight percent of the country's
federal deputies and four senators, including Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo and Igenia Mart nez
in the Federal District. Immediately, the FDN presented evidence of systematic voting
irregularities that had favored the PRI, focusing on the presidential election.16 C ardenas
rejected the ocial election results and called, unsuccessfully, for a new, clean election. By
refusing to recognize Salinas as the legitimate president of Mexico, C ardenas strengthened
his image as an external, anti-system, opposition force.
The Salinas administration assumed power under a cloud of illegitimacy and moved quickly
to legitimate and consolidate its rule (Ortega 2008: 206). Soon after the inauguration, the
PRI forged a pact with the conservative PAN, agreeing to recognize all of the party's future
subnational victories in exchange for PAN legislators' support of PRI economic and social
policies. In an attempt to pacify the left opposition, the Salinas administration oered the
regency of the Federal District to C ardenas (Borjas 2003: 245). Although some key FDN
gures (e.g., Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo) favored such a pact with the Salinas administration,
C ardenas, supported by the bulk of the FDN base, rejected Salinas's oer and imposed a
line of intransigencia: steadfast opposition, sustained confrontation, and refusal to negotiate
with the PRI under any circumstances.
16Ocial rates of electoral participation in rural areas tended to exceed participation in urban areas. In
many municipalities, the total number of votes recorded exceeded the number of registered voters. Results
from nearly 25,000 voting booths went unreported (Ortega 2008: 201-2).
184In an already polarized country, the PRI's defamatory, violent, and ultimately fraudulent
response to the rise of cardenismo further intensied social polarization and opposition mo-
bilization. In the lead-up to the 1988 election, millions of Mexicans had taken to the streets
for C ardenas, and for the democratic and economic transformation that they believed a
C ardenas victory would signify. In response, the PRI, at the federal and subnational lev-
els, had shown that it would stop at almost nothing to keep Mexico's left opposition from
governing the country. Subnational PRI authorities had murdered left activists, and on the
standard view among FDN supporters, the national PRI had encouraged, assisted in, and
covered up systematic electoral fraud in order to secure Salinas's victory. Following the 1988
elections, in which fraud extended to the legislative elections as well, C ardenas supporters
dialed up their use of mass mobilization, carrying out mass marches, rallies, and public sit-
ins, disrupting long segments of highway, and occupying city halls and government oces
in various parts of Mexico. Protests were strongest in Michoac an, where the FDN enjoyed
the `greatest mobilizing capacity' (Borjas 2003: 340). The Salinas administration and mass
media characterized these actions as intentionally destabilizing (Borjas 2003: 339).
In order to create an institutional channel for this energetic mass movement, C ardenas and
the top FDN leadership, in late October of 1988, proposed the creation of a new left political
party. C ardenas appealed to the millions of Mexicans who had supported his presidential
bid, arguing that hastily constructed, poorly organized electoral fronts like the FDN could
not eectively wage the post-electoral struggle or, more broadly, generate progressive change
in Mexico.17 C ardenas's strong performance in the 1988 election, despite manifold disadvan-
tages, suggested that in the next presidential election, he could win. On the Mexican left,
the prospect of a C ardenas victory { and, with it, a complete transition to democracy and
the beginning of a neoliberal reversal { animated individuals and groups of all stripes. The
17Mart nez (2005: 58); C ardenas (1988: 5-9).
185CD and PMS immediately joined. The other constituent parties of the FDN - the parastatals
- did not.18 In addition to the CD and PMS, millions of independent cardenistas and more
than twenty civil society organizations and social movements pledged their support.19
The Party of the Democratic Revolution was ocially created in May of 1989. To satisfy
federal requirements for state assemblies and membership, the PRD adopted the registry of
the PMS.20 In the broadest terms, the early PRD constituted a left front forged in opposi-
tion to an authoritarian, neoliberal ruling party. The party was neither revolutionary nor
reformist, but revolutionary nationalist and cardenista.21 The party's leader commanded
a large external voting base. Internally, the party brought together a cadre of dissident
PRI elites (the CD), subnational ex-PRI networks linked to these elites, the bulk of the
traditional Marxist left, and the bulk of the social left. These heterogeneous actors united
around a vision of democratizing Mexico and reversing the country's neoliberal turn. More
concretely, they sought to win positions of national and subnational power and, in 1994, to
deliver Cuauht emoc C ardenas to the Palacio Nacional.
Low access to media and the state
during the PRD's formative phase
At the time of the PRD's founding, the PRI controlled the federal government, the govern-
ments of the Federal District and all the Mexican states, and the vast majority of Mexico's
municipal governments. The PRD came into existence with no governors and only a handful
18In justifying their decision not to join, the PARM cited the proposed party's links to communism, while
the PPS and PFCRN cited the proposed party's weak commitment to socialism. In fact, the parastatals
acted in their own short-term political interest, intending to minimize PRI hostility and prevent a loss of
seats, or even a loss of party registry, in future elections (Mart nez 2005: 58, note 26; Rodr guez n.d.: 248,
note 37).
19Mart nez (2005: 58); Rodr guez (n.d.: 244).
20In one party leader's phrase, the PRD was therefore `just the continuation of the PMS by another name'
(Gonz alez 2010: 259). Details on the PMS's dissolution come later in the chapter.
21Interview with Flores.
186of mayors in small, poor municipalities. In response to the PRD's policy of intransigencia
(i.e., no negotiation), the Salinas administration adopted a strategy of selective democrati-
zation: while opening positions of power to the PAN, national PRI leaders and subnational
PRI authorities sought to neutralize the PRD with a range of tactics. These tactics included
systematic fraud, repression and murder, lavish campaigns, massive social transfers designed
to erode left support, and crucially, the manipulation of mass media coverage. Together,
these measures sharply curtailed the PRD's early electoral success and, consequently, access
to state resources. Not until the late 1990s would the PRD begin to gain signicant access
to media, nancial resources, and state power.
Fraud against the PRD
(late 1980s to mid-1990s)
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PRD suered repeated fraud at the municipal
and state levels. In 1989 and 1990 alone, the PRI stole hundreds of mayoral elections in
Mexico state, the southern states of Guerrero, Michoac an, Oaxaca, Puebla, and Veracruz,
and additional states such as Baja California, Campeche, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango,
Hidalgo, and Yucat an.22 Municipal fraud occurred selectively. The PRI stole elections in
larger municipalities but generally accepted PRD victories in smaller municipalities with
paltry budgets. Of the PRD's rst 111 mayoral victories, 78 took place in municipalities
with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants (Borjas 2003: 363).
During the rst half of the 1990s, the most signicant instances of anti-PRD fraud occurred at
the state level in PRD strongholds. In San Luis Potos  in 1991, Michoac an in 1992, Guerrero
in 1993, and Tabasco in 1994, the PRD lost gubernatorial elections under questionable
circumstances. In each case, the PRD, often presenting copious evidence, accused the PRI
22G omez Tagle (1994a, 1994b), Crespo (1995), Eisenstadt 2004, Rodr guez (n.d.), Borjas (2003).
187of electoral fraud in addition to voter coercion, illegal levels of spending, and rampant vote-
buying. Each of these elections sparked mass protests.
There is evidence that the early PRD suered limited fraud at the federal level as well. After
the 1991 congressional election, in which the PRD fared poorly, party leaders presented evi-
dence of ballot irregularities, rural voter overregistration, and urban voter underregistration
(Borjas 2003: 402-3).23 The PRD demanded postponement of the voting, but to no avail.
The PRD's unsuccessful general election in 1994 provoked similar allegations from the party
leadership.
In fact, however, the 1991 and 1994 federal elections, while imperfect, were signicantly
cleaner than the 1988 presidential election (Bruhn 1998: 254). Newspapers El Pa s, The Fi-
nancial Times, The Guardian, The Times, and Barcelona-based La Vanguardia all reported,
for example, that the PRI did not commit large-scale fraud in the 1994 presidential elec-
tion.24 At the federal level, the PRD's electoral disappointments and setbacks during early
development resulted primarily from factors other than fraud, including repression, stark
resource asymmetries, and mass media ostracism and hostility.
Repression of the PRD
(late 1980s to mid-1990s)
From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, subnational PRI authorities violently repressed FDN
and PRD activists in select strongholds.25 In the 1988 election's lead-up and aftermath,
thousands of FDN activists were accosted, persecuted, beaten, or jailed, and nearly fty
were killed. After the PRD's creation, subnational PRI authorities murdered hundreds of
23See also Rodr guez (n.d.): 290-1.
24Cited in Borjas (2003): 580.
25In fact, Mexico's PRI regime and its allies committed more political violence against the left, in proportional
terms, than the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Brazil (Rodr guez n.d.: 297) and Uruguay.
188PRD activists and organized peasants, both to quell specic instances of mass mobilization
and to discourage opposition activism more generally. Sources indicate that, by the late
1990s, opponents of the left had murdered between 250 and 600 FDN and PRD activists.26
Roughly sixty percent of these murders occurred between 1988 and 1994, the remainder
between 1994 and 1996.27
The murders were uncoordinated and relatively dispersed, although the majority took place
in poor southern states, where C ardenas and the social left claimed large, active, ercely
loyal, and often radical bases. In these poor regions, homicides rarely resulted in arrest. The
largest number of murders occurred in Michoac an, Guerrero, and Oaxaca, respectively.28 In
some instances, the PRI targeted key individuals for killing. Four days before the 1988 pres-
idential election, for example, assailants in the Federal District murdered two of C ardenas's
top campaign aides, Francisco Xavier Ovando and Rom an Gil, and left their bodies to be
found in an apparent warning to the FDN (Bruhn 1998: 139).
In PRD strongholds, PRI groups also inicted softer forms of repression, issuing threats,
beating protesters, and making arrests on `trumped-up charges' (Greene 2007: 95). Political
arrests of left activists numbered in the thousands, perhaps the tens of thousands, between
late 1980s and mid-1990s. Because repression was widespread, FDN and early PRD activists
often knew victims and, in many cases, carried out party work at considerable personal risk.29
The PRD's resource disadvantage
(late 1980s to mid-1990s)
26Gonz alez et al., eds. (2010: 66); interview with Zambrano in Gonz alez et al., eds. (2010: 284); Ortega
(2008: 208); Bruhn (1998: 202); Borjas (2003: 45, 341, 436); Rodr guez (n.d.: 284); Eisenstadt (1999).
27Borjas (2003, vol. II): 45.
28Murders in these three states comprised sixty-ve percent of the total (Bruhn 1998: 202).
29One PRD founder opines that the current generation of young perredistas lack an appreciation of the
PRD's harsh origins: `When you tell them how hard it was to build the PRD, facing the PRI government,
they don't understand you because they didn't live through that period' (Duarte 2010: 249).
189To a greater extent than repression or fraud, however, an immense resource disadvantage
hindered the PRD's early electoral progress (Greene 2007). The PRD formed outside the
state and with very few connections to the economic elite or well-nanced organizations.
From the beginning, PRD nances `fundamentally depended' on the public party fund, a
small pittance until the landmark electoral reforms of 1996 (Borjas 2003: 297). As late as
1994, ve years after the PRD's founding, the national PRD organization could only af-
ford fty permanent sta (Bruhn 1998: 189). The party chronically suered from `nancial
shortages' and a lack of `resources to invest in electoral campaigns, infrastructure, and pro-
fessional cuadros' (Borjas 2003: 297). Well into the 1990s, PRD candidates had to nance
and run their own campaigns, with little or no nancial or material support from the party
organization.30
In contrast, the PRI, during the PRD's initial years, `enjoyed virtually unlimited access to
government funds',31 siphoned o billions of Mexican pesos from the public treasury,32 and
received billions more from business supporters.33 Throughout the PRD's formative years,
the PRI spent huge sums on electoral campaigns. National and subnational candidates used
party funds and private donations to nance traditional campaign events such as rallies and
concerts, and also to purchase and distribute clientelistic goods and services, such as free
meals and haircuts, on a large scale.34 Bruhn (1998) nds that in the 1991 congressional elec-
tions, for example, the PRI, unlike the PRD, ran `intelligent, ruthless, and lavish campaigns,
led by a professional, well-organized, and well-nanced sta' (279-80).
30In the 1989 state and local elections, for example, the PRD's National Executive Committee wrote that
`being a PRD candidate can be a true punishment, given that each one must obtain resources, build a
team and organize activities without support or advice of any kind' (Borjas 2003: 346).
31Cornelius (1996): 58.
32Oppenheimer (1996); Cornelius (2004).
33Oppenheimer (1996); Philip (1999); De Swaan, Martorelli, and Molinar Horcasitas (1998).
34See, for example, Bruhn (1998): 291.
190Throughout the rst half of the 1990s, the PRI systematically outspent its competitors,
especially the PRD, by massive margins. In Michoac an's 1992 gubernatorial election, for ex-
ample, the PRI outspent the PRD by a factor of fty. In 1993, twenty-nine of Mexico's most
prominent businessmen donated 75,000,000 pesos or more to the PRI's coming presidential
campaign; added together, these donations exceeded the budget provided to all political
parties by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) (Borjas 2003: 426-7).35 For the 1994 general
election, the PRI spent eleven times more than the PRD and PAN combined.36
The PRI's resource advantage went well beyond ocial campaign spending. Shortly after
taking oce, Salinas and his ministers implemented the National Solidarity Program, or
PRONASOL. PRONASOL allocated federal funds to municipalities for public works, food
aid, agricultural credit, land title legalization, and the construction and renovation of schools,
hospitals, and transportation infrastructure. A social program of then unprecedented scope
in Mexico, PRONASOL, by 1992, accounted for approximately sixty percent of Mexico's
infrastructural spending and approximately half of the country's social development spending
(Bruhn 1998: 219).
PRONASOL was a central component of the PRI's strategy to win back public support
after the cardenista surge and electoral crisis of 1988.37 The PRI distributed PRONASOL's
vast resources in a timed, targeted, and clientelistic manner,38 with the specic goal of un-
35All the businessmen in attendance agreed to donate the requested sum or more (Borjas 2003: 426-7).
36Personal communication with Ortega, June 9, 2011).
37Molinar and Weldon (1994); Magaloni (2006): 136.
38PRONASOL resources moved through an extensive patron-client network. Salinas directly appointed state
PRONASOL commissioners, who in turn appointed local committees charged with distributing PRONA-
SOL funds for local projects. Local PRI brokers individualized the transfers at the ground level, condi-
tioning the distribution of PRONASOL food baskets, construction materials, and scholarships on electoral
support for the PRI (Borjas 2003: 487). The PRI under Salinas also spent millions of dollars on PRONA-
SOL advertisements emphasizing the PRI's association with the program. PRONASOL packages `came
painted with Solidarity colors { the same as those of the PRI and the Mexican ag' (Bruhn 1998: 234).
191dermining the PRD.39 The PRI systematically increased PRONASOL disbursements before
elections, especially the 1991 and 1994 federal contests (Magaloni 2006: 149). During the
1994 general election season, PRONASOL transfers amounted to `ninety-ve percent of the
resources spent by all parties'.40
The PRI did not disburse PRONASOL funds to PRI or PAN strongholds, so as not to waste
electorally valuable resources on secure pri stas or on panistas considered unpersuadable
(Magaloni 2006: 141). Instead, the PRI leadership sought, through large-scale but surgical
social spending, to win the votes of poor Mexicans who had supported C ardenas in 1988.
Thus, the Salinas administration concentrated PRONASOL outlays in the FDN's 1988 mu-
nicipal strongholds. In order to `undermine opposition party-building', the PRI made an
exception in the FDN bastions where voters, after 1988, had elected a mayor from the PRD
or PAN (141, 149). In these municipalities, the PRI, instead of attempting to `buy back'
1988 C ardenas supporters,41 `punished' them by withholding PRONASOL transfers.42
PRONASOL bore electoral fruit for the PRI, at great expense to the PRD. The program's
generous transfers held critical importance for millions of poor individuals and a multitude
of underresourced civil society organizations.43 By 1991, the PRI, through PRONASOL, had
managed to co-opt or divide many of the municipal constituencies and civil society organi-
zations previously sympathetic to C ardenas. Hundreds of municipalities that had supported
C ardenas in 1988 defected to the PRI in 1991 and 1994.44 Major popular associations that
39Molinar and Weldon (1994); Magaloni (2006).
40Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, Proceso, no. 931, September 5, 1994, pp. 8-9.
41See Molinar and Weldon (1994).
42Magaloni (2006): 141 and Chapter 4, passim.
43Bruhn (1998) writes, for example, that `[f]or many of the demands made by popular organizations, PRONA-
SOL was the only game in town' (219).
44One party activist recalled, for example, that the Salinas administration, through PRONASOL, provided
key social services such as road repair in order to defeat the PRD in his hometown of San Andr es Tuxtla,
Veracruz (interview with Antemate).
192had supported C ardenas in 1988 fractured or wholly distanced themselves from the PRD in
order to receive PRONASOL funds and other targeted PRI transfers.45
Numerous scholars, including Molinar and Weldon (1994), Borjas (2003), and Magaloni
(2006), have identied PRONASOL as a key determinant of the PRD's electoral setbacks
in 1991 and 1994. Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo echoed this assessment at the time. After the 1991
congressional elections, he wrote that through PRONASOL, the PRI had transformed from
a `party of the state' { a common characterization for decades { into a `party-state'.46 After
the 1994 election, Mu~ noz Ledo, who had been elected party president a year earlier, assessed
that the PRD had underestimated government agencies' `capacity for local manipulation
through PRONASOL'.47
In the relatively small number of municipalities controlled by the early PRD, perredista
mayors typically could not oset PRONASOL and other PRI programs with major projects
and social policy initiatives of their own. Municipal governments in Mexico possessed paltry
independent budgets and depended to a large degree on federal and state funds (Bruhn
1998: 229, 232).48 Early PRD municipal governments received scant resources from the
federal government and also, critically,49 from state governments, which were under PRI
and PAN control. Federal and state governments systematically postponed, rationed, and
45A former Asamblea leader and PRD founder recalled, for example, that in Mexico City, the PRI, under
the regency of Manuel Camacho, used social transfers to divide the Asamblea (interview with Rasc on).
46Proceso no. 776, 9/6/1991: 28-32. For similar remarks by C ardenas, see Proceso no. 773, 8/26/1991:
10-11. Cited by Borjas 2003: 412.
47Proceso, no. 931, September 5, 1994, pp. 8-9.
48In the USA, the federal government, in the mid-1990s, was responsible for less than 60 percent of total
public spending, compared to roughly 90 percent in Mexico (Bruhn 1998: 227; Bailey 1994: 105). Due to
scal centralization in Mexico, Bruhn (1998) writes that `...to govern eectively[at the municipal level,] a
party must successfully extract resources and cooperation from other state institutions and actors' (Bruhn
1998: 227).
49Magaloni (2006) shows that PAN mayors received more resources in states where the PAN also held the
governorship (149).
193sometimes atly denied various forms of aid (not just PRONASOL resources) to PRD-
governed municipalities.50
In summary, the PRI enjoyed access to vast public and private resources during the late 1980s
and 1990s. With these resources, the PRI nanced lavish campaigns and used targeted social
spending to co-opt the left's natural constituencies. From the late 1980s until the second
half of the 1990s, the PRD enjoyed virtually no access to state resources or nance. This
resource disadvantage constituted a signicant electoral handicap.
The PRD's low access to media
(late 1980s to mid-1990s)
At the time of the PRD's emergence, most Mexicans depended on television to acquire po-
litical information, and even to form political views. Although print media had a signicant
impact on elite opinion, the vast majority of Mexican citizens did not read newspapers, given
the country's high functional illiteracy rate and weak newspaper circulation.51 As late as
2002, fewer than fteen percent of Mexicans drew their news primarily from print media.52
Radio played a similarly marginal role in providing political information.53 Radio stations
prioritized music and sports. Besides urban commuters and poor or isolated individuals
without access to television, few tuned into the radio for news (Lawson 2002: 98).
Control of the airwaves and, secondarily, print media conferred a major electoral advantage.
Prior to the PRD's emergence, over decades of single-party rule, the PRI had thoroughly
50On postponement and rationing, see Borjas (2003): 468. One party activist stated that PRI governors have
`always' denied the PRD resources (interview with C ortez). Bruhn (1998) summarizes that the Salinas
and Zedillo administrations undermined the PRD `by controlling the ow of resources and shaping the
party's ability to deliver on promises as a mediator for popular movements, as a local government, and so
on' (Bruhn 1998: 210, emphasis added).
51Low education levels may also have made Mexican voters more `susceptible to media inuences than voters
in developed democracies like the United States' (Lawson 2002: 168).
52Lawson (2002: 61); Vanden Heuvel and Dennis (1993: 40).
53As of 2002, 15-20 percent of Mexicans received political information from radio (Lawson 2002: 98).
194penetrated national broadcast and print media through bribes, subsidies, penalties, and ma-
nipulation of broadcasting concessions.54 These measures resulted in a `docile', `dependent',
and `captive media establishment that faithfully reected the ruling party's priorities' (Law-
son 2002: 8, 173). In exchange for the government favoritism and support necessary for
their economic prosperity and elite status (Vanden Heuvel and Dennis 1993: 21), the major
owners of Mexican media, a few dozen in total, helped set the public agenda in broad ac-
cordance with PRI priorities, omitted sensitive, potentially damaging political developments
from news programming, and broadcast open propaganda in support of the PRI and against
PRI competitors (Lawson 2002: 8).
At the core of Mexico's PRI-dominated media establishment lay the Televisa conglomerate
(est. 1973). Ties between Televisa and the PRI ran deep. The Mexican television industry
emerged in the early 1950s and took o in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. From the 1950s
onward, Televisa and its precursor, Telesistema Mexicano (est. 1953), received a succession
of important concessions from PRI governments, including the country's original broad-
casting licenses and, subsequently, licenses to broadcast cable, satellite, and high-denition
television (Lawson 2002: 29). These concessions and other forms of government favoritism,
such as generous subsidies for infrastructural development, enabled Televisa to consolidate
monopoly status in the critical television sector.
By the 1990s, Televisa commanded over four fths of Mexico's television audience and re-
ceived a similar share of television advertising revenue (Lawson 2002: 29). In exchange
for government support, Televisa, like the media establishment more generally, tailored its
news programming in a variety of ways to benet the PRI.55 In a telling quotation from the
54According to Lawson (2002), before media liberalization, `Mexico's media were thoroughly intertwined
with the country's one-party system' (8).
55`For more than two decades, Televisa and the PRI were deeply intertwined, with the network depending on
the regime for concessions and infrastructure development, and the regime relying on Televisa for political
marketing' (Lawson 2002: 30).
195mid-1990s, Televisa's chief executive, Emilio Azc arraga Jr., described himself as a `soldier of
the PRI' and characterized the network as `part of the governmental system' (Lawson 2002:
30).56
Predictably, throughout the 1990s, and especially during the rst half-decade of its existence,
the PRD suered from low access to media and high levels of media hostility. The Salinas
administration, through the Secretaria de Gobernaci on, used carrots and sticks, in particular
the provision and cancelation of concessions and subsidies, to manipulate news coverage in
detriment to the PRD. In order to gain or retain access to critical government support, media
practiced self-censorship, omitting coverage of the PRD and denying the party advertising
space.57
Practitioners of self-censorship included major print media outlets. Before the rise of the
center-right Reforma (est. 1993), the news weekly Proceso was the only signicant medium
in Mexico, print or broadcast, `to consistently investigate and report on...`closed' topics'
and, more specically, to provide a forum for left-wing political elites and intellectuals to
communicate their views to a relatively large educated audience (Lawson 2002: 67).58
Media manipulation mattered most, however, in the broadcast sectors. Mexico's major
television outlets, led by Televisa, created and reinforced perceptions of left marginality by
systematically blacklisting C ardenas and the PRD.59 A founding PRD elite and popular
56PRI elites enjoyed similarly cozy relationships with subnational broadcasting outlets and major national
newspapers including Exc elsior, El Universal, El Sol, Novedades, El Diario de M exico, El D a, El Heraldo
de M exico. Some of the PRI's informal media alliances (e.g., with the Heraldo de M exico) dated back to
the Mexican Revolution (Lawson 2002: 29-30).
57In addition, neither the FDN nor the early PRD could aord major television and radio spots (Bruhn
1998: 280).
58In conversation, Borjas qualied this point, describing the readership of left publications like Proceso as a
`captive audience'. She emphasized that they already supported the PRD. In her view, it was only through
broadcast media that the PRD might have reached politically disengaged, undecided, and skeptical voters
(interview with Borjas).
59On occasion, broadcast station owners explicitly pressured rank-and-le not to discuss C ardenas or report
196movement leader stated that during early development, the PRD had no opportunities to
disseminate a positive message via mass media. `It was completely closed', he summarized.60
Examples of PRD blacklisting abound. In the 1988 presidential campaign season, C ardenas
received under nine hours of airtime on Mexico's most watched cable news program, 24 Ho-
ras, while Salinas received over one-hundred and forty hours.61 According to the Mexican
Academy of Human Rights, Ernesto Zedillo (PRI), in the early months of the 1994 presi-
dential campaign, received forty-six times more airtime than C ardenas and Diego Fern andez
de Cevallos (PAN) combined.62 C ardenas repeatedly experienced `the unforeseen cancela-
tion of previously arranged media programs' (Borjas 2003: 513), and during the NAFTA
debates, the PRD's `ability to aect public opinion was practically nonexistent' due to in-
formal media censorship (430-1). A party founder and ex-federal deputy recalled that in the
smaller elections, early PRD candidates generally interviewed at independent radio stations
with limited reach because the major networks, `sold' to the PRI, denied access to the left
opposition.63 In the rare events that PRD leaders received access to media, they often faced
open hostility.64
The paltry coverage of the PRD that media did provide highlighted `the violent, subver-
sive, and dangerous character of Cuauht emoc C ardenas and the party he led' (Borjas 2003:
246). Throughout the PRD's formative phase, mass media touted the PRI65 while depicting
left critiques of the government. See, for example, Borjas (2003): 566).
60Interview with Rasc on.
61Adler (1993): 155; Rodr guez (n.d.): 190.
62See Bruhn (1998): 280;
63Interview with Flores.
64Borjas (2003) notes that television news hosts consistently displayed `hostility and aggression toward
perredismo and its leader' during the 1994 campaign (513-4).
65The `counterpart' of negative PRD coverage was positive PRI coverage (Lawson 2002: 52). While depicting
the PRD as fringe and dangerous, media suppressed government criticism and cast the PRI as the party
of security, prosperity, and public approval. In the 1988 presidential campaign, for example, Salinas `was
197C ardenas and the PRD as a radical threat to social order.66 During the 1988 presidential
campaign, national television programs cast C ardenas as the favorite of radical fringe groups,
especially Marxist student organizations. In response to anti-fraud protests of 1989-90, `mass
media and ocial propaganda' depicted the PRD as `a party of troublemakers who broke
the law and disregarded institutions' (Rodr guez n.d.: 288).67 During the 1991 congressional
campaigns, media characterized the PRD as violent and conictual, ignoring the party's
repeated condemnations of violent actions taken in the party's name. In 1994, media stoked
public fears of violence and disorder68 and attempted to resurrect the image of C ardenas
and the PRD as dangerous, zeroing in on C ardenas's meeting with Subcomandante Marcos
of the Zapatista National Liberation Army. Portrayals of the early PRD as dangerous and
destabilizing extended to state and local elections as well.69 One PRD scholar summed up
the basic image of the PRD disseminated by television and other media outlets across the
country: `Being a perredista was something really, really bad'.70
always presented surrounded by multitudes' (Rodr guez n.d.: 190), and Televisa `launched a systematic
campaign...to sell President Carlos Salinas' program of economic reform' (Lawson 2002: 101). During
the implementation of PRONASOL, Televisa `donated time for PRONASOL commercials, and its news
programs gave priority to favorable coverage of the PRI' (Bruhn 1998: 280). In 1993, C ardenas stated
that national media, due to pressure from the Salinas administration, were presenting an unrealistically
positive image of Mexico to the United States (Proceso no. 847, 1/25/1993: 28). In the 1994 presidential
campaign, there were twice as many positive PRI news stories as positive PRD news stories, and four
times as many positive stories about Zedillo as about C ardenas. Meanwhile, the PRI periodically censored
critical media. For example, the Salinas government prohibited the circulation of allegedly defamatory
publications such as Cambio 16 Am erica, which accused Salinas of granting state favors to friends and
family members (Borjas 2003: 435).
66Borjas (2003) writes that mass media `busied themselves with reprimanding the [early PRD's] behavior
and disqualifying the party as a desirable governing alternative' (Borjas 2003: 308).
67According to Borjas (2003), coverage of marches, protests, and rallies `deepened the belligerent and violent
images of the PRD that the media emphasized' (477).
68During the election campaign, Televisa heavily covered violence in Guatemala, arguably with the intention
to make voters more fearful, reactionary, and hence anti-PRD (Lawson 2002: 53-4).
69In the PRD's early bids for the governorship of Michoac an, for example, local newspaper coverage of the
PRD was scarce and negative (Bruhn 1998: 236), and local media disseminated PRI slogans including
Your vote decides: three years of violence or three years of peace, and Order and stability are the goals
(Beltr an del R o 1993: 114).
70Personal communication with Rodr guez, August 1, 2011.
198As the left mobilizations of the late 1980s and early 1990s deintensied, news programs re-
mained systematically critical of the PRD, but increasingly, instead of casting the PRD as
a threat to social order, they structured their negative coverage around the party's policy
stances and initiatives. Leading television programs generously broadcast and indepen-
dently reinforced PRI critiques of the PRD on key issues such as NAFTA and the Zapatista
movement. Describing the 1994 election, Borjas (2003) writes that `the media, under the
appearance of democracy, multiplied' the airtime given to supporters of the Zedillo campaign
`so that they could discredit or criticize [the opposition], above all the PRD' (566). Journal-
ists often received negative feedback, and occasionally outright dismissal, if they attempted
to cover party disputes in a balanced manner. During the NAFTA debates, for example,
several media commentators lost their jobs after reporting that prominent intellectuals and
regional politicians in Mexico supported the PRD's anti-NAFTA stance.71
The combination of media hostility and low media access cost the PRD dearly in early
elections. G omez (1997: 16) attributes the PRD's initial electoral weakness to two primary
factors: PRI repression and, above all, the media's perpetual `smear campaign' (campa~ na
de desprestigio). Similarly, Borjas (2003) identies Mexican media's hostility and informal
censorship as a central determinant of the PRD's electoral setbacks in 1991 and 1994: `With
the help of the media' in 1991, the PRI `recovered and maintained [the initiative] through
the orchestration of a permanent campaign against the PRD', and in 1994, the `fraud' did
not take place `in the voting booths', but was `a process fundamentally based on inequality
of resources and access to media and the [media's]...manipulation of information' (514-5,
571, 587).72
71This story was picked up by the New York Times, which increased international attention to press censor-
ship. As a result, Mexico's Director of Radio, Television, and Cinematography, in charge of private media
regulation, resigned (Borjas 2003: 429).
72See also Borjas 2003: 477-8.
199Mexican media started to become more competitive and state-independent in the early to
mid-1990s. Televisi on Azteca was born in 1993 and, over the course of the decade, became
consolidated as Televisa's main competitor. The 1994 election included Mexico's rst ever
televised presidential debate, featuring the PRI's Ernesto Zedillo, C ardenas, and the PAN's
Diego Fern andez de Cevallos. C ardenas began his opening remarks with the statement: `This
opening of the media is, without a doubt, without any doubt, an achievement for those of
us who, from distinct positions, from dierent organizations, are struggling for democratic
change in our country'.73
Yet media liberalization during the early to mid-1990s should not be overstated. The initial
process of media opening occurred slowly and cautiously. Mexico's major television news
programs continued to provide circumscribed, unassertive reporting past the mid-1990s.
Televisa's political coverage remained `tentative and halting', and `as late as 1996, only a
small fraction [of its news coverage]...was devoted to...`closed' topics' such as `ocial corrup-
tion, drug tracking, electoral fraud, anti-government protests, and the Mexican military'
(Lawson 2002: 105). TV Azteca (est. 1993) did not provide `authentic' news coverage during
its early years, focusing primarily on entertainment (Lawson 2002: 104). Independent print
media did not begin to take o until the mid-1990s, with the rise of Reforma, El Financiero,
and La Jornada. Among these, only La Jornada was located on the left of the ideological
spectrum.74
* * *
Due to the four adverse conditions identied in this section { fraud, repression, resource
disadvantage, and media blacklisting and hostility { the early PRD did not win any signicant
positions of power. In contrast to the PAN, the PRD did not win a single governorship or
73http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycDBzt7XZQo
74See Lawson (2002): 62-9 for a discussion of print media liberalization.
200major mayoralty (save Morelia, Michoac an) before the late 1990s.75 In Mexico's centralized,
authoritarian political system, small mayoralties and minority legislative blocs at the state
and federal levels, through the mid-1990s, did not give the PRD policy autonomy, control
of large government agencies, or signicant public nancing. One party activist and scholar
summarized in an interview that past the midpoint of the 1990s, `there was nothing to
distribute': no patronage, no salaried positions.76
Media and state access
during the late 1990s
In several important respects, the political landscape, and the PRD's fortunes, began to
change toward the end of the 1990s. The landmark electoral reforms of November 1996,
which the PRD played a critical role in devising and legislating, constituted a major step
in Mexico's democratic transition. The reforms made the critical Federal Electoral Institute
an independent body, opened the Federal District to direct elections,77 placed restrictions
on private campaign spending,78 and provided all registered political parties, including op-
position parties, with increased access to public television and much more generous public
nancing.79 The reforms also increased the requirements for party registry in order to prevent
tiny parties from cluttering the national political system (Klesner 1997).
Also toward the end of the 1990s, Mexican mass media began to provide more balanced
political coverage (Lawson 2002; Navarrete 2010: 264). In the 1997 congressional elections,
opposition parties `were nally given a real chance to present their views' (Lawson 2010:
109). C ardenas stated in Proceso that `the unquestionable opening of the media' made
75The PAN won its rst governorship (Guanajuato) in 1992.
76Interview with Borjas.
77Previously, the president appointed the regente of the Federal District.
78Only ten percent of campaign spending could come from private sources.
79`Major-Party Deal in Mexico to Bring Political Reforms', New York Times, July 27, 1996.
201his 1997 victory in the Federal District possible.80 Also in 1997, the PRI experienced an
unprecedented decline in popularity among Televisa viewers (Lawson 2002: 170). `By the late
1990s, Televisa had evolved from a private Ministry of Truth into a more typical commercial
network' (Lawson 2002: 10).
Yet even the media liberalization of the late 1990s should not be overstated. Lawson (2002)
observes that media network owners, cross-nationally but especially in Mexico, tend to hold
conservative views and tilt coverage in favor of conservatives: `Nowhere has this been clearer
than in Mexico, where television coverage has been substantially more sympathetic to the
PAN than to the PRD and remains constrained on any topics that might be construed as
leftist (Lawson 2002: 208). Thus, in 2000, most mass media strongly opposed C ardenas.81
To the present, perceptions of media bias remain widespread within the PRD. 82
Partially as a result of the above developments { the 1996 reforms in nance and public
media, the liberalization of private media { the PRD, in the late 1990s, began to invest more
heavily in mass media initiatives and win more major elections. The new political party fund
divided all registered parties' yearly allotment into two categories: ordinary expenses and
campaign expenses. In 1997, the rst year in which registered parties received the enlarged
party fund, the PRD's CEN allocated seventy percent of its campaign expenses to television
and radio advertisements and paid media spots (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 124). In the years 1997
to 1999, the PRD won its rst major executive victories. In 1997, C ardenas prevailed in the
rst ever election for jefe de gobierno of the Federal District, the second most important
80Proceso, no. 1067, April 13, 1997.
81Authors interview with C ortez.
82At the federal and subnational levels, perredista activists and elites repeatedly complain of unbalanced
coverage on the part of private media, especially Televisa. Such complaints proliferated and intensied
after the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections, during which PRD supporters alleged systematic smear
campaigns against Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador. The Yo Soy 132 social movement, created in the
lead-up to the 2012 election, lists as its central goal the democratization of Mexican politics and media.
202elected oce in the country. In 1998 and 1999, the PRD won its rst three governorships in
Zacatecas, Tlaxcala, and Baja California del Sur.
Access to mobilizing structures
during the PRD's formative phase
The PRD's early adversity shaped elite electoral strategies. With very little access to state
resources, nance, and media, the PRD leadership had limited options for building electoral
support. Television, radio, and most newspapers cast the party in a negative light and
denied party leaders meaningful opportunities to counter this image. The party controlled
no important governments { just a small number of resource-strapped municipalities { and
thus could not build a reputation, even subnationally, for eective governance. Given the
party's lack of access to state patronage, public nance, and private nance, candidates
could not run professional campaigns with teams of consultants and strategists and armies
of electoral workers, all incentivized by salaries or promises of government spoils. The PRD
would rise or fall, in large measure, on the strength of its volunteer ground organization.
PRD founders understood this. Resource asymmetries, media ostracism, and media disin-
formation all rankled the party elite. Proceso featured numerous expos es of the Mexican
television industry, often written by PRD intellectuals and elites, which focused on the ma-
jor networks' right-wing bias and hostility toward the left opposition.83 Candidate speeches
and campaign pamphlets treated local PRD activists as essential to the party's success: only
the militancia, these materials emphasized, could neutralize the negative inuence of media
by delivering the PRD's unltered message to voters.84 Four party founders emphasized,
in interviews with the author, that media blacklisting and PRI political hegemony made
83See Borjas (2003): 246 note 34.
84Examples needed.
203the PRD's ground campaigners fundamental.85 Borjas (2003) nds that in the early 1990s,
penury and media ostracism dictated PRD strategy, impelling party candidates to base their
campaigns on exhaustive local tours and large rallies in town plazas (486).86
Elite incentives, however, were not sucient for the emergence of a strong PRD organization.
Low access to media and state resources gave PRD elites an incentive but not the capacity to
acquire activist networks and organizational infrastructure in large swathes of the national
territory. Lacking resources, the central PRD oce could not nance or administer the
formation of thousands of local party branches. Early organizational expansion could only
occur from the bottom up, through the initiative, and with the dispersed resources, of local
civil society leaders and the organized networks under their control. Access to preexisting
civil society structures and opposition party networks gave PRD elites the capacity, or means,
for organizational implantation.
On creation, the PRD embarked on a mission of large-scale, base-level expansion, seeking to
establish local committees in as much of the national territory as possible.87 Acutely aware
of the national party's resource constraints, the PRD leadership set out in 1989 to forge
linkages with leaders from across Mexican civil society; in Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo's words, `to
base the party on what existed'.88 With contact and encouragement but little aid or oversight
from the PRD's central oce, local leaders took it upon themselves to organize local PRD
branches and nuclei. In a rejection of PRI-style corporatism, the PRD prohibited feeder
organizations from transferring their members to the PRD as a single bloc, at least formally.
85Interviews with Rasc on, Saucedo, Gamundi, and Hidalgo.
86`The insuciency of economic resources limited the penetration of PRD campaigns, given that, in addition
to being ostracized by the media, the PRD could not buy advertising space... Under these circumstances,
the PRD's electoral strategy [in the early 1990s] remained based on direct contact with the people through
candidates' exhaustive local tours and the organization of rallies in all the main plazas' (Borjas 2003: 486).
87Interview with Gamundi.
88Interview with Mu~ noz Ledo.
204The PRD `sought to become a party of citizens based on individual membership...in which
the axis of party life was participation in the comit e de base' (Rodr guez n.d.: 254).
The local leaders who built the PRD organization at the ground level came primarily from
three groups: the traditional Marxist left, the social left, and ex-PRI networks. The tradi-
tional Marxist left provided a small activist base but a large reserve of educated, experienced
political elites and cuadros. The social left provided a large social base, divided into numer-
ous local activist networks and grassroots structures in most of the PRD's early strongholds,
including the Federal District and southern states. In the CD's territorial bastions of Mi-
choac an and Tabasco, the PRD inherited signicant core electorates, large activist networks,
and valuable organizational machinery from the PRI.
The traditional Marxist left
For most of the twentieth century, the Mexican Communist Party (PCM, est. 1919) dom-
inated Mexico's Marxist landscape. Yet in the late 1960s, due to the background inuence
of the Cuban Revolution and the galvanizing eects of the D az Ordaz (PRI) government's
violent repression of UNAM students, new Marxist parties, organizations, urban and rural
guerrilla groups, and intellectual cliques proliferated. Some were PCM splinter groups. Both
the traditional Marxist parties and most of the social left organizations that would eventually
feed into the PRD emerged from this period of new Marxist ferment in Mexico.
During the 1970s and 1980s, as a consequence of diminishing repression and increasing
political liberalization, much of Mexico's new Marxist left moderated. These groups ended
or reduced their participation in `extraparliamentary' forms of struggle, including guerrilla
warfare, and created political parties for the purposes of electoral participation. Heberto
Castillo, later to become the most important Marxist founder of the PRD, created the
Mexican Workers' Party (PMT) in 1974, after spending two years in prison from 1969 to
2051971. Other important parliamentary Marxist parties founded between the mid-1970s and
early 1980s include the Trotskyist Socialist Workers' Party (PST, est. 1975), the Trotskyist
Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT, 1976), and the Revolutionary Patriotic Party (PPR,
est. early 1980s). The PPR was an insurgent successor party, founded by members of the
urban Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre, Mexico's strongest guerrilla organization.89 These
actors, together with the PCM, came to compose the traditional Marxist left.
From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the parties and groups of the parliamentary Marxist
left, separated for decades due to rigid sectarian divisions, forged a succession of electoral
alliances. First, in 1976, the still-proscribed PCM joined with a group of smaller parties
to form the Left Coalition (Coalici on de Izquierda, or CI), an alliance backing the 1976
presidential bid of the PCM's Valent n Campa, a railway union leader and former political
prisoner. Salazar received 600,000 votes, registered as invalid due to the legal ban on left
opposition parties. The growing strength of the organized left opposition led the PRI regime,
in 1977, to lift the legal ban on left opposition parties. The PCM and PST quickly obtained
registries, and several small parties united with the PCM to contest the 1979 midterms. The
PCM won 703,000 votes, consolidating its status as Mexico's third electoral force.
The push for left electoral unity continued in the 1980s. Key leaders of the traditional left
judged, early in the decade, that a more united Mexican left could prove a true counter-
weight to the PRI: `It was calculated that electoral-political unity would lift the left from
marginality and could convert the left into a real protagonist in the country's decision-
making' (H ernandez 2010: 33). Thus, in late 1981, the PCM, in its twentieth Congress,
dissolved itself and transferred its registry to a new, larger left party, the Mexican Uni-
ed Socialist Party (PSUM). PSUM leaders chose `March for Democracy' (Marcha por la
Democracia) as the presidential campaign slogan for Arnoldo Mart nez Verdugo, who re-
89The Liga claimed nuclei in all of Mexico's major cities.
206ceived nearly four percent of the vote.
The creation of the PSUM marked an important step in the unication of Mexico's traditional
Marxist left, but the process would culminate in the formation of the PMS. Like the 1982
presidential election, the 1988 election gave Mexico's still-fragmented traditional Marxist left
an incentive to seek even greater unity. In 1988, the PSUM dissolved itself and transferred
its registry to the new PMS, which absorbed, in addition to the PSUM, six Marxist parties
and organizations: Heberto Castillo's PMT, the PRT, a defecting faction of the PST led by
Jes us Ortega, the Union of the Communist Left (UIC), and the more radical Revolutionary
People's Movement (MRP, est. mid-1960s) and aforementioned PPR (H ernandez 2010: 36).
The creation of the PMS marked the culmination of a decades-long process of left unication.
When the PMS nominated Heberto Castillo as its candidate for the 1988 presidential election,
the party claimed a broader coalition of left forces than any left party in Mexican history.
As disussed earlier, however, C ardenas's independent 1988 presidential bid rapidly eclipsed
Castillo's and threatened the PMS's survival. Consequently, the PMS retired Castillo's
candidacy, joined the FDN, and in 1989, dissolved itself and transferred its registry to the
PRD. The PRD thus inherited the PMS wholesale.
The PMS claimed party representatives and local or regional branches across the national
territory.90 On adopting the PMS's registry, the PRD inherited several thousand PMS
members and activists, a network of oces (particularly in large urban areas), and additional
organizational resources (e.g., telephones). Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, the PRD's rst national
Secretary of Organization, recalled that during the late 1980s, the national PRD leadership
contacted or visited PMS oces across the country in order to develop an initial territorial
network of local PRD nuclei.91 The PMS's national headquarters, located at Monterrey 50
90Interview with G omez Tagle.
91Interview with Mu~ noz Ledo.
207in the Federal District, became the PRD's rst national headquarters.
Yet the PMS's role in the PRD's territorial implantation should not be overstated. The
PMS's most critical contribution lay in the provision of experienced, educated elites and
cuadros. A disproportionate number of these individuals rose to positions of national lead-
ership and won major oces. The party's several thousand members, however, did not
represent a signicant share of the PRD's mass base. As Cuauht emoc C ardenas observed
in a 2001 interview: `I would say that the PMS is an organization that comes with many
cuadros but without a broad popular base in general terms'.92 To build a mass base, the
PRD depended much more heavily on the extraparliamentary social left and, to a lesser
extent, the defecting PRI.
The social left
Following the PRI's brutal repression of students in 1968, many left organizations, in contrast
to the above Marxist parties, continued to reject institutional politics and engage in social
struggle throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These organizations disdained elections, detested
the PRI, claimed `f erreas militancias' (iron-willed activist bases), and engaged in `warlike
(including armed) forms of struggle' (Mart nez 2005: 53, 55). Many included individuals
who had split from traditional Marxist parties or taken up parallel activities after 1968.
The social left organizations that fed into the PRD, almost all of which had actively sup-
ported the FDN in the 1988 presidential campaign, either possessed large social bases or,
more commonly, strong ties to organizations with large social bases. Key social left feeder
organizations with large bases included the National Worker and Peasant Council of Mex-
ico (CNOCM); the Democratic Peasant Union (UCD); the University Student Council; 93
92Interview with Cuauht emoc C ardenas in Borjas (2003, vol. II: 410-1).
93Hern andez (2010): 38.
208the Worker, Peasant, and Student Coalition of the Istmo (COCEI, est. 1976); the Popu-
lar Urban Movement (est. 1985) and, within it, the Asamblea de Barrios (est. 1987); the
University Student Council (CEU, est. 1986); and the peasant-based Cardenista National
Council (CNC).
Those with with strong ties to large social bases included parties and cliques such as the Or-
ganizaci on Revolucionaria Punto Cr tico (ORPC, est. 1972), a Mexico City-based Marxist
organization founded by student movement leaders and in charge of the inuential left mag-
azine, Revista Punto Cr tico; the Popular Action Movement (MAP, est. 1980), an ORPC
splinter; the L nea de Masas faction of the Maoist Revolutionary Leftist Organization (OIR-
LM, est. 1981); the Revolutionary People's Movement (MRP, est. 1981); the Maoist Rev-
olutionary National Civic Association (ACNR, est. 1982), a nucleus of former guerrillas;
the Revolutionary Patriotic Party (PPR, est. early 1980s), also a member of the PMS; the
Green Party (PV, est. 1986); the Movement Toward Socialism (est. March 1988), a PRT
splinter; the Grupo Poliforum; the Liberal Party; and Democratic Convergence.94 These
cliques and small parties claimed strong ties to a range of organized social sectors, includ-
ing peasants (ACNR), urban popular movements (ORPC), student associations in Mexico
City, Guerrero,95 and elsewhere (MAS, ACNR), left teachers' unions such as STUNAM and
the CNTE (MAP, OIR-LM), left blue-collar unions (MAP), and post-materialist movements
(PV).
Although a wide range of social left actors contributed to the organizational development
of the PRD, rural unions and urban popular movements played the most important role
in creating permanent PRD base-level structures (Rodr guez n.d.: 257-8). Peasant unions
played an especially critical role in southern Mexico. Rural worker associations provided ex-
94See Mart nez (2005: 53-5); Hern andez (2010: 37-8); Rodr guez (n.d.: 188); Borjas (2003: 279).
95One PRD founder and early activist notes the key role that left student groups at the Autonomous
University of Guerrero played in early PRD mobilization and organization (interview with Gamundi).
209tensive activist networks and infrastructure. The aforementioned CNOCM, a confederation
of progressive rural and urban unions that had split from the Mexican Workers' Confeder-
ation to support C ardenas's 1988 presidential bid,96 gave the PRD an organized rural base
in Michoac an, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, and Veracruz. According to Bruhn
(1998), local branches of the Democratic Peasant Union (UCD) simply became local PRD
committees in many cases: `Membership of local PRD/UCD committees often overlapped
nearly 100 percent' (225). One PRD founder described rural unions as the early PRD's
`spinal cord' in large parts of the southern `peasant states'.97
The Popular Urban Movement (MUP) { and especially the Asamblea de Barrios, which
the MUP produced { played an indispensable role in the early PRD's organization-building
in Mexico City. The MUP (est. 1985) emerged in response to Mexico City's devastating
1985 earthquake. The earthquake wrought havoc on the city's vast popular neighborhoods,
destroying homes and the supporting infrastructural systems. Widespread dissatisfaction
with the pace and scope of the de la Madrid administration's response sparked the MUP,
which involved an unprecedented owering of neighborhood associations dedicated to hous-
ing rights advocacy and community reconstruction. H ernandez (2010) identies the 1985
earthquake as the most signicant event for the development of Mexican civil society that
had occurred in decades (35).
With the rise of the MUP, popular urban sectors, traditionally a PRI constituency, defected
to the opposition. Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, in a 2009 interview, summarized that `the citizenry,
confronting the inadequacy of the de la Madrid administration, organized itself, and the
government's authority in [Mexico City] was over'.98 The city's proliferating neighborhood
96C ardenas (2010).
97Interview with Gamundi.
9820 a~ nos del PRD: Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, May 22, 2009.
210associations united to form numerous umbrella organizations.99 In 1987, the largest of these,
the Coordinadora  Unica de Damnicados, dissolved into an even larger confederation, the
Asamblea de Barrios.100 Months after C ardenas announced his candidacy, the Asamblea en-
dorsed him. Other important C ardenas allies from the MUP included the Uni on de Colonias
Populares and the Frente Popular Francisco Villa. These organizations fed into the PRD
on its founding.
In the Federal District, the PRD inherited a mass activist base and dense grassroots struc-
tures from the MUP. In the late 1980s, the Asamblea alone claimed 60,000 member families,
an estimated eighty-ve percent of whom became perredistas.101 One PRD founder and
early federal deputy summarized that the MUP enabled the PRD to move beyond university
students and radical unions and become rooted in mass society.102 MUP leaders mobilized
neighborhood activists and groups into local PRD committees.103 Many became PRD can-
didates for public oce.104 The Asamblea lent C ardenas and the PRD key assets, including
panel trucks for campaigning.105 Such was the Asamblea's contribution to C ardenas and the
99These included the Uni on de Colonias Populares, the Frente Popular Francisco Villa, the Uni on Popular
Nueva Tenochtitl an, in which future PRD leaders Ren e Bejarano and Dolores Padierna participated), the
Coordinadora de Cuartos de Azotea de Tlatelolco, the Comit e de lucha Inquilinaria del Centro, the Uni on
de Vecinos de la colonia Pensil, and the Uni on Popular de Inquilinos de la colonia Morelos-Pe~ na Morelos.
100See Hern andez 2010: 37.
101Interview with Rasc on.
102Interview with  Avila.
103Local PRD committees, Bruhn (1998) writes, tended `to coalesce around preexisting pockets of movement
organization', particularly those connected to the Asamblea (226). A PRD founder and early federal
deputy recalls that in the Federal District, PRD activist groups were `transplanted' from urban popular
movements (interview with Flores). Another PRD founder early federal deputy states, similarly, that he
and other urban popular movement leaders mobilized PRD support in their movements' neighborhood
strongholds (interview with Saucedo). Both interviewees drew on their recognition and support among
the movement base to build large, local constituencies and launch successful campaigns for federal deputy
(interview with Flores).
104Successful federal deputy candidates drawn from urban popular movements included Marco Rasc on and
Francisco Saucedo of the Asamblea, Cuauht emoc `Memo' Flores of the Coordinadora  unica de Damni-
cados, Alejandro Luebano of COPEDI and the Uni on de Colonias Populares, and Ren e Bejarano of the
Uni on Popular Nuevo Tenochtitl an.
105When campaigning in Mexico City in 1988, C ardenas made many of his appearances in the Barrio M ovil,
211PRD that, in the words of one movement leader, the Asamblea `destroyed (deshizo) the PRI'
in the Federal District.106
Mexico's social left movements and organizations, taken together, provided the PRD with
a larger social base than any other feeder category. In addition, the social left furnished
a large number of experienced leaders and cuadros who occupied important positions in
national and subnational party organs. These individuals exerted a profound inuence on
activist formation and discussions of party program and tactics. Early party meetings, for
example, predominantly consisted of radical activists and intellectuals.107 One ex-member
of the ORPC recalls that groups like Punto Cr tico played a critical role in educating PRD
activists and leading discussions of political theory and coyunturas. These contributions, he
stated, fueled the political and ideological struggle.108
It should also be noted, nally, that many perredistas of extraparliamentary Marxist origin
viewed the PRD as a stage, important but temporary, in a longer-term struggle for rev-
olutionary, socialist change in Mexico.109 A signicant fraction of these individuals, after
joining the PRD, maintained parallel, clandestine activities, especially until the mid-1990s.
Ex-PRI networks
During the PRD's early years, ex-PRI networks furnished key human and organizational
resources in several states, especially Michoac an and Tabasco.110 Michoac an constituted
a large panel truck that the Asamblea had created primarily for public presentations of their mascot,
Super Barrio G omez (personal communication with Greene, June 10, 2011).
106Interview with Rasc on.
107Personal communication with Bruhn, June 10, 2011.
108Interview with Gamundi.
109For example, one early PRD federal deputy, a Marxist and MUP member, recalled that when he joined the
party, he believed that revolution would ultimately prove necessary, but that achieving electoral success
would help the left acumular fuerzas, or amass power (interview with Flores).
110It should be noted that many defecting pri stas simultaneously participated in social left organizations
(e.g., peasant unions), but most did not.
212the primary bastion of cardenismo and perredismo throughout the formative phase. L azaro
C ardenas served as the governor of Michoac an from 1928 to 1930, and Cuauht emoc C ardenas
served in the same position from 1980 to 1986. Prior to the creation of the FDN and PRD,
a large fraction of Michoac an's electorate identied as cardenista, not pri sta.111 Thus, when
C ardenas defected, most of the PRI organization and electorate defected with him. In the
1988 election, C ardenas received the majority of the state's vote. On formation, the PRD in
Michoac an inherited a large network of ex-PRI cardenista supporters, activists, and cuadros.
In a 1992 edition of Proceso, Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo estimated that in Michoac an, `98 percent
of our militantes and cuadros were from the PRI'.112 Of the three-hundred mid-level leaders
(cuadros) who defected from the PRI 1988, two-hundred and fty hailed from Michoac an
(De la Madrid 2004). Fern andez (2003) states that the PRD of Michoac an came whole and
ready-made (en forma integra) from the PRI. The PRD also inherited valuable organizational
assets such as oces, computers, and telephones.113
Ex-PRI networks also played a key role in the PRD's early implantation in Tabasco. Be-
ginning in 1989, the rst president of the PRD's Tabasco oce, ex-pri sta and CD member
Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador (AMLO), built a statewide network of precinct-level PRD
committees (comit es de secci on). He based these committees on a similar network of PRI
committees that, as Tabasco's PRI president in 1983, he had helped develop and integrate
horizontally. In 1993 and 1994, AMLO, in anticipation of the 1994 gubernatorial race, un-
dertook a second major organizational push, to impressive eect. Building on his initial
network of local PRD comit es, AMLO spearheaded a new, major recruitment eort, re-
sulting in a surge of PRD members and local nuclei. By 1995, the PRD claimed a higher
111Interview with Flores.
112Proceso, no. 820, July 20, 1992. According to Borjas's (2003) less precise estimate, the majority of early
PRD activists in Michoac an were ex-pri stas (355).
113In many parts of Michoac an, according to one PRD founder, the PRI organization simply `became' the
PRD organization, in terms of personnel as well as resources (e.g. computers) (interview with Flores).
213member/population ratio in Tabasco than in any other Mexican state.114
* * *
In sum, while low access to state and media made territorial implantation electorally vital for
Mexico's new left, access to human and organizational resources from the traditional Marxist
left, social left, and former PRI made it possible: `The credit for the PRD's territorial
implantation fundamentally goes to the work carried out by leaders and members of the
local organizations and movements that were incorporated into the party...[and] contributed
human and material resources to party implantation' (Borjas 2003: 245).115
The early PRD's
organizational strength
Within several years of its creation, the PRD had built a territorial infrastructure that, in
reach and density, rivaled or surpassed that of nearly every new left party in Latin America on
a comparable timeline, including Brazil's PT.116 The party claimed roughly 700,000 members
in late 1991 and, by 1995, over one-million.117
Geographical unevenness followed from the diuse, bottom-up nature of the early PRD's
organization-building. In the territorial bastions of the PRD's organized allies, PRD branches
proliferated. Elsewhere, few branches materialized.118 Early perredistas heavily populated
114Borjas (2003: 519); Borajs (2003, vol. II: 74).
115Similarly, an early activist recalls that the PRD became territorially rooted through locally implanted
organizations, especially where big leaders of social movements operated (interview with  Avila).
116Although the PRD, in regional comparative perspective, has a high level of territorial rootedness, PRD
members and analysts tend to downplay or deny the party's infrastructural strength. In interviews,
dozens of party elites and activists described the party as infrastructurally weak. This assessment usually
resulted from comparing the PRD to the PRI, which has penetrated every region of Mexico.
117First statistic from Borjas (2003: 371).
118One PRD leader and federal deputy states that wherever the early PRD received signicant support,
it came from already-organized left groups (interview with Flores). Borjas (2003) writes of the PRD's
214the Federal District, Mexico state, and much of the South, but not the North or, for the
most part, Central Mexico. At the PRD's rst two Congresses, the largest delegations came
from the Federal District and Mexico State, Michoac an, Veracruz, and Tabasco.119
By 1993, the PRD had set up a party oce in every municipality of Michoac an and estab-
lished a `signicant presence', proportional to population, in six additional states: Chiapas,
Guerrero, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas.120 Throughout this period, the PRD
claimed a strong, active base in the Federal District and, to a lesser extent, Mexico state,
but given high population size in both entidades federativas, the party's proportional pres-
ence was comparatively weak. In 1994, due to electoral mobilization for the presidential and
gubernatorial contests, the PRD's percent membership in the Federal District and Tabasco
skyrocketed. As of 1995, the party's member/population ratio in these two entidades sur-
passed those in all other Mexican states,121 and the majority of PRD members, nationally,
resided in six entidades: the Federal District, Michoac an, Tabasco, Veracruz, Oaxaca, and
Guerrero.122
early organization-building process: `The diversity of social movements and organizations that joined the
PRD...in some places, led to an important and almost immediate territorial implantation derived from
the rootedness (arraigo) and mobilizing capacity of those who headed them and formed part of the PRD's
organizing committees...' (301).
119Borjas (2003): 371 fn. 284, 532.
120The party had a weaker, but moderate, presence in Aguascalientes, Baja California, the Federal District,
Jalisco, Mexico state, and Nuevo Le on (Borjas 2003: 518).
121See Borjas 2003, vol II: 74).
122Borjas (2003, vol. II): 74, 87-8.
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216Figure 4.4: PRD Member/Population Ratio, 1995
Polarization and the sources
of activist commitment
In sum, the PRD, during its rst half-decade, built a strong organization with over 1000
municipal oces, roughly one-million members, and a mass activist base, concentrated pri-
marily in the Federal District, Mexico state, and the Southern region. PRD activists, the
lifeblood of this organization, possessed high levels of partisan commitment, enthusiasm,
and drive. In unprompted recollections, various PRD founders vividly attested to this fact,
describing the early militancia as a mass of enthusiastic volunteers characterized by idealism,
a willingness to work around other important responsibilites, a knack for creative grassroots
mobilization, and an aversion to central features of modern Mexican campaigning such as
patronage, clientelism, paid media spots, and political professionalism.
Distilling a commonly expressed sentiment, one PRD founder and ORPC member stated
217that early PRD activists enjoyed party work.123 Another party founder and MUP member
stated that for most early PRD militantes, political activism was `natural' and the concept
of political professionalization almost non-existent. More clinically, one party activist and
scholar stated that the `psychological benets' of participation drove the early PRD's `big
volunteer army'.124 A founding PRD member, formerly of the PSM, described the PRD's
convocation as a `great outpouring' of spontaneous, vigorous debate and analysis among
thousands of members and numerous small parties and organizations.125 In early speeches,
party elites frequently trumpeted the PRD's spirit of volunteerism and contrasted the PRD's
creative and spirited grassroots campaigns with the money-fueled, professional campaigns
of the PRI. One interviewee fondly recalled early PRD propaganda as highly `artisanal'
(artesanal) and stated that creative, low-budget propaganda had more credibility than a
`[expletive] TV ad'.126
A PRD founder and intellectual stated, without prompting, that the party's mass reserve of
enthusiastic, spontaneous volunteer activism constituted its core strength and comparative
advantage. For no other party during the early 1990s, he said, did small groups of individ-
uals routinely engage in spontaneous grassroots activities such as writing PRD slogans on
asphalt sidewalks.127 One early PRD activist noted the absence of bureaucracy and structure
during early ground campaigns and also highlighted the untutored quality of his and oth-
ers' early party work. He and fellow activists, he said, allocated time outside of their work
and study schedules128 and improvised with little supervision, campaigning door-to-door,
123Interview with Gamundi.
124Interview with Borjas.
125Interview with  Avila.
126Interview with Rasc on.
127Interview with Gamundi.
128Along these lines, one PRD founder and future federal deputy from Mexico state, in a 2010 interview,
described doing party work in the evening, after classes: `When I began as a PRD activist, I studied at
218painting grati on walls, and distributing locally produced iers. He recalled that many
such individuals, including he, continued their party work between election campaigns, with
a focus during these periods on forging ties to popular organizations. All these eorts, he
stated, were spontaneous and decentralized, with each activist aware that s/he needed to
make a contribution to building the PRD.129
One interviewee emphasized that during the `artisanal' period, early PRD militantes typ-
ically invested at least some of their energy in local elections.130 Since eective ground
campaigns conferred a potentially decisive advantage in smaller elections, he stated, many
activists assigned top priority to local contests and devoted most of their party work to local
candidates. These individuals did not expect the PRD to win national power easily. On
the contrary, they expected, even welcomed, a gradual, bottom-up transformation of Mex-
ico's political system, in which the left would amass victories and governing experience at
the local and state levels before winning control of the federal government.131 In 1991, the
national leadership followed the base's lead by establishing its rst set of ocial principles
and guidelines for PRD municipal governments.132
What factors account for the commitment and enthusiasm of the PRD base? Selection
pressures played an important role. The PRD's early adversity, in addition to shaping elite
the Colegio de Ciencias y Humanidades during the afternoon and evening. I would get home at 9. At 10,
with my brother, I would hang up posters and distribute iers (Interview with Duarte in Gonz alez et al.,
eds. (2010: 250).
129Interview with Hern andez.
130Interview with Rasc on.
131Interview with Rasc on.
132Initially, the PRD possessed clear national objectives (e.g., democratization, defeating the PRI, rolling
back neoliberalism), but the party `did not consider an initial proposal for winning state and local gov-
ernments'. In 1991, the national party, `aware of the importance of winning positions at diverse levels
of government', organized a national municipal assembly and produced a multipoint set of guidelines for
PRD municipal governments (Baptista 2010: 175). Six more assemblies would follow, and in 1997, the
national PRD would create two organs, the Institute of Municipal Development (IDM) and the Mexi-
can Association of Local Authorities (AALMAC), to support its municipal governments (Baptista 2010:
175-6).
219electoral strategies, created selection pressures at the base level. Active participation in
the early PRD presupposed a willingness to do party work without a salary or the credible
promise of a government job. The party's rst national Secretary of Organization, Porrio
Mu~ noz Ledo, deftly noted in an early Proceso article that `we live by substituting good faith
and enthusiasm for resources'.133 Bruhn (1998) notes that most early perredistas also paid
less visible costs, having `to take time out of protable work activities' and expend income
on fuel, food, and travel lodging (286). For many, participation in the PRD required a
willingness to put one's own safety at risk, especially in the more violent southern states.
Rodr guez (n.d.) thus writes that `being a victim of persecution and exclusion, experiencing
electoral fraud, even losing one's life were constant possibilities for party activists' (284,
emphasis added).
Unremunerated labor, dim short-term electoral prospects, and the threat of violence and
murder discouraged political careerists (arribistas), opportunists, and patronage-seekers from
joining the early PRD. The PRD's adverse formative phase thus selected for militantes
creyentes, committed activists who sincerely believed in the PRD's causes. Greene (2007)
nds evidence of these selection eects. Individuals who joined the early PRD in years
of heightened resource asymmetry and repression, he shows, held more extreme left-wing
views on economic policy and democracy, holding constant economic development, a host
of demographic variables, and activists' formal position in the PRD hierarchy (158, 305).134
One party activist and scholar stated in an interview that conditions during the PRD's early
development were `very dicult', but that this diculty helped the party. Because the early
PRD had very few opportunities to win important elections, she stated, the party `couldn't
133Proceso, no. 757, May 6, 1991, p. 19. Cited by Borjas (2003): 486.
134In particular, many of the PRD's early ideologues `came from Mexico's older, radical left' (Greene 2007:
164) and had themselves `been recruited into the opposition when joining was such a high cost and low
benet activity that only relative extremists found it worthwhile to do so' (94-5).
220be a business'. Perredistas joined for other reasons, like ideological conviction.135 Borjas
(2003) also suggests the existence of selection eects, writing that `the repression exercised
by the government led...to the despondency and desertion of the FDN's base' in `many cases',
but not for the most strong-willed individual and group supporters (341, 245).
Selection pressures alone, however, cannot account for the commitment of early PRD ac-
tivists. Even if a particular set of conditions selects for committed activists, individuals and
groups will not donate their time, energy, and resources to a party-building project unless
driven by a positive higher cause. Party-building commitment on a national scale presup-
poses a higher cause of national import, around which large, heterogeneous, and dispersed
segments of a population can unite and rally. Independently of selection pressures, such a
cause, in a given context, may or may not emerge.
Steven Levitsky and his collaborators have argued that periods of national polarization and
conict often produce the higher causes necessary for large-scale, volunteer collective action
and party-building (Levitsky et al. n.d.). The early PRD conforms to this pattern. Intense
polarization and conict between Mexico's governing powers and left opposition during the
late 1980s and early 1990s generated the common causes that fueled early PRD activists.
Cardenismo, the broad movement that fed into the PRD, both reected and contributed to
this polarization.
By the late 1980s, the PRI, governing amid economic and humanitarian crisis and failing
to respond adequately, could no longer legitimate its rule by citing strong performance. In
increasing numbers, Mexican voters and civil society organizations began to defect from the
PRI and join the opposition. The marginalization of the Corriente Democr atico, headed by
Cuauht emoc C ardenas, revealed the PRI's internal resistance to change. When C ardenas
defected from the PRI to mount an opposition presidential bid, the anti-PRI resentment
135Interview with G omez Tagle.
221within civil society and the broader electorate found a positive outlet. A heterogeneous
front of left elites and civil society actors, despite weak horizontal linkages and manifold
dierences, united around a single cause: to defeat a dominant party that, in their view,
had committed to a failed, right-wing economic model and proven unresponsive to internal
and external demands for economic reform and social justice. C ardenas oered the national
clout necessary to make this cause reality.
Paradoxically, the PRI's fraudulent, repressive response to cardenismo strengthened the
left opposition by hardening activist commitments. During Salinas's sexenio, national PRI
politicians and leaders and subnational authorities stole the presidency, stole governorships,
stole mayoralties, killed scores of left activists, manipulated the media establishment, and
channeled vast resources, all in order to cow and defeat the FDN and PRD. For perredistas,
the Salinas administration and subnational PRI oligarchies, during this period, went well
beyond their original crimes, revealing that they would stop at nothing to retain power.
As the political establishment employed the full powers of the Mexican state to keep the left
in the political wilderness, activist anger and deance mounted, and mobilization increased.
Fraud across levels of government provoked a steady stream of left mobilization from 1988 to
the mid-1990s. As discussed earlier, C ardenas's defeat provoked a sustained mass movement
that eventuated in the creation of the PRD. Also in 1988, Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador,
the FDN's gubernatorial candidate in Tabasco, ocially lost to the PRI's Salvador Neme
Castillo, alleged fraud, and organized a series of mass actions to protest the new government,
including rallies and blockades of highways and gas stations. Throughout 1989 and 1990, as
the PRI systematically defrauded the PRD in municipal elections across the country, PRD
supporters and activists mobilized at the local level, staged marches, blocked highways,
and occupied city halls.136 In 1991, AMLO organized his rst `exodus for democracy' from
136Media broadcast these actions in order to reinforce perceptions of the PRD as destabilizing.
222Tabasco to Mexico City in protest of municipal-level fraud. The same year, in San Luis
Potos , PRD activists carried out a long series of mass demonstrations and marches to protest
the illegitimate triumph of Fausto Zapata (PRI) over the PRD's Salvador Nava.137 Similar
demonstrations occurred after gubernatorial elections in Michoac an in 1992 and Guerrero
in 1993. In 1994, AMLO lost his second bid for the Tabasco governorship, this time to
Roberto Madrazo (PRI). In 1995, presenting copious evidence of electoral fraud and other
abuses, AMLO organized his second `exodus for democracy', leading 2500 PRD activists138
to Mexico City to protest the Tabasco results as well as systematic fraud at the national
level.139
To an even greater extent than systematic fraud, however, the use of violence and repres-
sion by subnational PRI authorities strengthened the PRD cause. Violence against the left
galvanized the PRD base, motivated new entrants,140 and generated cohesion. According
to the testimony of numerous party founders, the repression of the Salinas years hardened
PRD activists. Instead of retreating or exiting politics, most perredistas became more reso-
lute in the face of violence.141 According to Borjas (2003), `the repression exercised by the
government...contributed to unifying and strengthening the convergence of distinct groups
and citizens generally who resolved to unite to resist governmental violence' (341). In 1992,
Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo wrote in Proceso: `Every time the PRI confronts us directly...the party
137Tellingly, the PRI refused to cede the governorship to the PRD after Fausto Zapata's resignation, even
though in the same year, the PRI did cede the governorship of Guanajuato to PAN candidate, Carlos
Medina Plascencia, in response to weaker anti-fraud protests by PAN activists.
138Borjas (2003, vol. II): 65.
139The protesters also addressed issues such as the potential privatization of Pemex.
140In addition to galvanizing the existing base, the PRD's David and Goliath-like struggle against the PRI
may also have inspired and activated previously inactive individuals and supporters. Borjas (2003, vol.
II) argues that the PRD's `elevated territorial coverage' in Michoac an, Guerrero, and Chiapas `can be
attributed precisely to repression as a source of party members' cohesion, resistance, and activism' (vol.
II: 245).
141Interview with Borjas.
223unies, strengthens inside, works toward a tighter coordination and deeper solidarity. It isn't
new that adversity unies'.142
For many perredistas, PRI violence transformed the conict between the political estab-
lishment and left opposition into a war. When asked why the PRD did not fold after the
disastrous 1991 elections (about which more below), one party founder from San Luis Potos 
replied simply: `We were at war'.143 In a 2010 interview, party founder and early federal
deputy Carlos Navarrete stated:
[The Salinas sexenio] was a very hard time because our struggle was against the current. They
were times of persecution, of hundreds of dead activists. They were times in which they stole
elections from us, covering the width and depth of the country. They were times in which the
government besieged us. They were times of resistance, fundamentally, of not giving up, of
maintaining and raising our ags'.144
Mart nez (2005) observes that, as late as 1994, most of the PRD opposed negotiation with
the PRI due to the party's `warlike relationship' (beligerante trato) with Carlos Salinas
(70-1). In major speeches, party leaders frequently paid tribute to fallen perredistas. In
his acceptance of the PRD's nomination for the 1994 presidential campaign, for example,
C ardenas commemorated the 239 party members murdered thus far (Borjas 2003: 512): `We
must honor those who, with their sacrices and their lives, made it possible for us to arrive
at this day: hundreds of deaths for democracy across the country have been a harsh price
paid by all Mexican people'.145 In 2010, the PRD produced a hardback commemorating the
party's twenty-year anniversary. There were two dedications, the rst `to those who lost
their lives in the struggle to build the Party of the Democratic Revolution' (Gonz alez et al.,
eds., 2010).146
142Proceso no. 820, 7/20/1992, p. 10.
143Interview with Nava.
144Interview with Navarrete in Gonz alez et al., eds. (2010: 265).
145Proceso, no. 1101, December 7, 1994, pp. 6-15. Cited in Borjas (2003, vol. II): 161.
146The second was to the militancia.
224The fraud and repression of the Salinas years remain salient for the PRD's early elites and
activists and continue to inform their perspectives, behaviors, and collective identity. Party
founder and current party president Jes us Zambrano (2011-14) recalled in a 2010 interview
that following the `imposition' of Salinas, neoliberalism became consolidated, and the left
experienced `the most brutal repression' in its history, with over 600 deaths during the
Salinas sexenio. Party members Gonz alez et al., eds. (2010) describe the Salinas years as
`the hardest moments for the PRD. In this period we have 500 PRD deaths, the stolen election
in Michoac an, such a grave problem in the Guerrero election, and the exodus for democracy
in Tabasco'.147 Many perredistas of long standing still consider electoral fraud endemic in
Mexico.148 Others lament that newer generations of perredistas lack an awareness of the
party's adverse origins. In the words of party founder and early Texcoco mayor, Horacio
Duarte: `When you talk to [19- and 20-year olds] about how hard it was to build the PRD
opposite a PRI government, they don't understand you because they didn't live through
that period'.149
* * *
In summary, due to circumstances of adversity and the elite incentives, selection pressures,
and activist orientations that owed from these circumstances, the early PRD constructed a
strong organization composed of committed activists. By the mid-1990s, the party had re-
cruited over one-million members and built municipal oces in most Mexican municipalities.
Early perredistas were primarily left ideologues and principled opponents of the PRI. They
were not driven by selective incentives, as PRD elites had few selective incentives to oer.
147Gonz alez et al., eds. (2010: 66).
148After the 2006 presidential election, perredistas, despite a high degree of skepticism within the broader
electorate, overwhelmingly believed that Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador had lost due to fraud. For two
months after the election, hundreds of thousands of perredistas, perhaps millions, participated in mass
demonstrations, rallies, marches, and encampments.
149Interview with Duarte in Gonz alez et al., eds. (2010: 249).
225In contrast to patronage-seekers, the local leaders and activists who built the PRD were not
likely to defect from the partisan left in the absence of short-term payos or government
spoils. They genuinely believed in the party's cause: to defeat the violently authoritarian
PRI, halt the advance of neoliberalism, and usher in an era of progressive, democratic change
in Mexico, all under the moral leadership of Cuauht emoc C ardenas.
Electoral crisis and
survival in 1991 and 1994
Greene (2007) argues that the PRD's early joiners hurt the party by supporting unelectable
candidates and promoting radical, unpopular policy stances. This account passes over an
important point: the commitment of the PRD's early joiners, rooted in opposition to PRI
authoritarianism and neoliberalism and hardened by PRI hostility and violence, made the
PRD more durable during the formative phase. Early activists did not join the PRD because
they expected a quick, easy route to national power and the associated spoils. They believed
in the PRD's cause and accepted, even welcomed, the prospect of an extended, hard-fought
struggle. Partisan belief and commitment extended their time horizons, steeling them against
early electoral setbacks.
In particular, organizational strength and activist commitment contributed decisively to the
PRD's survival of early electoral crises in 1991 and 1994. The PRD suered major electoral
setbacks in both years, rst in the Chamber of Deputies and second in the presidential
election. In both cases, networks of committed activists rebounded and redoubled their
eorts in the party's territorial strongholds.
The 1991 Chamber of Deputies election
Memories of the 1988 general election lifted the early PRD's electoral expectations. The
FDN elected almost thirty percent of Mexico's federal deputies, and C ardenas won the pres-
226idential contest on most accounts. Subsequently, perredista candidates registered strong
performances in the party's rst elections at the subnational level. Despite a slew of dis-
advantages, the PRD won scores of mayoralties in 1989 and 1990. Absent fraud, the party
would have won many additional mayoralties and might have won several governorship (e.g.,
Tabasco, San Luis Potos ). In view of these encouraging early results, PRD leaders and
activists looked to the 1991 congressional elections with optimism. Despite a highly un-
even electoral playing eld, `leaders and activists shared...a certainty' that the party would
win `broad representation' in the Mexican Congress (Borjas 2003: 388). A strong perfor-
mance in the election, they believed, would enable the PRD legislative bloc to stymie the
Salinas agenda, pass institutional reforms leveling the electoral playing eld, and thus lay
the groundwork for a C ardenas victory in 1994. This optimism `represented the...point of
convergence within the party organization' (Borjas 2003: 288).
The PRD performed abysmally. The party lost seats150 and nished a distant third, with
a mere eight percent of the vote. The PAN maintained a vote share of eighteen percent,
while the PRI jumped from fty-one to sixty-one percent.151 Taken together, the constituent
party's of the former FDN increased their vote share and defeated the PRD. The PRD also
failed to elect a governor for the third consecutive year. The PRI won all seven 1991 guberna-
torial elections (Campeche, Colima, Guanajuato, Nuevo Le on, Quer etaro, San Luis Potos ,
and Sonora), although it ceded the governorship of Guanajuato to the PAN in response to
anti-fraud protests.
The 1991 results dashed perredistas' expectations and threatened the party's survival. Promi-
nent PRD leaders from the social left, citing PRI abuses, manipulations, and violence during
150The PRD had entered the 1991 midterms with fty-ve deputies
151In the election, the party performed well above the party average in its organizational redoubts. Specif-
ically, federal deputy candidates were most successful in Michoac an, Guerrero, and, to a lesser extent,
Oaxaca, Tabasco, the Federal District, Mexico state, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, and Nayarit.
227the campaigns, advocated that the PRD completely withdraw from the electoral sphere. In
an early 2000s interview, C ardenas described 1991 as the most challenging episode in the
PRD's history: `The objective of the '91 midterms was the real, eective liquidation of the
PRD... [T]his was the PRD's hardest electoral moment'.152 Less than a month after the
election, Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo publicly stated that the PRD's continued electoral signicance
might hinge on an alliance with the conservative PAN { an unthinkable prospect for much
of the PRD rank-and-le.153 Bruhn (1998) writes that the PRD's `dismal performance [in
1991]... damaged its credibility as a threat to the PRI...and led many to question its very
survival' (250). Borjas (2003) states that after the election, `it was completely undeniable
that the survival of the PRD...was in danger' (457-8).154
After the election, party leaders, despite their concerns about the party's viability, exhorted
the base to regroup. Leaders urged militantes, in particular, to redirect their attention toward
upcoming subnational contests, municipal and state. In its internal diagnosis, the National
Executive Council emphasized that the PRD continued to suer from `great shortcomings'
in the organizational domain and resolved, moving forward, to prioritize territorial expan-
sion from the regional to precinct level, and to identify areas of infrastructural weakness
with `X-ray' precision.155 Cardenas himself proposed a `major organizational eort', and
Mu~ noz Ledo concurred, proposing that the party expand its territorial reach, in electoral
and organizational terms, by forging broader alliances.156
Independently of top-down exhortations, however, the 1991 crisis actually galvanized much of
152Interview with Cuauh'emoc C ardenas in Borjas (2003, vol. II): 408.
153Proceso, no. 776, September 16, 1991, pp. 30-1.
154The party, Borjas (2003) observes, `suered a severe setback (retroceso) not only in relation to the seats
obtained by the constituent parties of the FDN, but even relative to itself, given that it did not manage
to hold the fty-ve seats obtained by the FDN members who had become perredistas' (408).
155Proceso, no. 776, September 16, 1991.
156Proceso no. 773, 8/26/1991: 10-11, Proceso no. 776, 9/6/1991: 29.
228the PRD base. As described by the editors of the PRD's twenty-year commemorative: `1991
represented for the PRD its rst political setback but at the same time the consolidation of
an iron-willed base (militancia f errea)' (Gonz alez et al., eds., 2010: 66). Early perredistas
viewed the PRI's overwhelming victory in 1991 as illegitimate: the product of repression,
massive state spending, a corrupt media establishment, and fraud. By and large, these
activists opted to continue the struggle.
One party founder and activist, recalling the mentality at the base level after the 1991
election, emphasized that the PRD was `at war'. The PRI had murdered scores of activists
and, just as in 1988, defrauded the national electorate. The PRD had not actually lost. For
these reasons, the interviewee stated, the elections did not depress early activists' ` animo'
(spirits).157 Another founder and early federal deputy with social left origins expressed a
similar sentiment. The elections, he stated, were not a huge disappointment because there
had not been real competition. Pri stas had used every conceivable lever of state to win.
They had cheated and used the state apparatus and media. Local chiefs with impunity
had killed activists `just for defending the vote'. PRI hostility motivated the militancia.
PRD activists did not even entertain the thought of giving up after 1991. They `had to' get
organized, as there was no other way to defeat the PRI.158
The PRD survived the electoral crisis of 1991 due to the persistence of activist networks
in the party's territorial redoubts. In the gubernatorial elections of 1992 and 1993, the
PRD's rst major post-1991 contests, the PRD, despite failing to win a single governorship,
registered strong performance in numerous states. In particular, PRD candidates performed
well above the party average in organizational strongholds such as Michoac an, Guerrero,
Nayarit, Veracruz, and Zacatecas (Borjas 2003: 490-1). The PRD also advanced at the
157Interview with Nava.
158Interview with Saucedo.
229state-legislative level in most territorial strongholds.
In 1992 and 1993, the PRD's top leadership gave public voice to the confrontational, deant
attitude that predominated among local party activists. In mid-1992, Mu~ noz Ledo stated
in Proceso: `What irritates Salinas is the PRD's position... the attitude of democratic
intransigence... It bothers him that we're incorruptible. That's what pains him the most.
What most irritates him is that we can't be bought, and don't even feel afraid, to such a
degree that we go looking for fear recklessly'.159 Along similar lines, C ardenas stated in 1993
that Salinas `must be annoyed...because he has not been able, with all the state's resources,
to crush the PRD or its leaders'.160
The 1994 presidential election
The PRD survived the 1991 congressional election due to organizational strength and ac-
tivist commitment. Local networks of base-level perredistas regrouped and continued their
party work, expanding the grassroots organization and campaigning for subnational PRD
candidates. In the 1994 presidential election, however, the PRD suered another electoral
crisis, testing the PRD's durability a second time.
In a sense, C ardenas's landslide loss in 1994 posed a more signicant challenge to the PRD
than the 1991 electoral crisis. The prospect of a C ardenas victory { and, with it, the
completion of Mexico's transition to democracy and an historic victory for the Mexican left
{ had animated perredistas since the party's founding. CEN member Jes us Ortega wrote
in Proceso in August of 1995 that the PRD had possessed only one objective until that
point: to elect C ardenas president the previous year.161 According to Mart nez (2005), `the
PRD was conceived around one person and one idea: to carry Cuauht emoc C ardenas to
159Proceso no. 820, 8/30/1992.
160Proceso no. 820, 8/30/1992.
161Proceso, no. 980, August 14, 1995, pp. 12-5. Cited in Borjas (2003): 69.
230the presidency' (97). Borjas (2003) writes that `rescuing', or `recovering', the presidency
for C ardenas constituted the PRD's `central short-term objective' as of 1993 and, more
generally, `one of the main ideas...guid[ing] the actions of the PRD' in its initial years (456,
507). Rodr guez (n.d.) describes the goal to win the 1994 presidential election { to `take back
what they stole from us in 1988' (257) { as the early PRD's central reason for existence.162
Throughout the early 1990s, numerous perredistas did not believe that the PRD would
survive if C ardenas lost in 1994.163
Further, according to pre-election conventional wisdom within the PRD, C ardenas would
prevail if the party's ground forces, unlike in 1988, did a thorough job of defending the
vote.164 The PRD's 2010 hardback commemorative recalls the atmosphere at the II National
Congress in mid-1993: `The spirit of the second congress was dierent from 1990. It was of
resistance, of electoral strength reduced to eight percent, but with a militancia convinced
that it would win 1994'.165 Borjas (2003) writes that PRD leaders and militantes were `sure
that in 1994, circumstances would be dierent' (507).
But C ardenas lost in a landslide. He placed a distant third with seventeen percent of the
vote.166 That C ardenas not only lost, but received under one-fth of the valid votes, damaged
the party's credibility and self-conception as a serious challenger to the PRI. Party moderates
argued that the PRD lost, fundamentally, because the C ardenas campaign had espoused
radical views, which alienated moderate left voters, and relied on antiquated campaign tactics
such as rallies, which limited C ardenas's exposure (Greene 2007). Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, for
162Personal communication with Rodr guez, August 1, 2011.
163Personal communication with Bruhn, June 10, 2011.
164Personal communication with Rodr guez, Aug. 1, 2011.
165Gonz alez et al., eds. (2010: 66).
166In the concurrent Chamber of Deputies election, the PRD also placed a distant third. Although the
PRD gained seats in the Chamber of Deputies, party leaders had anticipated a stronger result due to
presidential coattail eects.
231example, criticized the C ardenas campaign's programmatic decisions, especially to support
the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and oppose the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).167 C ardenas himself highlighted the campaign's overreliance on
rallies (m tines) and underutilization of more modern, ecient forms of campaigning such
as mass media appeals.168
To be sure, C ardenas's loss deated hopes and led to anger, disillusionment, and recrimi-
nations. As in 1991, however, the PRD militancia { more radical, by and large, than the
party moderates who criticized the C ardenas campaign { remained unfazed. Local PRD
activists viewed C ardenas's crushing defeat as part of a long pattern of illegitimate electoral
outcomes, based on media ostracism and hostility, massive resource asymmetries, activist
repression, and (rightly or wrongly) fraud.169 The PRI's hostility and perceived abuse of
power thus remained a galvanizing force. During a discussion of the 1994 election, one party
founder stated that the playing eld remained highly uneven, and the PRD remained at
`war'. Perredistas, he stated, owed it to their fallen comrades to soldier on and eventually
defeat the PRI.170
As had occurred in 1991, PRD activist networks in the party's territorial strongholds, fol-
lowing C ardenas's 1994 defeat, redirected their attention and energies toward subnational
elections, both for electoral mobilization and (in Tabasco) post-electoral civil resistance. As
noted earlier, the year 1995 gave rise to the second and more heavily publicized `exodus for
democracy', in which AMLO led a march from Tabasco to Mexico City in protest of both
167Mu~ noz Ledo also wrote that the PRD had underestimated the PRI's capacity to manipulate the electoral
process. Proceso, no. 964, April 24, 1995, p. 23, and no. 931, September 5, 1994, pp. 8-9. Cited by
Borjas (2003): 582-3.
168Proceso, no. 933, September 19, 1994, p. 10, and no. 940, November 7, 1994, p. 39. Cited by Borjas
(2003): 581-2.
169Interviews with Nava and Saucedo.
170Interview with Nava.
232state and national fraud. In territorial strongholds, the PRD performed well above the party
average in 1995 and 1996 state and local elections, including the 1995 gubernatorial race in
Michoac an, the 1995 and 1996 state legislative contests in Oaxaca and Guerrero, and the
1995 and 1996 municipal elections Chiapas, Michoac an, Oaxaca, Mexico state, Guerrero,
Hidalgo, and Nayarit.171
Thus, as with the electoral setback in 1991, after the 1994 presidential election, PRD ac-
tivist networks in the party's territorial redoubts regrouped and shifted focus to subnational
contests. Asked to explain the PRD's resilience after the 1994 election, a party scholar
based in Mexico stressed the importance of the PRD militancia. Loyal networks of activists,
he stated, never accounted for most PRD votes, but by remaining committed and active
through disappointing times, they gave the PRD a sturdy electoral oor and enabled the
party to overcome crises like C ardenas's 1994 loss.172
PRD organization-building
during the late 1990s
During the second half of the 1990s, the PRD began to engage aggressively in top-down
{ and more mercenary { forms of organization-building. This initiative formed part of a
broader strategy to improve the PRD's future performance in major elections. Under the
party presidency of AMLO (1996-9), the National Executive Committee (CEN) made a
series of tactical compromises to position the PRD for victory in the 1997 Federal District
mayoral election, a slew of late 1990s gubernatorial elections, and the 2000 presidential
election. Controversial among PRD purists, these compromises included major new mass
media initiatives and, in the domain of organizational expansion, the large-scale use of paid
activists and the frequent co-optation of external candidates and activist networks.
171Borjas (2003, vol. II): 94, 599-600.
172Interview with Ortega.
233AMLO's media strategy arose in part from the 1996 political reforms and the opening of
private media in the late 1990s, but also from the recognition that ground organization
and rallies alone did not deliver major executive victories. C ardenas's 1994 defeat raised
awareness within the PRD leadership that, at least in major national elections, traditional
party organization and campaign events could not substitute for media. Citing the impact
of regime capacity and `media attacks', one party leader stated in Proceso: `We thought
that just with rallies we were overcoming the actions of the [government] apparatus in the
electoral process'.173 As party president, AMLO impressed upon the PRD that success in
the largest elections would require a greater willingness and ability to use mass media. His
internal administration thus poured campaign resources into media advertisements.
Simultaneously, however, the PRD retained its organizational ethos and sought to continue
its organizational expansion even as it embraced media. In particular, AMLO sought to beef
up the PRD's electoral infrastructure in historically problematic localities and regions, where
base-level party networks still had not sprouted up. By the mid-1990s, the PRD claimed over
one million members and formal branches in most of the nation's municipalities, but this
left much of the country untouched. In most Mexican states, the PRD lacked professional
cuadros capable of governing at the state level or ground organizations large enough to drive
successful gubernatorial campaigns. Aided by the inux of public funding in 1997, AMLO's
CEN nanced the creation and development of the Brigadas del Sol (Sun Brigades), a large
army of new militantes activated for electoral campaigns and remunerated for their services,
in contrast to the PRD's initial activist cohort. The PRD allocated thirty percent of the
1997 campaign fund to the Brigadas. By the end of the year, the Brigadas included 63,000
paid activists, one for every electoral precinct in Mexico (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 124-5).
In 1998, territorial expansion remained a top party priority. C ardenas stressed at the party's
173Proceso no. 930, 8/29/1994.
234fourth National Congress in March of that year: `The road that the PRD must travel in
the coming months and years is not easy. The party must keep building, developing, and
consolidating itself across the country; creating new base-level and municipal committees'.174
In order to increase the PRD's territorial implantation in organizational and electoral terms,
AMLO initiated the practice, in states with a weak PRD presence, of incorporating external
candidates, often defecting pri stas, with their own local and regional networks and machines.
In 1998, gubernatorial elections took place in nine states: four in the North (Chihuahua,
Durango, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas), two in the Central region (Aguascalientes, Zacatecas), two
in the East (Puebla, Tlaxcala), and one in the South (Oaxaca). In eight of the nine states,
the PRD elded external candidates. Five of the PRD's external gubernatorial candidates
defected from the PRI to run on PRD tickets.
AMLO's electoralist tactics provoked heated internal criticism, nationally and subnationally,
from PRD leaders and activists of radical and social left origin. These leaders rejected the
use of selective incentives to fuel activism and the co-optation of external candidates, espe-
cially ex-pri stas with little or no connection to C ardenas's original Corriente Democr atica.
Yet the tactics paid dividends, both organizationally and electorally. It was under AMLO's
party presidency that the PRD won its rst major executive victories: the 1997 DF may-
oralty and three governorships in 1998-9. All three successful gubernatorial candidates were
external and ex-PRI: Ricardo Monreal in Zacatecas, Alfonso S anchez in Tlaxcala, and Leonel
Cota in Baja California del Sur. In Zacatecas, the PRD, prior to inheriting Monreal's re-
gional machine, claimed oces in only twenty-one of the state's fty-seven municipalities.
Monreal brought an `extensive network of loyalties' with him, helping bolster the state PRD
organization (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 211). As of 1998, the PRD claimed two-million members,
six-thousand comit es de base, full municipal oce penetration percent in the Federal District
174Citation needed.
235and six Mexican states, over 85-percent penetration in thirteen states, and nearly 64-percent
penetration nationally.175
175Borjas (2003 II): 65, 74, 244-5, 248.
236Chapter 5 Avoiding schism in the early PRD:
the indispensability of Cuauht emoc C ardenas
Adverse circumstances led to the emergence of a strong PRD organization composed of com-
mitted activists. While critical for the PRD's survival of early electoral crisis, organizational
strength and activist commitment also brought risks of fragmentation and schism, for two
reasons. First, as suggested earlier, the early PRD's committed activists and leaders, for
the most part, were ideologues, not pragmatists (Greene 2007). Although ideology extends
individuals' time horizons and thus strengthens member loyalty amid crisis, ideologues are
also more likely than pragmatists to value ideological and programmatic purity over electoral
success. Many ideological parties and political movements { even relatively narrow, homoge-
neous ones { suer from low cohesion and bitter divisions (e.g., Latin American communist
parties). In the early PRD, the strong presence of ideologues, other things equal, militated
against compromise and contributed to sectarianism and factional conict.
Second, the PRD was far from homogeneous. It is almost never feasible to build a strong
party organization without incorporating a highly heterogeneous set of individuals and orga-
nizations. The PRD, in order to establish party nuclei and branches in large swathes of the
national territory, had to allow for considerable internal dierence, and not just in ideologi-
cal terms. In a single umbrella party, or partido-escoba,176 the early PRD brought together
social movements, civil society organizations, regional PRI structures, traditional Marxist
structures, and several small political parties. Although these groups shared the objective
of electing C ardenas and, in the process, democratizing Mexico and halting the country's
neoliberal turn, they diered in their long-term ideological visions, short-term programmatic
and tactical preferences and priorities, class makeups, regional proles, organizational sub-
cultures, and personal loyalties.
176Borjas (2003) uses this term (258).
237Within the traditional Marxist left alone, one of just three central PRD feeder categories,
all of the above dierences existed. The constituent parties of the PMS, overwhelmingly
the PRD's main source of traditional Marxist elites, cuadros, and organizational structures,
spanned the full range of Marxist currents, possessed their own partisan cultures, and pro-
fessed loyalty to competing leaders. The PMS succeeded the PSUM, itself an almost in-
tractably heterogeneous Marxist coalition. The declaration of principles of the PSUM had
`reected an almost impossible amalgamation of ideologies'. `In a single party', the `com-
munist, socialist, lombardista,177 Trotskyist, liberal, and revolutionary nationalist [lefts]' had
come together (H ernandez 2010: 34). In addition to absorbing the PSUM, the PMS, as
discussed earlier, incorporated six separate Marxist parties and organizations, some rmly
institutionalist and reformist (e.g., Jes us Ortega's defecting PST faction), others less so (e.g.,
PPR, MRP).178 During its short existence, the PMS lacked a `common identity to erase the
loyalties of members of its component parties' (Bruhn 1998: 163).
Thus, the traditional Marxist left, just one of the PRD's three major feeder categories, lacked
cohesion. Moreover, the central point of convergence within this PRD feeder category { es-
tablished participation in democratic institutional politics { set it apart from a second major
PRD feeder category: the extraparliamentary social left. Gradualist rather than revolution-
ary, the constituent parties of the PMS, for decades, had embraced electoral competition
as the primary means for advancing left ideals and interests. In contrast, the PRD's feeder
movements, organizations and parties from the social left, prior to 1988, had either disdained
democratic politics or simply not participated. These actors embraced tactics of mobilization
and, for the most part, categorically rejected negotiation and dialogue with the PRI.
177After Mexican labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano (1894-1968).
178The entry of groups such as the PPR and MRP marked a hitherto rare fusion of social and traditional left
forces. Predictably, leaders of the PPR and MRP `revived an argument that the [PMS] had supposedly
overcome: the commitment to legality' (Mart nez 2005: 92). See also Rodr guez (n.d.): 258.
238Despite sharing an extraparliamentary orientation, groups on the social left diered widely
along dimensions of region, class, and ideology. As noted earlier, they included ex-guerrilla
nuclei, rural unions, popular urban movements, teachers' unions, blue-collar unions, student
associations, NGOs, and post-materialist organizations. Some were anarchist, others na-
tionalist. Most were Marxist but, within Marxism, diered in sectarian orientation, ranging
from Trotskyist, Maoist, and Guevarist to revolutionary Christian (Mart nez 2005: 53).
The third major feeder category of the PRD, the Corriente Democr atica (CD), contained
ideological divisions at the elite level and distinct leadership loyalties at the base level. At the
elite level, CD leaders divided into two camps: those centrally concerned with mass mobiliza-
tion and confrontation (e.g., Cuauht emoc C ardenas), and those focused on reform through
institutional politics (e.g., Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo). This dierence mirrored that between the
confrontational, movimientista social left and the predominantly reformist, institutionalist
PMS. At the base level, the PRD's two strongest ex-PRI feeder networks, in Michoac an
and Tabasco, supported dierent leaders, Cuauht emoc C ardenas and Andr es Manuel L opez
Obrador. For the individuals within these organized bases, loyalty to the relevant leader
(C ardenas, AMLO) trumped commitment to the broader array of forces in the PRD.
Prior to the PRD's creation, horizontal linkages, both within and across PRD feeder cate-
gories, were often supercial or nonexistent. Where relations ran deep, they were typically
characterized by high levels of conict and low levels of routinization. Ties between defect-
ing PRI networks, for example, barely existed. Regional ex-PRI networks in Michoac an,
Tabasco, and Mexico City, prior to the PRD's creation, shared a party label but had existed
independently, with little interaction, for decades. The sprawling social left, having eschewed
elections during the 1970s and 1980s, never had an incentive to unify at the national level
before the PRD's founding. Thus, social left movements and organizations possessed little
or no experience of negotiating, bargaining, and resolving conicts with each other under
239the umbrella of large national coalition movements and organizations.
In particular regions, social left groups often did possess ties that predated the FDN and
PRD. In most cases, however, these ties had given way to bitter sectarian division by the
PRD's founding. The social left in the state of Guerrero, a major bastion of the early
PRD, provides a case in point. In the 1960s and 1970s, Guerrero constituted the primary
battleground of the dirty war between Mexico's rural guerrilla insurgency and the state,
and during this time, numerous guerrilla groups and sympathetic left organizations pooled
resources and joined forces. After the guerrillas' decisive defeat in the 1970s, however,
alliances frayed, and Guerrero's social left fragmented into a multitude of conicting sects
with their own leaders, strategies, and local and sectoral strongholds (Fern andez 1993).
Although the traditional Marxist left did, through the creation of the PSUM and PMS, make
a modicum of progress toward unication before the PRD's founding, horizontal relations
within the traditional Marxist left remained conictual and weakly routinized at the base and
elite levels. Excluded from the unication process, activists and members in the PMS's feeder
parties did not have time `to redene their models of activism and organization in a demo-
cratic manner' (Rodr guez 2010: 258). At the elite level, informal negotiations rather than
formal procedures determined the allocation of candidacies and internal positions (Bruhn
1998: 163). Until the PRD's creation, the PMS remained a `hostage of its internal divisions.
Heterogeneity...blocked cohesion' (Mart nez 2005: 92). Prud'homme (1997) summarizes: `As
a party, the PMS never managed to become institutionalized: the most disciplined cuadros
of the PSUM and PMT coexisted with a multiplicity of leaders from the small, radical left
organizations' (12).
Finally, linkages across the PRD's three broad feeder categories were also weak or nonexis-
tent. Historically separated by distance and ideas, the CD-aligned dissident PRI, traditional
Marxist left, and social left, before C ardenas's presidential bid, had not joined in collec-
240tive movements or organizations. The year 1988 marked the rst major conuence of these
categories.
In sum, the early PRD, in absorbing most of Mexico's traditional Marxist left, most of its
social left, and multiple regional PRI structures, inherited a geographically dispersed and
highly heterogeneous set of movements, organizations, and partisan networks characterized
by supercial or nonexistent horizontal relations or, where relations ran deeper, high levels
of sectarianism and conict and weakly routinized collective decision-making procedures. Of
necessity, the PRD, on creation, inherited all of these characteristics.
Barriers to unity
in the early PRD
Much like Brazil's PT and Peru's IU, the PRD, from its founding statutes, was a party
of factions, not with factions. Founding statutes structured the PRD organization as a
presidential system mediated by corrientes, formally recognized factions often described
as the PRD's `parties' or, in informal parlance, tribus (tribes). Throughout the PRD's
formative years, in order to receive candidacies or ascend in the national or subnational
party apparatus, one had to belong to or ally with a corriente. In large measure, corrientes
received primacy in the early PRD because of the party's PRI origins, and because well-
organized groups within the PRD, especially from the PMS and CD, wished to place a check
on C ardenas's internal power (Mart nez 2005: 101).
Except during national Congresses, power within the PRD resided in the National Executive
Committee (CEN) and the larger National Council (CN). The president of the party was
the chief executive and head of the CEN. The CEN consisted of numerous secretar as, the
equivalent of PRD `ministries'. The formal structure of state and municipal party organs
paralleled that of the national organization. Power at these levels resided in state and
241municipal executive committees and councils. National Congresses, convoked as necessary,
were the PRD's supreme authority and consisted of delegates selected, through varying
mechanisms, by subnational organs.
Given the level of heterogeneity within each feeder category of the PRD, the early PRD
organization was extremely heterogeneous, with `many leaders, partisan and organizational
cultures, and networks of personal loyalty coexist[ing]' (Prud'homme 1997: 12). Mart nez
(2005) describes the early PRD as `an explosive cocktail that mixe[d] communists and Trot-
skyists, ex-pri stas and ex-guerrillas, nationalists and internationalists' (59). 179
In broad terms, the internal functioning of the PRD's early municipal organs, state organs,
and national secretar as (PRD ministries) varied depending on which leader/s, backed by
which PRD feeder organization/s, controlled them. The result was multi-layered organi-
zational heterogeneity, from municipal organ to municipal organ, from state organ to state
organ, and from national secretar a to national secretar a. Reecting a `precarious union',180
these organs and agencies possessed weak or nonexistent horizontal linkages, a fact empha-
sized in Borjas (2003) and Rodr guez (n.d.).
Within individual party organs, especially the national and top subnational executive com-
mittees and councils, conict and division ran rampant between leaders and between corri-
entes. Global ideological conditions xed the boundaries of this internal conict and division.
The PRD was founded the same year that the Berlin Wall fell. The collapse of the Soviet
Union undermined Marxism as a global ideology and, consequently, shaped the ideological
struggle within the PRD. Debates did not center on grand questions of capitalism versus com-
munism. Leaders and corrientes did dier, however, on fundamental questions of program,
179The `diversity of the groups and organizations that supported C ardenas (and the left in general)', writes
Bruhn (1998), `made profound internal divisions very likely' (165).
180Borjas (2003) writes that due to the diversity of PRD feeder groups, `high heterogeneity and a precarious
union' obtained between secretar as, between state committees, and between municipal committees (450;
see also 301, 518).
242internal procedure, and above all, the proper tactics and timeline for democratizing Mexico
and rolling back neoliberalism.181 At the national and subnational levels, leaders competed
for coveted candidacies and control of the internal apparatus, both for personal gain and to
advance factional agendas. From these struggles, clear winners and losers emerged.
Early state PRD organs, for example, often became terrains of bitter sectarian conict be-
tween dizzying arrays of left forces. In Guerrero, for example, seven distinct early `PRD
projects' emerged, dominated by moderate leaders in some cases (Zen on Santib a~ nez, Eloy
Cisneros) and radical leaders in others (e.g., F elix Salgado, Rosal o Wences), and character-
ized in every case by dierent combinations of social and traditional left actors,182 including
ex-guerrilla groups, peasant unions, teachers' unions, and university networks linked to the
powerful183 Autonomous University of Guerrero.184 Although these `PRD projects' oper-
ated under the PRD label, the party label `hid' the competing `strategic projects' that had
`pulverized the left in the 1970s and 1980s', as well as `all the accumulated resentments' (ren-
cores) of that period (Fern andez 1993). Similar internal divisions obtained at the state level
in the PRD's other early bastions, including Chiapas, Mexico state,185 Michoac an, Tabasco,
181Javier Hidalgo emphasized this point in an interview with the author.
182Unlike in Michoac an and Tabasco, in Guerrero, defecting PRI networks played a very marginal role in
building the PRD (Fern andez 1993).
183Fern andez (1993) observes that, given the weakness of Guerrero's economic sector, Catholic Church,
national political class, and party system, the UAG played a major role in mediating relations between
the state government and population.
184The seven `PRD projects' identied by Fern andez (1993) had the following leaders: Orth on Salazar,
teachers' union leader and ex-PCM member, in the Monta~ na region; F elix Salgado, radical, former PFCRN
member, and early FDN/PRD deputy and senator, in the North region; Zen on Santib a~ nez, moderate
dialoguista, former PFCRN member, and bitter rival of F elix Salgado, in the Tierra Caliente region;
Eloy Cisneros, ex-guerrilla with ties to the Autonomous University of Guerrero, in the Costa Chica
region; dierent alliances of ex-guerrilla and universitarios in the Costa Grande and Acapulco regions;
and Rosal o Wences, former PCM member, rector of the strategically important Autonomous University
of Guerrero (1972-90), and arguably Guerrero's most important PRD leader in the early 1990s, in the
Central region. Wences chose not to run for governor of Guerrero in 1994, preferring to run for rector a
fourth time (Fern andez 1993).
185In Mexico state, the social left, traditional Marxist left, and former PRI converged in the FDN and early
PRD, and `local factions tended to mirror political divisions among the old left parties and leaders [and]
243Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas.186
At the national level, however, the PRD's internal struggles received their fullest expression.
The national leadership and associated corrientes represented all of the PRD's major points
of view and all three of its feeder categories (the former PRI, the traditional Marxist left,
and the social left), along with each category's internal contradictions.
Moreover, internal conict resolution and decision-making were weakly routinized. Perhaps
no single fact illustrates this more clearly than the frequency of national Congresses. In order
to change core party statutes and address various forms of internal dysfunction, the PRD
convoked six congresses in the rst twelve years of its existence. Brazil's PT, in contrast,
held only one Congress in its rst twelve years.
Subnational organs typically followed their own rules. In Borjas's (2003) words, `state and
municipal committees functioned according to who led them and not based on established
norms and procedures' (519). Decision-making practices and outcomes in the critical areas
of programmatic development, candidate selection, delegate selection, the distribution of
internal positions, membership criteria, and activist formation varied from one subnational
organ to the next. Where national party statutes dictated to subnational organs in these
areas, subnational organs often outed the relevant statutes, almost always without con-
sequence. The national party also exercised little control over subnational politicians and
national legislators, who rarely received serious sanctions if they deviated from the formal
or informal party line.
More importantly, within the National Executive Committee and Council, the PRD, during
its formative years, never consolidated formal procedures for resolving the most critical
ex-pri stas. Prevailing divisions reected, remarkably, the original political experience of an individual -
ex-communists versus ex-PMT members versus MASistas, and so forth' (Bruhn 1998: 191).
186For analyses of the PRD's development in most of these states, see the chapters in L opez and Cadena
(eds., 2013).
244conicts between leaders and corrientes. As of the mid-1990s, the national leadership had
still failed to reach agreement on a common national party program.187 Throughout the
1990s, the PRD did not have stable formal procedures for selecting candidates, for selecting
its own president, or for distributing positions within the party apparatus. Typically, the
national party leadership depended on informal negotiations to distribute candidacies and
internal posts. When the leadership adhered to formal procedures, elites often determined
the specic procedure through informal negotiation and on a case-by-case basis.188 National
leaders regularly outed the formal rules of internal competition, such as the ban on running
in consecutive PRD presidential elections.
Moreover, procedures intended for long-term use rarely endured more than a few years. The
party's procedure for electing its own president, for example, changed over the course of
the 1990s, beginning as a congressional vote and shifting to a closed primary.189 Procedures
for determining the composition of the CEN and distribution of candidacies also changed
repeatedly. Initially, the party president personally appointed all secretar as in the CEN. In
1993, the party instituted a formal proportional representation system. This planilla system
was later abolished at the party's sixth Congress in 2000.190
Finally, disloyal opposition, low levels of trust, and perceptions of illegitimacy almost rou-
tinely marred the use of the PRD's collective decision-making institutions. In particular,
throughout the second half of the 1990s, PRD elites who competed with each other via
closed primaries for major candidacies and top internal leadership positions repeatedly al-
leged fraud and refused to recognize the results. The early PRD's internal dysfunction,
187This was one stated reason why Jorge Alcocer (PCM/PSUM/PMS) defected from the PRD in late 1990.
188Party elites agreed, for example, to hold a closed primary to determine the candidate for the 1997 Federal
District mayoral election.
189The party's rst two presidents were elected by the rst and second Congresses. Subsequently, the PRD
membership voted for party president in closed primaries, independently of party congresses.
190The number of secretar as also changed numerous times over the course of the 1990s.
245frequently publicized in mass media, damaged the party's image among the broader elec-
torate. Internal and external critics argued that the PRD, by modeling democracy so poorly
internally, disqualied itself as a governing alternative and force for democracy in Mexico.191
A document approved at the sixth Congress in 2001, for example, partially attributed the
crushing defeat of Cuauht emoc C ardenas and the PRD in 2000 to a public loss of condence
in the PRD following the disorderly 1999 internal presidential election (about which more
below).192
Despite all of the above, the early PRD averted the worst. High levels of heterogeneity, weak
horizontal linkages, erce and constant internal battles over ideas and cuotas de poder, and
weakly routinized procedures for resolving conicts did not give rise to serious fragmentation
or fatal schisms. What factor/s enabled the early PRD to avoid fragmentation and schism?
The indispensability of
Cuauht emoc C ardenas
As Chapter One argues, two general factors decrease the likelihood of debilitating schisms,
especially in large, heterogeneous parties with weak horizontal linkages and major divisions:
(1) a strong electoral incentive for elites and factions to remain in the party, and (2) a
mechanism for balancing internal interests and adjudicating internal conicts. For almost
all established political parties, the party label, or brand, provides the rst. Many established
parties, over time, institutionalize a set of procedures for adjudicating internal aairs, which
provides the second.
For the most part, new parties lack successful brands and institutionalized conict resolution
procedures. The early PRD was no exception. During its rst decade, the party was still
19120 a~ nos del PRD: Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, May 22, 2009.
192See Prud'homme (2003): 118, 118 note 14.
246attempting to establish a solid and far-reaching partisan brand in the electorate. It was also
attempting { and, as shown above, failing { to institutionalize procedures for the balancing
of diverse interests and the adjudication of disputes.
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, party leader Cuauht emoc C ardenas substituted for a
strong brand and also for a set of institutionalized conict resolution procedures. Although
the PRD was beset by internal conicts over political tactics, cuotas de poder, and pro-
gram during the formative phase, the C ardenas brand provided a strong electoral incentive
against lower elite defection. Equally, through active brokerage and arbitration, rooted in
unquestioned internal authority, C ardenas balanced internal interests, resolved conicts, and
enabled the party to act in a minimally unied manner. In these ways, C ardenas played a
critical role in preventing fragmentation and schism within the early PRD.
C ardenas's brand
and coattails
Not just any leader could have substituted for a strong left party brand in Mexico during
the late 1980s. Cuauht emoc C ardenas, however, possessed tremendous, unrivaled electoral
clout. One Mexico City-based journalist and political activist deftly observed that in contrast
to the early PRD, which lacked access to electronic media and could not build support
quickly, C ardenas, from the beginning, did not need the media, or even a campaign. He
`communicated just in virtue of existing'. With a name like C ardenas, `the campaign was
carried out every day in school'.193
The genesis of the FDN and PRD demonstrated the fundamental importance of C ardenas's
electoral clout for left unity. Despite its extraparliamentary origins, the PRD required an
`electoral sphere...to become consolidated as a political force' (7, emphasis added). The
193Interview with Lajous.
247Mexican left initially united, rst in the FDN (1988) and subsequently in the PRD (1989),
as a means to win the presidency: in the FDN to win the 1988 contest, and in the PRD to win
the 1994 contest. In 1988, diverse left and center-left forces circled around C ardenas upon
recognizing his unique capacity to draw left and independent voters. As noted earlier, these
forces included the PMS, which supported C ardenas after it became clear that the entire left
electorate, including traditional Marxist constituencies (e.g., UNAM students), supported
C ardenas's 1988 bid.No PRI elite save C ardenas, writes Bruhn (1998), `could...have united
united all the center-left opposition parties' or `[reached] the agreement with the Mexican
Socialist Party that gave the PRD institutional life' (102).
In the 1988 election, C ardenas showed that he could win. In fact, his performance sug-
gested that in 1994, with a stronger organization and improved defend-the-vote operation,
he would win.194 No other left leader could credibly oer the possibility of national power.
As evidenced by his 1988 campaign and performance,195 C ardenas's personal electoral brand
eclipsed that of all previous left parties and leaders. These facts cemented PMS and broader
left support and provided the central impetus for the creation of the PRD.
During the PRD's formative years, the PRD continued to `[depend] heavily on...C ardenas to
draw together diverse political allies' (Bruhn 1998: 190). In early 1991, Arnoldo Mart nez
Verdugo (PMS) stated that `there is a man whose level surpasses the PRD, who is a national
leader... That is Cuauht emoc C ardenas'.196 In October of 1993, Heberto Castillo stated that
`there is no other citizen in the country with greater potential to unite currents around him
than Cuauht emoc'.197 Lower elites thus defected at their own electoral peril. Rodr guez
194Interview with C ortez.
195The `convergence' of Mexican left forces in the FDN (1988) and PRD (1989) was `produced and consoli-
dated by C ardenas's [1988] candidacy and performance' (Borjas 2003: 290).
196Proceso, no. 741, January 14, 1991.
197Proceso, no. 874, June 14, 1993.
248(n.d.) argues that even if C ardenas had attempted to institutionalize his dominance within
the early PRD by establishing a formal cardenista faction, a schism would not have resulted
because `there were few external incentives for the party's intermediate leaders to split' (257).
Coming out of the 1994 election, which he lost in a landslide, C ardenas did not have the same
proven external clout as after 1988. Yet the impact of this election on perredistas' percep-
tions of C ardenas's external clout should not be overstated. To begin, although C ardenas
suered a crushing defeat, many PRD leaders and most of the base attributed his loss,
primarily, to PRI spending and media manipulation, not to his weaknesses as a candidate.
Moreover, C ardenas resurged in 1997, winning the rst ever election for mayor of the Federal
District in a landslide.198 In the view of nearly all perredistas, no other left leader stood a
comparable chance of winning the 2000 presidential election. More than that, most believed
C ardenas stood a good chance of winning. Given his performance in the 1997 DF election
and the PRD's subsequent gubernatorial victories, `the Party of the Democratic Revolution
approached the 2000 presidential elections with optimism' (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 238).
In sum, during the PRD's formative years, C ardenas delivered the votes. The PRD brand,
by and large, did not. To quote Borjas (2003), `the charismatic leader and not the PRD was
the receiver of the votes... The incorporation of citizens, organizations, and social movements
resulted from his mobilizing capacity and not from a party program...' (507-8). C ardenas
both `was the PRD' and `was more than the party, since his leadership was recognized by
citizens and non-activist groups willing to back him. In synthesis: the PRD was C ardenas,
but, surpassed by him, without his presence it was nothing' (508).
It should also be emphasized that as the 1990s unfolded, the PRD brand, as distinct from the
C ardenas brand, strengthened considerably. Surveys indicate that by 2000, most Mexicans
19848.1 percent of the vote to 25.6 (PRI) and 15.6 (PAN).
249could locate the PRD on the left-right spectrum.199 Whereas in the 1991 Chamber election,
with C ardenas o the ballot, the PRD had received only eight percent of the vote, in the 2003
Chamber election, the PRD's rst election with C ardenas o the ballot since 1991,200 the
party received eighteen percent of the vote. Thus, as C ardenas's brand weakened over the
course of the 1990s, the PRD brand strengthened, creating an osetting electoral incentive
against elite defection.
C ardenas's unquestioned
internal authority
In addition to substituting for a strong party brand, C ardenas substituted for internal
decision-making procedures by acting as the PRD's key decider and, in the event of conict,
its informal high court, or arbiter of last resort. C ardenas's ability to assume these functions
owed from his unquestioned internal authority, rooted in a combination of factors: un-
matched external appeal, which gave C ardenas leverage over potential elite competitors, but
also (1) high moral stature within the party, especially the base, and (2) a singular position,
established very early, at the hub of the PRD's sprawling, heterogeneous, and fragmented
vertical and horizontal networks.
C ardenas's internal
moral stature
C ardenas's m stica and moral stature within the PRD stemmed from several factors: his lin-
eage, but also his political record and experiences prior to the PRD's creation and his intran-
sigent opposition to the PRI throughout the PRD's formative phase. Although C ardenas's
lineage elevated him in the eyes of the broad electorate, as emphasized earlier, it especially
199Citation needed.
200In 1994 and 2000, C ardenas ran for president, and in 1997, he ran for the Federal District mayoralty.
250raised his stature within the left. `C ardenas' was the last name `most respected by the po-
litical left' (Borjas 2003: 293). In the formulation of one Mexico-based political scientist,
General C ardenas symbolized the aspirations of the Mexican left, and the Mexican left asso-
ciated C ardenas the son with his father.201 C ardenas's lineage endowed him with an almost
mystical quality for much of the PRD base. Among perredistas, C ardenas symbolized the
party's highest aspirations. The party and its moral leader were inextricably linked. PRD
activists and supporters attributed to C ardenas, more than to any other party leader, the
authentic commitment and will necessary to bring about democratic change in Mexico.
C ardenas's actions and experiences during the 1980s helped solidify his stature. As governor
of Michoac an (1980-6), he opposed and deed the neoliberal reforms of the de la Madrid
government. More importantly, in 1988, according to nearly all Mexican leftists and left
supporters at the time, C ardenas unocially defeated Salinas, sent the long-hegemonic PRI
into an unprecendented internal crisis, and came close to toppling the regime. Subsequently,
he refused to be purchased, rejecting Salinas de Gortari's oer of the regency of Mexico City
and insisting on democratic intransigence and sustained confrontation. Because of these
actions, and because of his name, Cuauht emoc C ardenas, at the PRD's founding, possessed
unrivaled moral stature on the left. In the words of MUP leader Javier Hidalgo, C ardenas
had `the moral quality to be everyone's leader'.202
C ardenas's m stica and moral stature carried the most weight at the base level. C ardenas
commanded the unconditional loyalty of most of the party rank-and-le, drawn primarily
from the social left and the defecting PRI. Many of these base-level perredistas did not
aliate with a national corriente, did not hold oce or paid party positions, and thus needed
collective incentives `in order to remain connected to the PRD organization' (Rodr guez n.d.:
201Interview with Somuano.
202Interview with Hidalgo.
251255). C ardenas possessed `an almost monopolistic capacity to produce collective goods' for
these groups and individuals (255).
During the PRD's early development, C ardenas shored up his support among the base by
consistently prioritizing base-level demands, taking intransigent positions, and supporting
the conception of the PRD as a movement, even at the expense of broader electoral appeal.
`On nding receptivity to their demands and avenues to promote them, the social left within
the PRD became an interest group willing to obey, in any moment, the directives of the
charismatic leader' (Borjas 2003: 303)
In short, just as the left-leaning electorate tended, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, to
vote for C ardenas rather than for the PRD, the early PRD rank-and-le was fundamentally
loyal to C ardenas rather than to the PRD. In Borjas's (2003) formulation, during the PRD's
early years, `the loyalty of members was directed fundamentally toward C ardenas' and `only
secondarily to the party itself' (450-1). Many base-level perredistas identied the party with
C ardenas and considered the two inseparable.203
C ardenas's diehard support from the base, to some degree, reected a broader trend. In
general, C ardenas commanded the most steadfast support among the more instransigent,
confrontational sectors of the party. Although disproportionately represented at the base
level, these sectors of the party also existed at the elite level. From the beginning, C ardenas
established alliances with a range of social left leaders with origins on the extraparliamentary
left. Journalist and intellectual Arnoldo C ordova thus wrote in late 1990 that `paradoxi-
cally', `C ardenas die-hards (incondicionales) come mainly from ultra-left groups', not from
the CD.204 Internal alliances between C ardenas and the radical PRD leadership would last
203`From the perspective of Panebianco and given the importance conferred to Cardenas by the perredista
bases, Cardenas `arises as the creator and interpreter of a set of political symbols (the original ideological
goals of the party) that come to be inseparable from his person" (Borjas 2003: 450-1).
204Unom asuno, Novemeber 16, 1990.
252throughout the formative phase, in part because of C ardenas's uncompromising stands as
party leader.
Thus, C ardenas commanded the unconditional loyalty of the PRD base and certain radical
sectors of the national leadership. In addition, given that he combined unmatched exter-
nal electoral clout with unmatched internal, base-level support, C ardenas enjoyed immense
leverage over lower elite competitors and opponents. This leverage took three forms. First,
lower PRD elites knew that they received extra votes due to C ardenas's external appeal and
coattails. Second, because C ardenas commanded unrivaled loyalty among the PRD base, any
lower elite who aspired to the party presidency, or needed broad internal support for some
other reason, required C ardenas's backing regardless of whether s/he agreed with C ardenas's
policies, tactics, and leadership style. In Borjas's (2003) formulation, PRD members' loy-
alty to lower elites and members had `an indirect character, given that [their loyalty] was
fundamentally directed to [C ardenas] and only in the second place to the party itself... The
charismatic leader established himself as the source of other leaders' legitimacy...' (Borjas
2003: 450-1). Third, there was a broad recognition within the national PRD organization,
among leaders of all stripes, that given the millions of external votes that C ardenas delivered,
and the countless individuals and organizations who joined and actively supported the PRD
in primary allegiance to C ardenas, PRD unity depended on C ardenas.
C ardenas used both his loyalties at the base and elite levels and his leverage at the elite level
to establish himself as the hub of the complex PRD complex organization. More specically,
C ardenas established strong crossfactional ties both vertically (i.e., national to subnational)
and horizontally (i.e., across national leaders and corrientes).
C ardenas's vertical
crossfactional ties
C ardenas developed much stronger ties to the PRD's subnational leaders/organs than any
253other national PRD elite. Not any leader could have achieved this, but C ardenas, due to
his intense, often die-hard support at the base level, established wide-ranging vertical ties
with relative ease. Leaders and activists from the social left and ex-PRI networks controlled
most local and regional PRD oces. By and large, these individuals were cardenistas rst
and perredistas only by extension. `Cuauht emoc C ardenas was the PRD, and the PRD was
Cuauht emoc C ardenas. Consequently, organization and social movement leaders established
personal, direct linkages with [C ardenas]', interfacing with the national party organization
through him alone (Borjas 2003: 337). No other national leader claimed a remotely com-
parable network of subnational loyalties. The `tight links between C ardenas and the PRD's
social left leaders meant that control...was shared and exercised almost completely by the
group...headed by the charismatic leader' (303). Subnational leaders across the PRD's terri-
torial bastions displayed a `willingness to cede [control] so that it could be assumed...by the
charismatic leader...through bonds of loyalty established with him' (450).
The weakness of horizontal linkages across subnational organs further strengthened C ardenas's
position within the PRD organization. Most subnational organs engaged only in vertical
communication, through C ardenas, and did not form strong independent ties to each other.
Rodr guez (n.d.) observes that C ardenas's `incontestable leadership became a node of orga-
nization between the dierent groups that...did not manage to organize horizontally' (254,
263). Borjas (2003) similarly writes that the party's `distinct subunits...more than interact-
ing among themselves, established direct linkages with [C ardenas]' (448).
Many internal critics and external analysts have claimed that C ardenas intentionally mo-
nopolized vertical communications and deliberately undermined horizontal linkages across
subnational organs and feeder groups in order to prevent the creation of independent alliances
and counterweights within the party organization, and hence to maximize his internal control.
Rodr guez (n.d.) states that C ardenas `reserved for himself negotiation with the local and
254regional chiefs, establishing a network of political alliances under his control' (254; emphasis
added). Borjas (2003) argues that C ardenas `avoided the formation of horizontal linkages
across leaders and across groups and guaranteed unconditional loyalties that permitted him
to reinforce his control of the PRD' (302-3).205
C ardenas's strong ties across the PRD's horizontally disconnected subnational organs gave
him immense control in the critical zones of candidate selection, internal advancement and
promotion, and programmatic and tactical development. C ardenas used his vertical cross-
factional ties to inuence who entered the party, who ascended within the party appartus,
who received important candidacies, what information lower organs received, and more. In
exchange for `loyalty and unconditional support' from the movement and organization lead-
ers who headed the PRD's subnational organs, C ardenas listened to and communicated their
grievances (Borjas 2003: 298) and awarded them candidacies and party posts (Borjas 2003:
337).206 Through his strong ties to subnational leaders, C ardenas also weighed in on local
recruitment practices, helped determine which activists received promotions, and controlled
the internal ow of information.207
It should be noted that C ardenas did not enjoy a complete monopoly on vertical ties.
Rodr guez (n.d.) observes that the PRD's vertical structure of power, whereby subnational
organs established individual, direct linkages with the national organization in pursuit of pa-
tronage, resources, and ideological inuence, did empower other national leaders in addition
to C ardenas. Yet other national leaders' vertical linkages paled in comparison to C ardenas's,
205See also Prud'homme (1997: ); Mart nez (2005: ), Rodr guez (n.d.: ).
206`The leaders of organizations and social movements established direct and personal links with the former
presidential candidate and shared with him the role of executing the clientelistic exchanges within the
organizations they represented. In this way, a complicated and solid network of relations arose within the
PRD: social leaders gave loyalty and unconditional support to Crdenas, and in exchange they received
candidacies and party positions' (Borjas 2003: 337).
207C ardenas's control of information ows helped him impose the informal party line of democratic intran-
sigence and sustained confrontation with the PRI (about which more below). See Borjas (2003): 299.
255who had relationships with a much larger number of local leaders than any other national
elite, and who often commanded local leaders' unconditional loyalty.
C ardenas's horizontal
crossfactional ties
C ardenas supplemented vertical crossfactional ties with horizontal crossfactional ties at the
national level. Just as he established hub-and-spokes relationships with the PRD's subna-
tional leaders and organs, he established a network of direct, personal, and informal ties
across the distinct national corrientes and their leaders. When C ardenas skyrocketed to
national prominence in the late 1980s, `the establishment of direct contacts with [C ardenas]
became almost a rule' for national left leaders (Prud'homme 1997: 12, note 30). As early
as 1988, many FDN and PMS elites had established direct ties to C ardenas that supplanted
their previous party disciplines and loyalties.208 This dynamic persisted. Throughout the
1990s, `Cuauht emoc C ardenas occupied the center, toward which the distinct corrientes with
their respective leaders converged' (Prud'homme 2003: 118).
C ardenas position at the hub of the national organization stemmed, in part, from bonds of
loyalty. C ardenas commanded the respect and near unconditional loyalty of the intransigent
sectors of the national leadership, drawn from social left organizations such as the ACNR,
ORPC, and MAS. Yet other sectors of the national leadership did not possess similar loyalty
to C ardenas. In particular, national leaders from the traditional Marxist left and reformist
sectors of the CD opposed C ardenas's policies and often viewed him as a competitor. In
order to draw these elites to the table, C ardenas depended more on leverage than on loyalty.
208Prud'homme paraphrasing Jorge Alcocer. Prud'homme paraphrases Alcocer that `the establishment of
direct contacts with [C ardenas] became almost a rule. At the moment the PMS gave up its registry,
the only nucleus that continued to function as a party organization was composed of ex-leaders of the
PSUM and the PMT' (12, note 30). Regarding FDN leaders, Borjas (2003) writes that they were `aware,
to varying degrees, that their position was the result of C ardenas's vote, and as a result, each directly
established bonds of loyalty and political commitment...to the charismatic leader, more than to the social
or political organization that he or she came from' (311).
256Lower elites recognized C ardenas's indispensability for the party's electoral success, for their
own internal legitimation (should they need it), and for party unity. Consequently, they
submitted to his leadership.
One journalist and political activist from Mexico City independently invoked the hub-and-
spokes metaphor to characterize C ardenas's dealings with lower elites in the national orga-
nization, or with individuals and groups who wished to join the PRD. Then, echoing the
earlier critique that C ardenas undermined horizontal linkages between subnational organs,
the journalist argued that C ardenas also undermined horizontal linkages within the national
organization, intentionally meeting with only one or two people at a time in order to `keep
himself above others'.209
It should also be noted, however, that in order to stand above national leaders and corrientes
during the PRD's formative period, C ardenas made a consistent eort to avoid direct in-
volvement in disputes and, when directly involved, not to dismiss any perspectives. C ardenas
himself wrote in August of 1995, `I have tried to avoid being involved in disputes between
groups and factions within the party'.210 At national congresses and other public debates,
C ardenas did not reject opposing points of view or lord his power over those who disagreed
with him. Instead, `in the public domain, Cuauht emoc C ardenas insisted on presenting him-
self as just another party member' (Borjas 2003: 509) and attempted, where possible, to
synthesize moderate and radical positions.
* * *
In summary, C ardenas commanded the loyalty of the PRD base and radical elite; he enjoyed
leverage over elite competitors due to his unrivaled combination of external clout and internal
209Interview with Lajous.
210Proceso, no. 982, August 28, 1994.
257base-level support; and he occupied a singular position at the hub of the PRD's vertical and
horizontal networks. National elites of an extraparliamentary bent supported him uncondi-
tionally. Reformist national elites from the PMS and CD recognized his indispensability for
party unity, valued his coattails, and often, in pursuit of their internal objectives (e.g., the
party presidency), could not aord to oppose him. Due to vertical and horizontal centraliza-
tion in the person of C ardenas, `getting the party to adopt a policy depended less on debate
or construction of a compromise than on convincing C ardenas' (Bruhn 1998: 190). Due to
all these factors, C ardenas `stood above the dierent leaders that converged and coexisted in
the PRD',211 and every perredista knew it. In short, C ardenas enjoyed unquestioned internal
authority.
Key illustrations of C ardenas's
unquestioned authority (1989-2000)
What did C ardenas do with his unquestioned internal authority? In broad terms, as already
stated, C ardenas acted as the PRD's substitute for institutionalized procedures of decision-
making and conict resolution. Recognizing and capitalizing on his unquestioned internal
authority and indispensability, C ardenas, as he saw t, imposed decisions unilaterally and
without consulting party leaders or statutes. When interests required balancing, or conicts
arose, C ardenas served as an active broker and arbiter, mediating and negotiating agreements
and adjudicating internal conicts.
In order to manage his decision-making agenda and responsibilities as leader, C ardenas, in
a practice known as comunizaci on, appointed a network of aides, to whom he delegated and
entrusted dierent tasks. Although these individuals did not hold formal positions within
the PRD apparatus, they spoke for C ardenas and thus, along with C ardenas, acted as the
hub of the PRD's vertical network and national horizontal network. The cardenista nucleus
211Borjas (2003): 299.
258never became a formal corriente, but it did constitute, for Prud'homme (1997) and Rodr guez
(n.d.), the early PRD's dominant coalition.212 The `central factor' of this dominant coalition,
Rodr guez (n.d.) writes, `was C ardenas's incontestable leadership' (liderazgo incontestable)
(256).
What were the critical, contentious decisions that C ardenas rendered or imposed during the
PRD's formative years? C ardenas exercised his power and vanquished internal competitors
in three critical areas: candidate selection, internal promotion, and programmatic/tactical
development. Within each of these areas, a number of key processes and episodes illustrate
C ardenas's enduring and near absolute control of the early PRD.
The consolidation of the line
of intransigence (1989-93)
From 1989 to 1993, national conict within the PRD centered, most centrally, on whether
the PRD should embrace intransigence, mobilization, and the party-movement model (the
intransigente, or rupturista view), or instead seek change through reform in the institutional
sphere (the reformist view). To the chagrin of reformists, C ardenas's informal decision-
making and arbitration, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, wholly substituted for internal
procedures and led decisively to the consolidation of the l nea de intransigencia.
At the PRD's founding Constituent Assembly of May 1989, national leaders agreed, almost
universally, on the right to organize in corrientes. The PRD's initial corrientes corresponded
to the party's feeder categories. The most disciplined corriente, the PMS,213 supported re-
formist positions, as did the CD corriente's more moderate wing (headed by Porrio Mu~ noz
212Prud'homme (1997) treats C ardenas and his nucleus of loyalists as a hegemonic dominant coalition, while
Rodr guez (n.d.: 256) treats them as a Bonapartist dominant coalition. Borjas (2003) treats C ardenas as
the core of a broader dominant coalition that also included Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo and Heberto Castillo.
213Mart nez 2005: 61).
259Ledo). The more radical sector of the CD, headed by C ardenas, supported rupturista po-
sitions, as did the social left corrientes (e.g., ORPC, MAS, ACNR, OIR-LM). Reformist
groups from the CD and PMS insisted on giving corrientes primacy, in part, to establish
counterweights to C ardenas's internal powers (facultades) (Mart nez 2005: 101).214
Yet party elites allowed Cuauht emoc C ardenas, the unocial leader, to appoint all thirty-
two members of an interim CEN.215 Tellingly, they also agreed that the CEN would not
include a Secretary General position, which `would strengthen the structure but counter-
act [C ardenas's] personal leadership' (Mart nez 2005: 101). Explaining the decision not
to include the Secretary General post, Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador stated in La Jor-
nada: `Competing power centers cannot be generated in the party; the indisputable leader
is Cuauht emoc C ardenas'.216
C ardenas's CEN appointments `reproduced the balance of power between corrientes' (Mart nez
2005: 61), but also reected C ardenas's own personal ties. Composed of `leaders who sym-
bolized the party's struggle', and characterized by the `coexistence of many partisan and
organizational cultures' (100), the rst CEN included fteen CD members, split between
rupturistas and reformists, ten social left leaders, and six traditional Marxist leaders, all
pemesistas (PMS). A large number of these individuals were C ardenas's friends, previous
collaborators, fellow ex-pri stas, new allies, and fellow rupturistas (61, 63).
The appointments produced instant recriminations from excluded groups (e.g., MAP) and
quarrels within and between the CD and PMS corrientes, especially in Mexico City.217 The
214Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo added in a 2009 interview that the corriente-based internal structure of the PRD
reected the party's PRI origins. We organized the party in corrientes, he stated, because `we [the
Corriente Democr atica] were a PRI corriente'. See 20 a~ nos del PRD: Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, May 22,
2009.
215Informal negotiations between corriente leaders determined the composition of the provisional Consejo
Nacional.
216La Jornada, May 7, 1989.
217Mart nez (2005): 63, including note 30.
260inghting led C ardenas to create a Coordinating Commission, composed mainly of allies,
which became responsible for the party's `fundamental decisions' until the formation of the
next CEN (Mart nez 2005: 63). `Not by chance', most individuals kept o the C ardenas-
appointed Commission had supported reformist, not rupturista, positions in the previous
months (Mart nez 2005: 63, 100).
At the Foro de Estatutos, held in July 1989, national leaders reviewed and nalized the basic
statutes to be voted on at the rst Congress in November 1990. This Congress would also
elect the party's rst full-term president and Consejo Nacional. The statutes agreed upon at
the Foro granted extensive powers to the president, assumed in advance to be C ardenas. Not
only could the president appoint all members of the CEN, the CEN had to vote as a bloc,
such that opposition corrientes in the CEN could not easily veto presidential initiatives. The
Foro rearmed the removal of the Secretary General post, which `consolidated [C ardenas's]
ascendance and role as a substitute for the lack of institutionalization' (Mart nez 2005: 101,
emphasis added).218 With these measures, C ardenas, `supported by the radical sector of
the CD and groups on the social left', `conrmed his authority in detriment to the factions
interested in regulating his authority (mando)' (Mart nez 2005: 101).
In addition to using appointment powers to strengthen the rupturista position in the na-
tional PRD organization, C ardenas wielded his base-level clout to impose the line of in-
transigence on reformist elements at the subnational level. Rodr guez (n.d.) observes that
C ardenas's `moral leadership...allowed him to control the terms of negotiation with outside
political forces' (255). He `was the one who could establish the line separating `friends from
enemies', and the boundary between `congruencia and betrayal, central axes of political
identity, particularly visible in contexts of high political polarization' such as the PRD's
(255). Consequently, according to Borjas (2003), he could `[impose] his vision of the PRD
218`...Consolida su ascendencia y papel supletorio a la falta de institucionalizaci on'.
261as a party-movement and justify the line of democratic intransigence and the strategy of
confrontation with the government' (Borjas 2003: 451).219
By way of illustration, after the mid-1989 municipal elections in Michoac an, PRD senator
from Michoac an, Roberto Robles Garnica, criticized party activists for conducting prolonged
occupations of various city halls in protest of perceived fraud. A group of local PRD leg-
islators accepted the municipal results and participated in the formation of plural local
governments. In response, C ardenas issued a statement in support of the protesting ac-
tivists. Despite Robles's public critique and the local PRD legislators' acceptance of the
electoral results, the protesters, `on learning that they had the charismatic leader's support,
maintained the occupation of the city halls' (Borjas 2003, p. 352), and Robles and the lo-
cal PRD legislators `submitted to the line that C ardenas imposed' (Borjas 2003, p. 357).
To observers, such episodes suggested an `anarchy' within the PRD that `only Cuauht emoc
C ardenas could counteract due to the arbitrating role that local leaders gave him' (Borjas
2003: 371).
Throughout this period, the top two lower elites, Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo and Heberto Castillo,
openly opposed two central developments: rst, the consolidation of the line of intransi-
gence; second, the reliance on C ardenas's informal decisions, base-level appeals, brokerage,
and arbitration, not on routinized procedures, for distributing positions and choosing party
tactics and program (Borjas 2003: 303-6). Nevertheless, they possessed virtually no inter-
nal leverage and `decided to back the charismatic leader' (305-6). Neither Mu~ nnoz Ledo
nor Castillo and the traditional Marxist left `played a relevant role in the decision-making
process' (306). `Their proposals and critiques were debated', but `they ended up being dis-
carded `democratically' by the cardenista majority, which declared in favor of intransigence
219Borjas (2003) also observes that `control of communication determined that the ow of information oc-
curred in a vertical manner, reinforcing the necessity of maintaining the party line of `intransigencia
democr atica' and the strategy of confrontation with the government' (299).
262and confrontation' (Borjas 2003: 303-4). Equally, although Mu~ noz Ledo and Castillo en-
joyed a margin of autonomy in certain spheres (e.g., Mu~ noz Ledo in the legislature), and
also intended in the longer term to change the party's institutional and tactical prole, they
`recognized C ardenas's initial and short-term importance as a unier of diverse groups', a
`representative of the collective party identity', and `a decisive source of unity necessary for
party consolidation' (305-6).
At the PRD's rst Congress, in November 1990, party radicals ascended. Delegates to the
Congress, selected through dierent procedures by municipal and state organs, voted for the
party presidency and the Consejo Nacional. In an election outcome that Mart nez (2005: 64,
102) calls `natural' and a `rubber stamp' (tramite), C ardenas ran for the party presidency
unopposed and prevailed. The rupturista social left fared well in the concurrent election for
the CN, with a plurality of twenty-three seats to the CD's twenty-one and the PMS's eigh-
teen. Similar to C ardenas's previous interim CEN, the new CEN's `composition reproduced
the balance of power expressed in the Congress with the additional ingredient of loyalty to
the leader' (Prud'homme 1997: 15). At the Congress, C ardenas unambiguously endorsed
intransigencia, rejecting any negotiation that did not entail the `dismantling' of the PRI
regime (64). Prominent traditional Marxists who had criticized the l nea de intransigencia,
notably Jorge Alcocer220 and Jos e Woldenberg, did not receive CEN appointments, prompt-
ing their defection and strong objections from other prominent traditional Marxists such as
Heberto Castillo and Arnoldo Mart nez Verdugo (Borjas 2003: 375).221
The 1991 midterm elections, while a major setback for the PRD as a whole, strengthened the
internal position of intransigentes. First, in internal, relative terms, the social left fared very
well in the 1991 elections, electing eighteen federal deputies, to the traditional left's thirteen
220Jorge Alcocer was a respected leader of the PCM/PSUM/PMS.
221Castillo voted against the CEN, while Mart nez Verdugo requested exclusion from the CEN (Borjas 2003:
375). In subsequent years, Mart nez Verdugo would shift away from reformism in favor of intransigencia.
263and the CD's four. In Prud'homme's (1997) formulation, these results `displaced' the CD
`as the support base for the party leadership' (Prud'homme 1997: 16 note 41). Second, the
election results did not undermine the authority of C ardenas, who had not participated. In
fact, for some, the results bolstered C ardenas's authority, evidencing the PRD's inability to
win votes without C ardenas atop the ticket.222 C ardenas `remained the source of unity of the
groups that converged in the party and, moreover, through rhetoric and actions consistent
with party objectives, he distributed the collective incentives necessary to maintain party
activism and participation in spite of defeats' (455).
Even though pemesistas and CD moderates had fared poorly, they read the PRD's overall
results as vindicating: at the ballot box, intransigencia evidently had not paid o. Heberto
Castillo and other reformists criticized radical groups for their parallel clandestine activities
and, as reported in Financiero, called on the PRD to force them `out of the shadows'.223
Party radicals, for their part, attributed the PRD's poor results to fraud and other disad-
vantages and argued for continued intransigence. C ardenas denounced the PRI's electoral
abuses and, in order to sustain morale at the base level, intensied his rhetoric of intransi-
gence. `Radicalizing the battle of ideas' in favor of confrontation with the PRI, writes Borjas
(2003), `constituted the only alternative for the PRD to guarantee its survival as a political
force' (455).
In sum, during the PRD's initial few years, internal struggles centered, most immediately,
on the intransigente/reformist debate, and C ardenas imposed the line of intransigence. `As
the one responsible for building bridges, but also interested in dodging rules that would limit
his leadership', C ardenas personally staed the early CENs and Coordinating Commission
222`It is important to highlight...that the authority of Cuauht emoc C ardenas was not questioned: not having
directly participated in the contest, the defeat was the PRD's as an institution and not C ardenas's' (Borjas
2003: 416).
223Statement by Ricardo Valero, Ricardo Pascoe, and Heberto Castillo in El Financiero, May 3, 1991.
264and sought to reproduce the rough balance of power between corrientes (Martinez 2005:
99). Yet simultaneously, so far as possible, he appointed allies and tilted the balance toward
fellow rupturistas. He imposed the line of intransigence, where necessary, on reformist party
elites at the subnational level (e.g., Michoac an). His rm intransigencia and support from
the PRD base contributed decisively to the ascendance of radical social left forces at the
1990 Congress and in the 1991 legislative elections. In all these ways, C ardenas `gradually
steered the ship in favor of the social left' and tactics of mobilization and confrontation (99).
Through these actions, C ardenas demonstrated that his informal role as decider and arbiter
prevailed over any routinized procedures for collective decision-making and conict resolu-
tion. `Between 1989 and 1993', Mart nez (2005) writes, `What is the party and how is it
going to work? were questions to which perredistas did not have a common answer, beyond
their recognition of Cuauht emoc C ardenas's undisputed leadership (liderazo indiscutido)'
(104-5). Borjas (2003) summarizes that a few years into the PRD's existence, `relations
between PRD elites still emerged around specic disputes for positions that, arbitrated by
Cardenas...reinforced the predominance of the charismatic leader, who continued imposing
himself above institutional procedures' (Borjas 2003: 516). In the early PRD, C ardenas's
word was eectively law.
It should be noted that many early PRD elites, predominantly reformists, objected to the
extreme and informal centralization of power in C ardenas's person. C ardenas's power, they
charged, diminished the independence and vitality of local leaders and organizations, pre-
vented the creation of horizontal linkages, and above all, prevented internal routinization.
Jorge Alcocer, for example, emphasized in his resignation letter that crucial decisions took
place through informal exchange and negotiation, always revolving around C ardenas, instead
of formal and transparent decision-making processes that would empower the party base.
This disqualied the PRD, he suggested, from claiming the mantle of democracy: `In order
265to participate in discussion, one must be aligned with Cuauht emoc C ardenas. If authori-
tarianism is the enemy, the PRD must be consistent in its internal life. The truth is that
party-related manners are not settled through the party's formal institutions but through
private consultations [with Crdenas]', an arrangement that `concentrates functions in the
party president' (Proceso no. 740, 1/7/1991).
Heberto Castillo quickly became marginal within the PRD due to his outspoken, frequently
public critiques of C ardenas's caudillismo (e.g., in Proceso). Castillo's public airing of
grievances damaged his reputation among the large cardenista base of the PRD (Borjas
2003, vol. II: 448), and Castillo did not possess a strong independent base of his own. Even
within the PMS, he mainly commanded the support of PMT cuadros. Although Mu~ noz Ledo
agreed with Castillo that C ardenas's leadership style undermined routinization, he made a
realistic, calculated decision to continue `[accepting] the predominance of C ardenas's lead-
ership' (449). Only in subsequent years, when political circumstances changed, and he had
accumulated signicant political capital as a PRD legislator, would Mu~ noz Ledo attempt to
challenge C ardenas for leadership of the party.
In late 1992, a PRD corriente, Corriente por la Reforma Democr atica del PRD, formed in
opposition to the authoritarian, personalistic structure of the PRD. Echoing a commonly
voiced critique,224 the corriente's founders argued that C ardenas, instead of encouraging
subnational organs to develop their own identities and voices, created vertical power struc-
tures based on personal loyalty. In a document published in Proceso, they wrote that the
`informal network of loyalties [to C ardenas]' constituted the `real leadership' of the PRD
and was `erod[ing] the organizational bases of the PRD and replacing a policy of activist
224According to one party founder, MUP member, and early federal deputy, C ardenas put loyalists in charge
of state organs instead of encouraging them to develop their own identities and voices (interview with
Flores).
266formation and education with one of cooptation to loyalty'.225
Selecting the 1994
presidential candidate
According to some perredistas, prior to the 1988 presidential election, C ardenas and Porrio
Mu~ noz Ledo agreed that if C ardenas lost in 1988, Mu~ noz Ledo would receive the candidacy
in 1994. C ardenas has denied this claim.226 Regardless, the PRD did not have a formal
procedure in place for deciding the candidacy.
Eectively, the Mexican public and PRD base decided the matter by demanding that
C ardenas run. Because PRD members and supporters revered C ardenas, and also recog-
nized his unique capacity to attract support outside the party, they overwhelmingly pressed
for his candidacy in 1994. The PRD base did not demonstrate its support for C ardenas
through formal procedures. As would occur six years later, support for C ardenas's candi-
dacy bubbled up outside formal party channels, from perredistas and non-perredistas alike.
On February 5, 1993, at a public event celebrating the anniversary of the Mexican Con-
stitution's signing, nearly one-thousand Mexican citizens, mostly but not exclusively PRD
activists, proposed that C ardenas run. C ardenas provisionally accepted and later leveraged
this internal and public support to secure the candidacy through informal negotiation. In a
late 1990s interview, Mu~ noz Ledo stated that overwhelming internal demand for C ardenas's
candidacy induced him, in this informal negotiation, not to compete for the nomination:
`It's clear that Cuauht emoc's leadership of the party was very broad, and that our peo-
ple were...programmed for revenge... Overwhelmingly, the majority of the party were for
[C ardenas]... So I told him that I wouldn't compete'.227
225Proceso no. 833, 10/19/1992.
226See Borjas (2003: 531 note 215) and Borjas (2003, vol. II: 420-1).
227Proceso, no. 1155, December 20, 1998.
267The 1993 election for
president of the PRD
On February 28 of 1993, C ardenas resigned the presidency of the PRD to begin his campaign
for the Mexican presidency (Mart nez 2005: 67). Many national PRD leaders believed that
C ardenas's absence from internal party aairs might facilitate routinization. With C ardenas
on the campaign trail, the rest of the party leadership might have time and room to hammer
out and consolidate formal decision-making and conict resolution procedures, which would
replace C ardenas's informal arbitration (Borjas 2003: 508-9).
In July 1993, several months after C ardenas's resignation, the PRD held its second Congress.
Like the rst Congress, the second Congress would include the election, by congressional
delegates, of the PRD's next president. The winner would replace interim president Roberto
Robles Garnica, former pri sta and member of the CD.
The second Congress reected and contributed to several important shifts in the early PRD.
First, the election for party president triggered the rst of several attempts, by the PRD
during its formative phase, to compose the CEN via procedure, not through informal ne-
gotiations dependent on leaders' ties and loyalty to C ardenas.228 The 1993 race for party
president marked the rst in which C ardenas did not participate. Given C ardenas's absence,
the national party lacked its informal mechanism for distributing CEN secretar as post-
election. `Competing without C ardenas's direct arbitration and aware of the risk of schism'
(fractura), the candidates for the PRD presidency agreed, in advance of the election, to use
a formal proportional representation system in the allotment of CEN secretar as (Mart nez
2005: 68).
In particular, each candidate would run as part of a planilla, a formal coalition of national
228`The importance of the Third Congress resided in the fact that, for the rst time, internal procedures
were imposed over negotiations between dierent groups... [Leaders'] loyalty began to be directed toward
the party itself and not just to Chauht emoc C ardenas' (Borjas II 2003: 72).
268leaders that could mix corrientes. A candidate's share of the congressional vote would de-
termine the number of CEN secretar as and CN seats allotted to his or her planilla. The
planillas would determine internally, via negotiation beforehand, which individuals would
receive secretar as and CN seats. The agreement also stipulated that if the winning candi-
date lacked an absolute majority, the second-place planilla would receive the newly created
number-two Secretary General position, the number-two post in the CEN.
Second, the Congress both reected and contributed to a shift in the axis of competition
within the PRD. During C ardenas's tenure as party president, corrientes and coalitions in
the CEN and CN had corresponded very closely to the party's initial feeder organizations:
the CD, the PMS, and dierent social left groups. By the second Congress, national leaders
had reorganized the PRD's national coalitions around ideological proposals, some internally
focused, others externally focused (Mart nez 2005: 67). These new coalitions cut across and
mixed the PRD's three initial feeder categories.
Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, one of two PRD senators at the time, led the Arco Iris (Rainbow)
planilla, which spanned the CD, PMS, and social left. The Arco Iris planilla favored a
negotiated democratic transition. In addition, it called for the PRD to focus on a concrete
governing program, externally, and on the routinization of decision-making and conict
resolution, internally.
Three candidates ran in opposition to Mu~ noz Ledo. Heberto Castillo led the Cambio
Democr atico planilla, which included elements of the PMS and elements of the CD. Castillo
based his campaign on a critique of the PRD's internal functioning: in particular, of the
party's low transparency and its multiple layers of presidentialism, whereby each corriente
followed the dictates of its leader, and the distribution of candidacies and internal positions
across corrientes depended on opaque informal processes of negotiation and arbitration, all
revolving around C ardenas. His planilla proposed greater decision-making transparency and
269routinization.
Mario Saucedo of the ACNR led the Trisecta coalition, composed exclusively of social left
and independent leaders. Trisecta opposed negotiation, embraced tactics of mobilization,
and envisioned the PRD as an agent of social movements and organizations. Finally, Pablo
G omez of the PMS led a relatively small coalition that, like Castillo's, focused on internal
issues. G omez's planilla proposed a primary system for electing both party leaders and party
candidates (Mart nez 2005: 68-9).
Although C ardenas did not run in the election, he decided the outcome by providing critical,
if unspoken, support to the bid of Mu~ noz Ledo. `Whoever wanted to lead the PRD had to
win C ardenas' favor' (Borjas 2003: 522). Mu~ noz Ledo was the `unquestioned leader of the
PRD's legislative bloc' and had demonstrated a unique `capacity to reach deals outside of the
party domain' (Borjas 2003: 530). Given his reformist, institutionalist views and exceptional
political abilities, most of the PRD's `historical gures' favored him (e.g., Igenia Mart nez).
Yet Mu~ noz Ledo `had abstained from establishing ties of loyalty to the bases that might
have allowed him to contest C ardenas's leadership' (Borjas 2003: 530). To win a plurality
of congressional delegate votes, Mu~ noz Ledo needed C ardenas's support.
Although C ardenas and Mu~ noz Ledo disagreed on fundamental questions of external tactics
and internal procedure, C ardenas quietly lent favor to Mu~ noz Ledo,229 fellow CD member
and the party's most able and decorated public servant. The party presidency constituted
an implicit consolation prize for Mu~ noz Ledo, in exchange for Cardenas's having taken the
PRD's nomination for the 1994 presidential race.230 C ardenas supported Mu~ noz Ledo for
other reasons as well. Unlike Heberto Castillo, Mu~ noz Ledo had shied away from direct
229See Borjas (2003): 529-30.
230Mu~ noz Ledo himself later stated that he and C ardenas struck a deal whereby C ardenas took the presi-
dential nomination, Mu~ noz Ledo the party presidency (20 a~ nos del PRD: Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, May 22,
2009). See also Borjas (2003): 531.
270criticisms of C ardenas, even though Mu~ noz Ledo, like Castillo, objected to the personaliza-
tion, centralization, and lack of routinization associated with C ardenas's internal leadership
(Borjas 2003: 530). In addition, C ardenas trusted that Mu~ noz Ledo possessed the will and
capacity to manage internal aairs eectively and `lead the party to institutionalization', a
prospect C ardenas did not seem to oppose (Borjas 2003: 531).
With C ardenas's considerable weight behind him, Mu~ noz Ledo won with a large plurality
of congressional votes (42 percent), while Saucedo placed second and Castillo a close third.
Mu~ noz Ledo thus assumed the presidency and Saucedo the position of Secretary General.
In order to marginalize Castillo, Mu~ noz Ledo named Pablo G omez to the presidency of
the Consejo Nacional (Pivron 1999: 263-4). All four candidates' planillas' received roughly
proportional shares of CEN and CN seats.
It should be noted that the second Congress, in addition to electing the new CEN and
CN, approved and codied a new set of procedures for future internal elections. The new
rules synthesized dierent corrientes' proposals, mandating continued use of the planilla
PR system and, crucially, a new primary system. In future elections for party president,
candidates would have to compete for PRD members' votes in closed primaries, not for
delegate votes at party congresses.
The 1994 crisis and
C ardenas's resilience
The mid-1990s produced a set of challenges for C ardenas's leadership. Even before the elec-
toral failure of 1994, the PRD's internal battle of ideas had begun to shift in the reformists'
favor. The shift began with Mu~ noz Ledo's victory, facilitated by C ardenas's backing, in
the 1993 internal election. Although C ardenas supported Mu~ noz Ledo's bid, Mu~ noz Ledo's
victory, and the subsequent proportional allotment of CEN and CN seats, constituted an
271advance for the moderate, pro-negotiation wing of the PRD. Whereas rupturistas had pre-
viously dominated the internal debate, after the 1993 internal, `the disagreement between
Mu~ noz Ledo and C ardenas over the PRD's role in the transition to democracy' became a
less lopsided and more contentious battle within the PRD (Mart nez 2005: 70). Between
the second Congress and the 1994 presidential election, `two sides would tighten the party':
the rupturistas, composed of C ardenas, CD sectors, and most of the social left, and the
reformists, composed of CD sectors, the former PMS, and the former MAP (70-1).
Tensions mounted between C ardenas and Mu~ noz Ledo in particular. In a March 1994 in-
terview with La Jornada, C ardenas did not recognize the electoral reform agreements that
Mu~ noz Ledo had reached with PRI legislators in the senate. C ardenas's statement caused
a rupture in the PRD congressional bloc, with almost half of the PRD's deputies voting
against the agreement, and several abstaining (Mart nez 2005: 70). In addition, C ardenas
openly questioned Mu~ noz Ledo's decision to re and replace Samuel del Villar, PRD rep-
resentative to the IFE. A CD member, intransigent, and C ardenas appointee, Villar had
caused controversy by raising questions about the Mexican electoral registry, controlled by
the IFE (70).
Reformists scored another important internal victory prior to the 1994 general election.
Before the election, several members of the CEN left their posts in order to mount campaigns.
Mu~ noz Ledo capitalized, using the occasion to reorganize the CEN and empower the reformist
wing of the party. Mu~ noz Ledo distributed fourteen of twenty CEN positions to reformists,
including the most important positions under his control.
Nevertheless, before the 1994 election, the rupturistas still retained the upper hand. Al-
though reformists formally controlled the internal apparatus after the July 1993 Congress,
the number-two post of Secretary General still belonged to rupturista Mario Saucedo (ex-
ACNR), and more importantly, the debate remained `tilted toward the rupturistas given
272the [party's] warlike relationship with Carlos Salinas and the strong leadership of C ardenas'
(Mart nez 2005: 70-1). Reformists thus had little choice but to accept C ardenas's deci-
sions, popular among the PRD's largely social left base, to meet with the Subcomandante
Marcos of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, to oppose NAFTA, and to back out of
negotiations on electoral reform.
The 1994 election signicantly aected the balance of the rupturista/reformist debate. C ardenas
underperformed abysmally, and in contrast to the 1991 congressional elections, moderates
within the national leadership, in 1994, could read the electoral outcome as a public verdict
against C ardenas. The election, they argued, constituted an implicit rebuke of the l nea de
intransigencia that C ardenas and his base-level supporters espoused. Rupturistas' uncom-
promising stand on negotiation, in addition to other questionable choices such as meeting
with Comandante Marcos and opposing NAFTA, had clearly not paid o electorally. With
electoral results to back up their assertions, reformist critics and their arguments now carried
more internal weight than before.
After the 1994 election, instead of taking a formal position within the PRD, C ardenas
founded a think tank, the Fundaci on para la Democracia, and ocially received the des-
ignation of `moral leader' of the PRD. The ascendance of the reformist wing culminated in
events at the PRD's third Congress, in late August of 1995. The rupturistas, led by C ardenas,
proposed that the PRD demand Zedillo's resignation. The reformists, or dialoguistas, led
by Mu~ noz Ledo, proposed that the PRD recognize Zedillo's legitimacy and participate in a
pacted transition to democracy (Mart nez 2005: 73). In May of that year, Mu~ noz Ledo had
captured the prevailing view among dialoguistas, stating that it was `necessary to decide if
what we want is the defense of certain principles even at the risk of becoming marginal'.231
The Congress formally resolved in favor of the reformists. The rupturistas, after propos-
231Proceso, no. 964, April 24, 1995.
273ing a societal referendum on Zedillo's impeachment and losing another congressional vote,
accepted the reformists' victory.
Despite the results of the Congress, C ardenas's leadership and authority remained uncompro-
mised. On the one hand, his persistence in the radical line continued to sustain the loyalties
of the many perredista militantes who favored intransigence (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 64). On the
other, C ardenas took actions that strengthened his reputation as the PRD's internal peace-
maker and unier. First, he publicly recognized and praised Mu~ noz Ledo for his leadership
and eorts (Mart nez 2005: 74, note 56). Second, he openly addressed a prominent critique,
apologizing to the party for having created an independent campaign committee during the
1994 presidential race. According to Pivron (1999), `the recovery of C ardenas's leadership
reached its apex when he recognized his errors... By `conceding', C ardenas recovered his
image as a great conciliator, a symbol of unity...who prioritized institutional over personal
interests. In reality, he had regained (recobrado) his leadership' (266). In short, coming out
of the 1994 presidential election and the third PRD Congress in 1995, C ardenas maintained
broad internal authority. He retained his image as above faction and symbolic of the party
as a whole, while his continued commitment to intransigence kept radicals psychologically
invested in the PRD.232
The 1995-6 period marked the apex of Mu~ noz Ledo's trajectory within the PRD.233 Not only
did he oversee the reformists' victory at the 1995 Congress, he also played an instrumental
232Bruhn (1998) summarizes that after 1994, C ardenas remained the PRD's `strongest unifying force' and
`an important reference point for many perredistas, giving him latitude to aect party policy against the
preferences of the national leadership by making public policy statements, ingenuously identifying himself
as just a PRD member with liberty to express his opinion, but fully aware of his impact' (Bruhn 1998:
193).
233Borjas (2003, vol. II) summarizes Mu~ noz Ledo, in contrast to C ardenas, as follows: `C ardenas's behavior
was guided by the principles on which internal legitimization in the PRD was based... [If] he was the
charismatic leader who moved the bases and disciplined the party leaders and legislative bloc, Mu~ noz
Ledo was the statesman who, fortied by the pressure that that could represent, had managed to convert
PRD principles into facts and concrete content' (note 244, 121).
274role in the passage of new internal procedural reforms234 and, even more importantly, the
landmark electoral reforms of 1996 in the Mexican national legislature. As noted earlier,
these reforms represented a decisive step in Mexico's democratic transition, and Mu~ noz Ledo,
among perredistas, could rightfully claim the most responsibility for them. Together, Mu~ noz
Ledo's legislative activities and achievements consolidated the PRD's internal strategic shift
from `intransigencia to limited cooperation' (Prud'homme 2003: 103).
Despite all this, Mu~ noz Ledo, as a leader, remained clearly secondary to C ardenas. In mid-
1996, Mu~ noz Ledo launched a series of accusations against C ardenas in order { according
to Borjas (2003: 86) { to strengthen his position within the party. In the weeks before the
mid-July election for party president, Mu~ noz Ledo stated publicly that C ardenas, after the
1988 presidential election, had held two secret meetings with Carlos Salinas de Gortari and
Manuel Camacho, the Federal District's newly appointed regente. In Proceso, Mu~ noz Ledo
described these meetings as `incongruous' with C ardenas subsequent stance of intransigencia.
He also criticized the timing, questioning C ardenas's decision to engage in dialogue when the
public would have supported intransigence (i.e., in 1988), and later to insist on intransigence
in a `radical, strident, and unnecessary' manner well into the 1990s, after the appropriate
moment had passed.235 C ardenas denied that the meetings took place and called Mu~ noz
Ledo's accusations `lies' and `fantasies'.236
Mu~ noz Ledo's gambit backred. Top national PRD leaders, as well as inuential leftists
not in the PRD, either backed C ardenas (Heberto Castillo, Gilberto Rinc on Gallardo, Jorge
Alcocer) or remained neutral and downplayed the conict (AMLO, Amalia Garc a).237 Jorge
234The procedural reforms decentralized power in the national PRD, taking CEN appointment power away
from the party president and putting it in the hands of the CN { and, by extension, the corrientes and
related planillas. See Mart nez (2005: 74); Wuhs (2008: 56).
235Proceso, no. 1026, June 30, 1996.
236Proceso, no. 1026, June 30, 1996.
237Borjas (2003, vol. II): 86.
275Alcocer accused Mu~ noz Ledo of sowing seeds of discord and suspicion.238 The PRD base also
forcefully supported C ardenas. Thus, `instead of becoming stronger within the PRD, Mu~ noz
Ledo brought about the forceful conrmation and unconditional backing of C ardenas's lead-
ership by the PRD base and leadership (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 86).
In the heat of the conict, and just a week before the mid-July internal presidential election,
Heberto Castillo wrote of Mu~ noz Ledo in Proceso: `Porrio never managed to escape from
the shadow of the caudillo that Cardenas has been, rst as the unity candidate of nearly all
of [the country's] left forces, and later in the PRD, which is founded on the directives that
[C ardenas] imposes with his charismatic force among the perredista bases'.239
The 1996 election
for PRD president
In mid-July of 1996, over 300,000 perredistas, roughly a fourth of the party membership,
cast their vote in a closed primary for Mu~ noz Ledo's successor. The 1996 internal election
marked an important and enduring shift in the structure of competition within the PRD.
While internal coalitions had corresponded to the party's initial feeder categories in 1990,
and to ideological positions in 1993, in the 1996 campaign, internal coalitions mixed feeder
groups and ideologies and reected, above all, personal loyalties (Mart nez 2005: 24, 214).
This trend has persisted to the present day.
PRD members elected Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador by an overwhelming margin. Amalia
Garc a, whom Mu~ noz Ledo backed, received under ten percent of the vote. Two thirds of the
vote were cast in Michoac an, the Federal District, Mexico state, and AMLO's native Tabasco.
In a well-calibrated campaign that targeted the PRD's organized bases, AMLO identied
himself as center-left but also declared himself a revolutionary nationalist  a la C ardenas.
238Proceso, no. 1026, June 30, 1996.
239Proceso no. 1027, July 7, 1996.
276Most centrally, however, he placed emphasis on political tactics { specically, the importance
of mass mobilization { rather than specic policy proposals. AMLO characterized the party
v. party-movement debate as a false choice: `As some negotiate, others help by mobilizing
society'.240 If the PRI committed fraud even at the gubernatorial level, he claimed, the PRD
must use its mobilizing capacity to create a national crisis (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 82). He also
insisted on negotiating with the PRI as equals, not as `ants to elephants' (Borjas 2003, vol.
II: 82).
AMLO's rise within the party did not result from internal moral stature, as in the case of
C ardenas, or from decades of accumulated political capital and connections, as in the case
of Mu~ noz Ledo (Mart nez 2005: 200-1). Instead, his rise resulted from short-term success
at building a large coalition that cut across feeder categories and ideological perspectives.
Crucially, AMLO's success at internal coalition-building stemmed from his `proximity' to
Cuauht emoc C ardenas.241 C ardenas's `backing...activate[d] bridges between previously op-
posed groups' (Mart nez 2005: 74). More specically, in negotiations facilitated by C ardenas,
AMLO managed to strike deals and form electoral alliances with Mario Saucedo's radical
corriente and Jes us Ortega's moderate Nueva Izquierda corriente. Prior to the coalition's
formation, Saucedo had campaigned against AMLO's center-leftism (Borjas 2003, vol. II:
79), while Ortega, like fellow competitors Amalia Garc a and Heberto Castillo, had opposed
AMLO's emphasis on mobilization and argued that the PRD, in order to win at the national
level, must abandon the logic of a political movement and adopt the logic of a political
party.242 Ortega and Saucedo decided to join forces with AMLO, recognizing the likelihood
of an absolute majority for AMLO atop such a broad coalition. The leaders agreed that
in the event of an absolute majority, the Secretary General position would go to Ortega,
240AMLO's initial campaign speech, quoted in Borjas (2003, vol. II): 82.
241Borjas (2003, vol. II) uses the term proximidad to describe the C ardenas/AMLO relationship.
242Proceso, no. 116, April 22, 1996.
277while Saucedo's corriente would benet in the proportional allotment of CN seats. Thus, in
AMLO's new CEN, Ortega received the post of Secretary General. Other top members of
AMLO's planilla possessed strong ties to C ardenas, separately reecting the inuence of the
PRD's undisputed leader on the new party president.243
The 1997 DF election, the 1998
Congress, and C ardenas's resurgence
After the 1996 internal election, the internal debate between reformists and intransigentes
remained intense and unresolved, and tensions between Mu~ noz Ledo and C ardenas continued
to mount (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 84). The electoral reforms of 1996 opened the Federal
District to direct elections, raising the question who in the PRD would run. Both C ardenas
and Mu~ noz Ledo sought the party's nomination, and the party held a closed primary to
determine the victor. `[I]n terms of leadership and popular acceptance, the battle was lost
in advance' for Mu~ noz Ledo, given C ardenas's clout with the PRD base (Borjas 2003, vol.
II: 121).244 After losing the internal, Mu~ noz Ledo accepted a candidacy for federal deputy.
According to Borjas (2003, vol. II), C ardenas's landslide victory in the rst ever direct elec-
tion for Federal District mayor elevated his internal status to unprecedented heights (233).
To begin, C ardenas beneted from the inevitable glow of victory. Further, his performance
restored a sense of hope and condence in perredistas that the party could win major elec-
tions.245 Crucially, however, the July 1997 victory also elevated C ardenas's status because
243These included Adolfo Gilly, Rodolfo Gonz alez Guevara, Carlos Lavore, and Ricardo Pascoe (Borjas 2003,
vol. II: 83).
244In a 2009 interview, Mu~ noz Ledo called the 1997 internal elections `unfair' and `very doubtful', claiming
that C ardenas's supporters took over polling stations, and the party distributed campaign resources
unequally. Mu~ noz Ledo claims to have informed AMLO, the party president, that he would not again
tolerate `that kind of internal manipulation' (20 a~ nos del PRD: Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, May 22, 2009).
245According to Borjas (2003, vol. II), C ardenas's victory not only showed `that democratic intransigence
had borne fruit', but also that `it was possible to continue reaping victories' (233).
278he had refused to make ideological compromises during the campaign. On the contrary, he
had remained rmly committed to the l nea de intransigencia.
C ardenas consolidated his elevated status at the PRD's fourth Congress in March 1998.
Given the events of previous months, `his leadership was never more complete' than at
the fourth Congress (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 233). Moreover, during the Congress, C ardenas
eectively played the role of bridge-builder. A central debate at the Congress concerned
whether to dene the PRD as a party of the left. As documented in Proceso, C ardenas
weighed in, stating that instead of using the terms `right' and `left', he preferred to identify
the party in terms of ideological content, particularly national sovereignty, liberty, rights of
the masses, equality, distributive justice, universal access to education and health.246 Borjas
(2003, vol. II) writes that `by separating himself from the PRD, C ardenas once again placed
himself above the party, given that he demonstrated a more inclusive attitude that allowed
him to build bridges toward other political expressions and set himself up as the center and
guarantor of any alliance' (237).
C ardenas v. Mu~ noz Ledo: the selection
of the PRD's 2000 presidential candidate
Internal jockeying for the PRD's 2000 presidential candidacy began in late 1998, with
C ardenas in the middle of his mayoral term, and Mu~ noz Ledo nearing the end of his term as
president of the Chamber of Deputies. Mu noz Ledo publicly revealed his intention to com-
pete for the PRD's nomination in October of 1998. In late December, he made a case for
himself in Proceso. While recognizing and lauding C ardenas's rm ideological convictions,
Mu~ noz Ledo suggested that the argument for C ardenas rested mainly on lineage, and that
the appropriateness of a third C ardenas run would depend on the success of his hitherto
246Proceso no. 1145, 10/11/1998.
279underwhelming tenure as mayor of the Federal District.247
The following week, battle lines were drawn. C ardenas, for the rst time, stated that he
was inclined to seek the PRD's nomination and cited the will of the PRD militancia as
the critical determinant.248 `Everything depended on which side the militancia favored, and
C ardenas and Mu~ noz Ledo knew well which side [the militancia] would be on. Thus, as
always, the moral leader of the PRD had the last word' (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 290).
In the early months of 1999, PRD internal leaders, legislators, and militantes rallied around
C ardenas, setting into motion of a series of events that eventuated in C ardenas's nomina-
tion and Mu~ noz Ledo's exit from the party. In January of 1999, over one-hundred PRD
deputies penned an open letter in support of C ardenas's candidacy, which leaked after party
president L opez Obrador, on Mu~ noz Ledo's entreaty, prohibited its circulation (Borjas 2003,
vol. II: 290-1). Having previously called a truce in order to avert debilitating internal con-
icts, Mu noz Ledo went on the oensive. He rejected the proposal to nominate the party's
candidate through an internal primary (comicios internos), characterizing the proposal as
a veiled maneuver for securing C ardenas's nomination (292). In early April, after C ardenas
admitted to having met with Carlos Salinas de Gortari after the 1988 election, Mu~ noz Ledo
excoriated the leader for inconsistency and duplicity and, in Proceso on the same day that
C ardenas formally announced his candidacy, called the revelation the `collapse of a myth'.249
Mu~ noz Ledo's oensive maneuver only worsened his internal position. A growing number of
PRD leaders, including many key leaders who had long sided with Mu~ noz Ledo on the party's
central debates { reformism v. rupturismo, institutionalization v. caudillismo { closed ranks
around C ardenas and criticized Mu~ noz Ledo for doing detriment to the party. Foremost
247Proceso, no. 1155, December 20, 1998.
248Proceso, no. 1156, December 27, 1998.
249Proceso, no. 1172, April 18, 1999.
280among these was Amalia Garc a, a reformist who had supported Mu~ noz Ledo's bid for the
party presidency in 1993, and whose bid for the presidency Mu~ noz Ledo had supported
in 1996.250 In May, the PRD-aligned wing of El Barz on, a popular business and farming
movement, publicly declared their support for C ardenas, while the PRD's State Committee
in Michoac an went ahead and established a pro-C ardenas campaign committee (295). PAN
overtures regarding a possible PAN/PRD alliance heightened Mu~ noz Ledo's vulnerability,
as C ardenas, in virtue of his proven electoral clout, would likely receive more support from
panistas (294-5).
At the end of May, C ardenas imposed his candidacy in an unexpected manner. In what
Mu~ noz Ledo would later call a `disgraceful' violation of party statute, C ardenas, without
formally consulting the party, accepted the nomination of the Partido del Trabajo, correctly
calculating that this action would induce the PRD to support his bid immediately and, in
this way, streamline the nomination process. Given that the PAN's Vicente Fox had been
campaigning for the better part of the year, and that the PRI had also started the campaign
season early,251 speed mattered.
Mu~ noz Ledo blasted C ardenas and demanded that the CEN revoke C ardenas's membership
for violation of party statutes. Predictably, the CEN refused Mu~ noz Ledo's demand. Interim
president Pablo G omez said that to do so would be to confront C ardenas directly, while to
deny the soundness of Mu~ noz Ledo's argument would be to support C ardenas. Both, he
stated, were unacceptable, as the party leadership must remain neutral (Borjas 2003, vol. II:
297). Of course, by remaining neutral, the CEN denitively opened the way for C ardenas's
nomination { a point not lost on Mu~ noz Ledo.252
250Borjas (2003, vol. II): 293-4. As an aspirant to the party presidency in 1999, Garc a and other moderates
(e.g., Jes us Ortega) had an incentive to support C ardenas's third bid (Mart nez 2005: 80).
251Quotation from Amalia Garc a in Proceso, no. 1188, August 8, 1999.
252Proceso, no. 1184, July 11, 1999.
281The selection of the PRD's presidential candidate in 2000 evidenced that, more than a decade
after the PRD's creation, C ardenas remained above any formal party statute. To summarize
the above, in early 1999, C ardenas almost secured the PRD's nomination informally due to
the sustained outpouring of support he received upon announcing his tentative intention to
run. Yet Mu~ noz Ledo doggedly pursued the nomination, and C ardenas, if he had chosen
to resolve the internal struggle in adherence to party statutes, would have had to engage
in internal negotiation and perhaps submit to some type of internal election. This process
carried an outside risk of losing and would have sucked valuable time and energy from the
presidential campaign. Hence, instead of resolving the struggle institutionally, C ardenas
resolved it unilaterally and in violation of PRD statute, accepting the PT's nomination,
forcing the PRD to nominate him immediately, and marginalizing Mu~ noz Ledo in a naked
demonstration of power.253 `The message', Mu~ noz Ledo stated in Proceso, `is that the PRD
has an owner'.254 Almost a year later, Mu~ noz Ledo, no longer a perredista, would summarize:
`When there's someone above everyone, there is no law. We could never institutionalize the
party'.255
The 1999 election
for PRD president
Mere weeks after the CEN's refusal to remove or even censure C ardenas, the PRD held a
closed primary to determine AMLO's successor. This primary caused the most severe internal
crisis in PRD history. Four candidates ran, two moderates from the traditional Marxist left
(Amalia Garc a, Jes us Ortega), two radicals from the social left (Mario Saucedo, Rosa Albina
Garavito). No ex-pri stas ran. Garc a and Ortega violated party statute in running, having
253`One more time', writes Borjas (2003, vol. II), `the PRD's charismatic leader based his political leadership
on external alliances in order to situate himself, in a convincing manner, atop Mu~ noz Ledo, but above all
atop the PRD itself' (295).
254Proceso, no. 1178, May 30, 1999.
255Proceso, no. 1227, May 7, 2000.
282contested the previous internal. In the ocial tally, Garc a prevailed by a very narrow
margin, and Ortega's supporters disputed the results, leading to the invalidation of the
election and creation of an interim CEN.
In the interim, all four candidates joined in a shaky coalition, with Garc a atop the ticket. In
the event of an absolute majority, Ortega's ally Jes us Zambrano would receive the Secretary
General position, Albina Garavito would receive the position of consejera nacional, and
all four candidates' previous planillas would receive a share of the new coalition planilla's
CEN quota. Eight additional candidates ran, including Igenia Mart nez, backed by Porrio
Mu~ noz Ledo and his planilla, Nueva Rep ublica. C ardenas supported Garc a, presumably in
order to contain Mu~ noz Ledo.256 Garc a also claimed the support of AMLO and Ricardo
Monreal, capable of delivering Tabasco and Zacatecas virtually wholesale (Mart nez 2005:
83).
Garc a prevailed, and Igenia Mart nez fared so poorly that Mu~ noz Ledo's Nueva Rep ublica
planilla won just one seat on the CEN. Utterly marginalized, Mu~ noz Ledo, in late August,
accepted the presidential nomination of the PARM and, in January of 2000, formally exited
the PRD (Borjas 2003, vol. II: 298-300).257 Mart nez (2005) writes that, a full decade after
the PRD's creation, the 1999 internal `evidenced an alarming inability to channel conicts
through stable procedures' (83).
The 2000 presidential campaign evidenced the CEN's weakness, as C ardenas's independent
committee held primary decision-making power, and Garc a's `unsteady performance' pro-
voked internal criticism (Mart nez 2005: 83). Following C ardenas's landslide loss, the PRD
called its sixth Congress in twelve years. Prior to the Congress, a conict arose in the Con-
sejo Nacional between one bloc, led by consejera nacional Rosa Albina Garavito, calling for
256Mart nez (2005): 83, note 76.
25720 a~ nos del PRD: Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo, May 22, 2009.
283Garc a's resignation, and another bloc, led by supporters of Garc a and Ortega, supporting
the completion of Garc a's term. After Garc a refused to step down, Albina, who had joined
Garc a's coalition planilla little more than a year earlier, resigned as consejera nacional.
The Congress provoked a series of debates on tactics and program, with new wings forming
around Garc a/Ortega on the moderate, institutionalist side and C ardenas { along with ally
Rosario Robles { on the more radical, movimientista side. The Congress ended with collective
agreement on the need for greater internal routinization but also, somewhat ironically, a new
set of rules for distributing internal positions. The Congress abolished the planilla system,
such that candidates for party president, moving forward, would run accompanied only by
a candidate for Secretary General.258
* * *
The PRD thus remained weakly routinized throughout the formative phase. Until 1993,
many basic formal procedures (i.e., for composing the CEN) still did not exist. Subse-
quently, despite various attempts to routinize decision-making and conict resolution within
the national organization, party leaders, including C ardenas, regularly violated, rejected,
and changed internal procedures. At the turn of the millennium, PRD's `permanent need to
revert to methods of informal arbitration in cases of grave internal conicts evidenced the
deciencies and instability of the PRD's formal procedures' (Prud'homme 2003: 118, 104).
C ardenas's informal role as decision-maker and arbiter prevailed over any formal proce-
dure.259 C ardenas concentrated an incredible amount of decision-making authority. Capital-
izing on his moral stature, leverage, and singular position at the hub of the PRD's vertical
258For details and qualications, see Mart nez (2005): 87-8.
259Scholars converge in this assessment. The early PRD was `led and arbitrated by the charismatic leader'
(Borjas 2003: 445-60). On Prud'homme's (2003) summary, `C ardenas exercised an important function
of informal arbitration in the internal life of the organization' (118). Mart nez (2005) identies three
`authentic birthmarks' of the PRD. The rst is C ardenas's role as `arbiter': `The presence of C ardenas
as the leader of a movement broader than the PRD, who had great legitimacy and was placed at the
284and horizontal networks, C ardenas, during the PRD's formative phase, repeatedly swayed
internal presidential elections, brokered the allocation of positions (e.g., secretar as) and can-
didacies, imposed himself as the party's candidate in major executive elections, and served
as a powerful spokesperson, arbiter, and broker in the PRD's tactical and programmatic
development.
Although C ardenas played a less active role in internal party life from the mid-1990s onward,
internal procedures did not become consolidated, and C ardenas remained able and willing
to broker alliances (e.g., AMLO's 1996 coalition), tilt or sway internal presidential elections
(1996, 1999), and impose himself as the PRD's top executive candidate (2000). C ardenas
often made these decisions without consulting other key actors.260
Throughout the formative period, most moderate party elites and many outside observers
criticized C ardenas's leadership style, citing its `negative consequences for routinization'.261
These critiques persisted throughout the 1990s. In late December of 1998, for example,
perredista and former student leader, Ra ul  Alvarez Gar n, publicly rebuked C ardenas for his
caudillista practices as party leader and jefe de gobierno of the Federal District:
[C ardenas] doesn't discuss problems. He receives them and considers them in private. He
doesn't interact in debates. He doesn't risk making judgments or proposing solutions to certain
problems in a daring manner. [His] hermetism, separated from debate, is damaging for collective
political life. He establishes bilateral relationships, and this gives the appearance of favoritism
or, even worse, solutions caused by particularistic inuences. Naturally, due to his weight in
the party and his modus operandi, these are practices that many consider unacceptable and are
seen as caudillismo.262
center of the party as an arbiter, established balance between forces that compete[d] for his support'
(97). The second `birthmark' is that the corrientes constituted the only avenue of participation. The
third is weak routinization and a reliance on informal, short-term measures to resolve disputes. He later
summarizes the early PRD national organization as divided between a reformist, traditional wing and a
radical, extraparliamentary wing with `a charismatic leader, acting as the cement, [who] seeks to balance
disputes' (101).
260As Borjas (2003) summarizes, C ardenas's `charisma' `equipped him to impose on the party all key decisions
without having to negotiate with the rest of the actors' (Borjas 2003: 451).
261Martinez (2005): 107.
262Proceso no. 1155, 12/20/1998.
285Yet it could be argued that PRD unity, especially in the initial years, hinged on C ardenas's
assumption of decision-making and conict resolution responsibilities. By substituting for an
internal decision-making and conict resolution procedure, C ardenas enabled the PRD to act
as one and speak in a single voice. Rodr guez (n.d.) suggests that given the PRD's `unstable
equilibrium', if C ardenas had not acted as the party's informal decision-making center and
high court, and instead attempted to routinize his charisma by creating a corriente cardenista
and submitting to established procedures, the PRD might have fractured (256-7). Later, she
writes: `Diversity coexisted in a conictual manner within the party, but during its initial
years, [the PRD] generally managed to act in a unied manner' due to C ardenas, whose
`dominance...was sustained thanks to agreements with dierent groups and the recognition
of his incontestable leadership' (Rodr guez n.d.: 303). In a 2010 historical reection, party
founder and leader Jes us Ortega wrote: `In our party, guevaristas, castristas, Christians,
atheists, socialists, social democrats, liberals, and communists came together, and what
kept them united? The strength and authority of Cuauht emoc C ardenas...' (Ortega 2010:
18).263
To this day, the PRD still has not become internally institutionalized. As late as 2005,
`perredista attempts to improve procedures' remained `undermined by the precariousness of
their achievements' (Mart nez 2005: 88). In the last decade, party leaders have continued to
resolve power struggles informally, and candidate selection procedures still change regularly.
On multiple occasions, the PRD has required the intervention of outside bodies to adjudicate
claims of internal electoral fraud.
Yet since the late 1990s, weak routinization has posed less of a threat to the PRD's basic
integrity, given the party's increased access to state patronage and nancial resources. The
263Ortega also cites the `strength and authority' of Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador. I exclude this part
of the quotation because the chapter concerns the role of leadership during the PRD's formative years.
AMLO's status as the PRD's leader only became established after C ardenas's retirement from politics,
which followed the 2000 presidential election.
286party has continuously controlled the Federal District since 1997 and won over a dozen
gubernatorial elections since 1998. The party has maintained a relatively strong presence
in the national legislature, which, since the 1996 political reforms, has resulted in generous
outlays of public funds. The PRD's hardcore vote (voto duro), combined with the spoils
that now go along with it, provide much stronger incentives against elite defection than
existed during the bulk of the PRD's formative phase. Perredistas continue to wage bitter
and disorderly power struggles, but few dare to exit.
287Chapter 6 Electoral Collapse: the Case of Argentina's FREPASO
In their origins, Argentina's FREPASO and Mexico's PRD bear a signicant resemblance.1
Like Mexico's hegemonic PRI in the early 1980s, Argentina's dominant, traditionally populist
Partido Justicialista (PJ) adopted major neoliberal reforms in the late 1980s. The Carlos
Menem (PJ) administration took oce amid economic crisis in 1989 and quickly lowered
protectionist taris, carried out a battery of privatizations, and implemented strict, anti-
inationary monetary policies. Menem's economic policies provoked opposition among left-
leaning PJ deputies, eight of whom defected from the party in mid-1990. For the next-half
decade, this `Group of Eight' (Grupo de los Ocho), in alliance with other left and center
actors, created a succession of opposition fronts and parties, culminating in the formation of
the Big Front (Frente Grande, or FG) in 1993 and FREPASO (Frente Pa s Solidario) in late
1994. FREPASO quickly became Argentina's third electoral force, behind the PJ and UCR
(Uni on C vica Radical). Like Mexico's PRD, FG/FREPASO thus originated as a left-wing,
anti-neoliberal splinter group from a dominant, traditionally populist party, developed over
the course of the 1990s, and became the rst new party in decades to challenge the national
two-party establishment.
Four years after FREPASO's founding, an anti-Menem coalition of the UCR and FREPASO
(the Alianza) placed rst in the 1999 presidential and congressional elections. The Alianza's
victory ended a decade of PJ dominance and seemed to solidify FREPASO's status as Ar-
gentina's third major party. At the height of FREPASO's electoral success, several scholars
assumed that FREPASO would become institutionalized (Abal-Medina 1998; Novaro and
Palermo 1998) and contribute to the `normalization' of Argentina's historically unstable
democracy (Levitsky 2000).
1Abal Medina (1998a) elaborates this point.
288Yet in 2001, FREPASO collapsed, never to be rebuilt. The immediate cause of the collapse
was a congressional electoral crisis precipitated by economic calamity. The Alianza's rst
year in government coincided with one of the worst economic downturns in Argentine history.
The downturn, combined with a 2000 Senate corruption scandal, seriously damaged the
Alianza's public image and led FREPASO's leader, Carlos `Chacho'  Alvarez, to resign the
vice presidency in October of 2000. Months later, in the 2001 midterm elections, FREPASO
suered a major setback, losing sixty percent of its congressional seats. Shortly thereafter,
the party dissolved.
Figure 6.1: FREPASO in the Chamber of Deputies
Paradoxically, however, the root cause of FREPASO's failure lay in the party's unencum-
bered access to media and resulting organizational weakness. After breaking from the PJ in
1990, FREPASO's founders contested six separate national elections in less than a decade.
Organization-building, by consuming scarce time and resources and placing procedural and
289ideological constraints on elite decision-making, would have prevented FREPASO from chal-
lenging Argentina's two-party establishment in these perpetually imminent elections. The
Group of Eight began their party-building project under democracy, with full access to
a vibrant, independent mass media establishment. The short-term electoral incentive to
rely on media, and to bypass organization-building, was overwhelming. To maximize their
prospects in perennial national elections, the Group of Eight and their allies appealed to
millions of voters directly and instantaneously through press conferences, speeches, public
actions, and interviews covered by the nation's leading broadcast and print outlets. Aware
of the short-term costs associated with organization-building, they eschewed base-level party
development.
Thus, although media enabled FREPASO's meteoric rise, media also prevented the party
from investing in organization. Amid electoral crisis in 2000, FREPASO lacked the territorial
infrastructure and activist networks necessary to regroup and rebound. With a failed brand
and a nonexistent base, FREPASO collapsed. The party's approximately two-dozen elites
either joined other parties2 or retired from politics.
The chapter is organized in two sections. The rst section identies FREPASO's access
to mass media as the fundamental source of its organizational weakness and shows that
FREPASO's organizational weakness lay at the root of its 2001 collapse. The second section
considers alternative explanations.
2Many returned to the PJ. Some joined the short-lived ARI, which began as a coalition (Argentinos por una
Rep ublica de Iguales (est. 2000)) and briey became a party (Armaci on para una Rep ublica Igualitaria
(est. 2002)).
290The rise and fall of Frente
Grande and FREPASO
FREPASO's original precursor, the Group of Eight, formed in opposition to the neoliberal
reforms of the rst Carlos Menem (PJ) administration (1989-93). Menem assumed oce in
1989 after winning Argentina's second post-transition presidential election.3 The election
took place amid sustained hyperination and recession, and the UCR { whose leader, Ra ul
Alfons n, was the sitting president { suered a comprehensive, resounding defeat. Menem
defeated the UCR's Eduardo Angeloz in a landslide, and the PJ strengthened its lead relative
to the UCR in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.4
Although Menem campaigned on a traditional PJ platform, promising a major wage increase
(salariazo) and other pro-labor policies, his administration rapidly implemented a spate of
neoliberal reforms upon taking oce. Designed to combat the crisis, these reforms included
reductions in import taris to stimulate foreign direct investment, privatizations of numerous
public industries including the national oil company (YPF), telephone service, post oce,
and electric, water, and gas utilities, and strict monetary policies culminating in the 1991
institution of a xed exchange rate that pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar (the
Convertibility Plan).
Given the PJ's historical identication with organized labor and support for public and
private national industry, Menem's reforms provoked signicant backlash within left-leaning
sectors of the PJ. In protest of Menem's alianza con liberalismo (`alliance with neoliberalism')
{ as well as his administration's `delegative' governing practices5 and decision to pardon
3Argentina transited from military dictatorship to democracy in 1983.
4The PJ's assumption of power in 1989 marked Argentina's rst orderly transfer since the election of Hip olito
Yrigoyen (UCR) in 1916.
5To force through { and ensure compliance with { his controversial economic policies, the Menem adminis-
tration relied heavily on `delegative' governing tactics, which included court-packing and the unprecedented
use of executive decrees (O'Donnell 1994)
291`Dirty War'-era military ocials6 { eight federal deputies with roots in the Federal Capital
left the PJ and formed an independent legislative bloc, the Grupo de los Ocho, or `Group of
Eight'.7
After operating on the margins of Argentine electoral politics for nearly three years, the
`Group of Eight' and their allies rose to national prominence in the April 1994 constituent
assembly elections. Thus began the rapid ascent of the FG (est. 1993) and its successor
party, FREPASO (est. 1994), which culminated in the creation of the UCR/FREPASO
Alianza8 in 1997 and the Alianza's victories over the PJ in the 1997 congressional elections
and the 1999 presidential and congressional elections.
Even at its electoral apex, however, FREPASO had no base-level organization. Moreover,
throughout the 1990s, no grassroots left alternative emerged at the national level. What
explains the failure of left-wing party organization-building in 1990s Argentina?
FREPASO, mass media access, and
incentives against organization
The Group of Eight were engaged in a `permanent campaign' from 1990 until the end of
the 1990s.9 With an expanding network of allies, they competed in national elections in
1991 (legislative), 1993 (legislative), 1994 (constitutional assembly), 1995 (general), 1997
(legislative), and 1999 (general). The period from late 1993 to mid-1995 was especially
6Interview with Jozami.
7Chacho  Alvarez, Germ an Abdala, Juan Pablo Caero, Luis Brunati, Dar o Alessandro Sr., Franco Caviglia,
Mois es Fontela, and Jos e Carlos Ramos. According to one party founder, it was not a coincidence that the
PJ schism occurred in the Federal Capital: `Outside of the Federal Capital, no one wanted to leave the PJ.
Kirchner is a great example; very similar critique of Menem, but he wanted to stay. But in the Federal
Capital, we dissidents had a very low ceiling, so for us, there was an incentive to leave and contest elections
outside of Peronism' (interview with Wainfeld).
8Alianza is a common shorthand for Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educaci on (Alliance for Work,
Justice, and Education).
9`FREPASO was in a permanent campaign' (interview with Mazzei.
292`blurry'. Between October 1993 and April 1994, the FG went from marginal political actor
to Argentina's tercera fuerza electoral (`third electoral force'), and between April 1994 and
May 1995, the party { virtually unknown outside the Federal Capital just eighteen months
earlier { mounted a serious bid for the presidency.
After splitting from the PJ, the Group of Eight rst created a series of small, unsuccess-
ful parties. The intention was to pick o PJ supporters by assaulting Menem's economic
policies and governing practices. In 1991, the Group of Eight allied with a few small op-
position parties to form MODEJUSO10 and contest select subnational elections. Following
across-the-board losses, MODEJUSO incorporated the group, Democracia Popular,11 to form
FREDEJUSO12 and mount a broader electoral challenge in the 1991 congressional elections.
Not a single FREDEJUSO candidate prevailed in 1991.  Alvarez would later describe the
early 1990s as el desierto (`the desert') (Abal Medina 1998b: 102).
In advance of the October 1993 congressional elections, FREDEJUSO's leaders forged a new,
broader coalition called the Frente Grande (FG). The FG comprised FREDEJUSO as well
as the social democratic, center-left Partido Intransigente and the Frente del Sur, a more
radical, nationalist left alliance headed by lmmaker/politician, Fernando `Pino' Solanas,
and partially composed of dissident sectors of the Argentine Communist Party (PCA). The
FG named  Alvarez president, and in the 1993 congressional election, the FG outperformed
expectations, electing three federal deputies:  Alvarez, Solanas, and Graciela Fern andez Mei-
jide, who had joined FREDEJUSO in 1991 as a member of Democracia Popular.13
Despite these victories, the FG, as of late 1993, remained a marginal force at the national
10Movimiento por la Democracia y la Justicia Social
11Founded the previous year by Christian Democratic leader, Carlos Auyero, Democracia Popular brought
together several leaders and groups opposed to the Menem administration's neoliberal reforms, including
human rights leader Graciela Fern andez Meijide and many of her supporters.
12Frente Democr atico Justicia Social
13The FG also elected four municipal councilors in the Federal Capital (Abal Medina 1998b: 103).
293level. The party had achieved little success in its eorts to attract disaected Peronist
supporters. The PJ maintained a lock on most of the country's poor and working-class vote.
The UCR, in turn, commanded the support of most urban middle-class voters, in and out of
the Federal Capital. Absent substantial voter realignment, the FG seemed unlikely to break
ve percent of the national vote.
In December of 1993, Argentine partisan alignments shifted quickly and dramatically, with
favorable consequences for the FG. Six weeks after the October congressional election, the
PJ and UCR forged the Olivos Pact, in which the UCR's leader, Ra ul Alfons n, pledged to
Menem that the UCR would support the PJ in amending the `no reelection' clause of Argen-
tine constitution to allow Menem to run for a second term. Olivos provoked a middle-class
backlash. The Argentine public broadly supported Menem's neoliberal reforms, viewing aus-
terity and market liberalization as a necessary antidote to the hyperination and recession
of the Alfons n economy. Yet as Menem's rst term progressed, middle-class voters began to
coalesce around the view that the administration's governing tactics { corrupt deal-making,
circumvention of the legislature through executive decree, court-packing { were undermin-
ing the country's political institutions. The Olivos Pact intensied these concerns. The
UCR's tolerance of Menem's `hegemonic' pretensions and constitutional tampering produced
a restorm of opposition, especially among the UCR's middle-class base.
The tenor of national media reected the public's growing concern,14 creating an electoral
opportunity for media-savvy political entrepreneurs. The FG seized the opportunity.15 Al-
though the party's `romance' with the media had begun in the wake of the 1993 midterms,
it took o after Olivos. Telegenic and crisp, FG leaders took aim at the two-party establish-
14`...[A]fter the Olivos Pact, the threat of a hegemonic power that recognized no limits became palpable for
journalism and the media' (Novaro and Palermo 1998: 116).
15`FG leaders understood the importance of media coverage...and generated initiatives that addressed is-
sues...ranked high on the media's agenda' (Abal Medina 2009: 369).
294ment but directed their appeals at middle-class progressives disaected with the UCR. The
FG branded itself a `modern' center-left party,16 primarily concerned with the middle-class
valence issue of corruption.17 In order not to `turn o' their new target constituency, FG
leaders both moderated and downplayed the party's statist, redistributive economic propos-
als.18
The FG rose to national prominence in the April 1994 constitutional assembly election. Be-
hind the campaign slogan, `A Constitution without Maas',19 the party registered a break-
out performance, winning 31 of 244 constitutional assembly seats (thirteen percent). Almost
overnight, the FG had become a serious national contender, validating party leaders' strate-
gic shift to the programmatic center.20
The FG's burgeoning voter base came primarily from the urban middle class, especially the
large population of middle-class progressives in the Federal Capital. In the 1993 congressional
election, the FG had received three percent of the vote nationally but almost fteen percent
16Interview with Wainfeld. According to one party member,  Alvarez insisted on modernizing the Argentine
left out of genuine conviction, not just electoral calculation. He and like-minded FG elites, the frepasista
argued, believed that `the populist state had gangrene,' and that the left needed to adapt to the country's
new, neoliberal era by focusing on corruption, checks and balances, and the establishment of a broad safety
net within the free market context (interview with Mocca.
17This evolving platform, writes Abal Medina (2009), `added up to an eclectic, centrist-oriented political
discourse and created this peculiar party, which was, perhaps, a post-materialist version of the Latin
American left' ( ).
18The economic policy preferences of the Argentine middle class reected an emerging global consensus in
support of market economics. By the 1990s, middle-class progressives had largely abandoned `systematic
critiques of the world capitalist system' (interview with Mocca.). One FG member recalled that  Alvarez
refused to advance a radical economic critique of Menemism because middle-class voters did not strongly
oppose Menem's privatization and corporate tax policies (interview with Jozami). Another party member
argued that only under conditions of crisis would the Argentine middle class have supported fundamental
economic reform (interview with Mocca). In his view, the success of Nestor Kirchner's left-wing economic
appeals during the early 2000s illustrates this point. If Kirchner had advocated the same economic policies
in a context of macroeconomic stability and growth, he stated, the public would not have supported him
nearly as much as they did.
19Una Constituci on sin Maas.
20Interview with De Luca.
295in the Federal Capital, sucient to elect  Alvarez, Solanas, and Fern andez Meijide.21 In the
1994 constituent assembly elections, the FG went signicantly further, `tak[ing] from the
Radicals a signicant fraction of their electoral support'.22 Twenty-ve of the FG's thirty-
one successful candidates came from Buenos Aires province, and twelve from the Federal
Capital alone.23
Following the constitutional assembly election, Argentine media frequently raised the pos-
sibility of an FG/ Alvarez presidential bid in 1995 (Novaro and Palermo 1998: 111). FG
leaders, however, regarded a broader alliance as necessary in order to defeat the PJ in na-
tional elections. In the words of one party elite, the country's center and left opposition
remained fragmented, and the FG `needed to reorganize it'.24 The FG thus set about forg-
ing a series of new alliances, which eventuated in the creation of the center-left FREPASO
in late 1994.
In mid-1994, Jos e Octavio Bord on, the ex-governor of Mendoza province and a longtime
centrist, Christian Democratic peronista, defected from the PJ, created a new party, PAIS
(Pol tica Abierta para la Integridad Social), and allied with the FG. The FG and PAIS then
allied with Unidad Socialista, a small socialist party, and a group of ex-Christian Democrats
led by Carlos Auyero. In November of 1994, this center-left electoral front became a regis-
tered party, FREPASO.25 FREPASO members coined the term `transversality' (transversal-
idad) to describe the `common cement' (e.g., opposition to corruption) holding together the
party's heterogeneous elite networks.26
21In fact, by `stealing' a signicant portion of the Federal Capital's middle-class vote share from the UCR,
the FG caused the UCR to lose to the PJ in the capital for the rst time 1973 (interview with Mocca).
22`FREPASO le saca al radicalismo una buena parte de su clientela electoral' (interview with Mocca).
23The remainder were from the provinces of Santa Fe, Neuquen, C ordoba, and Entre R os.
24Interview with Sigal.
25In February of 1995, an elite network of ex-Radicals led by Carlos Raimundi also joined FREPASO.
26Novaro and Palermo (1998: 136). In another FREPASO member's formulation, transversalidad meant the
296In anticipation of the 1995 general election, FREPASO took to the airwaves, promoting
anti-corruption, competent governance, and horizontal accountability through `ecient and
intense use' of televised speeches and press conferences, interviews with broadcast outlets
and major newspapers (e.g., Clar n, La Naci on), and media-tailored `political displays' (No-
varo and Palermo 1998: 117, 150-1).27  Alvarez, in particular, was a `media phenomenon',
`charm[ing] the media with [his] irreverence toward the traditional rituals of politics, [his]
ease of manner and speed' (Abal Medina 2009: 369).
Just as FREPASO gravitated toward the media,28 the media { according to several un-
prompted interview statements { gravitated toward FREPASO. In the words of one mem-
ber, television news anchors, radio hosts, and newspaper journalists `lived o' the party's
charismatic, articulate leaders.29 FREPASO rarely had to purchase television spots. Instead,
party leaders held press conferences, gave speeches, staged media displays, and the media
`just showed up'.30
FREPASO took a great leap forward in the 1995 general election, mounting a serious elec-
toral challenge to Argentina's two-party establishment. The Bord on/ Alvarez presidential
`maximum common denominator' among the party's center and left forces (interview with Sigal).
27In one characteristic display, FREPASO organized an initiative in which a large group collected trash on
the streets of Buenos Aires and carried the trash bags to the oce of the federal environmental secretary
(interview with Mazzei).
28According to one party member, FREPASO leaders did not just rely on the media for votes. They often
drew their opinions from informed journalists (interview with Sigal).
29Interview with Novaro. According to Bord on, the media simply `liked'  Alvarez because he was `from the
barrio', `very nice', and left-leaning (interview with Bord on).
30The media also may have gravitated toward FREPASO, in part, due to ideological anity. According to
several party members' contemporaneous writings and independent, unprompted statements, FREPASO's
ideals and policies t within the ideological parameters of the mainstream media, or media `establishment'.
On this account, the nation's opinion-makers { reecting the views of the urban middle class, to which
they belonged { broadly accepted the free market consensus but regarded Menem as a threat to Argentine
political institutions. Given FREPASO's economic moderation and emphasis on corruption and executive
accountability, the party and the media thus made natural bedfellows.
297ticket31 placed second with twenty-nine percent, and FREPASO quintupled the FG's 1993
congressional vote share, jumping from 4.2 to 21.0 percent. FREPASO also relegated the
UCR to third place in the presidential election for the rst time in decades.32
Still, FREPASO had lost to the PJ by an unexpectedly large margin.33 The party leadership
thus concluded that a victory over the PJ would require an even broader alliance.34 In the
lead-up to the 1997 congressional election, FREPASO took a bold step, allying with the
UCR to create a broad, centrist, anti-Menem electoral coalition, the Alianza.35 The move
provoked some internal controversy, as the UCR was a centrist party of the establishment
that, at Olivos, had signed o on Menem's manipulation of the constitution.36
Yet FREPASO leaders generally agreed that the UCR and FREPASO had been dividing
the middle-class PJ opposition vote for too long. They believed that it was electorally
imperative, in the short term, to set aside programmatic dierences, articulate common
principles and programs, and work together to unseat the PJ. Following the lead previously
taken by FREPASO, the Alianza branded itself a centrist coalition, principally focused on
defeating Menem and restoring clean government and horizontal accountability.
The 1997 and 1999 elections marked the apex of FREPASO's electoral trajectory. The
31In advance of the election, FREPASO held an open national primary to nominate its presidential candidate,
and Bord on won a surprise victory, defeating  Alvarez largely on the strength of his Mendoza base.
32The UCR's Horacio Massaccesi (UCR) nished a distant third, with seventeen percent of the vote. The
UCR narrowly defeated FREPASO in the Chamber of Deputies, winning 21.7 percent of the vote.
33Menem won the presidential election with fty percent of the vote, and the PJ won the Chamber of
Deputies with fty-two percent.
34One party member recalled the party's surprise at Menem's overwhelming margin of victory. In his view,
the leadership believed that the party needed to create something `bigger' in order to win the presidency,
and this belief led to the formation of the Alianza (interview with Sigal).
35Shorthand for the Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia, y la Educaci on (Alliance for Work, Justice, and
Education).
36One of FREPASO's most inuential voices, Christian Democrat Carlos Auyero, forcefully opposed any
alliance with the UCR throughout the mid-1990s. According to one party member, FREPASO leaders
only felt at liberty to create the Alianza after Auyero's death in 1997 (interview with Mazzei).
298Alianza won the 1997 congressional election with a large plurality of the vote, and in the
1999 general election, the Alianza resoundingly defeated the PJ across the board: the De la
R ua/ Alvarez presidential ticket prevailed,37 and in the Chamber, the Alianza expanded its
margin of victory over the PJ from 9.5 to 10.1 percent of the vote.
In summary, FREPASO rose meteorically over the second half of the 1990s by targeting
post-Olivos middle-class voters with eective mass media appeals. FREPASO's rise would
have been unthinkable in the absence of mass media. Writing in 1998, party member Juan
Manuel Abal Medina described mass media as the `primary engine' of FREPASO's growth,
without which `it would be nearly impossible to explain how it could become so quickly
installed in the national political arena' (Abal Medina 2009: 369).38
Investing in base-level organization would have impeded the progress of FG/FREPASO in
several ways. The organization-building itself (e.g., recruiting and training activists and
elites, establishing local oces and communication systems) would have diverted attention
and resources while important national elections loomed on the horizon. As one party
member succinctly observed: `There was no time to build an organization.'39 Chacho  Alvarez
has provided the same assessment, stating in a separate interview that he and fellow party
leaders could not devote energy to party organization with major elections constantly on the
near horizon.40
Moreover, a party organization, once built, would have impeded the party's short-term elec-
toral progress. First, cumbersome internal decision-making procedures would have slowed
37On the strength of the UCR's extensive territorial infrastructure, Fernando De la R ua (UCR) defeated
Graciela Fern andez Meijide (FREPASO) in the Alianza's open primary for the presidential nomination.
Open primaries receive less media attention and generate lower turnout, making on-the-ground electoral
mobilization more decisive. Extensive base-level organization therefore gave the UCR a massive advantage
in the 1999 open primary (interviews with Wainfeld and Sigal).
38For a similar claim, see Cheresky (1994).
39Interview with Mazzei.
40 Alvarez's interview with Steven Levitsky, July 29, 1997.
299elite response time. In numerous interviews, party members and observers made clear that
FREPASO's leaders prized the capacity for rapid decision-making amid fast-changing polit-
ical circumstances. One party observer recalled, for example, that  Alvarez and FREPASO
wanted to be able to `move nimbly' (correr ligero), as contemporary politics required `speed'
(aceleridad). Journalists appear with a microphone, he remarked, and politicians need to
say something.
The interviewee contrasted FREPASO with his own Socialist Party. The president of the
Socialist Party, he stated, could not speak publicly for the party before s/he held a meeting
with the membership. In contrast,  Alvarez `just held a press conference'.41 Abal Med-
ina (2009) summarizes that `FG leaders always fought to have freedom of action, hoping
not to be tied down by institutional procedures when making decisions.... [T]he party's
nucleus...considered  Alvarez's speed of response an important requirement' (). Numerous
party members used the same word, lastre (burden), to capture the way FREPASO leaders,
particularly  Alvarez, viewed party organization.
A strong base-level organization also would have denied elites the ideological exibility nec-
essary to maximize short-term electoral advantage. Leftists in 1990s Argentina tended
to hold views characteristic of traditional left-wing Peronism.42 One party member de-
scribed the typical leftist during this period as `statist (intervencionista), populist, and
anti-imperialist'.43 A party base composed of such individuals might have nominated un-
electable candidates (Abal Medina 2009)44 or pressured FREPASO candidates to refuse
alliances and take comparatively extreme, electorally suboptimal policy positions. These
41Interview with Gallotti.
42`[F]aced with the dicult task of appealing to 1990s' voters', write Novaro and Palermo (1998), ` Alvarez
and his followers found the discourse of traditional left-wing Peronists constraining' ().
43Interview with Novaro.
44`[P]arty leaders feared that the more left-wing character of the party base would result in the selection of
candidates that would damage the FG's appeal to the general electorate' ( ).
300positions would have satised the base but alienated the much larger number of moderate,
disaected, middle-sector voters.
By restricting party decision-making to a small cadre of elites, FG/FREPASO preserved `ex-
treme operational exibility',45 which enabled the party to implement the vote-maximizing
strategies of coalition-building and programmatic moderation.46 To ensure the nomina-
tion of moderate, electable candidates, FREPASO either held open primaries (e.g., Bordon
for president in 1995) or, more frequently, selected candidates through elite negotiation.47
FREPASO's leadership systematically rejected radical candidacies.48
There is evidence that FREPASO's leaders, in addition to viewing party organization as
an electoral encumbrance, did not recognize the potential, longer-term importance of party
organization. In one party member's formulation, the need to invest in party infrastructure
`became, in the eyes of some party leaders...non-urgent' (Novaro and Palermo 1998: 150)
and `very secondary' (bastante secundario).49 Another FREPASO elite asserted that rapid
electoral growth `led [the party leadership] to think that politics was built from media success.
If [the party] didn't have neighborhood structures, it didn't matter' because they could still
`mobilize people' (convocar gente) with media appeals.50
45Interview with Mocca. Along similar lines, Abal Medina (2009) writes: `The party combined shallow
organizational roots with the highest level of autonomy in an almost perfect example of what Kitschelt
calls `cadre parties' (365).
46One FG member and intellectual recalled emphasized that the FG's moderation on economic issues came
directly from `the top' (interview with Wainfeld).
47Candidates selected through elite negotiation included Fern andez Meijide for federal deputy in 1996, federal
deputy in 1997, president in 1998, governor of Buenos Aires in 1999;  Alvarez for federal deputy in 1993,
federal deputy in 1997, and vice president in 1999; An bal Ibarra for mayor of the Federal Capital in 1995
and 1999; and Carlos Auyero for governor of Buenos Aires province in 1995.
48One party member recalled, for example, that the leadership vetoed the congressional candidacy of left
labor leader, Francisco Guti errez, believing that his left-wing economic views would have alienated `middle
sectors' (interview with Jozami).
49Interview with Novaro.
50Interview with Jozami.
301In sum, FREPASO's leaders recognized the various short-term electoral costs associated with
organization-building, and they understood that mass media appeals, unlike organization-
building,51 oered instantaneous visibility and the potential to achieve national success in
the short term.52 Consequently, they opted to circumvent the grassroots left through direct
media appeals to more moderate voters, and through `hypercentralized' elite procedures for
candidate selection and program articulation.53 After 1991, `[t]he idea of building a solid
and stable party organization was never in the minds [of  Alvarez and his followers]' (Abal
Medina 2009: 360).
By the end of the 1990s, FREPASO dominated the left political spectrum, but it was a
tiny elite cadre with no base-level structures. According to two party members writing in
1998, `the FG and then FREPASO seem to have an almost ghostlike existence outside of
the media arena' (Novaro and Palermo 1998: 151). Even at its electoral apex, FREPASO's
activist base was vanishingly small, its organizational apparatus `practically non-existent'
(Abal Medina 2009: 364). At the end of the 1990s, FREPASO had fewer than ten paid
employees (Abal Medina 2009: 363). One campaign strategist for the Alianza described
FREPSAO simply: `There was no organization'.54
FREPASO's electoral
crisis and collapse
By the late 1990s, FREPASO members and most outside observers assumed that the party
would endure and become institutionalized. In the wake of Bord on's landslide loss in mid-
51Novaro and Palermo (1998) summarize that `due to the recognition of the diculty of mass mobiliza-
tion...[FREPASO's] political initiatives and electoral campaigns naturally tended to be based on the most
important asset available to the party leadership: the support of journalists and access to the media'
(Novaro and Palermo 1998: 116; emphasis added).
52`Instead of focusing on an area like Buenos Aires City,  Alvarez pushed the FG to compete nationwide'
(Abal Medina 2009: 361).
53The term `hypercentralized' comes from the author's interview with Mocca. See also Abal Medina(2009).
54Interview with de Santiba~ nes.
3021995 and acrimonious exit in early 1996,  Alvarez and FREPASO, explicitly unfazed,55 had
rebounded in dramatic fashion, allying with the UCR to defeat the PJ in the 1997 con-
gressional election. On one party member's analysis, `[t]he judgment of Bord on did not
take into account that the FG...was already a political organization rooted (anclada) in a
large sector of the population and, consequently, capable of overcoming defeats and internal
conicts' (Abal Medina 1998b: 105). Party members Marcos Novaro and Vicente Palermo
described the `survival of the electoral defeat in May 1995 and of Bord on's departure in
February 1996' as `proof that the Front was consolidating as a force and as a moderately
institutionalized political space' (Novaro and Palermo 1998: 129; emphasis added). They
condently referred to FREPASO's `durability', writing that `FREPASO does not constitute
a circumstantial episode, a necessarily short-lived media phenomenon.... Neither [the rise of
Duhalde in the PJ nor that of De la R ua in the UCR] puts at risk [FREPASO's] durability
(perdurabilidad)...' (Novaro and Palermo 1998: 137). According to some, FREPASO's rise
and apparent consolidation heralded a new era of partisan competition in Argentina. Party
scholars and members, including  Alvarez,56 argued that the Argentine party system was
`normalizing' (Levitsky 2000). Moving forward, they held, the once-dominant PJ would face
two serious national contenders with large, stable constituencies and proven resilience.
Yet FREPASO fell as suddenly and dramatically as it had risen. Exogenous factors trig-
gered the collapse, as the Alianza's assumption of oce coincided with the worst social and
economic crisis in contemporary Argentine history. The crisis had been building for years.
Despite strong aggregate growth under the Menem administration, Menem's liberalization
policies had eliminated manufacturing jobs without producing commensurate employment
gains. In addition, although Menem's public-sector reforms had shrunk parts of the budget,
55YouTube video, `Carlos Chacho Alvarez habla sobre la renuncia de Bordon al Frepaso', Uploaded Feb. 12,
2011.
56Marcos Novaro described the normalization thesis as `chachismo puro' (interview with Novaro).
303government spending had remained relatively high, and corruption had increased. These
problems deepened in 1998 and 1999. The economy grew anemically in 1998 and contracted
by four percent in 1999, producing the rst recession in nearly a decade. Unemployment
rose sharply, and the federal decit spiked due to plummeting tax revenue.
Upon assuming oce in December 1999, the Alianza thus inherited an economy in recession,
hundreds of thousands of newly unemployed voters, and a ballooning national debt. In short
order, the De la R ua administration implemented a succession of austerity packages designed
to slow the decit spike and ensure Argentina's continued access to IMF credit. Contrary
to the government's projections of robust growth in 2000, however, the recession persisted,
partially due to the decrease in aggregate demand that resulted from federal budget cuts.57
Unemployment continued to rise,58 and tax revenue continued to fall, osetting reduced
spending. The Alianza now `owned' Argentina's recession and debt, creating a political
crisis for the country's new governing coalition.
The political crisis intensied in late 2000, when, amid economic and scal turmoil, a major
corruption scandal broke, centering on allegations of bribery in the Senate. According to
federal charges, eleven senators { eight from the PJ, three from the UCR { accepted payments
totaling four million US dollars, conditional on their support for a 2000 labor market reform
bill proposed by the Alianza.59 Media reports alleged that the payments originated in the
oces of two Alianza ministers, Intelligence Secretary Fernando de Santiba~ nes (UCR) and
Labor Secretary Alberto Flamarique (FREPASO).
The combination of economic crisis and major corruption allegations raised the Alianza's
political crisis to a fever pitch. The coalition had won power on a platform of anti-corruption.
57The economy shrunk by 0.8 percent in 2000.
58By the middle of 2000, the ocial unemployment rate had reached fourteen percent.
59`Spreading Bribery Scandal Shakes Argentina's Senate', The New York Times, September 19, 2000.
304Through its participation in the senate bribery scheme, the Alianza simultaneously violated
its central campaign promise and rendered itself indistinguishable from Menem's PJ on the
valence issue of corruption. The scandal thus threatened to dilute and destroy the coali-
tion's brand (Lupu forthcoming).60 Absent a quick, decisive act of political atonement, the
corruption scandal could sink the Alianza. Through September of 2000,  Alvarez maintained
public support for De la R ua but privately urged him to re De Santib~ anes and Flamarique,
arguing that only drastic measures would preserve the Alianza's credibility.61 De la R ua
ultimately refused, and in early October,  Alvarez tendered his resignation. Announcing his
resignation to the press,  Alvarez stated, `I am very ashamed a sixteen- or seventeen-year old
should feel that politics is similar to crime'.62
Party members and observers generally agree that  Alvarez resigned in a last-ditch eort to
save FREPASO. In leaving oce, he was `jumping out of a burning building'; the party's
future would be uncertain without  Alvarez, but it would be even more uncertain absent a
dramatic response to the corruption scandal.  Alvarez lacked the power to expel the impli-
cated ministers and senators. Only by stepping down could he send a suciently powerful
signal to FREPASO's supporters. Or so he concluded.
Following  Alvarez's resignation, Argentina's economic and scal crises deepened. In Novem-
ber, Standard and Poor's raised Argentina's risk prole, and the interest rate on Argentine
federal bonds spiked to sixteen percent, the second highest in Latin America.63 To ensure
60In his branding theory of partisanship, Lupu (forthcoming) identies inter-party dierentiation and intra-
party consistency as the two pillars of brand success. In Lupu's scheme, the senate scandal toppled both
pillars for the Alianza, diluting the coalition brand and causing electoral failure.
61In ocial testimony twelve years later,  Alvarez stated that during the scandal, he had `expected' the
removal of Flamarique and De Santiba~ nes `as a political gesture' (`Chacho  Alvarez: `Estaba convencido de
que los sobornos existieron", P agina 12, September 13, 2012).
62`Chacho renunci o con cr ticas y De la R ua dice que no hay crisis', Clar n, October 7, 2000.
63Interest rates on Ecuadoran government bonds remained the highest in the region. See `Argentina, Wobbly,
Clears a Borrowing Hurdle', The New York Times, November 9, 2000.
305continued access to IMF funds, the cash-starved Alianza government implemented another
round of austerity measures, culminating in a series of savage cuts in mid-2001. In July,
the government slashed all public-sector salaries and pensions by thirteen percent and, in
August, began to pay the salaries of high-income public-sector employees in bonds instead
of cash.64 Aggregate demand plummeted, depressing production and leading to a sharp
increase in unemployment.
As Argentine voters took to the polls for the October 2001 midterms, the economy was
still contracting, and the ocial unemployment hovered near twenty percent.65 Rightly or
wrongly, voters punished FREPASO, the Alianza, and the entire governing class. From 1999
to 2001, the sum of null votes, invalid votes, and votes for marginal parties and electoral
vehicles leapt from 12.4 to 48.7 percent of the overall vote total, a nearly four-fold increase.
While the PJ's vote share rose marginally, from 32.3 to 35.8 percent, the Alianza's share fell
by half, from 43.7 to 22.6 percent. For FREPASO, the outcome was especially dire. The
UCR lost a quarter of its congressional seats (24 of 89), but FREPASO lost roughly sixty
percent (22 of 37), retaining only fteen seats. Two months later, De la R ua resigned amid
riots, and the PJ returned to power in early January.
The message from voters was clear: the Alianza brand had failed (Lupu forthcoming). Fur-
ther, unlike the UCR, which claimed a national grassroots organization and a small but
committed rank-and-le membership, FREPASO depended exclusively on its brand. `When
FREPASO lost its image', one party member recalled, `it lost everything'.66 FREPASO
lacked the territorial infrastructure necessary to regroup and rebound from its heavy midterm
losses. In the wake of the election, FREPASO amounted to a cadre of two dozen elites, most
64These new government bonds were called patacones. `Argentines cry over `fast food currency", The Tele-
graph, August 22, 2001.
65`Argentina Unraveling', The New York Times, December 21, 2001.
66Interview with Mazzei.
306in the national legislature and one, An bal Ibarra, in the Federal Capital's mayoral seat.
It was evident that the party brand had stopped delivering, and that the electoral benets
of party membership had therefore disappeared. FREPASO's elites jumped ship, most re-
turning to the PJ, to smaller left parties, or to PJ satellite parties.67 In the words of one
frepasista, `each [party member] returned to his home'.68 Reecting on FREPASO's collapse,
one Alianza strategist invoked an old metaphor: `Building an image through the media is
like building with mud'.69
Alternative explanations
of FREPASO's collapse
So far, the chapter has argued that access to mass media lay at the root of FREPASO's
collapse. Media access weakened incentives for FREPASO to invest in organization, and
the resulting organizational weakness made FREPASO fragile, ill-equipped to survive the
economic/electoral crisis of 1999-2001.
One could object to this argument in two ways. First, one could object that the economic cri-
sis of 1999-2002, not organizational weakness, fundamentally explains FREPASO's electoral
collapse. Second, one could question, on several grounds, whether FREPASO's organiza-
tional weakness primarily resulted from party founders' access to mass media. This section
addresses both objections in turn.
67The Frente Grande remains a registered party to the present, but it is now an electorally marginal Peronist
satellite, in perpetual alliance with the PJ.
68Interview with Mazzei.
69Interview with De Santiba~ nes.
307The role of economic crisis
in FREPASO's collapse
One might argue that the economic crisis of 1999-2002, not FREPASO's organizational
weakness, caused FREPASO's collapse. Yet this alternative account rests on a false choice.
As Chapter One argues, and Chapters Two and Four seek to demonstrate in the cases of
the PT and PRD, organizational strength and activist commitment matter precisely because
they help new parties survive crisis. In general, major new parties do not fail because of
crisis or organizational weakness. They fail because of the two factors combined.
Many new parties with strong organizations and cores of rank-and-le believers have with-
stood and rebounded from major electoral crises due to the resilience of activist networks
in territorial bastions. As Chapters Two and Four show, Brazil's PT rebounded from a dis-
astrous election in 1982, while Mexico's PRD rebounded from back-to-back electoral crises
in 1991 and 1994. Another example, in some ways more relevant, is the UCR, FREPASO's
senior partner in the Alianza and the only party held even more responsible than FREPASO
for the Argentine economic crisis. While not a new party like FREPASO, the UCR survived
and recovered from the 1999-2002 crisis, evidencing the critical importance of territorial
organization and committed activist networks.
The survival
of the UCR
As detailed in the previous section, the UCR/FREPASO Alianza assumed power in 1999, the
same year that Argentina fell o the economic precipice and entered the worst economic and
social crisis in its history. High unemployment, exploding decits, a massive and sustained
economic contraction, and escalating bank runs and capital ight engulfed the new Alianza
government. As the senior partner and governing party, the UCR, to an even greater extent
than FREPASO, took a reputational hit due to the economic crisis. After the corralito bank
308freeze and subsequent riots of December 2001, which resulted in deaths and the declaration of
a national state of emergency, President De la R ua, the UCR's standard-bearer and president
of the Republic, tendered the rst resignation of a post-transition Argentine president.
Yet as briey noted earlier, there was a crucial dierence between the UCR and FREPASO:
the UCR claimed a territorially extensive, organized activist base, built over many decades,
while FREPASO did not possess base-level activist networks. Both FREPASO and the
UCR came into the 2001 election with brands, but only the UCR came in with organization
{ the same organization that had enabled De la R ua to defeat F ernandez Meijide handily
in the Alianza's 1999 open primary. With committed networks of Radicals dispersed across
the national territory, the UCR fell back on a large base of supporters and campaigners,
giving the party a low but solid national electoral oor and a continued ability to win major
positions of power at the subnational level.
The UCR thus weathered the crisis. In the 2001 midterms, the Radicals only lost a quar-
ter of their seat share and retained over a quarter of overall Chamber seats. In contrast,
FREPASO lost sixty percent of its much smaller previous seat share. The UCR retained
almost thirty percent of Senate seats. Subsequent elections at the subnational level pro-
vided more denitive evidence of the UCR's post-crisis resilience. In 2003, the UCR won
the governorship in Tierra del Fuego and retained governorships in Rio Negro, Chaco, Men-
doza, and Catamarca. In 2005, the UCR won thirteen and eighteen percent of Chamber and
Senate seats, respectively, and retained governorships in Corrientes and Santiago del Estero,
bringing its total number of governorships to seven, almost a third of the national total.
The UCR also held or retained over six-hundred mayoralties. In sum, the UCR remained an
important, albeit diminished, national force and continued to control a signicant fraction
of Argentina's provincial and municipal governments. This state of aairs has persisted to
the present.
309* * *
Ultimately, the question whether an organizationally stronger FREPASO would have sur-
vived the 1999-2002 economic crisis remains a hypothetical. There is little question that
the economic crisis played a decisive role in FREPASO's collapse, and that absent an elec-
toral crisis, FREPASO would have endured in the short term. Like Chile's PPD, FREPASO
might even have become institutionalized. The PPD, the only major new left party in Chile's
post-Pinochet Concertaci on government, possessed a weak organization during the formative
phase but did not face crisis and succeeded in becoming institutionalized.
Yet there is clear comparative evidence, from both outside (e.g., PT, PRD) and inside
Argentina (e.g., the UCR), that if FREPASO had built a strong organization and activist
base during the 1990s, it could have survived the 1999-2002 crisis.
The roots of FREPASO's
organizational weakness
Even if one accepts that organizational weakness played a decisive role in FREPASO's col-
lapse, one might question whether elite mass media access fully or even primarily accounts
for FREPASO's organizational weakness. How can we be sure that mass media access, and
not some other factor/s, lay at the root of FREPASO's organizational deciencies?
The role of patron-
age and nance
As argued in Chapter One, politicians in power have an incentive to use the state apparatus
as a substitute for party organization (Hale 2006). Since investing in parties requires elites
to sacrice resources and autonomy without the guarantee of an electoral or material return,
presidents in many countries have sought to maintain their electoral clout by tapping gov-
310ernment coers and agencies for money and candidates and deploying bureaucratic efdoms
to perform the campaign work often reserved for party activist networks.70
Yet FREPASO was out of power during the formative phase. Rapid electoral success notwith-
standing, FREPASO's founders spent the entire decade of the 1990s without executive
power at the national or subnational level. Abal Medina (2009) observes that `[b]efore 1999,
[FG/FREPASO] had no access to resources and positions within the executive branch (either
at the local or national level)' (364). Further, Menem's neoliberal reforms shrunk federal and
subnational budgets and bureaucracies, such that in the 1990s, the political system provided
less money and fewer jobs than in previous decades. Consequently, FREPASO's founders
could not use state resources as a substitute for party organization, as politicians in some
contexts have done. The FG and FREPASO also lacked strong ties to the economic elite.
Before 1999, FG/FREPASO's patronage and nance thus amounted to the annual public
party fund, a relatively small sum determined by parties' share of congressional seats, and
legislative oce jobs, which FREPASO deputies and senators distributed primarily to party
members (Abal Medina 2009: 364). In short, the resources at FG/FREPASO's disposal were
`far from sucient' to mount or sustain a national electoral challenge.71
FREPASO's origins outside Argentine power structures aected the party's self-conception.
After Bord on's surprise exit from FREPASO in early 1996,72 for example,  Alvarez, in a
nationally televised press conference, stated that `we are hurt [by Bordon's exit], but...we're
very rm, very, very rm because we are leaders who developed under adversity, outside of
70E.g., Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Alberto Fujimori of Peru, Boris Yeltsin of Russia, Leonid
Kuchma of Ukraine.
71Interview with Novaro.
72The causes of Bord on's exit remain subject to debate. Meijide's former press secretary opined that Bord on
left FREPASO because despite winning the 1995 primary, he remained informally subordinate to  Alvarez
(interview with Mazzei).
311power structures, without nancial help from the big economic groups' (emphasis added).73
More generally,  Alvarez and other elites observed in interviews and press conferences that
FREPASO's origins in the opposition gave the party credibility as a party of principle.
One FG founder, in an interview, spontaneously remarked that  Alvarez deserved praise
for pursuing his political ambitions outside the government, without money, resources, or
connections.74
The electoral triumph of the Alianza in 1999 marked FG/FREPASO's rst major executive
victory, as FREPASO and its precursors previously had not elected a single governor or
mayor of a major municipality (Abal Medina 1998b: 17). Two of ten Alianza cabinet
appointments informally went to FREPASO. Chacho  Alvarez appointed Graciela Fern andez
Meijide to head the Ministry of Social Development and named Alberto Flamarique Secretary
of Labor. In 2000, FREPASO's An bal Ibarra won the mayoralty of the Federal Capital. Also
from 1999 to 2000, FREPASO elected `Mendoza's deputy governor, a senator, 30 national
deputies, 16 other city mayors, 71 provincial legislators and nearly 200 [municipal] councillors
(Abal Medina 2009: 368). Thus, in 1999 and 2000, the founders of FG/FREPASO did gain
signicant access to state resources.
Yet this came nearly a decade after the Group of Eight defected from the PJ. FREPASO
thus spent its formative decade in the opposition, without economic connections, and thus
without access to patronage and nance. It was media access alone that weakened incentives
for Chacho  Alvarez and FREPASO to invest in organization.
73`...[E]stamos dolidos por lo que ha pasado, pero...estamos rmes, muy, muy rmes porque somos dirigentes
que nos hemos construido en la adversidad, sin aparatos de poder, sin apoyo nanciero de los grandes grupos
econ omicos...' (YouTube video, `Carlos Chacho  Alvarez habla sobre la renuncia de Bordon al Frepaso',
Uploaded Feb. 12, 2011.
74Interview with Wainfeld.
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structures and polarization
Yet can we attribute FREPASO's organizational deciencies exclusively to weak incentives?
Had FREPASO's leaders invested in organization, would they have managed to build a
large party apparatus with a committed activist base? If the answer is no, FREPASO's
organizational weakness would be an overdetermined outcome. One might even suppose that
FREPASO's founders chose not to pursue organization-building, at least in part, because
they anticipated failure.
Chapter One argues that when elites choose to invest in party organization, two factors
increase the likelihood that a strong party organization with committed activists will ac-
tually result. First, access to mobilizing structures in civil society provides the means for
organization-building. Without access to external mobilizing structures, especially preexist-
ing organizations and movements with territorial reach, large memberships, and ready-made
organizational hierarchies, party-builders will nd it dicult or impossible to implant local
party networks in large swathes of territory. Second, periods of intense social polarization
and conict can contribute to organization-building and activist commitment by producing
higher causes around which masses of individuals and groups unite and sacrice their time,
labor, and even personal well-being (Levitsky et al. n.d.).
For most of FG/FREPASO's formative phase, party leaders maintained informal ties to
left unions and Marxist, Christian Democratic, and ex-Radical networks and cadres. These
groups explicitly desired inclusion in a left-wing party-building project and, jointly, claimed
human and infrastructural resources on a national scale. Moreover, despite the absence of
intense social polarization and conict in 1990s Argentina, most of the individuals in these
groups held deep-seeded anti-neoliberal convictions rooted in Marxist or traditional Peronist
backgrounds. Their common commitment to defeating Menem very plausibly could have
313fueled large-scale, sustained partisan activism.
FG/FREPASO and anti-
Menemist civil society
When the Group of Eight defected from the PJ in 1990, unions were, and had long been, the
PJ's `core constituency' (Gibson 1996). Relative to other traditionally labor-based parties in
Latin America, the PJ succeeded in preserving strong union ties despite adopting neoliberal
policies (Murillo 2001; Levitsky 2003). Still, Menem's market and scal reforms provoked a
signicant backlash within two important, PJ-aliated unions: the State Workers' Associa-
tion (ATE) and the Teachers' Confederation of the Argentine Republic (CTERA). In 1991,
a group of left-wing ATE leaders, including Germ an Abdala, Victor De Gennaro, Claudio
Lozano, and Alicia Castro, defected and formed the independent, anti-neoliberal Argentine
Workers' Confederation (CTA).75 Around the same time, the top leaders of CTERA (e.g.,
Mar a S anchez, Adriana Puiggr os, Eduardo Macaluse) and their rank-and-le supporters
broke with the PJ and became forceful, public opponents of neoliberalism and Menemism.
Because the CTA and CTERA possessed national infrastructures and mass memberships, an
FG founder referred to them as `the two big ones' (i.e., the two major anti-Menem unions)
in Argentina during the 1990s.76
The leaders of these unions expressly wished to participate in a party organization-building
eort. Germ an Abdala and Victor de Gennaro, leaders of the CTA, advocated the con-
struction of a left opposition party modeled on Brazil's labor-based Workers' Party (PT).77
CTERA leaders favored a similar, union-based, organization-building approach.78 Moreover,
75According to one intellectual, the CTA `arose as [Argentina's] most innovative union option, with the
fullest answer to the crisis of traditional unions' (interview with Mocca).
76Interview with Sigal.
77De Gennaro even earned the nickname, the `Argentine Lula'.
78Citation needed.
314the Partido Intransigente, Frente del Sur, and ex-socialist, ex-Radical, and Christian Demo-
cratic splinter groups in FG/FREPASO possessed local infrastructures and activist bases of
varying sizes (Novaro and Palermo 1998: 112-3; Castiglioni 1996), and several inuential
FREPASO leaders with roots in these networks urged  Alvarez to use them.79
Fundamentally, these unionists and left activists/elites advocated a model of gradual, organic
party development, whereby Argentina's new partisan left would forge linkages with local
civil society, nurture a strong grassroots identity, and focus on occupying espacios locales
(i.e., municipal and provincial oces) while retaining the longer-term objective of national
power. One left-wing member of the FG insisted that the CTA, CTERA, and the various
networks of left-wing cuadros associated with FG/FREPASO had the will and joint capacity
to implement the grassroots party-building model. `FREPASO', he armed `could have built
a strong organization'.80
The FG and FREPASO did establish informal links to Argentina's anti-neoliberal unions.
Several CTERA leaders joined FG/FREPASO, became important elites, and brought their
rank-and-le supporters with them (e.g., Mar a S anchez, Adriana Puiggr os, Eduardo Macaluse).
The FG also maintained `close' informal ties to the CTA for much of the 1990s, initially
through Germ an Abdala, who died in 1993, and later through leader Victor de Gennaro
(Abal Medina 2009: 363).
Yet by design, FG/FREPASO never solidied or formalized ties to the unions and organized
left. On the contrary, throughout the 1990s,  Alvarez and other party leaders deliberately and
consistently kept these actors at a distance. Although leaders such as De Gennaro wanted
unions to form the basis of FG/FREPASO, FG/FREPASO maintained `full autonomy' from
79Carlos Auyero and Eduardo Sigal, for example, both pressed  Alvarez to incorporate Christian Demo-
cratic and ex-Socialist cuadros into the party organization and capitalize on their experience with member
recruitment and activist training and education (interview with Sigal).
80Interview with Wainfeld.
315the CTA as well as CTERA (Abal Medina 2009: 365).81 FG/FREPASO never incorporated
or established formal organizational ties to Marxist cadres and splinter networks from the
UCR and Christian Democrats.
FREPASO allowed its union ties to erode completely as the party progressively tacked to
the center during the second half of the 1990s. Abal Medina (1998b) notes that `with
the party's gradual turn to the centre...the informal relations it had developed with trade
unions became confrontational on several occasions' (). For example, when  Alvarez publicly
expressed support for the Law of Convertibility and several Menem privatization policies,
Victor De Gennaro, leader of the Argentine Workers' Confederation (CTA), became `en-
raged'.82 FREPASO/CTA ties gradually weakened, and the CTA severed ties completely
when FREPASO leaders, in government amid economic crisis, refused to support a round of
CTA strikes (interview with Novaro). FREPASO's informal linkages with sectors of CTERA
remained strong for a longer period but also eroded after after the Alianza took oce (Abal
Medina 2009: 374, note 7).
In sum, throughout the formative phase, FG/FREPASO's elite founders had access to mo-
bilizing structures in civil society, composed of committed anti-neoliberal and anti-Menem
leaders and activists, and chose not to utilize them. Had they formally incorporated the
CTA, CTERA, and the aforementioned cadres/networks of Marxists, Christian Democrats,
and ex-Radicals,  Alvarez and other elites would have been less nimble, autonomous, and
ideologically exible and risen more slowly. At the same time, FG/FREPASO would have
been able to inherit a sizable and committed rank-and-le, a large number of cuadros with
political and union experience, and local infrastructure and resources (e.g., physical locales,
81According to one FREPASO member/intellectual, both FREPASO and the CTA wanted to join forces,
but De Gennaro { with the Workers' Party model in mind { wanted unions to form the basis of FREPASO.
In contrast,  Alvarez wanted the unions to be `one more actor, a partner' (interview with Novaro.
82Interview with Novaro.
316communication systems) in large parts of the national territory.
FREPASO and the failure of left
party-building in 1990s Argentina
Although the leaders of FG/FREPASO chose not to formally incorporate left unions and
sympathetic cadres and networks from left to center, these unions, cadres, and networks, by
and large, supported FG/FREPASO. To be sure, they opposed FREPASO's hypercentral-
ization and, often more, its shift to the center. Yet the rise of meteoric rise of FG/FREPASO
created a powerful incentive for them to join instead of pursuing independent party-building
projects.
It should be qualied that among leftist elites and supporters of FG/FREPASO, the above
objections did result in numerous defections over the course of the 1990s. Expressing a rep-
resentative left-wing perspective, a party founder, left-wing journalist, and eventual defector
described the party's unwillingness to advance a `radical critique of Menemism' as its `great-
est deciency' (mayor carencia).83 In late 1994, federal deputy Fernando `Pino' Solanas, one
of the FG's rst three deputies, publicly charged the FG with accepting neoliberalism and,
after the FG held its ground, left the party.
Numerous left-wing activists and supporters stopped supporting FREPASO during the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, unwilling to positively reinforce the party's succession of right-shifting
alliances and programmatic compromises. For many, FREPASO's creation of the Alianza
in 1997 constituted a decisive and unpardonable shift to the center.84 A socialist and ex-
frepasista recalled, for example, that he and other left activists `held their noses' (tragamos
83Interview with Wainfeld.
84Commenting on the formation of the Alianza, one left-wing FG/FREPASO member voiced a widely held
view: that by allying with the UCR, the FREPASO eectively expunged all left-wing content from its
platform and reduced anti-Menemism to anti-corruption (interview with Jozami).
317sapos) and supported FREPASO through 1995 and 1996 but, in good conscience, could no
longer do so after the formation of the Alianza.85 A radical FG/FREPASO elite cited pro-
grammatic dilution as the central grievance of other radical elites and supporters, and the
one that ultimately led to his own and others' departure in the late 1990s.86
Still, most of the Argentine left, for most of FG/FREPASO's electoral run, rode on the
bandwagon. Although left-wing party leaders, unionists, activists, and voters objected to
FG/FREPASO's diluted policies and closed elite structure, they possessed very little in-
dependent electoral support and, consequently, would have become politically irrelevant if
they had joined `purer' left parties or pursued party-building independently. Only the most
committed, doctrinaire leftists would support electorally marginal left alternatives and, in
eect, simply cede left vote share to the ascendant FREPASO.
FREPASO's leaders recognized and took advantage of their leverage. On occasion, they even
publicly reminded left-wing members and outside left critics that FG/FREPASO, with its
large and growing middle-class support base, did not need the radical left to succeed. One
FG/FREPASO member recalled a 1994 television interview in which Chacho  Alvarez, asked
for a reaction to radical internal critiques, stated: `Either they change [their views], or they
leave' (`O cambian o se van'). `He didn't even hold a meeting', the party member recalled.87
Despite serious objections, from internal and external left elements, to FG/FREPASO's
programmatic moderation, broad coalition-building, and underinvestment in the grassroots,
`still, where  Alvarez went, everyone went.... All the public opinion, all the media, and many
[on the left] followed him'.88 By the time leftists started defecting from FREPASO in large
numbers (1999-2001), the support of the Argentine left was the least of FREPASO's concerns.
85Interview with Scherlis.
86Interview with Jozami.
87Interview with Mocca.
88Interview with Wainfeld.
318In sum, FREPASO founders chose not to incorporate sympathetic actors in civil and political
society, but these actors supported FG/FREPASO. Thus, not only did access to media elim-
inate incentives for FREPASO to invest in organization, FREPASO's meteoric, media-fueled
ascent, through bandwagon eects, proved inimical to the formation of an organizationally
strong left alternative in 1990s Argentina. In this way, the media-based rise of FREPASO
contributed decisively to the broad failure of left party organization-building in 1990s Ar-
gentina.
319Chapter 7 Collapse by Schism: The Case of Peru's United Left
In late 1980, several months after Peru's transition to democracy, seven left-wing Peruvian
parties joined in an electoral coalition, the Izquierda Unida (IU). On creation, the IU inher-
ited a territorially extensive network of local branches and activist cadres from its constituent
parties. On the strength of left unity, base-level organization, and leaders' charisma, the IU
rapidly became a serious contender for national power. In 1983, IU leader Alfonso Barrantes
won the Lima mayoralty, Peru's second most important elected oce. In 1985, Barrantes
placed second in the presidential election, and IU candidates won a quarter of the seats in
Peru's Chamber of Deputies.
Yet unlike several mass-based new left successes,1 the IU never cohered. Despite top-down
eorts to meld the coalition's heterogeneous networks into a single party organization, the
IU, throughout the 1980s, remained a loosely knit alliance held together by a broad, vague
leftism { the coalition's only ideological common denominator { and, crucially, the shared
perception that national electoral success required left unity.
As the rst chapter argues, new parties and coalitions typically lack solid brands and the
cohesion that such brands provide. Consequently, to the extent that a party's initial unity
depends on electoral incentives or patronage, it will be vulnerable to schism and collapse, as
electoral calculations and incentives may change, and patronage resources may abruptly `dry
up'. For new parties, cohesion comes from non-material sources, which supplement electoral
incentives for cooperation and, in the case of mass-based parties, counteract the centrifugal
forces associated with internal heterogeneity.
The IU did not have any such sources of cohesion. Unlike Mexico's PRD and El Salvador's
FMLN, the IU's heterogeneous actors did not become more politically united due to shared
1Uruguay's FA, Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD, Nicaragua's FSLN, El Salvador's FMLN.
320violent struggle.2 Moreover, the IU did not have a leader with strong crossfactional ties,
which can be `indispensable' for unity in heterogeneous, mass-based parties and coalitions
(Ansell and Fish 1999). Consequently, within the IU, coalition aliation and cooperation
never trumped constituent party attachments, personal loyalties, or other organizational
subidentities.
In late 1989, a moderate faction of the IU, which included Barrantes, concluded that Bar-
rantes did not need the coalition in order to mount a competitive presidential bid. When
Barrantes and his allies reached this view, the IU lost its main source of cohesion: the shared
perception among all key coalition players that electoral success required a united left. Bar-
rantes defected and launched a highly unsuccessful independent campaign for the presidency.
Henry Pease, who replaced Barrantes as the IU's presidential candidate, also fared poorly
in the 1990 election, garnering less than ten percent of the vote. Chastened by their defeat,
and electorally marginal without Barrantes, the IU leadership disbanded, and the coalition
collapsed.
The chapter is organized in three sections. The rst sets the stage for the analysis, detail-
ing the transformations in mass civil society that occurred during the military-authoritarian
period (1968-80) and describing the transition to democracy and creation of the IU in 1980.
The second section summarizes the IU's rise and collapse over the course of the 1980s. The
third section argues that weak sources of cohesion lay at the root of the IU's collapse. Despite
inheriting a strong base-level organization from its constituent parties, the IU lacked a uni-
fying foundation (e.g., a shared history of systematic repression, a leader with crossfactional
ties) that might have counteracted internal centrifugal forces.
2Although the IU's constituent parties and most of the coalition's main elites actively participated in the
anti-regime struggles of the late 1970s, the Morales Berm udez regime did not carry out systematic repression
against the left { or other opponents. The IU did suer systematic violence at the hands of the Sendero
Luminoso during the 1980s, but { as the chapter's nal section will detail { this violence did not generate
cohesion in the coalition.
321Left-wing military rule, democratization
and the creation of Izquierda Unida
Under the military governments of Juan Velasco (1968-75) and Francisco Morales Berm udez
(1975-80), Peru experienced an unprecedented increase in the organizational scope, horizon-
tal coordination, and radicalization of the popular classes, from urban workers and peasants
to the rapidly expanding informal sector.3 A heterogeneous set of Marxist parties played a
central role in this grassroots eervescence, both as `instigators and beneciaries' (Roberts
1998: ). By the end of the 1970s, several of the country's Marxist parties had developed
powerful party organizations, with skilled, disciplined core memberships and organic ties to
the popular sector associations that had expanded and radicalized during the military era.
When the Marxist left united months after the 1980 democratic transition, the resulting
coalition, Izquierda Unida, possessed one of the largest, most ideological, and most societally
rooted organizational bases in Latin America.
Popular sector mobilization under
the Velasco regime (1968-75)
From 1968 to the mid-1970s, Peru's left-wing military regime, headed by General Juan Ve-
lasco Alvorado, carried out a set of pathbreaking reforms, with long-term consequences for
the country's economy and civil society. Statist, redistributive, and nationalist, the Velasco
regime expropriated and nationalized a slew of foreign multinational companies, including all
major producers/exporters of primary commodities (e.g., petroleum, steel, minerals, sh).
The regime also nationalized the banking and airline sectors. To protect domestic industry
from foreign competition, the regime erected trade barriers and tightly restricted the inow
of foreign capital and investment. Finally, the regime `[broke] the back of oligarchic power'
in Peru (Roberts 1998: 215), seizing most of the country's largest rural estates and redis-
3`...[T]he period of military government from 1968 to 1980 witnessed rapid growth in the scope, density,
militancy, and horizontal coordination of popular organization.' (Roberts 1998: 213).
322tributing nearly ten-million hectares of land to roughly 300,000 peasant families (La Serna
2010). By the early 1970s, the Velasco regime had expropriated more property than all its
Latin American contemporaries, save the Cuban revolutionary regime.4
To ensure the consolidation of its reforms, the Velasco regime also set about organizing the
popular sectors, from labor and the peasantry to informal urban workers, in a new, pro-
gressive associational structure. For decades, the traditionally populist APRA had opposed
left-wing reform and maintained union support through co-optation and clientelism. The
Velasco regime sought to usher in a new period of labor corporatism in which urban and
rural unions would cooperate with the government in the service of a left-wing, state-led
developmental agenda.5 The regime actively promoted the formation, legal recognition, and
expansion of `parallel', non-aprista unions, oering inducements such as collective bargaining
rights, employment guarantees, and subsidies (Collier and Collier...).
These eorts quickly reaped dividends. Progressive unions in the agricultural, mining, indus-
trial, and service sectors expanded and proliferated during Velasco's initial years in oce.6
By 1972, the main confederation of non-aprista urban working-class unions, the General
Peruvian Workers' Confederation (CGTP) had surpassed the aprista Peruvian Workers'
Confederation (CTP) as Peru's largest trade association (Roberts 1998, pp. 210, 215).7
After progressive popular sector unions and associations began to enter the opposition,8 the
4See also McClintock 1981; Lowenthal 1983.
5In 1971, the regime created SINAMOS (El Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilizaci on Nacional), which
brought together ten government agencies in charge of mediating dierent regime/union relationships.
6Peruvian primary and secondary industry expanded rapidly during the late 1960s to mid-1970s due to the
military government's import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies.
7CTP: Confederaci on de Trabajadores Peruanos.
8Progressive associations entered the opposition in protest of the Velasco regime's corporatist restrictions
on civil society autonomy and { from 1973 onward { its poor economic stewardship. Peru entered a severe
recession in 1973.
323Velasco regime, increasingly dominated by reactionary elements,9 redirected legal and nan-
cial inducements to a second set of independent union confederations, spanning the industrial
(CTRP), educational (SERP), and agricultural (CNA) sectors. Although conceived as mod-
erate, state-allied counterweights to the CGTP (urban working class), SUTEP (teachers),
and CCP (peasants),10 these confederations did not weaken or neutralize the growing pro-
gressive union opposition. Consequently, the Velasco regime's second unionization initiative
achieved little save another increase in the scope of Peruvian labor organization.
The Velasco regime also promoted new forms of popular organization in Peru's informal sec-
tor (Cameron 1994; Stokes 1991). Heavy industrialization and urbanization throughout the
middle of the 20th century had given rise to a massive rural-urban exodus and concomitant
explosion of informal poor on Peru's urban peripheries. Between 1940 and 1984, the popu-
lation of shantytowns (pueblos jovenes) outside Lima proper, for example, increased nearly
twentyfold, from 120,000 to over two million (Roberts 1998: 212). Through nancial and
other means, the Velasco regime stimulated the creation of new, non-aprista neighborhood
associations in Peru's urban peripheral communities, causing these associations to spike in
number and size during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In addition to their direct consequences on income distribution and civil society,11 Velasco's
policies had a crucial indirect eect: to strengthen Peru's partisan left. Peru's left parties
took the lead role in organizing and mobilizing many of the non-aprista popular sector
associations favored by the Velasco regime (e.g., the CGTP, SUTEP, CCP). Moreover, when
left parties did not do the `instigating', they still beneted from the regime's independent
9The ascendance of reactionary forces within the regime resulted, in part, from Velasco's own deteriorating
health and consequent marginalization.
10SUTEP: Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores en la Educaci on del Per u. CCP: Confederaci on Campesina
del Per u.
11Velasco's policies had two main direct eects: rst, to redistribute a signicant portion of Peruvian agricul-
tural and industrial capital to low- and middle-income workers; second, to strengthen popular civil society,
especially urban and rural unions but also neighborhood associations on the urban periphery.
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orts, as non-aprista popular civil society organizations provided fertile terrain for the
recruitment of party cuadros and the development of new grassroots linkages.
The relevant left parties belonged to four informal, competing categories: (1) The Peruvian
Communist Party (PCP), aligned with the Soviet Union and closely linked to the CGTP;
(2) The Union of the Revolutionary Left (UNIR), controlled by the PC del P-Patria Roja
(henceforth Patria Roja), a Maoist PCP splinter party dominant within Peru's largest teach-
ers' union, SUTEP, and also linked to certain peasant organizations (Cameron 1994: ); (3)
Trotskyist parties, primarily FOCEP and APS, with ties to the more radical sectors of Peru's
organized labor and peasant classes (Roberts 1998: 204-9); and (4) A group of more recently
formed and internally diverse parties, including (a) the Revolutionary Vanguard (VR, est.
1965) a heterogeneous Marxist party linked to the Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP),12
neighborhood associations, and key primary-sector unions, especially the `powerful miners'
union' (Cameron 1994: 28); (b) the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR, est. 1962);
and (c) several smaller radical parties active in the shantytowns of Lima and other major
Peruvian cities (e.g., Arequipa).
Popular sector coordination and radicalization
under the Morales Berm udez regime (1975-80)
Although not by design, the policies of the Morales Berm udez successor military regime
helped unify and radicalize many of the grassroots forces unleashed under Velasco. In mid-
1975, amid a protracted economic downturn and with Velasco's health in decline, General
Francisco Morales Berm udez and a group of fellow market-oriented, democratizing reformers
staged a coup and assumed power. To combat the economic crisis, the Morales Berm udez
regime quickly implemented IMF-stipulated austerity measures and halted or rolled back
12The VR and other peasant-oriented Marxist parties pursued large-scale rural mobilization initiatives during
the Velasco era, fostering the creation of local and regional peasant associations and helping develop the
CCP into a national organization (Roberts 1998: 212).
325hallmark Velasco-era social and economic reforms. The Peruvian economy continued to
falter, however, with aggregate growth in 1975 and 1976 ranging from negative to anemic.
The combination of unpopular policy reversals, austerity, and the persistence of economic
stagnation brought social unrest to crisis levels in 1977 and 1978. Although union opposition
to the military regime had gathered some steam under Velasco,13 union/military relations
became openly `antagonistic' under Morales Berm udez (Collier 1999: 116). Organized pop-
ular opposition culminated in a set of ve general strikes (paros generales),14 beginning in
July of 1977 and lasting until the 1980 transition. The CGTP and Communist Party (PCP)
led the strikes, supported by a set of smaller, more radical unions and parties (Roberts 1998:
210-11).
Peru's striking urban unions acted as the `fulcrum' of a broader radicalization in popu-
lar civil society, which encompassed the country's peasantry and ballooning informal sector
(Roberts 1998: 214). Although Velasco's agrarian reform had delivered a virtual `death blow'
to Peru's landed oligarchy and redistributed land to hundreds of thousands of peasants in
the country's coastal highlands, more than eighty percent of Peruvian peasants { the vast
majority located outside the coastal highlands { continued to operate as `landless tempo-
rary workers' (McClintock 1981: 63). Thus, under Morales Berm udez, peasant land claims
and grievances remained largely unaddressed, providing `fertile social terrain' for continued
radicalizing eorts on the part of Peru's peasant-oriented Marxist parties (e.g., the VR).
Simultaneously, Peru's still rapidly expanding informal sector began to reverse its longstand-
ing vertical dependence on the state, becoming more organized at the base level, horizontally
13`...[M]any unions chafed at the corporatist restrictions associated with participation in prot-sharing `in-
dustrial communities' planned by the military reformers, and as smaller parties of the radical Left increased
their inuence in the labor movement, more militant organizations emerged which rejected any form of
collaboration with the government (Roberts 1998: 210).
14The strikes spanned the natural resource, industrial, and service sectors.
326integrated, and militant. Although nonclientelistic shantytown organizations had expanded
and proliferated under the Velasco regime, the vertical structure of informal sector inter-
est representation persisted due to Velasco's corporatist policies, which tied neighborhood
associations to the state through SINAMOS and other mediating bodies.15 Under Morales
Berm udez, Peru's mushrooming urban periphery became a central arena { the central arena
in some cases (PARTY NAMES NEEDED) { for left party consciousness-raising and anti-
regime mobilization. In the late 1970s, left parties unied hundreds of local shantytown
associations, pressing them to act as a unied sector, and radicalized them, exhorting them
to beef up their material demands and reject any government restrictions on their indepen-
dence. The oppositional character of Peru's neighborhood associations intensied as the
Morales Berm udez presidency progressed, and the twin scourges of recession and austerity
exacerbated living conditions on Peru's urban periphery.
Democratization and the
creation of Izquierda Unida
The Morales Berm udez regime did not employ heavy repression in order to quell or discourage
dissent. Throughout the contentious late 1970s, the regime did not murder a single member
of the political opposition or resort to forms of systematic soft repression such as mass arrest
or exile.16 Authoritarian `hostility' to Peru's organized popular sectors took the form of
anti-union economic and labor policies,17 mass political rings and blanket strike bans in
response to the paros generales,18 and select expulsions of radical left leaders, such as that of
15Before the military-authoritarian period, these associations had pursued access to basic public services
(e.g., water, sewage, electricity) through one-on-one relationships with relevant state agencies and public
(often aprista) ocials.
16Even the comparatively soft bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Brazil (1964-85) and Uruguay (1971-83)
arrested and exiled thousands of political opponents.
17The Morales Berm udez regime reversed employment security guarantees, eliminated industrial coopera-
tives, and placed restrictions on unionization and collective bargaining (Roberts 1998: 243).
18In response to the rst general strike in mid-1977, the legislature under Morales Berm udez ordered the
ring of 5000 striking laborers (Roberts 1998: 243).
327VR leader Javier Diez Canseco. One moderate IU member and scholar emphasized that even
at the height of Peru's social unrest in the late 1970s, the Morales Berm udez government
exiled very few individuals and did not close a single university.19
Far from crushing the opposition, the Morales Berm udez regime responsed to the anti-regime
mobilizations of the late 1970s by accelerating the process of political liberalization.20 Mil-
itary ocials set a constituent assembly election for June of 1978, to be followed by presi-
dential and congressional elections in early 1980. In the 1978 constituent assembly elections,
conicts over program and candidacies prevented left-wing electoral unity. Five separate left
parties/coalitions competed and, riding the wave of anti-regime popular mobilization, fared
well in collective terms, jointly winning thirty percent of the assembly seats.
By 1980, however, full democratization loomed on the immediate horizon, causing popular
mobilization and public discontent to taper o and therefore weakening electoral prospects
for the left. Meanwhile, conicts over program and candidacies continued to prevent left
unity. In the April 1980 general election, which marked Peru's full transition to democracy,
Peru's fragmented left parties suered a signicant setback, jointly winning only fourteen
percent of the Chamber seats. In the presidential contest, CCP peasant leader Hugo Blanco,
the top left-wing candidate (among several), placed a distant fourth with four percent of the
vote.21
The left's 1980 setback led directly to the creation of the United Left. Faced with the prospect
of political marginality in Peru's nascent democracy, and with key municipal elections {
including, crucially, the Lima mayoral race { set for November of the same year, most of
Peru's major left parties joined in an electoral coalition, the Izquierda Unida, to contest
19Interview with Panchi.
20The Morales Berm udez government had promised political liberalization since assuming power.
21Fernando Bela unde Terry of the center-right Acci on Popular (PA) prevailed, with APRA and the Christian
Democrats nishing second and third, respectively.
328national power. Only Hugo Blanco and his Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT)
opted not to join.22 Although the IU's parties disagreed on a range of strategic and policy-
related questions, they shared a basic democratic, left-wing orientation. In dierent ways,
and to varying degrees, they all sought to reduce poverty and inequality by working within
Peru's democratic system.
The IU's constituent parties numbered seven in total: the PCP; UNIR, dominated by Patria
Roja; Popular Democratic Unity (UDP), which primarily consisted of the VR and MIR
and would later form the basis of PUM (est. 1984);23 the Revolutionary Communist Party
(PCR), a VR splinter; FOCEP; APS; and the velasquista Revolutionary Socialist Party
(PSR) (Roberts 1998: 223).24 Several left-wing Christian elites led by Henry Pease and
Rolando Ames also joined the coalition.
Organizational inheritance
and the IU's mass base
To a greater extent than most new grassroots parties in Latin America, the IU was born
with a strong base-level party organization (or, more precisely, set of party organizations).
Whereas Uruguay's Broad Front (FA), Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD, and El Salvador's FMLN
all drew heavily from civil society and other preexisting structures in order to develop their
party organizations,25 the IU simply agglomerated preexisting parties. Several of the IU's
constituent parties (PCP, Patria Roja, UDP (later PUM)) had large organizational bases. In
22In the late 1980s, the IU's PUM absorbed much of the PRT.
23The Partido Unicado Mariateguista, or Unied Mariateguista Party, was founded in May of 1984, on the
belief that only an umbrella party uniting Peru's major Leninist parties, particularly the VR and MIR,
could make a political impact at the national level (Roberts 1998: 229).
24The PSR consisted mainly of former Velasco-regime military ocials and technocrats.
25The FA built on urban unions, the PT on industrial unions and Catholic grassroots communities, the FMLN
on a powerful guerrilla organization, and the PRD on neighborhood organizations and rural unions. (The
PRD also drew heavily from preexisting PRI networks and the Mexican Socialist Party. In this respect,
its grassroots development more closely resembles the IU's. For details on the PRD, see Chapter Four.)
329coalition, they boasted a sizable collective membership and territorially extensive network of
local party structures.26 Moreover, unlike the movements and civil society organizations that
anchored Latin America's other new left parties, the IU's constituent parties did not have to
redirect members and resources (i.e., to `feed' in) to a new, separate political organization.
Instead, the IU, on creation, inherited a sprawling army of ready-made party activists, many
with decades of experience, organized in disparate networks across the Peruvian territory.27
Although precise membership counts do not exist, one coalition elite { without specifying
the date { estimated the constituent parties' total membership at 25,000,28 with UNIR
(overwhelmingly Patria Roja) counting 8000 members, the PCP 6000, the UDP/PUM (VR,
MIR) 6000, the PCR 2000, the PSR 2000, and FOCEP 1000.29 Two party members { one
an elite in the independent bloc, the other a UDP/PUM activist and intellectual { provided
higher estimates of approximately 50,000.
For several reasons, these membership gures understate the organizational strength of the
IU. First, the IU quickly acquired tens of thousands of additional de facto members: active,
core supporters who lacked partisan aliation (the no partidarizados). Only in 1989 would
the IU attempt to incorporate these individuals formally through a mass recruitment drive.
In the drive, the coalition leadership registered and distributed IU cards (carnetes) to 150,000
individuals, `no more than 50,000' of whom belonged to the IU's constituent parties.30 Given
Peru's population size at the end of the 1980s (approximately 20 million), the 150,000 mem-
ber gure indicates that the IU, nine years after formation, had a member/population ratio
26In this respect, the IU's constituent parties did not signicantly dier from the civil society organizations
associated with other new grassroots parties and coalitions in the region.
27TANAKA QUOTE...
28Along similar lines, Seawright (2012) nds survey evidence that IU constituent party members in 1980 and
1985 jointly numbered in the tens of thousands.
29The interviewee did not estimate the membership of APS.
30Interview with Pease. The leadership also organized lower-level congresses in 400 districts, resulting in the
election of 3000 delegates to the national congress.
330of nearly one percent. In proportional terms, this places the IU between Brazil's PT and
Mexico's PRD on a comparable timeline.31
Second, the IU's main constituent parties { PCP, Patria Roja, PUM (VR/MIR) { were
`exclusive', explicitly vanguardist organizations composed of disciplined, skilled operatives
(Roberts 1998: ).32 Inuenced by `the foquismo of the 1960s', they recruited selectively,
incorporating individuals { `largely...intellectuals and labor or student activists' (Roberts
1998: 228) { with demonstrated ideological commitment, high levels of political education,
and/or proven ability to mobilize popular sectors, train cuadros, etc. As a result, the typical
IU constituent party member/branch possessed a higher capacity for political mobilization
and a more single-minded commitment to political activism than the typical member/branch
of most major parties in Latin America, new and old, enduring and short-lived.
Third, due to constituent party linkages with the movements and sectoral associations that
had blossomed under military rule, the IU had an exceptionally strong civil society `periph-
ery'. Seawright (2012), for example, uses ample survey evidence to demonstrate that local
IU party leaders in 1980 and 1985 had stronger ties to civil society organizations than local
leaders in Venezuela's AD and COPEI, Argentina's PJ and UCR, and Peru's APRA and
Acci on Popular (PA) { all parties with deep societal roots, at least historically.33
In sum, the IU quickly developed a territorially extensive set of local party structures and
activist networks, some formally incorporated, others not. With a skilled, disciplined mem-
bership core and a large, powerful civil society periphery, the IU boasted one of the strongest
organizations on the Latin American new left.
31The PT was smaller (Chapter Four), the PRD larger (Chapter Five).
32The smaller parties { APS, FOCEP, PCR, PSR { `were little more than political vehicles for a prominent
personality' (Roberts 1998: 228).
33To measure civil society linkages, Seawright asked a representative sample of party leaders to detail their
organizational memberships, donations, and meeting attendances in particular years.
331Alfonso Barrantes, compromise
choice for coalition leader
From the beginning, the IU's constituent parties belonged to two informal factions, some-
times called the reformist and revolutionary blocs (Cameron 1994).34 The reformist bloc,
comprising the PCP, PCR, and PSR, prioritized winning elections and using elected oce
to raise taxes on the wealthy, increase social transfers and public services, and implement
statist, pro-labor economic policies. Leaders of the revolutionary bloc, comprising the VR
and MIR (later the PUM), UNIR, FOCEP, and APS, tended to regard electoral success
as important but secondary to popular mobilization and the pursuit of radical change by
extraelectoral { though non-violent35 { means (e.g., strikes, mass protests).36
The IU's third main faction, the `independent' (Cameron 1994) or `neutral' (Roberts 1998)
bloc, consisted of elites { led by left Christians Henry Pease and Rolando Ames (Roberts
1998: 254) { who lacked constituent party aliations and organizational bases, tended to-
ward reformist (as opposed to revolutionary) ideological positions, but remained separate
from the reformist bloc in order to promote coalition integrity `by playing a leadership role'
and developing internally democratic decision-making and conict settlement procedures.37
34Others use the terms `pragmatists' and revolutionaries (Seawright 2012) or 'moderates' and `radicals'
(Roberts 1998).
35`The revolutionary Left positioned itself in opposition to both the repression of the armed forces and the
terrorist violence of the Shining Path' (Cameron 1994: 26; emphasis added). As will be discussed below,
radical sectors of the PUM (los libios) and allied parties developed a small, armed organization toward
the end of the 1980s.
36Cameron (1994) writes that for parties in the revolutionary bloc, `winning elections was secondary to
controlling the United Left coalition and turning it into a `genuine mass front' to seize power through class
struggle' (78). According to Roberts (1998), leaders of the PUM { the strongest party in the revolutionary
bloc { believed that the radical left `had to develop a more pragmatic, short-range political and economic
program with concrete tasks and realistic goals, even if the ultimate objectives and the teleological vision
of socialist revolution remained intact' (Roberts 1998: 229). In a La Rep ublica interview nearly a decade
after the democratic transition and the IU's formation, Jorge Hurtado Pozo (a.k.a. `Ludovico'), a top
leader in Patria Roja, stated that `elections should not be the priority; it is necessary to mobilize the
struggle of the workers' (La Rep ublica, June 29, 1989, cited in Cameron 1994: 93).
37`The independent bloc had greater ideological anity for the reformists. But its members were also
332Although the revolutionary bloc `controlled the strongest party machines' in the IU (Cameron
1994: 228), none of the coalition's blocs possessed broad-based, national electoral appeal.
The independent elites did not have national constituencies, and the revolutionary and re-
formist parties, while capable of mobilizing aliated civil society organizations, had `[limited]
popularity with the broader electorate' (Cameron 1994: 79). Roberts (1998) observes that
`[a]fter years of semiclandestine struggle, most of the leaders of the Left were not widely
recognized as public gures, and they did not have the organizational, nancial, or human
resources required to mobilize electoral support on a national scale' (Roberts 1998, p. 228).
In advance of the 1980 municipal elections, leaders of the three blocs, by consensus, desig-
nated left independent Alfonso Barrantes { a former aprista and labor lawyer with socialist
roots { as the coalition's president and candidate for the Lima mayoralty. Barrantes proved
an acceptable compromise choice for two reasons. First, his leadership and presence atop the
IU ticket brightened the coalition's national electoral prospects. With his `common touch
and popular appeal', Barrantes could `attract electoral support that far surpassed that of
the organized constituencies of the left parties', particularly among the `oating, lower-class
mass electorate' (Roberts 1998: 248).38
Second, and crucially, Barrantes' `political independence...enabled him to be a consensus
gure' (Roberts 1998: 248; emphasis added). Barrantes did not belong to any of the IU's
constituent parties or have an organizational base of his own. His assumption of leadership
committed to playing a leadership role in the IU, strengthening internal democracy, and avoiding division'
(Cameron 1994: 79).
38Although the 1960s and 1970s had seen a major increase in the scope of organized, mass-based civil
society, the electoral preferences of the urban informal poor, who generally `lacked any stable partisan
or ideological identity', determined most major national elections (Roberts 1998: 248). The partisan left
had made inroads in Peru's urban peripheral communities, especially during the late 1970s, but the IU's
organizational roots among the amorphous, `oating, lower-class mass electorate' remained fragmented
and circumscribed (Roberts 1998: 248). The heterogeneous, atomized informal sector posed inherent
challenges for horizontal coordination (Cross 1998), and the members of this large class tended to hold
relatively conservative views (Cameron 1994).
333would not tilt the organizational balance of power within the IU against any of the coalition's
main parties.39 Thus, the coalition's leading caudillos in the revolutionary and reformist
blocs (e.g., Javier Diez Canseco (VR, PUM), Alberto Moreno (UNIR, Patria Roja), Jorge
del Prado (PCP)) were willing to back him.
The IU's rise and fall
The combination of left unity under the IU banner and Barrantes' presence at the coali-
tion's helm reaped immediate electoral dividends. In the November 1980 municipal election,
Barrantes placed second in the Lima mayoral race, and the IU won thirteen of Peru's 188
mayoralties, nine in the pueblos jovenes encircling the Lima metropolitan area (Roberts 1998:
223). Yet the election only marked the beginning of the IU's rapid rise. As voters cast their
ballots in late 1980, Peru stood on the brink of radical social and economic changes that
would enable the IU to build quickly on its initial gains and, in a few short years, contend
seriously for national power.
Economic crisis and civil war gripped Peru in the earliest stages of its new democracy. From
1980 to 1983, economic conditions in the country deteriorated, culminating in a severe bout
of stagation. In 1983, national income contracted by over ten percent, while ination
more than doubled. During the same period, violent terror swept through the Peruvian
countryside. In early 1980, the Maoist guerrilla organization, the Shining Path,40 emerged
and declared war on Peru's democratic regime, from the coercive apparatus that secured it
to the political class that participated in it. In just a few years, the Shining Path { and,
39In Roberts' (1998) formulation, Barrantes' independence `shielded the coalition's presidency from intra-
mural partisan squabbles and prevented any single party from exercising hegemony within the coalition'
(248).
40The Shining Path originated as a small, Ayacucho-based Maoist party, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso. In
early 1980, the PCP-SL created a guerrilla organization and launched its armed struggle.
334secondarily, the MRTA41 { inicted thousands of casualties, many terroristic in nature,42 on
army and police, military-backed armed peasant groups (rondas), and local political activists
and leaders. The Sendero also expanded well beyond its original Ayacucho base, establishing
a strong, active presence in several neighboring departments (e.g., Huancavelica, Apurmac).
Predictably, the political opposition beneted from the Bela unde administration's (AP) gov-
ernment's weak economic performance and apparent inability to stem Sendero's tide. In the
1983 municipal elections, voters harshly rebuked the president's center-right Popular Action
(AP), APRA's traditional competitor and Peru's only other institutionalized national party.
In the nal tallies, APRA and the IU eclipsed AP, relegating it to a distant third.43 Although
APRA emerged the overall victor, the IU nished a close second, with almost thirty percent
of the nationwide municipal vote total. The IU won thirty-three mayoralties, and Barrantes
was elected mayor of Lima, an oce second only to the presidency in power and prestige.
Between the 1983 municipal and 1985 general elections, acute stagation gave way to anemic
growth, and the civil war intensied. The military beefed up its counter-insurgency eorts,
while the Sendero continued to commit large-scale murder and occupy new swathes of rural
territory. As in 1983, the dual problems of economic weakness and violent turmoil favored
non-incumbents in the 1985 general election. The IU consolidated its status as a major
electoral force, winning nearly a quarter (twenty-four percent) of the seats in Peru's Chamber
of Deputies. Barrantes placed second in the presidential contest with twenty-one percent of
the vote, losing to APRA's Al an Garc a. The general election, Peru's second since the 1980
transition, marked the apex of the IU's trajectory. Less than ve years after formation, the
41Movimiento Revolucionario T upac Amaru, a smaller Marxist insurgency, never counting more than a few
hundred members.
42As the Peruvian civil war escalated during this period, Sendero cells increasingly resorted to mass civilian
murder, exacting revenge on rural communities associated with peasant rondas and, more broadly, seeking
to weaken civil society and minimize organized opposition in the countryside (Yashar 2005).
43FIGURES NEEDED.
335coalition had emerged as APRA's main competitor and one of the most signicant left-wing
electoral forces in Peruvian history.
Beyond general anti-incumbent eects, the IU's rapid rise from 1980 to 1985 stemmed from
four factors. First, left unity increased support among left-leaning voters. With the left in
broad coalition, ideologically sympathetic voters no longer considered it a `waste' to vote
for the partisan left, unlike in previous eras characterized by left fragmentation.44 Second,
Barrantes' external appeal broadened the IU's electoral base, particularly among the informal
poor (Roberts 1998: 248). Third, the IU had begun to develop a modestly successful brand
in the broader electorate through the local grassroots work of its activists and the innovative
municipal governance strategies of its mayors (especially the strategy of autogesti on, or
community self-management, implemented in Lima shantytowns such as Villa El Salvador.45
Fourth, and crucially, the IU's organizational strength gave the coalition a major advantage
in the electoral `ground game'. To a degree rivaled only by apristas, IU candidates across the
country could draw on activist networks, both independent and constituent party-aliated,
to wage eective ground campaigns.
Remarkably, however, after the April 1985 general election, Barrantes and the IU participated
jointly in only one more electoral cycle: the November 1986 municipal elections. In this
cycle, IU candidates for mayor and municipal councilor fared relatively well in the country's
secondary and tertiary cities,46 but Barrantes, a mere eighteen months after almost winning
the presidential election, lost his reelection bid for the Lima mayoralty.
Coalition members generally ascribe Barrantes' 1986 loss to a combination of structural
44The fragmentation and marginality of left parties had caused left-leaning voters to abstain or support
centrist candidates who, unlike any individual left party, stood a reasonable chance of winning.
45For a theoretical discussion of party brand formation, see the introductory sections of Lupu (n.d.). See
Samuels (n.d.) and Holland (n.d.) for more specic discussions of how local grassroots activity (Samuels)
and eective subnational governance (Holland) enable parties to establish brands.
46FIGURES NEEDED.
336economic factors, which beneted APRA at the IU's expense, and Barrantes' imprudent
detachment from his own campaign. Peruvian GDP skyrocketed from 2.3 percent in 1985
to 9.2 percent in 1986, following the implementation of heterodox economic reforms by the
recently inaugurated, left-tacking Al an Garc a (APRA) administration. The positive short-
term eects of these economic reforms increased the popularity of Garc a and APRA, at
the IU's electoral expense. APRA's successful shift to the left `crowded' the IU, rendering
the coalition's program less distinctive within the Peruvian party system and thus partially
diluting the IU brand.47
Coalition members have also faulted Barrantes himself, who { in their telling { opted not
to participate in his own reelection campaign, except at the `nal hour'. On one insider's
account, Barrantes wrongly believed that Al an Garc a would support his candidacy, not
that of fellow aprista Jorge del Castillo, and that he would coast to victory as a result.48
Only on the day of the election, when it had become clear that Garc a would remain `on
the fence' publicly, and that Barrantes trailed in the initial tallies, did Barrantes lead a
series of belated campaign rallies. Jorge del Castillo prevailed by a three-percent margin.49
Reecting on Barrantes' loss, the same insider quoted above simply rued: `No hizo campa~ na'
(`[Barrantes] did not campaign').50
In fact, Barrantes' politically costly behavior in the 1986 Lima mayoral campaign was not a
random event. His behavior formed part of a pattern and stemmed from a deeper problem in
the IU: the tenuous and weakening state of his relationships with the coalition's key secondary
leaders. Since the IU's creation in 1980, Barrantes, as president, had not played an integrative
47For a discussion of programmatic dierentiation and brand dilution, see Lupu (n.d.).
48Barrantes and Garc a were personal friends, and on numerous accounts, the two had considerable ideological
anity during the late 1980s (interview with Pease).
49`Opposition Protests Lima Mayoral Election', Associated Press, November 10, 1986.
50Interview with Pease.
337role or engaged heavily in internal aairs. He had frequently missed CDN meetings, for
example, and kept face-to-face meetings with secondary elites to a minimum.51 During
the 1983 and 1985 electoral seasons, the relatively moderate Barrantes had unilaterally
dismissed programmatic demands from the IU's revolutionary bloc, informally circumventing
the CDN's consensus requirement on the (correct) assumption that revolutionary leaders
would not defect for electoral reasons.
After the 1985 general election, these dynamics intensied. In the lead-up to the 1986 mu-
nicipal elections, the revolutionary PUM, UNIR, and FOCEP { joined by the historically
reformist PSR { demanded that the CDN approve a set of programmatic guidelines before
electing the IU's candidate. Barrantes bristled at the demand and `threatened' not to run
(Herrera 2002: 318), whereupon journalistic rumors abounded that the CDN would elect
independent Henry Pease instead of Barrantes. Although Pease `dismissed' these rumors
(Herrera 2002: 318) and Barrantes ultimately accepted the IU candidacy, Barrantes { as
discussed above { ran an extremely lackluster campaign. Moderate allies pleaded with Bar-
rantes to attend IU rallies { and also mounted independent eorts to mobilize the votes of
non-party-aliated, left-leaning voters { but to no avail.
In the years after the 1986 election, Peru fell into a dual economic and social crisis with
no equal in contemporary Latin American history. The short-term economic boom of 1986-
7, in which national income spiked by 9.2 (1986) and 8.5 (1987) percent, gave way to an
equally abrupt and severe recession. The Peruvian economy contracted by 8.3 percent in
1988 and 11.7 percent in 1989. Simultaneously, the Garc a administration's monetization of
Peru's ballooning public debt generated extreme hyperination. In 1988 and 1989, Peru's
ination rates reached an astonishing 1722.6 and 2776.6 percent, respectively, eclipsing the
contemporaneous hyperination rates in Argentina and Brazil.
51Interviews with Panchi, L opez, and Pease.
338Severe recession and hyperination coincided with { and, to a substantial degree, contributed
to { a violent escalation of the Peruvian civil war. Over the second half of the 1980s, tens of
thousands of additional Sendero operatives, state combatants, political activists and elites,
and Peruvian civilians (overwhelmingly indigenous peasants) died in assassinations, combat,
and attacks (including acts of terrorism). By the decade's end, the war had produced many
tens of thousands of casualties, and the Sendero had established a strong and active presence
in most of the Peruvian territory, including the department of Lima and all neighboring
departments save Ica.52 The Sendero had also developed numerous cells in Lima's pueblos
jovenes and was encroaching on the city center. Ordinary citizens widely assumed that the
Sendero would soon defeat the state and establish a Maoist dictatorship.
The IU's fatal schism occurred in this troubled context, as party leaders conicted over
the proper response to Peru's dual social and economic crises. IU moderates prioritized
democratic consolidation and hence the use of overwhelming force to halt and reverse the
Sendero's relentless onslaught. If Peru's democracy fell, the partisan left would return to
`square one', its decade-long electoral eorts proven for naught. On the moderate view,
defeating the Sendero required economic stability in addition to the systematic use of force.
Thus, moderates also favored the IU's participation, with APRA, in a national accord for
short-term stabilization, to be achieved through a massive injection of domestic and foreign
private capital (Roberts 1998: 250).
Leaders in the revolutionary bloc rejected the moderate position, stating that an accord with
APRA and an endorsement of market-based stabilization reform would irreparably compro-
mise the coalition's status as a genuine political alternative and potential agent of radical
change. The IU's radical elites also staked out a middle position between the state and insur-
gency. Javier Diez Canseco (PUM), Alberto Moreno (Patria Roja), and others condemned
52These are Ancash, Hu anuco, Pasco, Jun n, and Huancavelica.
339the Sendero but refused to single it out,53 arguing that the Peruvian democratic regime had
also committed terrorist atrocities in the course of its anti-Sendero military campaign,54 and
that both the Sendero and the state deserved the IU's public moral opprobrium.55
More broadly, the leaders of the revolutionary bloc held that Peru's economic crisis and
civil war evidenced the societal disconnect, exhaustion, and inherent instability of Peru's
`bourgeois' democratic institutions. On their diagnosis, Peru's situation required a deeper
democratic project in which popular sectors, in proportion to their numbers, would remain
organized at the grassroots level, retain the capacity for mass mobilization, and use their
collective power to control political decision-making. Fundamentally, the IU's revolutionary
leaders continued to regard mass mobilization as primary and electoral success as secondary
(although important). Only the former, in their view, could produce an appropriate shift in
the balance of power and policy outcomes between Peru's elite and popular sectors.
With Popular Action still in tatters and Al an Garc a's APRA government in free fall, the
IU had a major electoral opportunity in the April 1990 presidential election. In anticipation
of the election, the IU planned its rst national congress for January of 1989, to be held
in Huampan , a small city in Lima province. Importantly, in the two to three years prior
to the congress, Barrantes' internal IU linkages had begun to erode completely. In 1987,
he resigned as IU president, thus abdicating formal leadership responsibilities and severing
formal ties to the coalition. While remaining informally aliated with the IU, he began
to display a `general detachment from the political process', both internally and externally
(Roberts 1998: 255). By the 1989 congress, Barrantes played a marginal, irregular role in
the coalition's internal aairs.
53Only the most radical elites in the coalition adopted morally ambiguous positions with respect to the
Sendero and, more broadly, the use of violence to advance political objectives (interview with L opez).
54Some radical organizations within the IU (e.g., the PUM's libios) created their own armed organizations to
defend against hostility from `both sides': the Sendero and the state (interviews with Munive and L opez).
55Interviews with L opez and Munive.
340The congressional delegation passed a statute requiring internal primaries for the selection
of future presidential candidates. Although the recently registered no partidarizados (non-
party-aliated IU members) generally supported Barrantes' candidacy and outnumbered
party-aliated IU members two to one (at a minimum), the leaders of the revolutionary
bloc, with their active, disciplined party networks, `dominate[d] the internal organization of
the United Left' and might have been able to mobilize the most votes in an internal election
(Cameron 1994: 228). Barrantes desired the IU candidacy but calculated that he could lose
the primary, given his ideological alignment with IU moderates on the internally polarizing
issues of Sendero and the APRA accord.
In order to sideline the PUM and UNIR, the two key actors in the revolutionary bloc,56
Barrantes pressed the leaders of the independent bloc (e.g., Henry Pease) to reject the IU
primary statute, back his candidacy, and in doing so cause the revolutionaries either to exit
the coalition (Cameron 1994: 79) or to support him under pain of electoral marginality.
Independents Pease, Rolando Ames, and their allies, however, viewed coalition integrity as
essential to the left's electoral viability57 and to the neutralization of the Sendero.58 Thus,
they refused Barrantes' request, exhorted left unity and universal respect for IU statutes,
and pleaded with Barrantes in public and private to participate in the IU primary, pledging
to support his bid. This time, however, Barrantes, instead of caving in to internal demands,
followed through on his threat. With a network of allies, Barrantes rejected the independents'
counter-oer and defected from the IU in late 1989, creating a new electoral vehicle, Acuerdo
Socialista, and mounting a separate general election campaign.
As the leaders of the independent bloc had warned, Peru's newly disunited left fared ex-
56The PUM was especially strong: `The PUM quickly established itself as the strongest party on the Peruvian
Left, with the broadest base of electoral support and the greatest participation in grassroots social work'
(Robert 1998: 229).
57The PUM and Patria Roja, they feared, would leave the coalition if they acceded to Barrantes' request.
58Roberts (1998: 324, note 59).
341tremely poorly in the April 1990 general election. Henry Pease, Barrantes' replacement as
the IU presidential candidate, received less than ten percent of the vote. Barrantes' Acuerdo
Socialista ticket fared worse, with Enrique Bernales winning just 2.2 percent of the vote in
his bid for the Lima mayoralty and Barrantes placing fth in the presidential contest, with
a mere 4.8 percent. Marginal absent Barrantes, the IU disbanded, most elites and activists
resuming their constituent party work or independent political careers.
Alfonso Barrantes and the
roots of IU's fatal schism
What factors lay at the root of the IU's collapse?
Successful party-building is a rare event that does not occur automatically. Chapter One em-
phasizes that despite numerous major attempts at left-wing party-building in Latin America
since the onset of the third wave { and many more minor attempts, which never `took o'
{ only a handful of new left parties have succeeded. As Chapter One details, the diculty
stems in part from the challenge of organization-building in the contemporary era. The rise
of mass media has weakened the incentive for contemporary elites to invest in organization
(e.g., the leaders of Argentina's FREPASO). Yet it also stems from the challenge of unifying
large, heterogeneous party organizations and elite networks. To be durable, new parties and
coalitions need sources of cohesion, not just strong organizations.
The IU had a strong organization but failed to avert schism. Most scholars have attributed
the IU's split, fundamentally,59 to internal ideological polarization between moderates and
59The same scholars also assign limited explanatory weight to the IU's poorly designed, weakly institutional-
ized procedures for resolving internal conicts. One might stress procedural design, arguing that that the
IU National Leadership Council's (CDN) consensus requirement, which granted veto power to each con-
stituent party and to the independent bloc through their representatives, limited the scope and eciency
of collective decision-making. The IU's constituent parties and independent bloc each had two members
342radicals. Roberts (1998) points to the `competing projects of IU moderates and radicals'
(246-57), Seawright (2012) to the `strategic dilemma that proved impossible to resolve' be-
tween the IU's `pragmatic and revolutionary components' (43).
In contrast to these authors, the current chapter does not identify internal ideological polar-
ization as a central, structural impediment to new party cohesion. Although low cohesion
presupposes some degree of internal polarization, observed variation in internal ideological
polarization, in and out of Latin America, does not correlate with variation in the cohesion
levels of new parties/coalitions. The dierences across Marxist ideologies, for example, are
relatively small, but radical left parties and factions in individual Latin American coun-
tries have rarely cohered, instead demonstrating extreme sectarianism and fragmentation.60
Equally, many new parties have overcome the `problem' of ideologically polarized, regionally
dispersed, and well-organized factions. Most successful new left parties in Latin America, for
example, including Brazil's PT (Chapter Four) and Mexico's PRD (Chapter Five),61 cohered
despite comparatively high levels62 of ideological and regional heterogeneity and frequent,
intense conicts over program, strategy, and resources.
on the CDN. This arrangement gave the smaller, radical IU parties (e.g., FOCEP, APS) disproportionate
decision-making power in the coalition. Cameron (1994) and Roberts (1998) focus on institutional strength
(i.e. compliance), emphasizing that the IU's key players never unconditionally accepted a set of collective
decision-making rules, formal or informal. Roberts summarizes that the IU had `no real organizational
structure...of its own' (228), Cameron that `the IU had no institutional mechanism for resolving internal
tensions' (95). Nevertheless, these authors treat the design and strength of the IU's collective decision-
making institutions as secondary { and, to some degree, endogenous { to internal polarization. The CDN's
consensus requirement stemmed from deep factional divides at the IU's creation and constituent party
leaders' consequent refusal to submit, unconditionally, to the programmatic dictates of their counterparts.
On Roberts' account, the IU's `eorts to develop a more institutionalized structure following the coalition's
rst national congress in 1989 were negated by political polarization' (228, emphasis added).
60During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the left parties that created the IU possessed `a shared Leninist
ideology' but still functioned as `small, secretive, and conspiratorial groups' characterized by `extraordinary
levels of fragmentation and factionalism that exacerbated the parties' sectarian attributes' (Roberts 1998:
228-9).
61Others include Uruguay's Frente Amplio, El Salvador's FMLN, and Nicaragua's FSLN.
62Unlike the radical left, these parties and coalitions encompassed fully distinct ideologies, ranging from
orthodox Marxism to welfare-state capitalism.
343With some exceptions (e.g., FMLN, FSLN), new parties do not inherit solid brands or the
stable electoral incentives for cohesion that such brands generate. Thus, heterogeneous new
parties and coalitions that cohere almost always depend on special, `nonmaterial' sources
of cohesion (Levitsky and Way 2013). Chapter One identies (1) shared, violent struggle
against the political enemy and (2) a leader with strong crossfactional ties as the two main
conditions for robust unity in heterogeneous new parties.63 The IU did not cohere because
it lacked both sources of cohesion.
Violence and the IU
As the rst section argues, the Peruvian left did not suer signicant repression under the
right-tacking Morales Berm udez military regime. After democratization, however, the IU
did suer systematic (and somewhat targeted) violence at the hands of the Sendero. Over
the course of the 1980s, the Sendero murdered thousands of political elites and activists. The
Maoist insurgents reserved particular hostility for the democratic left. Scholars summarize
that the Sendero `considered the IU...its greatest enemy' (Burt 2006: 38) and `saved its most
strident attacks for leftist organizations' (Gorriti 1999: 11), including the IU's constituent
parties, independent activist networks, and aliated popular associations and movements
(Burt 2006: 38). Although precise gures do not exist, interview evidence suggests that in
total, the Sendero murdered several hundreds of left activists, union leaders, and local left
leaders.64
Crucially, however, the IU's diverse strands originally cohered in opposition to Peru's cen-
63As Chapters 4-5 argues, both sources of cohesion helped oset internal polarization, exibilize decision-
making procedures, and increase elite compliance and cooperation in Mexico's PRD during the 1990s. The
PT's (Brazil) early cohesion derived from less generalizable sources. Although Lula da Silva's crossfac-
tional ties played a role, the PT's formal, institutionalized, and amendable system of internal proportional
representation { a rarity among new parties { also may have contributed decisively (Chapter 2-3).
64Interviews with L opez and Munive.
344ter/right democratic establishment, not to the Sendero.65 Thus, while struggling against a
far left insurgency in the eld of violent conict, the IU faced parties/politicians to the right
in the eld of electoral competition. Shared violent struggle generates cohesion in new parties
by uniting heterogeneous forces in electoral opposition to the hostile actor in question (e.g.,
a party or regime) (Chapter One). The hostile party or regime simultaneously functions as
the enemy in combat and the enemy in electoral competition. Since the IU's enemies in `war'
and electoral competition were distinct { indeed, polar opposites { the Sendero's systematic
violence against the IU did not act as a source of cohesion within the electoral coalition.
To illustrate through contrast, El Salvador's FMLN had, in approximately the same actor,
both a wartime enemy and an electoral enemy. As a guerrilla organization, the FMLN acted
as the central anti-regime belligerent in the brutal Salvadoran Civil War (1979-92). Over
more than a decade of war, the country's right-wing military regime invested considerable
military resources and political/diplomatic capital in the destruction of the FMLN, eventu-
ally killing over 10,000 of its members. Upon demobilizing and becoming a political party,
the FMLN, in electoral competition, faced the right-wing ARENA, an authoritarian suc-
cessor party (or post-authoritarian party), `founded and led by high-prole incumbents and
supporters' (Loxton n.d.: 2) of El Salvador's outgoing right-wing military regime.66
Mexico's PRD had an analogous, although less extreme, formative experience. The het-
erogeneous PRD coalesced in 1989 around the goal of wresting power from Mexico's PRI
regime, which stood in the way of the left's two fundamental goals: democracy and economic
equality (see Chapters 4-5). After Cuauht emoc C ardenas (future leader of the PRD) lost
the 1988 presidential election due to massive PRI fraud, the PRD was born, and the PRI
65In fact, as the previous section details, IU leaders diered sharply on the proper public response to the
Sendero.
66The quoted segment is from Loxton's (n.d.) denition of post-authoritarian party, or authoritarian suc-
cessor party.
345leadership immediately set out to cripple Mexico's new left party through continued fraud,
various forms of bribery and corruption, and the large-scale murder of activists. From the
late 1980s to the mid-1990s, PRI-aliated maas in the Mexican left's regional bastions
murdered hundreds of PRD activists.67 Thus, during early development, the PRD faced, in
the PRI party/regime, both a violently hostile enemy and an electoral opponent.
To recap, in contrast to parties like the FMLN and PRD, the IU confronted distinct enemies
in the elds of violent combat and electoral competition. Consequently, the violence borne
by IU activists and local leaders did not generate cohesion within the electoral coalition.
The weak authority
of Alfonso Barrantes
`Alfonso Barrantes was accepted as a candidate
but disputed as a leader.' { Aldo Panchi
`The IU was not founded by Barrantes. Barrantes
was called to preside over it.' { Marcial Rubio
Like the leaders of other heterogeneous, mass-based new left parties in Latin America (e.g.,
Lula of Brazil's PT, C ardenas of Mexico's PRD), Alfonso Barrantes generated a minimum
of cohesion in the IU through external electoral appeal. Because `there was...no individual
party on the [l]eft...strong enough to compete with APRA on its own', the IU, throughout the
1980s, `remained heavily dependent on the populist appeal of Barrantes to garner electoral
support beyond the organizational networks of the coalition's vanguard parties' (230). For
the IU's secondary leaders and constituent party activists and supporters, electoral depen-
dence on Barrantes provided a strong incentive against defection, overriding the ideological,
tactical, and resource conicts that often dominated internal coalition aairs. For the en-
tirety of the IU's existence, no major constituent party or secondary IU leader ever defected
67During the same period, the PRI did not murder a single activist in the conservative PAN.
346from the coalition.68
External appeal alone, however, is a relatively weak source of cohesion. A new party leader
with mass appeal may abruptly lose favor in the electorate or, unable to manage internal
conict, defect from his or her party. In order to foster a more robust unity, leaders must
combine external appeal with strong crossfactional ties (Chapter One). New parties and
coalitions, especially mass-based ones like the IU, agglomerate movements, organizations,
and elite networks with distinct regional identities, diverse and conicting ideologies, and {
because they have little or no shared history of bargaining and cooperation { weak horizontal
linkages. In such a party, a leader who represents the party rather than a specic faction, and
who functions as the `hub' of the party network by nurturing strong relationships (`spokes')
and actively arbitrating between the major factions may be `indispensable' for the resolution
of conict, the forging of compromise, and hence the prevention of debilitating schisms
(Ansell and Fish 1999).
As Chapters Three and Five argue, the early PT's tend^ encias and the early PRD's corri-
entes had unique group identities and personal loyalties, adhered to doctrines ranging from
orthodox Marxism to welfare-state capitalism, and spanned the territories of the region's two
largest countries. Both Lula and C ardenas played active, central, and largely conciliatory
roles in the resolution of internal conicts and the negotiation of complex agreements. Their
positions at the dynamic center of complex { and, often, otherwise disconnected { internal
negotiations enabled them to mediate between the conicting preferences of moderates and
radicals, broker compromises, and enforce discipline when necessary.
Judging from the PT and PRD examples, the IU, given its deep internal divisions, would
have beneted from the presence of a `unier'69 who stood above faction and functioned
68It was Barrantes' exit that led to the IU's collapse.
69Pease used this term in an interview with the author.
347as the hub of the sprawling, heterogeneous coalition, with links to both the constituent
parties and the less-organized no partidarizados.70 Yet as Ansell and Fish (1999) observe,
`demand' (or need) for a leader with crossfactional ties does not guarantee `supply' (293).
As discussed earlier, the main parties that united to create the IU (e.g., PCP, UNIR, UDP)
refused to empower rival parties in the coalition by designating a rival elite (e.g., Jorge del
Prado, Alfonso Moreno, Javier Diez Canseco) as coalition leader. They designated Barrantes
as leader precisely because Barrantes, in addition to enhancing the IU's national electoral
prospects, lacked ties to any of the IU's constituent parties.
As importantly, Barrantes, once the IU's ocial leader, did not build or nurture strong
crossfactional linkages. On the contrary, as the previous section demonstrates, Barrantes'
general detachment from coalition aairs, the stubborn, dismissive, and threatening tenor
of his (infrequent) negotiations with secondary leaders of the revolutionary bloc, and his
near-total disengagement with the IU from 1987 onward all indicate that, throughout the
IU's formative phase, Barrantes did not have strong ties across the coalition's major factions.
In sum, because Barrantes did not play an active role as internal broker and arbiter, the
IU did not have a linchpin of unity in their leader. In contrast, within the PRD and PT,
leaders with strong crossfactional ties played a major role in generating cohesion. Thus, just
as the IU did not have the `benet' of violent shared struggle against the political enemy,
the coalition did not have a leader who played the essential transactional role assumed by
leaders like C ardenas and Lula. In recognition of the contrast between Lula and Barrantes,
specically, one top IU leader (with personal connections to Lula and the PT) summarized
that Lula, unlike Barrantes, was a `unier' { that there was a `huge distance' between the
70Barrantes recognized the IU's divisions and the challenge they posed, remarking in a 1983 interview with
La Rep ublica that `[t]here is a series of diculties we must overcome; diculties arising from natural
dierences in ideology, methodology, even habit, dierences of party and leader, personal dierences' (La
Rep ublica, August 12, 1983; cited in Adrianz en ed. 2011: 225).
348two leaders.71
Although scholars and members widely agree that Barrantes did not establish solid ties
across the IU's major factions,72 they attribute Barrantes' weak crossfactional ties to elite
personalities, on the voluntarist extreme, or to structural polarization within the coalition.
Regarding the former, IU members and outside analysts have emphasized the personal qual-
ities of important individuals in the coalition, mainly (though not exclusively73) Barrantes.
Barrantes has been described as an `aloof' and `ambivalent' leader `who...preferred a direct,
personal mandate from the electorate over party or organizational mediation' (Roberts 1998:
256; emphasis added) and displayed `contempt for the political process within the United
Left' (Cameron 1994: 81). In interviews and published testimonies, moderate and radical IU
members have frequently noted Barrantes' caudillismo and autocratic tendencies; his dismis-
sive attitude toward the revolutionary bloc; his insecure and distrustful nature;74 his practice
of demonstrating secondary leaders' subordination through `perverse games' (e.g., showing
up late for CDN meetings or missing them on dubious grounds);75 and, more specically, his
personally fraught relationships with key leaders and rivals such as Javier Diez Canseco76
and Henry Pease.77
71Interview with Pease.
72In interviews, scholars and IU members, without exception, attested to or spontaneously cited Barrantes
disengagement and/or his conictual relationships with key IU leaders. See also Cameron (1994) and
Roberts (1998).
73See nal two footnotes of this paragraph.
74Interview with Panchi.
75Interview with Panchi.
76On repeated occasions in interviews, IU members spontaneously referred { or, with prompting, attested { to
Barrantes' hostile relationship with Javier Diez Canseco, the IU's top revolutionary leader and, according
to one member, the `second most important' elite in the party (interview with Munive.). A moderate IU
elite recalled, for example, that Barrantes and Javier Diez Canseco `hated' each other, met only when
necessary (e.g., CDN meetings), and maintained a physical distance during meetings { all for reasons that
went beyond ideology (interview with L opez). The interviewee largely attributed the rivals' mutual animus
to personality dierences and even class resentment, as Barrantes came from a humble background, Diez
Canseco from a wealthy, elite Lima family.
77Observers have characterized Barrantes' relationship with Henry Pease, the top leader of the independent
349Other scholars emphasize structural impediments to the development of crossfactional ties
within the IU. In particular, they argue that internal polarization made it impossible for
Barrantes to accommodate the conicting preferences of the coalition's moderate and dog-
matic, sectarian sectors. Roberts (1998) writes, for example, that `the moderate and radical
agendas were mutually negating', and that `[r]adical demands polarized the political arena
in ways that made it impossible for Barrantes to perform an integrative role' (254, emphases
added).
Their merits notwithstanding, the above-cited studies do not place the Barrantes/IU rela-
tionship in proper comparative perspective. While one cannot rule out internal polarization
or the personal characteristics of key elites as decisive factors in the IU's collapse, a compari-
son of the IU to similar new left successes in Latin America provides ground for skepticism {
or at least qualication.78 Personal animosities, especially between rival leaders, exist in the
vast majority of political parties, successful and failed. Latin America's new left successes
are no exception.79 Equally, the degree of polarization within the IU seems unlikely to have
prevented the emergence of a leader with strong crossfactional ties. As discussed above, Lula
and C ardenas led comparably heterogeneous parties and still managed to establish strong
bloc and Barrantes' own Lieutenant Mayor from 1983 to 1986, as `dicult' (Herrera 2002: 319) and `tense'
(interview with  Angel Delgado, UNIR elite, in Herrera 2002: 319) due to contrasting leadership styles
(Barrantes' populist to Pease's technocrat), an unspoken battle of egos, and the accumulation of mutual
(often petty) grievances. One member of the revolutionary bloc opined that Barrantes, `jealous' of Henry
Pease's administrative capability and irritated by Pease's credit-claiming, `took great pains to demonstrate
[Pease's] subordination' in public (interview with  Angel Delgado, UNIR elite, printed in Herrera 2002: 319-
20). For example, although mayors and lieutenant mayors traditionally shared the stage at public actions
and ceremonies, Barrantes routinely seated Pease ostage (Herrera 2002: 319-20). Along similar lines, one
of Henry Pease's aides recalled that even when Barrantes and Pease worked in the same oce, Barrantes
did not communicate directly with Pease, instead using a middleman to relay important communications
(interview with Panchi).
78On a qualied account, leaders' crossfactional ties depend roughly equally on several factors, which include
the degree of internal polarization, leaders' personalities, and also { as will be argued below { leaders'
backgrounds and resulting levels of internal legitimacy.
79See Chapters Three and Five, which discuss some of the personal tensions in the early PT and PRD (e.g.,
between Cuauht emoc C ardenas and the PRD's second most important elite, Porrio Mu~ noz Ledo).
350crossfactional ties. More broadly, leaders have developed strong crossfactional ties in com-
parably polarized parties and coalitions both in Latin America (e.g., Menem in Argentina's
PJ)80 and across the world (e.g., Helmut Kohl of the West German Christian Democrats,
Fran cois Mitterand of the French Socialists, Gennady Zyuganov of the Russian Communists
(Ansell and Fish 1999)).
The dissertation's comparison of Lula, C ardenas, and Barrantes suggests that leaders' prior
backgrounds have an important, potentially decisive impact on their ability to forge cross-
factional linkages. Unlike Barrantes, Lula and C ardenas both entered their parties with
personal histories that gave them immediate, broad-based internal legitimacy. Lula's in-
ternal legitimacy stemmed from his active leadership role in the popular struggle against
Brazil's right-wing military-authoritarian regime. Lula `cut his teeth' in the PT's feeder
unions, and, in his capacity as autonomous union leader, became widely recognized on the
left as a defender of the working class, a symbol of regime deance, and a principled voice
for political and economic equality in Brazil. Similarly, C ardenas had broad-based moral
authority on the Mexican left before the creation of the PRD. Although C ardenas came
from both the PRI and the Mexican elite, he bore the legacy of his father, General L azaro
C ardenas, a champion of the popular sectors and the most potent symbol of left-wing ideals
and policies (e.g., economic nationalism, land reform, public education) in twentieth-century
Mexico. In keeping with this legacy, C ardenas governed independently of right-wing PRI
orthodoxy as governor of Michoac an (1980-6), defected from the PRI in 1987 in protest of
the party's neoliberalism, and mounted an independent (and nearly successful) challenge in
the 1988 presidential election.
In terms of prior background, Barrantes diered sharply from Lula and C ardenas. He entered
the IU without a personal history conducive to broad-based legitimacy, or moral authority, on
80See Levitsky 2003: 169-77
351the Peruvian left. Barrantes was a virtual unknown prior to the IU's creation, and as detailed
earlier, his selection as IU leader had much to do with his populist appeal and potential as
a candidate, but nothing to do with his connections or legitimacy within the coalition. One
member of the revolutionary bloc summarized that in a highly organic coalition, `[Barrantes]
was as ungrassroots (inorg anico) as could be',81 IU radicals who dominated the coalition's
internal organization viewed Barrantes as a populist without left-wing credibility or a serious
commitment to popular civil society. The most internally powerful and respected leader in
the IU, Javier Diez Canseco, openly described the IU as an electoral front united around a
caudillo, Barrantes.
The contempt ran both ways. Barrantes derisively described Peru's left as an olla de grillos
(`pot of crickets'), in which disorder, confusion, and mutual incomprehension prevailed, and
petty quarrels prevented unied action. Barrantes remarked in a late 1980s interview that he
could not respect left elites who held forth in university halls but seemed unable to produce
concrete proposals for developing Peru.82
In sum, both Barrantes and radical left leaders regarded the IU with as an electorally neces-
sary marriage of convenience and little more. While IU members commonly cite Barrantes'
extraordinary ability to connect with voters, none describes him as the coalition's `moral
leader' { a phrase often invoked to describe Lula in the early PT and C ardenas in the early
PRD. In a useful formulation from an independent IU member, Barrantes was `accepted as
a candidate but contested (discutido) as a leader'.83
Chapters Three and Five argue that internal legitimacy gave C ardenas and Lula a `leg up' in
the forging of crossfactional ties. Both leaders leveraged their moral authority to build and
81`Era de lo m as inorg anico' (interview with Munive.)
82Citations needed..
83Interview with Panchi.
352nurture linkages across the heterogeneous, largely disconnected PT tend^ encias and PRD
corrientes { something other leaders might have failed to do. Barrantes' lack of internal
legitimacy placed a constraint on relationship-building within the IU, most starkly and evi-
dently between Barrantes and the leaders of the revolutionary bloc. Because Barrantes did
not `come in' with comparable ideational resources, establishing crossfactional ties posed a
greater challenge for him than for leaders such as C ardenas and Lula.
* * *
To recap, violence did not generate cohesion within the IU, and the coalition did not have a
leader with strong crossfactional ties. Consequently, save the shared perception that electoral
success required left unity, there was little to counteract the heterogeneous coalition's natural
centrifugal forces. At the end of the 1980s, this shared perception changed. On Roberts'
(1998) account, the electoral consequences of a schism `were poorly understood by both sides'
(254).84 Radical leaders seemed to overestimate their ability to win external votes without
the populist Barrantes at the head of the ticket, and Barrantes { in the words of one insider
{ had come to believe that he was `el due~ no de los votos' (`the owner of the [left] votes]').85
With the electoral incentive for unity gone, the IU did not have any sources of cohesion.
Barrantes defected, and the IU collapsed, never to be rebuilt.
84See also Cameron (1994: 93).
85Interview with Pease. Barrantes' allies, the interviewee, stated, `made him believe that he was the owner
of the votes' (interview with Pease).
353Chapter 8 Conclusion: Overview, Shadow
Cases, Research Implications
This dissertation began with a simple claim: although political parties play an indispensable
role in representative democracy, we continue to know relatively little about the conditions
for successful party-building. Most of the classic literature on Western Europe and the US
examines how cleavages, access to patronage, and electoral rules shape emerging party sys-
tems, passing over the more fundamental question: Under what conditions do stable parties
and party systems emerge in the rst place? Drawing from this literature, a portion of the
early scholarship on party-building in third-wave polities assumed that stable party systems
would follow, with relative ease, from democratic competition, social cleavages, and the right
electoral rules. When outcomes fell short of these expectations, scholars began to empha-
size structural impediments to party-building in the third-wave era such as the neoliberal
consensus and growth of mass media. In fact, however, third-wave party-building outcomes
varied widely. While in many new democracies, social cleavages, electoral engineering, and
democratic competition did not give rise to strong parties, in numerous others, strong new
parties did take root.
The Latin American new left provides an ideal setting for examining this variation. Most
Latin American countries democratized during the 1980s and 1990s, shared a basic insti-
tutional framework (presidentialism, PR), and possessed similar social characteristics and
cleavages (inequality, large informal sectors). In some of these countries, attempts at left
party-building failed, while in others, new left parties took root. Drawing on evidence from
fourteen months of interviews and archival research in Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Argentina,
this project has oered the rst systematic comparison of party-building success and failure
on the Latin American new left.
The dissertation has argued that most new parties do not survive because they do not build
354strong organizations composed of committed activists. As a result, they do not withstand
early crises. Paradoxically, parties with strong organizations and committed activists are
more likely to form under conditions of adversity. Oce-seekers with low access to state
resources and mass media have an incentive to do the dicult work of organization-building.
Intense polarization and conict (e.g., civil war, mass political mobilization) generate com-
mitted activists by producing the higher causes that spur individuals and groups to collective
action.
Although party organization is the primary determinant of new party durability, organization-
building entails internal heterogeneity, thus bringing the risk of fragmentation and schism.
Preventing fragmentation and schism poses a challenge for new parties, as new parties tend to
lack both solid national brands, which provide electoral incentives against defection, and in-
stitutionalized procedures for decision-making and conict resolution. The book has argued
that strong party leaders can play a decisive role in preventing fragmentation and schism
in new parties. By combining electoral coattails with unquestioned internal authority, a
strong party leader can substitute for a brand and set of institutionalized decision-making
procedures.
Comparing the PT, PRD,
FREPASO, and IU
To illustrate the above claims, the book has provided four analytic narratives of new left
survival and collapse. So far, save minor asides, the book has treated these four cases sepa-
rately, attempting to trace out, in depth, the causal mechanisms at work in each individual
case. An explicit comparison of these cases, however, provides additional analytical leverage.
In particular, it is instructive to compare (1) the PT, PRD, and FREPASO on the causes
and eects of strong party organization, and (2) the PT, PRD, and IU on the causes and
eects of strong party leaders.
355Strong party organization:
the PT, PRD, and FREPASO
Chapters Two and Four showed that Brazil's PT and Mexico's PRD, shut out of the state
and media for the rst decade of their existence, depended on organizational strength to
achieve initial electoral progress. They built their organizations by drawing human and
infrastructural resources from sympathetic civil society actors: in the PT's case, the Marxist
left, Catholic left, and new unions, and in the PRD's case, the extraparliamentary social
left, the traditional Marxist left, and defecting PRD structures.
Chapter Six shows that FG/FREPASO, throughout the 1990s0, lacked access to state re-
sources and also, in order to build an organization, could have inherited signicant hu-
man and infrastructural resources from civil and political society: the CTA, CTERA, and
cadres and networks of Marxists, Christian Democrats, and ex-Radicals. Yet the leaders
of FG/FREPASO, in particular Chacho  Alvarez, had the opportunity to build a national
constituency rapidly, through media appeals. The meteoric, media-based rise of a national
opposition party or politician almost certainly could not have occurred in 1980s Brazil or
1990s Mexico. Thus, only elite access to media appears to distinguish FREPASO from the
PT and PRD, evidencing the critical relationship between media access and organization-
building.
In addition to illustrating the causal relationship between media access and organization-
building, the comparison between the PT, PRD, and FREPASO evidences the critical im-
portance of organizational strength for new party survival. As detailed in Chapters Two and
Four, both the PT and PRD, like FREPASO, faced at least one major electoral disappoint-
ment or setback during the formative years. In 1982, the PT expected a strong performance
in the Chamber and a Lula victory in S~ ao Paulo, but instead won a paltry 3.5 percent of
the Chamber vote, while Lula placed a distant fourth. In 1991, the PRD expected to make
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stead lost seats. Then, in 1994, C ardenas lost in a landslide, deating the collective hope
that had animated perredistas since the PRD's founding { that of rescuing the stolen 1988
presidency for C ardenas and the left. The PT's and PRD's early crises { and, in the PRD's
case, the 1991 crisis especially { dashed internal expectations and threatened party survival.
Yet both parties survived and rebounded due to the resilience of activist networks in the
parties' territorial bastions.
One might object that FREPASO faced a more severe crisis than the early PT or PRD. Yet
this argument would have been dicult to sustain ex ante. Argentina did face an extreme
social and economic crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and in contrast to the PT
and PRD, FREPASO was in government and thus received partial blame for deteriorating
socioeconomic conditions. Yet judging from objective electoral criteria, FREPASO's electoral
crisis was not obviously worse than the PT's and PRD's. In fact, in total absolute terms, it
was considerably less severe. After its crisis election of 2001, FREPASO remained Argentina's
third electoral force, retaining six percent of Chamber seats and, crucially, six of seventy-two
Senate seats. In contrast, the PT, in 1982, won just 3.5 percent of Chamber seats and zero
Senate seats, while the PRD, in 1991, fell to eight percent in the Chamber and won only two
of sixty-four Senate seats. Thus, in the immediate wake of their respective crises, FREPASO
retained a considerably stronger national legislative presence than the PT or PRD.
Admittedly, neither the PT nor the PRD fell as drastically as FREPASO in ocial electoral
terms. While FREPASO lost sixty percent of its congressional seats, the PT did not have
a previous electoral record, and the PRD gained two senators while falling only marginally
in the Chamber. Still, the PT and PRD drastically underperformed expectations and, in
contrast to FREPASO, could not attribute their crises to a once-in-a-generation exogenous
shock.
357Strong party leadership:
the PT, PRD, and IU
Just as a comparison of the PT, PRD, and FREPASO helps illustrate the causes and eects
of strong party organization, a comparison of the PT, PRD, and IU helps demonstrate the
sources and consequences of strong party leadership. During their formative periods, the
PT, PRD, and IU were left fronts composed of heterogeneous, well-organized factions: in
the PT, the tend^ encias, in the PRD, the corrientes, and in the IU, the constituent parties.
The PT, PRD, and IU all coalesced around a charismatic leader with more external appeal
than the party or coalition could otherwise command. For all three fronts, the leader's
coattails and the possibility of winning national power provided a strong incentive against
lower elite defection. Throughout their formative periods, the PT, PRD, and IU did not
suer major defections of lower elites or factions.
Yet from the beginning, Lula and C ardenas possessed unquestioned authority within the PT
and PRD, while Barrantes clearly did not possess unquestioned authority within the IU. Both
Lula and C ardenas supplemented their unrivaled external appeal with unrivaled internal
base-level loyalty. Lula's legitimacy among base-level petistas extended from moderate to
radical sectors. In the remarkably routinized early PT, Lula formalized his unquestioned
authority through the creation of a moderate tend^ encia, the Articula c~ ao, which attracted
early petistas of all stripes, including moderate new unionists, left Catholics, and more
radical Marxists. Tellingly, in 1993, at the peak of internal moderate/radical tensions, and
just months after the PT's most extreme left tend^ encias had won the internal election for the
Diret orio Nacional and National Executive Council, Lula won the internal election for party
president by consensus. As party president, and later as the party's undisputed nominee
for the 1994 presidential race, Lula informally imposed a dose of moderation on the 1994
platform and went outside formal party channels to build relationships and alliances to the
PT's right. However begrudgingly, the PT granted him this leeway.
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enjoyed a considerable margin of autonomy. The PRD activist base came primarily from
the extraparliamentary social left and defecting PRI networks, above all the cardenista ex-
PRI network in Michoac an. At the PRD's birth, national leaders tailored PRD statutes in
order to formalize C ardenas's unquestioned authority. By informal agreement, they ruled
out inclusion of a number-two Secretary General post in the National Executive Committee
in order to avoid dualidades de poder (competing power centers).1 They also required the
CEN to vote as a bloc, so that minority elements could not easily veto C ardenas's decisions.
C ardenas imposed the radical line of democratic intransigence on the PRD during the late
1980s and early 1990s. Even as the party moderated over the course of the 1990s, C ardenas,
who remained steadfast in his radical positions, secured all of the PRD's major executive
nominations, either by informal consensus or internal primary. In 2000, C ardenas circum-
vented formal procedures in securing his nomination for the presidency. In order to expedite
the internal nomination process, he accepted another party's nomination, and the PRD, as
C ardenas anticipated, quickly named him their candidate as well.
Like Lula and C ardenas, Barrantes held leverage over elite competitors due to his unrivaled
external appeal. Yet in contrast to Lula and C ardenas, Barrantes did not command the
unrivaled loyalty of the IU base. The IU accepted him as a candidate but not as a leader.
If the distinction of moral leader fell to anyone, it was to Javier Diez Canseco, the most
respected leader of the IU's radical bloc. The IU's constituent parties, which spanned radical
and reformist Marxism, never ceded decision-making authority to Barrantes. At the formal
level, each constituent party of the IU, from the coalition's inception, reserved veto power in
the National Executive Committee. In the late 1980s, as hyperination and civil war gripped
Peru, Barrantes tried and failed to impose a moderate, rmly anti-terrorist line on the IU's
1This phrase used by Andr es Manuel L opez Obrador in La Jornada in 1989. See Chapter Five.
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he accepted another party's nomination, only a small cadre of moderate independents exited
the IU with him. The IU collapsed after an abysmal performance in the 2000 presidential
election.
A comparison of the PT, PRD, and IU thus suggests that strong party leaders, by managing
internal dierences and imposing contentious decisions, can prevent debilitating schisms.
Equally, the comparison sheds light on the sources of unquestioned internal authority. The
unquestioned authority of Lula and C ardenas did not come primarily from their contingent
decisions or extraordinary leadership skills. Rather, it came from their moral and symbolic
endowments and inherited network ties. Due to dierent factors, both leaders furnished
collective incentives to party activists by embodying the founding narratives and credos
of their respective parties. Lula, the metalworker, incarnated the PT's founding myth,
which treated the PT as Brazil's rst authentically popular political expression. As the
central gure in the new unionism, Lula had worked with leaders from all three main feeder
categories, thus inheriting strong crossfactional ties on the PT's creation. As the sole bearer
of his father's legacy, C ardenas carried the PRD's revolutionary nationalism in his blood
and commanded the unconditional loyalty of PRD activists and elites from the former PRI
and social left. He used both his leverage and his base- and elite-level loyalties to establish
strong vertical and horizontal crossfactional ties during the PRD's early years.
In contrast to Lula and C ardenas, Barrantes entered the IU without strong network ties or
high moral stature. The leaders of the IU's constituent parties agreed to make Barrantes
leader precisely because he lacked ties to any of the IU's grassroots activist networks. In the
words of one radical IU members, `he was as inorganic as could be'.2 Barrantes did not play
a visible role in the mass struggles of the late 1970s, which led to the creation of the IU. He
2Author's interview with Munive.
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the internal balance of power. Far from founding the IU, Barrantes came from the outside
and `was called to preside' over it.3 Without a record of leadership in the IU's founding
struggles  a la Lula, or a rare source of inherited legitimacy and credibility  a la C ardenas,
Barrantes did not stand above other IU elites in moral stature. On the contrary, radical
leaders like Javier Diez Canseco commanded the loyalty of the IU's most powerful organized
networks. Expressing the prevailing base-level sentiment, Diez Canseco and other radical
leaders openly described the IU as a front around a populist caudillo. In Aldo Panchi's deft
formulation, Barrantes, from the IU's inception, `was accepted as a candidate but disputed
as a leader'.4
In summary, a comparison of the PT, PRD, and IU helps illustrate that in large, hetero-
geneous parties, party leaders who combine electoral coattails with unquestioned internal
authority can counteract tendencies toward fragmentation and schism. The comparison also
suggests that unquestioned internal authority is typically rooted in the leader's initial moral
stature and/or preeexisting ties to the party base.
Shadow cases: the
new left and beyond
The book's small-n comparison does not test the book's argument. Instead, it serves to
generate the main argument and probe its initial plausibility. This section goes outside the
book's small-n comparison, briey examining a few additional cases, both in and out of
sample, in order to gauge the theory's broader applicability.
Ex-guerrilla parties: El Salvador's
FMLN and Colombia's AD-M19
3This quote from Marcial Rubio. See Chapter Seven.
4Author's interview with Panchi.
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quickly achieved national electoral clout in their respective countries. El Salvador's FMLN
survived and today leads El Salvador. Colombia's AD-M19 disappeared in the early 1990s,
after just a couple of national elections. Why did the FMLN survive, while the AD-M19
collapsed?
Prior to becoming a political party, the FMLN guerrilla organization engaged El Salvador's
military in a bloody, twelve-year civil war that ended in truce. During this period, the FMLN
developed in ways that decisively contributed to its later survival as a political party. During
the civil war, El Salvador's regime was authoritarian, exclusionary, and repressive. The
need to recruit and protect soldiers impelled the FMLN to establish an extensive grassroots
presence, and the FMLN recruited soldiers and active supporters from mass-based civil
society organizations like unions, CEBs, and urban popular movements. Years of political
exclusion and violent conict selected for committed members and also generated the higher
causes that fueled the FMLN's diverse rank-and-le. The FMLN was born with a strong
organization and committed members.
The M19 (later AD-M19) was born with committed members but a weak organization. From
the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, the M19, a small network of guerrilla nuclei, raided military
supply posts, laid siege to government buildings, and, in a few instances, directly engaged the
Colombian armed forces. In proportional terms, El Salvador's FMLN { as well as Nicaragua's
FSLN { dwarfed the M19. In 1989-90, when the M19 demobilized and became a political
party, Colombia had thirty-three million citizens, fewer than one-thousand of whom M19
members. In contrast, El Salvador, in 1992, had roughly 5.5 million citizens, 15,000 of whom
were FMLN soldiers. Thus, while one in every four-hundred Salvadorans belonged to the
FMLN in 1992, one in thirty-thousand Colombians belonged to the M19 in 1990. As a
political party, the AD-M19 rapidly rose to national renown through elite media appeals,
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successive setbacks in the 1991 midterms and 1994 general election, however, the AD-M19
collapsed, never to be rebuilt.
Out-of-sample cases: Uruguay's
FA and Venezuela's LCR
Two out-of-sample left parties in Latin America, Uruguay's Broad Front (FA) and Venezuela's
Radical Cause, illustrate the book's two main arguments. The case of the FA, a new left
survivor, demonstrates the book's primary argument that adverse conditions give rise to
strong party organizations and committed activists. The story of the LCR, a case of new
left collapse, demonstrates the book's secondary argument regarding strong party leadership
and schism.
Founded in 1971, Uruguay's FA spent eleven of its rst thirteen years under military rule,
with zero access to public oce, very little access to media, and the pervasive threat of arrest
and exile. In clandestine opposition to military rule, and in anticipation of post-transition
elections, the FA, during the 1970s and early 1980s, established a national network of local
nuclei, drawing on its connections to opposition civil society, especially the CNT, Uruguay's
national union confederation. Political exclusion and repression selected for committed ac-
tivists, and intense polarization between the military regime and the opposition generated
the higher causes that united and collectively motivated the heterogeneous FA base. When
Uruguay democratized in 1983, the FA claimed a strong organization and committed activist
base, key ingredients for survival.
Also founded in 1971, Venezuela's Radical Cause (LCR) spent the rst two decades of its
existence on the margins of a powerful, societally rooted Venezuelan party system (AD,
COPEI). Like Brazil's PT in the S~ ao Paulo industrial belt, the LCR drew from iron and
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organization. After twenty years as a regional party, the LCR, in the early 1990s, rose
to national prominence by establishing ties to Caracas unions and picking o disaected
former AD supporters. Party leader Andr es Vel asquez won twenty-two percent of the 1993
presidential vote and, absent fraud, likely would have won more.
Yet like Alfonso Barrantes in Peru's IU, Vel asquez was a moderate in a party dominated
by radicals, possessed greater external appeal than any LCR elite, but did not hold un-
questioned internal authority. The latter distinction fell to radical leader Pablo Medina.
In 1988, competing radical and moderate currents had emerged within the LCR. The rst,
led by Medina, favored military revolt and popular mobilization. The other, led by Andr es
Vel asquez, favored the electoral route to social transformation. A series of `bitter recrimina-
tions' between velasquistas and medinistas followed on the LCR's humiliating performance
in the 1995 regional elections (Buxton 2001: 178). In February of 1997, months before the
1997 general election, internal conicts resulted in Medina's defection from the LCR to create
the PPT (Patria Para Todos). Medina's exit eviscerated the LCR base, as Medina departed
`with...the bulk of the movement' (Buxton 2001: 178-9). Both the LCR and PPT became
marginal and joined alliances with larger electoral forces.
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